Craig v. Gabbert, Jr., L. Glenn Worley And M. Kimberly Stagg Of ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    AT KNOXVILLE
    FILED
    February 29, 2000
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    IN THE MATTER OF:                     )      GREENE COUNTY
    ESTATE OF MARY TIMMONS AUSTIN,        )      E1998-00825-COA-R3-CV
    )
    THOMAS A. SCOTT, JR.,                 )
    Administrator C.T.A.                  )
    )
    ROBERT C. AUSTIN, JR.                 )
    )
    Beneficiary-Appellant            )      HON. THOMAS FRIERSON II,
    )      CHANCELLOR
    )
    v.                                    )
    )
    )
    ELIZABETH T. AUSTIN                   )
    )
    Beneficiary-Appellee             )      AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    JOHN P. KONVALINKA AND DAVID M. ELLIOTT OF CHATTANOOGA FOR
    APPELLANT
    CRAIG V. GABBERT, JR., L. GLENN WORLEY AND M. KIMBERLY STAGG OF
    NASHVILLE FOR APPELLEE
    O P I N I O N
    Goddard, P.J.
    This is an appeal from the Chancery Court’s judgment
    awarding attorneys’ fees from the assets of the Estate of Mary
    Timmons Austin.    Robert Austin, Jr., Appellant, raises the
    following issue:
    Did the trial court err in whole or in part by awarding
    attorneys’ fees from the Mary T. Austin Estate to
    Harwell Howard Hyne Gabbert & Manner, P.C., attorneys
    for beneficiary Elizabeth T. Austin?
    The facts of this case span a period of ten years.
    Mary Timmons Austin died on August 17, 1989, leaving a husband
    and three children.    She devised and bequeathed all her assets to
    her husband, Robert Austin, Sr.    Her will named her husband as
    the executor, but in the event he could not perform these duties,
    Elizabeth Austin, their daughter, was named executor.    On May 16,
    1990, an order was entered admitting Mrs. Austin’s will to
    probate in common form and Mr. Austin filed a Disclaimer of
    Interest in Decedent’s Estate wherein he renounced his claim to
    certain property and stock in the Estate.    Mr. Austin died on
    August 14, 1990, before completing administration of Mrs.
    Austin’s estate.
    On May 16, 1991, the court appointed Elizabeth Austin,
    who was the alternate executor in the will, as executrix of Mrs.
    Austin’s estate.    Robert Austin, Jr. opposed this appointment.
    The main point of contention among the three siblings has been
    the Rolich stock in Mrs. Austin’s estate.    In 1991 and 1992,
    Robert Austin, Jr. (hereinafter “Robert Jr.”) and Christy Austin
    (hereinafter “Christy”) moved the court to direct Elizabeth
    Austin (hereinafter “Lisa”)1 to distribute the Rolich stock in
    kind.    On July 23, 1992, Robert Jr. filed a motion to remove Lisa
    as executrix and to appoint a successor executor.    Before the
    court ruled on these motions, Lisa petitioned to resign as
    executrix on August 10, 1992, because the motions would require
    her to protect her rights as an individual beneficiary.
    On November 9, 1992, Lisa responded to the motions for
    her to distribute the Rolich stock in kind.    Lisa argued that the
    Rolich stock should be sold and the proceeds divided by the
    beneficiaries, instead of an in kind distribution.    On November
    18, 1992, Lisa petitioned the court to order the Administrator
    C.T.A. of the Estate to place the Rolich stock on the market for
    sale.    The Administrator C.T.A., Eric Christiansen, filed a
    memorandum which stated his intention to distribute the stock in
    kind unless otherwise directed by the court.    On March 3, 1993,
    the court granted the motion to distribute the Rolich stock in
    kind.    Lisa appealed the court’s decision and this court affirmed
    the trial court.    See Elizabeth T. Austin v. Christy N. Austin,
    et al., an unreported opinion of this Court, filed in Knoxville
    on June 30, 1994.   The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the trial
    court and this Court by holding that the personal representative
    is required to sell the stock and distribute the proceeds.      See
    1
    Our use of the first names of the parties should not be
    construed as any disrespect, but rather is for ease of reference.
    3
    Elizabeth T. Austin v. Christy N. Austin, et al., 
    920 S.W.2d 209
    (Tenn. 1996).
    The second lawsuit for which Lisa seeks attorneys fees
    involved a complaint Lisa filed, before she resigned as
    executrix, against Rolich Corporation on behalf of the Estate.2
    In the complaint, Lisa asserted that Rolich Corporation sold its
    Unaka stock to Lisa, Christy, Robert Jr. and Robert Sr. at a
    price less than fair market value.    According to Lisa, the
    Estate’s interest as a shareholder in Rolich was damaged by this
    sale of Unaka stock.   Mr. Christiansen, who was appointed
    Administrator C.T.A. after Lisa resigned, declined to pursue this
    litigation and surrendered his right to any beneficiary.     Lisa
    chose to pursue the litigation.   The lower court dismissed the
    action, but this Court reversed the lower court.    See
    Christiansen v. Rolich Corp., 
    909 S.W.2d 823
     (Tenn. Ct. App.
    1995).   We found that Lisa could maintain the lawsuit as a
    personal representative of the Estate.    See Christiansen, 
    909 S.W.2d at 825
    .
