Aeyon Cho v. Dae-Young Jeong - Concurring ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AEYON CHO, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9608-CV-00257 6, 1997
June
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
) INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL PURSUANT TO
v. ) RULE 9, T.R.A.P., FROM THE
) KNOX COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
)
)
)
DAE-YOUNG JEONG, )
) HONORABLE BILL SWANN,
Defendant-Appellant.) JUDGE
For Appellant For Appellee
JAMES M. CRAIN JEAN MUNROE
Knoxville, Tennessee Knoxville, Tennessee
LAURA RULE HENDRICKS
Eldridge, Irvine & Hendricks
Knoxville, Tennessee
OPINION
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1
We granted the application of Dae-Young Jeong (Husband)
for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9, T.R.A.P., to
consider whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction
to grant his wife, the plaintiff Aeyon Cho (Wife), an absolute
divorce.
On December 20, 1995, Wife filed a complaint seeking a
divorce from Husband on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
and inappropriate marital conduct. Wife’s complaint was met by
Husband’s motion to dismiss, in which he asserted that the trial
court “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction to award a divorce
between these two non-domiciliaries of Tennessee.” The trial
court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
Husband raises a number of issues that can be
encapsulated into three questions:
1. Does Wife’s nonimmigrant status under
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) preclude her, as a
matter of law, from establishing a domicile
in Tennessee?
2. Does the evidence preponderate against
the trial court’s determination that Wife had
the requisite intent to establish a domicile
in Tennessee?
3. Did Wife enter this country and does she
remain in this country based on false
statements to the United States immigration
authorities or the trial court so that
equitable principles bar her divorce action?
I. Facts
2
The parties are citizens of the Republic of Korea.
Their child, Min-gu Jeong, was born in Korea on October 6, 1994.
He too is a citizen of Korea. Wife entered the United States as
a nonimmigrant alien. At all relevant times, her alien status
was defined either by subsection (i) or by (ii) of 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(F):
(i) An alien having a residence in a foreign
country which he has no intention of
abandoning, who is a bona fide student
qualified to pursue a full course of study
and who seeks to enter the United States
temporarily and solely for the purpose of
pursuing such a course of study at an
established college, university, seminary,
conservatory, academic high school,
elementary school or other academic
institution or in a language training program
in the United States, particularly designated
by him and approved by the Attorney General
after consultation with the Secretary of
Education, which institution or place of
study shall have agreed to report to the
Attorney General the termination of
attendance of each nonimmigrant student and
if such institution of learning or place of
study fails to make reports promptly the
approval shall be withdrawn, and (ii) the
alien spouse and minor children of any such
alien if accompanying him or following to
join him.
Wife initially entered the United States pursuant to subsection
(ii) of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(F). At the same time, her
husband entered this country pursuant to subsection (i). When
Wife entered this country, she “was required to attest that she
had a residence in the Republic of Korea, to which she intended
to return when her husband’s course of study was completed.”1
1
The bulk of the facts set forth in the first paragraph under the
heading “Facts” were admitted by Wife when she failed to respond to Husband’s
request for admissions. See Rule 36, Tenn.R.Civ.P.
3
The statement of evidence filed pursuant to Rule 24(c),
T.R.A.P. provides as follows:
Ms. Cho testified that she and [Mr. Jeong]
were married on Christmas, 1993, and shortly
thereafter came to the United States so that
[her husband] could pursue his studies at the
University of Tennessee. She stated that she
had remained here all of her married life.
She testified that all of her family were in
“her country” (i.e., The Republic of Korea);
that neither she nor [her husband] had a
separate residence in the Republic of Korea,
and that she had no property or belongings in
the Republic of Korea. She testified that
she desired to make Knoxville her home, that
she has friends in Knoxville, that she was
involved in a church (Greystone Presbyterian
Church), that she had acquired a driver’s
license, a credit card, and a social security
number, that she has leased an apartment
under a six month lease, which was renewable
at the end of that term, that she has applied
for a “F-1" visa (i.e., for non-immigrant
status as defined [in] 8 U.S.C.
