Susie Buchanan v. Memphis Light, etc. ( 1997 )


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  •                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
    SUSIE BUCHANAN,                      )
    )
    Plaintiff/Appellee,           )      Shelby Circuit No. 76079 T.D.
    )
    vs.                                  )
    MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS & WATER
    )
    )
    FILED
    Appeal No. 02A01-9610-CV-00245
    DIVISION,                            )
    )                                 November 14, 1997
    Defendant/Appellant.          )
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY
    AT MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE JAMES E. SWEARENGEN, JUDGE
    For the Plaintiff/Appellee:          For the Defendant/Appellant:
    Brett B. Stein                       James F. Greer
    Memphis, Tennessee                   Memphis, Tennessee
    REVERSED AND DISMISSED
    HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J.
    CONCUR:
    ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
    DAVID R. FARMER, J.
    OPINION
    This case involves a de novo appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. The plaintiff
    obtained a default judgment in general sessions court. On appeal to circuit court, the defendant
    sought to assert the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court ruled that the defendant had
    waived the defense by failing to raise it in the general sessions court. We reverse.
    The Plaintiff/Appellee Susie Buchanan (“Buchanan”) filed a civil warrant in the General
    Sessions Court in Shelby County. She alleged that on November 9, 1992, Memphis Light, Gas, and
    Water (“MLG&W”) damaged her property in Memphis, Tennessee. She sought damages under the
    Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (TGTLA), Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 29-20-101
    et seq. Buchanan’s civil warrant in General Sessions Court was filed on October 12, 1995.
    MLG&W did not appear in General Sessions Court to contest the claim, and default judgment was
    entered for the plaintiff on February 14, 1996. MLG&W appealed to the Circuit Court for the
    Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis.
    On June 28, 1996, MLG&W filed a motion to dismiss in Circuit Court, asserting that the
    plaintiff’s claim was barred because she failed to file her lawsuit within the one-year statute of
    limitations period. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. An interlocutory appeal was
    granted, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The issue on appeal is
    whether MLG&W is barred on appeal to the Circuit Court from pleading the applicable statute of
    limitations as a defense, if the defense was not raised in the General Sessions Court. Buchanan does
    not dispute that her lawsuit was filed more than one year after the date of the accident at issue in this
    case.
    This appeal involves a question of law. We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo
    with no presumption of correctness. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d). See Carvell v. Bottoms, 
    900 S.W.2d 23
    , 26 (Tenn. 1995).
    The parties do not dispute that the applicable statute of limitations under the TGTLA is a
    one-year statute of limitations.      See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b)(1997).               Buchanan
    acknowledges that her lawsuit was filed more than one year after the accident at issue. Therefore,
    the only issue raised in this interlocutory appeal is whether MLG&W waived its statute of limitations
    defense by not raising it in General Sessions Court.
    In this appeal, Buchanan relies on Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-15-505 (1994), which
    provides:
    Objections to the jurisdiction of the general sessions court, before which the warrant
    is returned, shall be made before the hearing, or they will be considered as waived.
    Buchanan asserts that this statute takes priority over Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-11-108 (1994),
    which states:
    In appeals from courts of general sessions, the circuit court shall supply any defect
    in the proceedings of the inferior jurisdiction, as though the suit had been
    commenced in the circuit court.
    Buchanan’s argument is without merit.          MLG&W’s asserted defense does not involve the
    jurisdiction of the General Sessions Court; Section 16-15-505 is not applicable. An appeal from
    General Sessions results in a de novo trial in the Circuit Court -- there is no presumption of
    correctness in the lower court’s judgment. The case is tried as if there had been no previous
    proceeding. Hohenberg Bros. v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 
    586 S.W.2d 117
    , 119 (Tenn. App.
    1979).
    This Court’s decision in Wachovia Bank Card Services v. Overton, No. 03A01-9510-CV-
    00373, 
    1996 WL 64004
     (Tenn. App. Feb. 15, 1996) is analogous. In Wachovia, the plaintiff filed
    a lawsuit in General Sessions Court, but failed to obtain service of process on the defendant. On
    appeal to Circuit Court, the plaintiff argued that by appealing the judgment to Circuit Court, the
    defendant entered a general appearance and thereby submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction. This
    argument was rejected:
    Since the appeal from Sessions Court was for a trial de novo, and the Rules of Civil
    Procedure became applicable to the case upon appeal, the Rules allow the defendant
    to raise all defenses, including a challenge to personal jurisdiction of the Court in
    either a pre-trial motion or a responsive pleading.
    Id., at **2 (citing Landers v. Jones, 
    872 S.W.2d 674
    , 676 (Tenn. 1994)).
    Therefore, the trial court in this case erred in denying MLG&W’s motion to dismiss on the
    basis that MLG&W waived its statute of limitations defense by not raising it in General Session
    Court. The trial court’s decision must be reversed. Since it is undisputed that Buchanan filed her
    lawsuit beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations, on remand, Buchanan’s lawsuit must
    be dismissed.
    2
    The decision of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for entry of an order
    dismissing Appellee’s lawsuit. Costs on appeal are taxed to the Appellee, for which execution may
    issue if necessary.
    HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J.
    CONCUR:
    ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
    DAVID R. FARMER, J.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A01-9610-CV-00245

Filed Date: 11/14/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014