    2
    The parties refer to this lawsuit as the Roll Over Suit
    because Lisa, Christy, Robert Jr. and Robert Sr., as Directors of
    Rolich Corporation, sold shares of Unaka to themselves at a
    discounted price to avoid tax liability.
    4
    On April 30, 1998, Thomas A. Scott, Administrator
    C.T.A. of the Estate, filed a “Petition To Approve Attorneys Fees
    and Expenses and a Plan of Distribution and to Close the Estate.”
    The attorneys’ fees Mr. Scott petitioned to be approved were fees
    incurred during the distribution in kind litigation and the roll
    over litigation.   Mr. Scott recommended that the fees be awarded
    because benefit inured to the Estate, the lawsuits were pursued
    in the name of the Estate and the lawsuits guided the personal
    representative in the appropriate actions to take in
    administrating the Estate.   Rolich Corporation and Robert Jr.
    objected to the approval of these attorneys’ fees.   On November
    5, 1998, the Chancery Court awarded attorneys’ fees and expenses
    to Harwell, Howard, Hyne, Gabbert & Manner, P.C. (hereinafter
    “firm”) in the amount of $91,965.64.   The Chancery Court found
    the services provided by the firm were necessary to the
    administration of the Estate and inured to the benefit of the
    Estate.
    First, Robert Jr. argues that an agreement signed by
    Lisa in 1996 precludes her recovery of attorneys’ fees.   Rolich
    Corporation filed suit against Lisa, Christy and Robert Jr. to
    enforce this agreement through mediation.   According to Robert
    Jr., this matter should be part of the mediation process in the
    5
    separate lawsuit filed by Rolich.   Essentially, Robert Jr. asked
    the lower court to interpret the agreement, which was the issue
    of a separate pending lawsuit, or order that the attorneys’ fees
    issue in this case become part of the mediation in the separate
    Rolich suit.   The Chancellor, without interpreting the agreement,
    found that the attorneys’ fees issue should not be part of the
    mediation ordered in the separate lawsuit.
    Because the Chancellor only addressed the issue of
    mediation, we are constrained to do the same.    The interpretation
    of the agreement will be determined in the court-ordered
    mediation of the separate pending Rolich suit.     After a thorough
    review of the record, we agree with the Chancellor’s decision.
    Second, Robert Jr. argues that the attorneys’ services
    did not benefit the Estate.   “Fees for the services of an
    attorney not employed by the personal representative are
    sometimes allowed out of the assets but only where the services
    have inured to the benefit of the estate.”   Davis v. Mitchell,
    
    178 S.W.2d 889
    , 915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).   The trial court
    possesses broad discretion in assessing attorney’s fees against
    an estate if the services benefitted the estate.    See Merchants &
    Planters Bank v. Myers, 
    644 S.W.2d 683
    , 688 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    1982).   We will not disturb the trial court’s award of attorney’s
    6
    fees unless there is an abuse of discretion.       See Aaron v. Aaron,
    
    909 S.W.2d 408
    , 411 (Tenn. 1995).
    The distribution in kind litigation certainly
    benefitted the Estate because the stock was more valuable when
    sold as a unit compared to being split evenly among the
    beneficiaries.   As Mr. Scott stated in his petition to approve
    attorneys’ fees, the “sale resulted in a significantly higher
    price for the stock than was previously offered.”       The roll over
    suit was initiated to insure that the Estate’s interest in the
    Rolich Corporation was not damaged by the sale of Rolich’s Unaka
    stock.   On appeal, this Court stated that Lisa was acting as a
    personal representative of the Estate in filing the roll over
    suit although she was a beneficiary and participated in the
    alleged wrongdoing.   See Christiansen v. Rolich Corp., 
    909 S.W.2d 823
    , 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).    The Chancellor found the roll
    over suit benefitted the Estate.        We agree with the Chancellor’s
    determination that both actions benefitted the Estate.
    The parties dispute whether the fees must be shown to
    have been necessary and proper.3       Robert Jr. asserts that
    attorney’s fees charged to the estate, whether by the executor or
    a beneficiary, must be shown to have been necessary and proper.
    3
    Another requirement when requesting attorneys fees is that
    the fees are reasonable. The parties are not disputing the
    reasonableness of the award in this case.
    7
    See In re Estate of Wallace, 
    829 S.W.2d 696
    , 701 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    1992); In re Estate of Cuneo, 
    475 S.W.2d 672
    , 676 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    1971).    Lisa asserts that the only standard applied in cases
    where someone other than the executor sought attorney’s fees is
    whether the services inured to the benefit of the estate.        See
    Leaver v. McBride, 
    506 S.W.2d 141
    , 145-6 (Tenn. 1974); Pierce v.
    Tharp, 
    455 S.W.2d 145
    , 148 (Tenn. 1970); Merchants & Planters
    Bank v. Myers, 
    644 S.W.2d 683
    , 688 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
    We do not believe it is necessary under the facts of
    this case to resolve the competing contentions of the parties.
    We reach this conclusion because we are convinced that where the
    value of an estate has been enhanced and it would not have been
    absent the efforts of an attorney, the attorney’s services were
    obviously necessary.
    For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Chancery
    Court is affirmed and the cause remanded for the collection of
    costs below.   Costs of this appeal are adjudged against Robert
    Austin, Jr., and his surety.
    Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
    CONCUR:
    8
    Herschel P. Franks, J.
    John K. Byers, Special Judge
    9