1101(15)(F)(i)). . . . She testified that if
she returned to Korea, [her husband’s]
parents would immediately obtain custody of
her minor son. She testified that she had
established a relationship with local
doctors, . . . . She further testified that
she had established a “relationship” with
Child & Family Services, . . . She testified
that she had a Master’s degree, that her
family was willing to support her while she
was in the United States. She testified that
she wished to remain in Tennessee for as long
as necessary to obtain a divorce and maintain
custody of her son during his minority.
Ms. Cho testified that she had come to the
United States to be with her husband while he
completed his education. She was asked why
she changed [her] mind, . . . In response she
stated that her husband mistreated her, that
he consumed too much alcohol. She testified
that she wanted him to change, and that he
could change, but he would not. She was
asked how she wanted him to change, and she
stated that she wanted him to consume less
alcohol. She was asked why she had any
concerns about her husband having custody of
her minor child, . . . In response, she
related an event in which her husband had
consumed considerable alcohol, and over her
4
objection took their minor child out for a
drive around the parking lot. She stated
that law enforcement officers had come to
their apartment complex, one came to the door
. . . . She then testified that the officer
had told her that her husband was operating a
vehicle under the influence, that he should
not do so, particularly because of the danger
to their minor child. Ms. Cho testified that
she wanted to obtain a divorce from her
husband and retain custody of her minor
child, so that her child can get to know his
mother. She said that she had no particular
objection to a Korean divorce if she could be
assured of seeing her minor child on a
regular basis. She further testified that
Korean law did not protect battered spouses.
On cross-examination, she testified that she
had returned to Korea on two occasions during
the two years between her initial arrival in
this country and [the] filing of this suit,
that upon one occasion she had attempted to
obtain a divorce from her husband in Korea,
but was unable to do so; that her driver’s
license was a restricted driver’s license,
requiring the presence of a licensed driver
in the vehicle when she was operating same;
that she had obtained a checking account at a
local bank; and that her purpose of claiming
domicile was so that she could obtain a
divorce from her husband and custody of her
child. She further testified that, in making
application for an “F-1" student visa, she
had filed a statement with the United States
government that she had a home in Korea which
she had no intention of abandoning, and that
she wished to remain in the United States
solely to pursue her education. When asked
if she had lied when she made that statement,
she responded in the affirmative.
[Ms. Cho] called Mark L. Knisely as a
witness. He testified that he was the pastor
of Greystone Presbyterian Church, that he
knew [Ms. Cho], that she had been attending
his church for some two years, and had been
an active member for over one year. He was
asked what she had told him concerning her
intention to remain in the United States, . .
. Reverend Knisely then testified that Ms.
Cho had told him that she wished to remain in
the United States, that she had enrolled in a
class to enhance her ability to understand
the English language and that she had applied
for admission to the University of Tennessee.
On cross-examination he reaffirmed his
testimony that Ms. Cho and her son had been
5
regular participants at the church for a
year, but testified that he did not know
whether she and her son had returned to Korea
at any time during that year.
The record reflects that, in addition to the facts established
through Husband’s request for admissions and the evidence set
forth in the statement of evidence, the trial court also
considered the affidavit2 of Husband submitted in support of his
motion to dismiss:
My name is Dae-Young Jeong, and I am a
citizen of the Republic of Korea. My wife,
the Plaintiff Aeyon Cho, is similarly a
citizen of the Republic of Korea. We were
married in Komi, Korea on December 25, 1993.
I am a student at the University of
Tennessee, having been admitted to the United
States under a student visa to allow me to
pursue my education. My wife was admitted to
the United States under a visa allowing her
to accompany me as a member of my family. To
the extent that my wife and I have resided in
Tennessee, we have done so as temporary
residents. We have not--and according to my
understanding of the immigration laws of the
United States of America, we could not--have
become domiciled in Tennessee, because the
basis upon which we were admitted to the
United States precludes the establishment of
a permanent residence here.
My wife came to the United States on or about
December 30, 1993. She returned to Korea
less than four months later, on or about
April 12, 1994, and remained in Korea until
February 23, 1995. During her stay to [sic]
Korea, our minor child, Min-gu Jeong, was
born in the Republic of Korea. My wife
returned to the United States on February 23,
1995, and remained here until October 3,
1995, when she again returned to the Republic
of Korea. She returned to Tennessee on or
about November 20, 1995, and left our
apartment on or about November 25, 1995.
