Helen Bond Scofield v. Stephen David Scofield ( 1996 )


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  •                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
    ________________________________________________
    HELEN BOND SCOFIELD,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Dyer Equity No. 93-513
    Vs.                                                    C.A. No. 02A01-9512-CH-00276
    STEPHEN DAVID SCOFIELD,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________________________________________________________
    FILED
    November 5, 1996
    FROM THE CHANCERY COURT AT DYERSBURG
    THE HONORABLE JOE G. RILEY, JR., JUDGE Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    L. L. Harrell, Jr., Harrell & Harrell of Trenton
    For Plaintiff-Appellee
    Marianna Williams, Ashley, Ashley & Arnold of Dyersburg
    For Defendant-Appellant
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Opinion filed:
    W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
    PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
    CONCUR:
    ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
    DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
    This case involves a petition for increase of child support. Petitioner, Stephen David
    Scofield (Father), appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition to modify the parties’
    final decree of divorce to increase child support payments by Respondent, Helen Bond Scofield
    (Mother).
    The parties were divorced by final decree entered April 21, 1994. They entered into a
    Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA) which was approved and ratified by the trial court in the
    final decree of divorce. The parties have two children, a boy age 10, and a girl, age 7. Pursuant
    to the MDA, the trial court awarded joint custody to the parties. The MDA provided that Father
    would be the custodial parent, and Mother would have visitation rights. The MDA also provided
    that Mother would pay Father $250.00 per month in child support.
    Father filed a petition to increase child support on February 1, 1995. The petition alleges
    that circumstances have materially changed because Father’s income has been reduced by more
    than 15% and because Mother’s income has increased materially. Father also avers that Mother
    is not providing adequate support and that present circumstances do not justify a deviation from
    the Child Support Guidelines. Father seeks to increase Mother’s child support payments to an
    amount that is in compliance with the Child Support Guidelines promulgated by the Tennessee
    Department of Human Services. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, ch. 1240-2-4-.01 et seq. (1989,
    revised 1994) (Guidelines).
    In her Answer and Counter-Petition, Mother avers that there has not been a material
    change in circumstances and that Father’s income was reduced by his voluntary actions. She
    also alleges that, pursuant to the MDA, Father owes her $10,000.00. Mother later filed a
    Supplemental Counter-Petition that alleges that there has been a material change in
    circumstances, and that she should now be designated as the custodial parent.
    The trial court held a hearing on the petition on May 26, 1995. The pertinent facts
    developed at this hearing and from the technical record are as follows. Father was employed as
    an attorney by a law firm. In 1994, at the time of the divorce, his income was $60,030.00 per
    year.   However, his compensation package with the law firm changed and he became
    dissatisfied. In February of 1995, Father voluntarily left the law firm and now practices law in
    a shared office with another attorney. He made $5,769.24 in early 1995 before leaving the firm.
    At the hearing, Father testified that he was only making approximately $1,000.00 per month, but
    that he expected it to rise to $1,300.00 per month. Father testified that the standard of living of
    the children has not changed since he left the law firm, and that he adequately provides and cares
    2
    for them.
    Mother is employed by the State of Tennessee. In 1994, at the time of the divorce, her
    income was $33,262.00 per year. She received a raise and, at the time of the hearing, was
    making $107.00 more per month. Mother testified that she bought all of the children’s clothing
    with the exception of some jeans, that she paid for most of the children’s haircuts, and that she
    takes the children on vacations and trips. In addition, she testified that she regularly exercises
    her visitation rights.
    The parties reached an agreement concerning the $10,000.00 debt owed by Father to
    Mother, and the trial court ruled that custody should not change. The only issue that remained
    for the trial court was the petition for an increase in child support. The trial court held that child
    support should not be increased. In a Memorandum Opinion filed May 30, 1995, the trial court
    stated that circumstances had not changed except for Father’s voluntary career move, and that
    it was not appropriate to increase Mother’s child support obligation because of Father’s
    voluntary withdrawal from the law firm. Further, the trial court found that Mother’s salary
    increase of approximately 3.7% was not significant enough to justify an increase in child
    support. The trial court also found that there was more than a 15% variance between the
    requirements of the Guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered. However, the trial
    court stated that the variance resulted from a previously ordered deviation from the Guidelines.
    The court found that the parties agreed to the original deviation although the final decree of
    divorce did not expressly provide for it.
    Father perfected this appeal and presents only one issue for our review:
    Whether the trial court erred in its denial of his petition for an increase in child support.
    Since this case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, we review the case de novo
    upon the record with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact by the trial court.
    Unless the evidence preponderates against the findings, we must affirm, absent error of law.
    T.R.A.P. 13(d).
    Child support in Tennessee is statutorily governed by T.C.A. § 36-5-101 (1996). Section
    36-5-101(e)(1) provides that "[i]n making its determination concerning the amount of support
    of any minor child . . . of the parties, the court shall apply as a rebuttable presumption the child
    3
    support guidelines as provided in this subsection." Modification of an existing child support
    order is controlled by T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (1996), which states, in pertinent part:
    In cases involving child support, upon application of either party,
    the court shall decree an increase or decrease of such allowance
    when there is found to be a significant variance, as defined in the
    child support guidelines established by subsection (e), between
    the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered unless
    the variance has resulted from a previously court-ordered
    deviation from the guidelines and the circumstances which caused
    the deviation have not changed. (emphasis added).
