Butler v. Diversified Energy ( 1999 )

I N T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S FILED
A T K N O X V I L L E January 28, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
Clerk
W . D . B U T L E R a n d J . A . ) K N O X C O U N T Y
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v . ) H O N . H A R O L D W I M B E R L Y ,
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D e f e n d a n t s - A p p e l l e e s ) A F F I R M E D A N D R E M A N D E D
G A R R Y F E R R A R I S O F K N O X V I L L E F O R A P P E L L A N T S
F R A N C I S L . L L O Y D , J R . , O F K N O X V I L L E F O R D I V E R S I F I E D E N E R G Y , I N C . ,
a n d R A N D Y C . E D G E M O N
A N D R E W C R A I G T R O U T M A N O F K N O X V I L L E F O R A P O L L O F U E L S , I N C .
O P I N I O N
Goddard, P.J.
This is a suit by W. D. Butler and J. A. Halliburton,
employees of Norfolk Southern Corporation against Diversified
Energy/Appolo Fuels, Inc., and Randy C. Edgemon, President of
Diversified Energy, seeking damages for defamation.
The Trial Court granted a summary judgment against the
Plaintiffs, resulting in this appeal, wherein they raise the
following issues:
I. Is there a genuine issue of material fact whether
Defendant’s letter was capable of being understood as
defamatory?
II. Is there a genuine issue of material fact whether
Defendant published the June 2, 1995 letter?
III. Did the trial court err in failing to deny
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for Defendants’
non-compliance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
56.03?
The following passages taken from the Plaintiffs’ brief
accurately state the facts necessary for disposition of this
appeal:
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs Butler and Halliburton have worked for
Norfolk Southern Corporation (“Norfolk Southern”) since
1972 and 1964, respectively. In June 1995, Mr. Butler
was an engineer and Mr. Halliburton a trainman. For
approximately six months prior to June 1995, Mr. Butler
and Mr. Halliburton worked on the same crew. The crew
worked the Middlesboro mine run which included
Defendant Appolo Fuels, a customer of Norfolk Southern.
Appolo Fuels is a mining company. It has a close
relationship with Defendant Diversified Energy, Inc.
who handles Appolo Fuels’ sales. Defendant Randy C.
Edgemon is President of Diversified Energy.
On June 1. 1995, Defendant Edgemon talked to Paul
Gibson at Norfolk Southern, alleging that Mr. Butler
and Mr. Halliburton were deliberately delaying the
trains. Defendant Edgemon wrote a letter to Norfolk
Southern superintendent Paul Gibson on June 2, 1995,
that is the basis for Plaintiffs’ complaint. The
letter reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Gibson:
We at Diversified Energy/Appolo Fuels are
experiencing disruptive problems out of two Norfolk
Southern crew employees. The employees are a Mr.
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Wayne Butler and Jay Halliburton. We are requesting
that the two named employees be kept from coming onto
Appolo Fuels property.
Sincerely,
DIVERSIFIED ENERGY, INC.
Randy C. Edgemon
President
Notwithstanding the fact that this case was resolved by
summary judgment, a preliminary determination of whether the
letter is capable of being understood as defamatory is a question
of law to be determined by the court. Memphis Publishing Co. v.
Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn.1978).
In Stones River Motors, Inc., v. Mid-South Publishing
Co., 651 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn.App.1983), this Court stated the
following (at page 719):
For a communication to be libelous, it must
constitute a serious threat to the plaintiff’s
reputation. A libel does not occur simply because the
subject of a publication finds the publication
annoying, offensive or embarrassing. The words must
reasonably be construable as holding the plaintiff up
to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. They must
carry with them an element “of disgrace.” W. Prosser,
Law of Torts, § 111, p. 739 (4th Ed.1971).
The Defendants have cited the case of Moore v. Dreger,
576 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn.1979), which we believe is dispositive of
this appeal. The opinion, which we quote in its entirety, is
short and succinct, as is the wont of Justice Henry, its author.
OPINION
HENRY, Chief Justice.