2
Husband did not testify in person. Apparently, Wife did not object to
Husband “testifying” by affidavit.
6
Upon completion of my course of study at the
University of Tennessee, I will be returning
to the Republic of Korea. Indeed, under my
present immigration status, I must do so. It
is my understanding that upon the termination
of my wife’s status as a member of my family,
she also must return to the Republic of
Korea.
II. Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court concluded that “there is a sufficient
animus manendi3 for wife to have a Tennessee domicile as of the
time of [the] hearing.” The court relied “on wife’s testimony as
to her intent to retain custody of her baby, which she believes
is most likely under the laws of this country.”
Following its finding in favor of subject matter
jurisdiction, the trial court granted Husband an interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Rule 9, T.R.A.P. We granted the same relief
by order entered September 18, 1996.
III. Standard of Review
Husband filed what amounted to a motion for summary
judgment, see Rule 12.03, Tenn.R.Civ.P.; however, the trial court
elected to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised by
the motion. Because of this election, our review is de novo on
the record. Rule 13(d), T.R.A.P. The record is accompanied by a
3
The intention of remaining.
7
presumption of correctness, which we must honor unless the
evidence preponderates against the court’s findings. Id.; Union
Carbide Corporation v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.
1993). The trial court’s conclusions of law are not afforded the
same deference. Adams v. Dean Roofing Co., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 341,
343 (Tenn.App. 1986).
We embark upon our analysis mindful that
[a trial judge], on an issue which hinges on
witness credibility, will not be reversed
unless, other than the oral testimony of the
witnesses, there is found in the record
clear, concrete and convincing evidence to
the contrary.
Tennessee Valley Kaolin Corp. v. Perry, 526 S.W.2d 488, 490
(Tenn.App. 1974).
IV. Law and Analysis
The parties agree that the jurisdictional language of T.C.A.
§ 36-4-104(a)4 -- “bona fide resident of this state” -- requires
a showing that a given person is domiciled in this state. Brown
v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959 (1924). The subject of
4
T.C.A. § 36-4-104(a) provides as follows:
A divorce may be granted for any of the aforementioned
causes if the acts complained of were committed while
the plaintiff was a bona fide resident of this state
or if the acts complained of were committed out of
this state and the plaintiff resided out of the state
at the time, if the plaintiff or the defendant has
resided in this state six (6) months next preceding
the filing of the complaint.
8
domicile is discussed in the case of Sturdavant v. Sturdavant,
189 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn.App. 1944):
Before a new domicile can be acquired a home
must be actually established with the
intention to remain. No change of domicile
can be effected by a mere statement of an
intention not accompanied by some act in
accord with this intention. There must be a
concurrence of actual change of residence and
the intention to abandon the old and acquire
a new domicile.
Id. at 411 (Emphasis added). See also Sparks v. Sparks, 114
Tenn. 666, 88 S.W. 173, 174 (1905).
“In determining whether or not a change of domicile has
been made, it is proper to consider, along with the statement of
the party of his intent in the matter, his conduct and
declarations and all other facts that throw light upon the
subject.” Id. While an individual can have numerous places of
residence, he or she “can have but one domicile.” Brown, 261
S.W. at 959.
A. Nonimmigrant Status
Husband argues that Wife’s nonimmigrant status under 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(F) is an absolute impediment to her
formation of the requisite intent to “acquire a new domicile.”
Sparks, 88 S.W. at 174. He points out that Wife acknowledged, by
failing to respond to his request for admissions, that she had
previously “attest[ed] [to the United States Government] that she
had a residence in the Republic of Korea, to which she intended
9
to return when her husband’s course of study was completed.” He
also points out that, when she subsequently filed for
nonimmigrant status under subsection (i) of the same code section
in order to attend the University of Tennessee, she acknowledged
that she had a “residence in a foreign country which [s]he [had]
no intention of abandoning.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(F)(i).