    Father argues that there has been a material change of circumstances due to a decrease
    in his income. This argument is without merit, because the “substantial and material change of
    circumstances” test is no longer the proper standard for determining whether an existing child
    support order should be modified. Turner v. Turner, 
    919 S.W.2d 340
    , 343 (Tenn. App. 1995).
    In 1994, the General Assembly amended T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1)(1991) thereby replacing the
    “substantial and material change of circumstances” test with the “significant variance” test.
    T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1)(1994) (amending T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1)(1991)); see Turner, 919
    S.W.2d at 343 (discussing the amendment).
    Father next argues that there is a significant variance between the requirements of the
    Guidelines and the amount currently ordered, and that there has been no specific court ordered
    deviation from the Guidelines and no written findings justifying deviation as required by T.C.A
    § 36-5-101(e)(1).
    Currently, in Tennessee a “significant variance” is 15%. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.
    tit. 10, ch. 1240-2-4-.02(3); Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 343. In the case sub judice, the record shows
    that Mother’s gross income is $2,774.00 per month.1 The Guidelines require that the court order
    child support based upon the appropriate percentage of all net income. The record does not
    clearly indicate the amount of Mother’s net income. From her pay stubs, the net pay appears to
    be approximately $1,772.00 per month. The appropriate percentage in this case is 32%,
    mandating child support in the amount of approximately $567.00.2 Although we cannot compute
    1
    Mother testified that her income is $1,387.00 per pay period, and that there are 24
    pay periods in a year.
    2
    The Guidelines establish percentages based on the number of children. Child
    support for 2 children requires 32% of net income . The approximate amount of child
    4
    the exact numbers, we believe that the difference between what Mother was ordered to pay and
    the amount required by the Guidelines will still exceed 15% using her net income, and therefore,
    is a significant variance.
    When a significant variance exists, the court must set support in accordance with the
    Guidelines unless application of the Guidelines would be “unjust or inappropriate” in the case.
    T.C.A. § 36-5-101(e)(1) (1996). If the trial court finds that application of the Guidelines would
    be unjust or inappropriate based upon the best interest of the children or the “equity between the
    parties,” the court must make such a finding in writing and such writing shall “state the amount
    of support that would have been ordered under the child support guidelines and a justification
    for the variance from the guidelines.” Id. T.C.A. § 36-5-101(e)(1) (1996) provides:
    In making its determination concerning the amount of support of
    any minor child or children of the parties, the court shall apply as
    a rebuttable presumption the child support guidelines as provided
    in this subsection. If the court finds that evidence is sufficient to
    rebut this presumption, the court shall make a written finding that
    the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or
    inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the
    best interest of the child(ren) or the equity between the parties.
    Findings that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or
    inappropriate shall state the amount of support that would have
    been ordered under the child support guidelines and a justification
    for the variance from the guidelines.
    The statute also allows for the parties to reach an agreement concerning the amount of
    child support. The statute does not require that the parties’ provisions for support meet the
    Guidelines in a MDA, as long as adequate provision is made for the children. Mother argues that
    the MDA is a result of a negotiated settlement between the parties where Father agreed to accept
    a lower amount of child support. However, for the agreement to be effective, the parties must
    adhere to the statute. T.C.A. § 36-5-101(h) (1996) states:
    Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the
    affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an
    agreement between the parties as to support and maintenance of
    a party or as to child support. In any such agreement, the parties
    must affirmatively acknowledge that no action by the parties will
    be effective to reduce child support after the due date of each
    payment, and that they understand that court approval must be
    obtained before child support can be reduced, unless such
    payments are automatically reduced or terminated under the terms
    support was calculated by multiplying Mother’s approximate net income by 32%.
    5
    of the agreement. (emphasis added.)
    In the instant case, neither the parties’ MDA nor the final decree of divorce use the
    language contained in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(h), as that statute requires. Thus, the agreement does
    not effectively deviate from the Guidelines under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(h). Therefore, the deviation
    requires that the trial court make a written finding that the application of the Guidelines would
    create an unjust or inappropriate result. T.C.A. § 36-5-101(e)(1); Malone v. Malone, 
    842 S.W.2d 621
    , 624-25 (Tenn. App. 1992). No such finding was made at the time the final decree
    of divorce was entered. The trial court found that neither the MDA nor the final decree of
    divorce provided for the deviation from the Guidelines, but stated that it was apparent that the
    parties agreed upon the deviation in light of all the facts and circumstances. However, the
    General Assembly made express requirements for an agreement to be valid. T.C.A. § 36-5-101
    (h)(1996). If there is no agreement, the court is required to make a written findings, and the
    record is devoid of any written findings that compliance with the Guidelines would be unjust or
    inappropriate.
    For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this case.
    Upon remand, the trial court shall conduct an expedited hearing to determine Mother’s net
    income and to modify the parties’ final decree of divorce to comply with the Guidelines, or make
    a written explanation for its deviation. T.C.A. § 36-5-101(e)(1). All provisions for child support
    currently in effect shall remain in effect until the entry of another support order. Costs are
    assessed against the Respondent.
    _________________________________
    W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
    PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
    CONCUR:
    _________________________________
    ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
    _________________________________
    DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A01-9512-CH-00276

Judges: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford

Filed Date: 11/5/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021