Davis v. TN. Dept. of Correction & Campbell ( 1997 )


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  • RONALD L. DAVIS,                )
    Petitioner/Appellant,       )   Appeal No.
    )   01-A-01-9610-CH-00487
    v.                              )
    )
    TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF         )   Chancery Court No.
    CORRECTION and DONAL            )   96-304-II
    CAMPBELL, Commissioner,         )
    Respondents/Appellees.      )
    FILED
    February 21, 1997
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
    APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY
    AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE, CHANCELLOR
    RONALD L. DAVIS, PRO SE
    N.W.C.C.
    Rt. 1 Box 660
    Tiptonville, TN 38079
    CHARLES W. BURSON
    Attorney General and Reporter
    BRENDA RHOTON LITTLE
    Counsel for the State
    Parker, Allen & Crawford
    Suite 511, Cummins Station
    209 10th Avenue, South
    Nashville, Tennessee 37203
    ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES
    AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
    OPINION
    This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Ronald L. Davis, from the decision
    of the chancery court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by
    respondents/appellees, the Tennessee Department of Correction (“the Department”)
    and Donal Campbell, Commissioner.               The order resulted in the dismissal of
    Petitioner's petition for a declaratory judgment that the Department had incorrectly
    calculated Petitioner's release eligibility date and thereby violated the Ex Post Facto
    Clause of the United State Constitution. The facts out of which this matter arose are
    as follows.
    In November 1982, a jury convicted Petitioner of aiding and abetting second
    degree murder, and the court sentenced him to ninety-nine years. The Department
    calculated Petitioner's release eligibility date to be November 2012. In March 1986,
    Petitioner signed a waiver allowing him to receive sentence credits. Petitioner
    received a sentence summary on 9 January 1992 which stated that his release
    eligibility date was 6 July 2010. On 15 May 1992, Petitioner received a second
    sentence summary which the Department generated using its new computer system.
    This summary listed Petitioner's release eligibility date as 17 September 2010.
    Petitioner petitioned the Department for a declaratory order on 6 November
    1995 and requested a correction of his release eligibility date. Respondents did not
    reply, and Petitioner filed his petition for a declaratory judgment in the Davidson
    County Chancery Court on 29 January 1996.1 Petitioner asked the chancery court for
    the following relief: 1) declare the second sentence summary void and find that the
    second summary violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause; 2)
    order Respondents to correct the error; and 3) order a bench trial on all triable issues.
    On 4 April 1996, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
    12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, a motion for
    summary judgment and attached an affidavit. On 10 June 1996, the chancery court
    1
    The Department finally responded by letter dated February 1996. The letter stated that
    the Department deemed Petitioner's request inappropriate and explained that an error had been
    made on the 9 January 1992 summary.
    -2-
    entered a memorandum and order granting Respondents' motion for summary
    judgment. It is the opinion of this court that the chancery court thoroughly examined
    the issues and came to the proper conclusion.
    On appeal, we review a decision on a motion for summary judgment as if we
    were deciding the motion initially. Clifton v. Bass, 
    908 S.W.2d 205
    , 208 (Tenn. App.
    1995). In other words, we too must determine whether there are any genuine issues
    of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law. Byrd v. Hall, 
    847 S.W.2d 208
    , 214 (Tenn. 1993). Moreover, this court has
    stated that the moving party “must produce or point out evidence in the record which,
    if uncontradicted, entitles [the moving party] to judgment as a matter of law.” Armes
    v. Hulett, 
    843 S.W.2d 427
    , 429 (Tenn. App. 1992). If the non-moving party fails to
    contradict the evidence or establish that the moving party is not entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of law, the moving party shall prevail. See id.
    There is one possible factual dispute in this case, i.e., which sentence summary
    listed the correct release eligibility date. Respondents provided evidence with their
    motion that the second sentence summary listed the correct date. This evidence
    consisted of an affidavit statement from Candace Whisman, Sentence Technician,
    Sentence Information Services, Tennessee Department of Corrections, that the
    summary dated 15 May 1992 listed the correct date and that the error was due to the
    Department's old computer system. Petitioner responded by filing all of the sentence
    summaries he received since 17 September 1986. These summaries clearly show that
    Petitioner's release eligibility date continued to move forward each time a report was
    generated until 15 May 1992. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of this court that this
    evidence does not contradict the evidence of Respondent that the 15 May 1992
    summary contained the correct release eligibility date. Thus, there is no factual
    dispute as to which release eligibility date is correct.
    The next determination is whether Respondents were entitled to a judgment as
    a matter of law. It is the opinion of this court that the chancellor correctly concluded
    that the law entitled Respondents to a judgment. It is Petitioner's contention that the
    recalculation of his release eligibility date violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The
    United States Constitution Provides “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto
    -3-
    Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. An ex post facto law is “any law 'which imposes
    a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or
    imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.'” Weaver v. Graham, 
    450 U.S. 24
    , 28, 
    101 S. Ct. 960
    , 964, 
    67 L. Ed. 2d 17
    , 22 (1981) (quoting Cummings v.
    Missouri, 
    4 Wall. 277
    , 325-26, 
    18 L. Ed. 356
     (1867)). A change in release eligibility
    dates only raises an ex post facto concern if its effect is “to impose a greater or more
    severe punishment than was proscribed by law at the time of the offense.” Kaylor v.
    Bradley, 
    912 S.W.2d 728
    , 732 (Tenn. App. 1995). In this case, there was no “law”
    to raise ex post facto concerns. Nevertheless, if we assumed that the error was the
    result of the application of a law, we would still conclude that it did not violate the
    Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not impose a greater or more severe punishment
    than was applicable to Petitioner in 1982.
    Therefore, it results that the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed, and the
    cause is remanded to the chancery court for any further necessary proceedings. Costs
    on appeal are assessed against petitioner/appellant, Ronald L. Davis.
    _____________________________
    SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR, JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01A01-9610-CH-00487

Filed Date: 2/21/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014