We recently held that a party has the legal capacity to
acquire a domicile in Tennessee even though he or she is a
citizen of a foreign country. Anene v. Anene, C/A No. 03A01-
9511-CV-00387 (Tenn.App. at Knoxville, October 2, 1996).
However, Husband correctly points out that in Anene, we did not
consider the effect of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) on a
nonimmigrant alien’s attempt to establish a new domicile in this
state. Husband contends that the instant case is a case of first
impression in Tennessee, and we have found no authority to
indicate otherwise.
While this issue does not appear to have been addressed
by an appellate court in this state, it has been faced by a
number of other jurisdictions. The clear weight of authority is
to the effect that the nonimmigrant status of 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(F) is not a per se absolute bar to the acquisition of
a new domicile in this country, but only one factor to be
considered along with a myriad of other relevant factors. See,
e.g., Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111 (D.C.App. 1970); Bustamante v.
Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982); Cocron v. Cocron, 84 Misc. 2d
335, 375 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., Spc.Term, 1975); In re
Marriage of Dick, 15 Cal. App. 4th 144, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743 (Cal.2nd
10
Dist.Ct.App. 1993); Perez v. Perez, 164 So. 2d 561(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1964).
We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive. In
the Bustamante case, the Supreme Court of Utah made pertinent
statements, which we adopt as a part of the rationale for our
holding in this case:
Even if the plaintiff’s professed intention
to establish an actual and bona fide
residency is inconsistent with the terms of
her right of entry into the United States,
she is not thereby disqualified from becoming
a domiciliary for divorce purposes.
* * *
“A visa is a document of entry required of
aliens by the United States Government and is
a matter under the control of the government.
It has little relevance to the question of
domicile.” Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111, 115
(D.C.App. 1970). A state must determine who
qualifies as a resident under its own laws,
and need not assist the Federal Government in
enforcing the immigration and naturalization
laws. Numerous cases have held that
nonimmigrating aliens may form the requisite
intent to establish a permanent residence
necessary for divorce jurisdiction.
(citations omitted). Given the uncertainty
confronting an alien in knowing whether he
may be accorded the right to remain
indefinitely or permanently under certain
situations, we hold that an alien may have a
“dual intent”--an intent to remain if that
may be accomplished and at the same time an
intent to leave if the law so commands.
645 P.2d at 42. The same conclusion was reached in the case of
In re Marriage of Dick wherein the California Court of Appeals
stated the following:
11
We conclude that husband’s nonimmigrant
status does not preclude a finding of
residence under California law for purposes
of obtaining a dissolution of marriage. We
agree with Bustamante and Cocron that a
nonimmigrant alien in the United States on a
renewable visa may have the dual intention of
remaining in this country indefinitely by
whatever means including renewal of a visa
and of returning to his or her home country
if so compelled. At most, “alien status can
. . . operate as an evidentiary fact against
the person’s alleged intention to remain in
the state permanently [citation].” (Cocron
v. Cocron, supra, 375 N.Y.S.2d at p. 809.)
This conclusion is buttressed by the
different aims and purposes of immigration
and dissolution law; “[t]here is no rational
ground for intermingling these two distinct
areas of law . . . .” (Williams v. Williams,
supra, 328 F.Supp. at p. 1383.) It is not
necessary for the courts of this state to
carry out immigration policy by denying
nonimmigrant aliens a judicial forum when
they otherwise meet domiciliary requirements
and when they are subject to the courts of
this state for other purposes. (Ibid. [”The
enforcement of immigration laws properly
remains with those to whom it is entrusted by
law and does not need in aid of enforcement
the judicially created civil disability of
exclusion from our divorce courts.”];
Pirouzkar and Pirouzkar, supra, 626 P.2d at
p. 384 [”The enforcement of the immigration
laws is the function of the federal
government.”].)
18 Cal.Rptr.2d at 747-48.
Despite the wealth of authority against his position,
Husband nevertheless argues that the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in the case of Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647,
98 S. Ct. 1338, 55 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1978) supports his contention.
That case involved an attempt by nonimmigrant aliens residing in
Maryland to obtain the benefits of “in-state” status at the
University of Maryland, i.e., lower tuition and other benefits.
