Byrd v. Dept. of Corrections ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
JAMES W. BYRD, )
) FILED
Petitioner/Appellant, )
) Appeal No. February 23, 1999
) 01-A-01-9804-CH-00171
VS. ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
) Davidson Chancery
) No. 97-3206-III
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTION, )
)
Respondent/Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON
COUNTY AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE PRESIDING
JAMES W. BYRD
#078204 MCRCF
PO BOX 2000
Wartburg, TN 37887
PRO SE
JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General
PATRICIA C. KUSSMANN, BPR 15506
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights and Claims Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
Second Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR:
CANTRELL, J.
KOCH, J.
OPINION
In this appeal, a prisoner seeks review of the trial court’s dismissal of his
petition for declaratory judgment and other relief in which he claimed he had
been wrongfully denied sentence reduction credits to reduce his parole eligibility
date. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff’s claim of entitlement to sentence credits
which would reduce his parole eligibility date was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
In Byrd v. Bradley, 913 S.W.2d 181 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), this Court held
that Mr. Byrd, the Petitioner herein, who had been sentenced to life
imprisonment in 1976, was not entitled to a shortening of the time he must serve
before becoming eligible for parole because of the operation of Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-3613 (1975), which was in effect at the time of his conviction and
sentencing. That statute provided that anyone sentenced to life imprisonment
would be eligible for parole only after serving 30 full calendar years. Therefore,
the Court concluded, Mr. Byrd was not eligible, from the date of his
incarceration until he signed a waiver under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-
236(1985), for any sentence reduction credits which would make him eligible for
parole prior to his serving thirty years.
The trial court quite correctly determined that any claim by Mr. Byrd for
earlier parole eligibility which was based on the Department of Correction’s
failure to award him sentence reduction credits for the time period between his
incarceration and his execution of a section 236 waiver was barred, under the
doctrine of res judicata, by the Byrd v. Bradley holding. A simple definition of
res judicata is that it is a "rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties
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and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent
action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action". Black's Law
Dictionary 1172 (5th ed. 1979), as quoted in Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of
Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. 1995).
Mr. Byrd asserts on appeal that the trial court failed to address other issues
raised in his petition. In fact, the trial court specifically found:
Given the legal principle of res judicata and that an
inmate is not entitle [sic] to earn sentence reduction
credits until he has signed the waiver as well as the
absence in the complaint of any showing why the
petitioner is being detained in violation of federal and
state constitutions, the Court determines that the
respondent’s motion to dismiss shall be granted on the
grounds the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court clearly considered the Petitioner’s other claims and found
them wanting. We concur in the trial court’s judgment in this regard. Mr. Byrd’s
petition is clearly and exclusively directed to his current continuing
incarceration. Further, there appears to be no dispute regarding his eligibility for
credits after Mr. Byrd’s execution of a waiver on March 1, 1986 as authorized
in Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236 (1985). Mr. Byrd has not challenged the
Department’s computation of sentence credits for which he is eligible, but rather
challenged the Department’s interpretation of eligibility.
Mr. Byrd’s claims regarding his entitlement to “the benefits” of allegedly
shorter sentences afforded to persons sentenced under the 1989 Sentencing
Reform Act are without merit. The constitutional and statutory arguments
propounded by Mr. Byrd have been considered and rejected. See Wilson v. State,
980 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1998);
Smith v. State, 1998 WL 75288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); State ex rel. Stewart
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v. McWherter, 857 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), perm. to appeal
denied (Tenn. 1993); State ex rel. Crum v. McWherter, 1992 WL 99029 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1992), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1992). We agree with the trial
court that Mr. Byrd has failed to allege any basis for his claims of unlawful
detention.
The trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s petition for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted is affirmed, and this case is remanded
for whatever further proceedings may be required. The costs of this appeal
should be taxed to Mr. Byrd.
_______________________________
PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JUDGE
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