Samuel Bridgefourth, Jr. v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  •                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    June 18, 2014 Session
    SAMUEL BRIDGEFOURTH, JR. v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
    No. CT00555611     Robert Samual Weiss, Judge
    No. W2013-02468-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 21, 2014
    Plaintiff’s car was repossessed. Plaintiff paid the amount owed, but never received the car.
    Plaintiff sued and won a judgment for conversion. He was also awarded attorney’s fees, first
    as special damages and then, in an amended order, as punitive damages. Defendant appeals.
    We reverse because attorney’s fees cannot be awarded as punitive damages and no statute
    or contract involved in this case provides for attorney’s fees.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed
    A NDY D. B ENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID R. F ARMER, J., and
    J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., joined.
    Kannon C. Conway, Memphis, Tennessee, and Dustin N. Pickens, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
    for the appellant, Santander Consumer USA, Inc.
    Kevin A. Snider, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Samuel Bridgefourth, Jr.
    OPINION
    This case began with the repossession of Mr. Bridgefourth’s car by Santander
    Consumer USA, Inc. (“Santander”) on October 6, 2010. Mr. Bridgefourth was 85 days past
    due on the balance of the loan. On October 18, 2010, he paid the arrearage. Three days later,
    he received the title in the mail. Mr. Bridgefourth was also advised that he must pay a
    repossession fee. Santander eventually waived the repossession fee, but never provided the
    vehicle to Mr. Bridgefourth.
    Mr. Bridgefourth filed a civil warrant against Santander in Shelby County General
    Sessions Court in March 2011 alleging breach of contract, conversion, trespass to chattels,
    fraud, misrepresentations, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and a
    number of reckless or negligent actions and omissions. The general sessions court ruled in
    Mr. Bridgefourth’s favor, and Santander appealed to the circuit court. Mr. Bridgefourth filed
    an amended complaint. The case was tried September 11, 2011. Mr. Bridgefourth presented
    evidence about the car and also testified that he had incurred $13,386.00 in attorney’s fees.
    The trial court awarded Mr. Bridgefourth $6,000.00 in compensatory damages for conversion
    of the car and “special damages in the amount of $13,348.00 for attorney fees necessary to
    compensate Plaintiff for his losses as a result of Defendant’s actions.” Mr. Bridgefourth
    asked for clarification and the court, on November 25, 2013, entered an amended order of
    judgment which replaced the $13,348.00 special damages award for attorney’s fees with an
    award of $13,348.00 in punitive damages. Santander appealed.
    S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
    In a civil case tried without a jury, we review the trial court’s findings of fact de novo
    with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We review questions of law de novo with no presumption of
    correctness. Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    8 S.W.3d 625
    , 628 (Tenn. 1999).
    A NALYSIS
    Santander questions whether the trial court had jurisdiction to amend its previous
    decision to grant Mr. Bridgefourth punitive damages and whether any basis exists for
    awarding Mr. Bridgefourth his attorney’s fees. We will address the second issue first.
    “The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the
    wrongdoer and to deter others from committing similar wrongs in the future.” Concrete
    Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 
    2 S.W.3d 901
    , 906-07 (Tenn. 1999). “[A]ttorney’s fees are not
    punitive in nature.” Miller v. United Automax, 
    166 S.W.3d 692
    , 697 (Tenn. 2005).
    Attorney’s fees “are meant to be compensatory, and it is therefore inappropriate to award
    attorneys’ fees as punitive damages.” Buttrey v. Holloway’s Inc., No. M2011-01335-COA-
    R3-CV, 
    2012 WL 6451802
    , at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2012).
    In Tennessee, courts follow the American Rule, which provides that litigants must pay
    their own attorney’s fees unless there is a statute or contractual provision providing
    otherwise. State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
    18 S.W.3d 186
    , 194 (Tenn. 2000).
    At oral argument, Mr. Bridgefourth’s counsel conceded that the American Rule applies and
    there is no authority to award attorney’s fees in this conversion case.
    Because Mr. Bridgefourth cannot be awarded attorney’s fees as either punitive or
    special damages,1 we need not address the trial court’s jurisdiction to award the attorney’s
    fees as punitive damages.
    We reverse the decision of the trial court. Costs of appeal are assessed against the
    appellee, Mr. Bridgefourth, for which execution may issue if necessary.
    _________________________
    ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE
    1
    Counsel for Santander commented on opposing counsel’s argument thusly: “You can put
    lipstick on a pig, but it’s still a pig. And you can call attorney’s fees punitive damages, but they are
    still attorney’s fees.” The phrase regarding pigs seems to be a modern update of much older sayings,
    such as, “A hog in armour is still but a hog,” and “A hog in a silk waistcoat is still a hog.” Ben
    Zimmer, Who First Put Lipstick on a Pig?, SLATE MAGAZINE , (Sept. 10, 2008)
    http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/09/who_first_put_lipstick_on_a
    _pig.html. The lipstick variation is obviously of more recent origin. The word “lipstick” dates to
    1880. Id.