12
The plaintiffs in that case were dependents of parents who were
in this country under a “G-4 visa”--a visa granted to “officers,
or employees of . . . international organizations, and the
members of their immediate families” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(a)(15)(G)(iv).
In Elkins, the Supreme Court held that federal law was
not an impediment to an attempt by a nonimmigrant alien to
establish a domicile in the United States in those cases where
the alien was not required to maintain a residence in a foreign
country. The Supreme Court expressly declined to consider
whether a nonimmigrant alien who was required to maintain such a
residence could nevertheless establish a domicile in this
country. That issue was not before the court in Elkins. Because
that issue was not addressed in Elkins, we agree with those
courts that have held Elkins is not controlling precedent on the
question of whether an 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(F) alien can
acquire a domicile in this country for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dick, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d at
748. Elkins simply does not apply to the issue of domicile in a
divorce case; for this reason, we do not find the reasoning in
that case to be persuasive in the resolution of the instant
case.5
5
By way of a footnote, the court in Elkins recognized that a state has a
significant interest in determining who can become a domicile:
. . . the question of who can become a domiciliary of
a State is one in which state governments have the
highest interest. Many issues of state law may turn
on the definition of domicile: for example, who may
vote; who may hold public office; who may obtain a
divorce; who must pay the full spectrum of state
taxes. In short, the definition of domicile
determines who is a full-fledged member of the polity
of a State, subject to the full power of its laws
13
We hold that Wife’s nonimmigrant status under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(F) is not an absolute bar to a finding of “bona
fide resident” status under T.C.A. § 36-4-104(a). It is only one
of many facts that bear upon the question of whether a
nonimmigrant has the requisite intent to remain indefinitely in
this state.6
Husband’s first issue is without merit.
. . .
Elkins, 98 S.Ct. at 1347-48, n.16.
6
As an evidentiary matter, a statement by an alien to the United States
Government in connection with that person’s application for nonimmigrant
status is not conclusive. See Rule 803(1.2), Tenn.R.Evid. (“Statements
admissible under this exception [to the hearsay rule] are not conclusive.”)
14
B. Trial Court’s Finding of Domicile
Husband argues that even if the federal immigration
laws are not an absolute bar to Wife’s acquisition of a new
domicile in Tennessee, nevertheless she failed to establish the
dual requirements of residence and “intent[] to remain” in
Tennessee indefinitely.
The trial court focused on Wife’s professed intent to
remain here until her child reached his majority--some 16 years
in the future as of the date of the hearing below. It found this
to be a clear indication that Wife intended to remain
indefinitely in Tennessee. This is certainly a logical
conclusion since it is clear that Wife believes she will
encounter problems with respect to the custody of her child if
she returns to Korea. If one believes Wife, and the trial court
obviously did, it cannot be seriously contended that Wife wants
or intends to reside indefinitely in Korea; if not in Korea, then
where does she intend to live? We believe the question answers
itself.
Husband argues that Wife intends to remain in Tennessee
only because she views her presence here as a way to obtain a
divorce and secure custody of her child. Our focus is on Wife’s
true intent rather than on her reason(s) for forming that intent.
If Wife intends to remain in Tennessee indefinitely, she is a
“bona fide resident” of this state, regardless of the reason(s)
for that intent.
15
In this case, the trial court had to decide if there
was a “concurrence of actual change of residence and the
intention to abandon the old and acquire a new domicile.”
Sturdavant, 189 S.W.2d at 411. It is clear that there has been
an “actual change of residence.” Id. Wife came to Tennessee
shortly after her marriage in December, 1993. She has lived in
Knox County ever since, except for two visits to Korea. Since
her separation from Husband, she has rented an apartment in Knox
County on a six-month lease that is renewable. She does not have
a separate residence in Korea and has no property or belongings
in that country. The “residence prong” of the domicile test has
clearly been met.
On the second prong of the test, “the intention to
abandon the old and acquire a new domicile,” Id., the trial court
had to consider “[Wife’s] statement of... [her] intent in the
matter, [her] conduct and declarations and all other facts that
throw light upon the subject.” Sparks, 88 S.W. at 174. The
trial court basically had to decide if Wife sincerely intended to
remain in Tennessee indefinitely. Sturdavant, 189 S.W.2d at 412.
