Steven Belford v. J & J Plastering ( 2002 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    September 27, 2002 Session
    STEVEN R. BELFORD v. J & J PLASTERING, INC., ET AL.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County
    No. 99C201    Jacqueline E. Schulten, Judge
    FILED OCTOBER 30, 2002
    No. E2001-02575-COA-R3-CV
    Steven R. Belford (Plaintiff”) sued Danny W. Cox (“Cox”) and J & J Plastering, Inc., (“Company”)
    after he was rear-ended by a vehicle owned by the Company and driven by Cox. The jury returned
    a verdict for $9,000 in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed to this Court without first filing a motion
    for new trial. Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal, all of which center around the exclusion or
    admission of evidence at trial. Because Plaintiff did not raise these issues in a motion for new trial,
    we deem them to be waived and dismiss this appeal.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of
    the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded.
    D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HOUSTON M. GODDARD , P.J.,
    and CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., joined.
    Morgan G. Adams, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the Appellant Steven R. Belford.
    Robert A. Crawford, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellees J & J Plastering, Inc., and Danny W.
    Cox.
    OPINION
    Background
    This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on March 16, 1998,
    in Hamilton County. Plaintiff claimed a vehicle being driven by Cox and owned by the Company
    (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) collided with another vehicle which, in turn, “slammed”
    into Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that while there was no substantial property
    damage to his vehicle, he suffered a whiplash type injury resulting in personal injury, lost wages, etc.
    Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-5-113, Plaintiff attached to the complaint a copy of his medical
    bills from Total Health Chiropractic. The parties later entered into an Agreed Stipulation of the
    Parties pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-5-113(a)(3), whereby it was stipulated Plaintiff was
    entitled to a presumption that his medical bills of $3,959 were reasonable and necessary.
    Prior to trial, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit Defendants from
    questioning Plaintiff about the reasonableness and necessity of his medical bills. Plaintiff argued
    that in light of the above-referenced stipulation, Defendants had the burden of proving the medical
    bills were not reasonable or necessary. According to Plaintiff, since expert medical proof is required
    to show medical bills are reasonable and necessary absent any presumption that they are, medical
    proof also must be required to show that they are not reasonable and necessary if they are presumed
    to be so. Since Defendants had no expert medical proof that the medical bills were not reasonable
    or necessary, Plaintiff argued Defendants should not have been allowed to attempt to prove the
    medical bills were not reasonable and necessary via cross-examination of Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed
    a separate motion in limine seeking to prohibit Defendants from questioning Plaintiff as to how he
    came to be treated by the chiropractor and when he retained his attorney. Both of the motions in
    limine were denied by the Trial Court after voir dire of the jury was completed. At trial, Defendants
    were allowed to question Plaintiff regarding: (a) his medical treatment; (b) how he came to be treated
    by the chiropractor; and (c) when he retained his attorney.
    Plaintiff also sought damages related to the towing and storage of his wrecked
    vehicle. The Trial Court apparently concluded these were not recoverable items of damages and
    limited testimony and recovery to the difference in value of the vehicle before and after the accident.
    Plaintiff, therefore, made an offer of proof to the effect that the wrecker bill was $75 and the storage
    fee was $10 per day. The wrecked automobile apparently remained in storage after the accident
    because of Plaintiff’s claimed inability to pay the costs already incurred.
    The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $9,000 as compensation to
    Plaintiff for his personal injury and property damage incurred in the accident. Court costs were taxed
    to Plaintiff in the judgment entered by the Trial Court. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the
    judgment claiming these costs should have been taxed to Defendants. Defendants apparently agreed,
    and an Agreed Order was entered amending the judgment to tax the costs to Defendant. No other
    post-trial motions were filed.
    Plaintiff appeals, “contending that the trial court was in error for refusing to exclude
    when the plaintiff hired his attorney, how the plaintiff found his doctor, and in allowing the plaintiff
    to be examined on his medical treatment and the purpose of the treatment. [Plaintiff] further
    contends that the economic loss associated with this wreck, the storage fees and towing charges,
    should have been allowed to be presented to the jury.”
    Discussion
    The four issues raised by Plaintiff on appeal center around either the admission of
    evidence (i.e. cross-examination of Plaintiff regarding his medical treatment, when he hired his
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    attorney, and how he came to be treated by the chiropractor), or the exclusion of evidence and/or
    refusal to charge the jury regarding the wrecker and storage charges incurred by Plaintiff.
    In relevant part, Rule 3(e) of the Tenn. R. App. P. provides as follows:
    [I]n all cases tried by a jury, no issue presented for review shall be
    predicated upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, jury
    instructions granted or refused, misconduct of jurors, parties or
    counsel, or other action committed or occurring during the trial of the
    case, or other ground upon which a new trial is sought, unless the
    same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise
    such issues will be treated as waived. Failure of an appellant to take
    any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
    affect the validity of the appeal but is ground only for such action as
    the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal
    of the appeal. . . .
    It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not file a motion for new trial raising these issues.
    Inasmuch as all issues raised by Plaintiff on appeal center around the admission or exclusion of
    evidence, pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e), we deem these issues waived and dismiss this appeal.
    See generally Fahey v. Eldridge, 
    46 S.W.3d 138
    , 141 (Tenn. 2001)(“It has long been the rule in this
    state that in order to preserve errors for appeal, the appellant must first bring the alleged errors to the
    attention of the trial court in a motion for a new trial.”).
    Conclusion
    The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the Trial
    Court for such further proceedings as may be required, if any, consistent with this Opinion, and for
    collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellant Steven R.
    Belford, and his surety.
    ___________________________________
    D. MICHAEL SWINEY, JUDGE
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Document Info

Docket Number: E2001-02575-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge David Michael Swiney

Filed Date: 9/27/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014