In doing so, it had an advantage that we do not have--it was able
to hear, and observe the demeanor of, the two witnesses who
testified in person, i.e., Wife and her minister. Because of
this, the trial court was in a much better position than are we
to decide whether these witnesses testified truthfully; more
specifically, whether Wife was sincere when she said that she
wanted to “make Knoxville her home.”
16
We have carefully reviewed all of the evidence before
the trial court. It is clear that Wife’s credibility was an
important issue in this case. The trial court chose to believe
her testimony and the other evidence tending to support a finding
that Wife intends to remain indefinitely in Tennessee. We are
not in a position to second-guess the trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of Wife and the credibility of the other evidence
favorable to her position. Tennessee Valley Kaolin Corp., 526
S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn.App. 1974). Furthermore, we cannot say
that the facts relied upon by Husband--including Wife’s
statements to the federal government--preponderate against a
finding that Wife’s present intent is to establish a domicile in
Tennessee. It is clear to us that Wife wants to remain
indefinitely in Tennessee. As we view it, what she may or may
not be compelled to do by the federal government does not change
that present intent. It goes without saying, that life is filled
with uncertainties. Unexpected events can and do occur that
impact, and even cause a person to change, a previously-formed
intent to stay in a given locale indefinitely. The child of a
sick parent may feel duty-bound to permanently abandon his or her
home to care for the ailing parent. Marriage may prompt one to
give up his or her longtime residence. Loss of employment can
bring about the same result. A devastating tornado may convince
a lifelong resident of the flatlands to move elsewhere. As
pertinent to this case, the federal government may compel a
person to leave this country even though that person has
previously formed a firm intent to remain here indefinitely. The
issue regarding domicile is not what may happen in the future,
17
because no one can predict the future; the real question is what
is the subject person’s present intent.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
[e]ach state as a sovereign has a rightful
and legitimate concern in the marital status
of persons domiciled within its borders. The
marriage relation creates problems of large
social importance. Protection of offspring,
property interests, and the enforcement of
marital responsibilities are but a few of
[the] commanding problems in the field of
domestic relations with which the state must
deal. Thus it is plain that each state by
virtue of its command over its domiciliaries
and its large interest in the institution of
marriage can alter within its own borders the
marriage status of the spouse domiciled
there, even though the other spouse is
absent.
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 63 S. Ct. 207, 213, 317 U.S.
287, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942). We do not believe that our
determination--that Wife has established a domicile in Tennessee,
which brings her marriage relationship within the ambit of this
state’s concerns--in any way offends the fundamental concept of
due process embodied in the federal constitution. She has been
in Tennessee since 1993; she obviously did not come into this
state for a “quickie” divorce.
The evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s factually-driven determination that Wife has the
requisite intent to establish her domicile in Tennessee. The
second issue is found adverse to Husband.
18
C. Equitable Considerations
Husband argues that Wife has worked a fraud either on
the federal government or the Fourth Circuit Court of Knox County
such that her claim of domicile and entitlement to divorce should
be denied and dismissed out of hand. We have reviewed the cases7
cited by Husband and do not find that any of them are applicable
to the facts of this case. As we have previously pointed out,
there is a difference between the goals and purposes of the
federal immigration laws, and a state’s need to address the
marriage relationship, and issues attendant thereto, of a person
who resides here and intends to remain here indefinitely. We
find no basis for holding that Wife is equitably estopped from
pursuing her claims for relief in this case.
Husband’s final issue is without merit.
V. Conclusion
It results that the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant and his
surety. This case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
7
Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749 (1933); Knox Tenn.
Rental Company v. Jenkins Insurance, 755 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. 1988); Winters v.
Allen, 166 Tenn. 281, 62 S.W.2d 51 (1933); Tennessee Ice Company v. Raine, 64
S.W. 29, 107 Tenn. 151 (1901); Wyatt v. Brown, 39 Tenn.App. 28, 281 S.W.2d 64(1955); Investors Syndicate of America v. Allen, 198 Tenn. 288, 279 S.W.2d 497(1955); In Re Conservatorship of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn.App. 1995).
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CONCUR:
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Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
__________________________
Don T. McMurray, J.
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