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Respondents Dreger and Konvalinka, two waitresses
employed by petitioner Kentucky Rib-Eye, brought this
action for slander per se, alleging injury to their
occupational reputation. According to the complaint,
respondent Moore, who managed the restaurant, stated in
the presence of customers:
You all are no longer employed here because of giving
bad service. I had to pay for three meals for you
[Dreger] and three meals for you [Konvalinka] because
of the bad service you all gave.
The trial court granted petitioners’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6). The Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded for trial, ruling that a jury question had
been raised. We granted certiorari to consider whether
the statement is actionable under the circumstances.
Upon consideration, we hold that it is not.
FONES, COOPER, BROCK and HARBISON, JJ., concur.
Moreover, in Stones River, Judge Conner lists a number
of cases--including those from Tennessee, sister states, and
federal courts--holding that various characterizations of the
plaintiffs were not actionable (651 S.W.2d at page 722):
Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir.1978)
(use of the word “swindle” to characterize the
plaintiff’s violation of Michigan’s Blue Sky law, while
“ill chosen” held not actionable); Fram v. Yellow Cab
Co. of Pittsburgh, 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1329
(W.D.Pa.1974) (statement that the plaintiff’s previous
statements reflect “the sort of paranoid thinking that
you get from a schizophrenic” held not actionable,
because it would be understood as mere “rhetorical
hyperbole”); Reoux v. Glenn Falls Post Co., 18 Misc. 2d
1097, 190 N.Y.S.2d 598, 600-01 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959)
(statement that plaintiff’s refusal to tell a court the
whereabouts of certain money was “contumacious conduct”
was not actionable, because it simply expressed an
opinion that the plaintiff was “stubborn or contrary or
obstinate or disobedient”); Schy v. Hearst Pub. Co.,
205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir.1953) (charging the plaintiffs
with “gestapo-like” tactics not actionable, because it
was merely “a somewhat rhetorical way of saying that
their conduct was dictatorial”); Bleecker v. Drury, 149
F.2d 770 (2nd Cir.1945) (statement that a lawyer had
committed “a fraud upon the court” was merely a
“bombastic characterization of the plaintiff’s
maneuvers” in representing his client, and was not
actionable as libel); Williams v. Rutherford Freight
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Lines, Inc., 10 N.C.App. 384, 179 S.W.2d 319, 323
(1971) (statement in the course of a labor dispute that
the plaintiffs were “gangsters” is “nothing more than
vituperation or name calling” and is not actionable);
Heft v. Burk, 302 So. 2d 59, 60 (La.App.1974)
(statemennt that the plaintiff was “pirating” employees
away from the defendant and that his actions were
“totally unethical” merely expressed the defendant’s
strong opinion concerning the plaintiff’s attempts to
hire employees away from him, and were not actionable);
Brown v. Newman, 224 Tenn. 297, 454 S.W.2d 120 (1970)
(statement “have the skids been greased at city
council?” not actionable).
Finally as to the first issue, we find a case from
Minnesota, McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., 502 N.W.2d 801, (Minn.
App.1993), in which the language used is strikingly similar to
the case at bar. In that case the word describing the plaintiff
was “troublemaker.” In holding the use of that word was not
actionable, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota, stated the
following (at page 808):1
McGrath argues the trial court erred in granting
JNOV on his defamation claim. We disagree. The oral
statements at issue fall into three categories: (1)
threats that McGrath would be blackballed at other
banks; (2) statements between managers about McGrath;
and (3) a manager’s statement to employees about
McGrath. Essentially, all the managers’ statements
involve the phrase “troublemaker.” The trial court
found the phrase “troublemaker” was not actionable
because:
Unlike the accusation that a person is “dishonest,”
which suggests specific acts which society has
determined to be improper, making trouble is
generally in the eye of the beholder, and for that
reason cannot be proven true or false.
The trial court properly determined the phrase
“troublemaker” was not actionable under either
constitutional or common law standards. The term
“troublemaker” lacks precision and specificity. This
phrase also fails to suggest verifiable false facts
about McGrath. Finally, the ambiguity of the term
“troublemaker” prevents any underlying facts from being
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F o o t n o t e s a r e o m i t t e d .
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inferred from this phrase. Accordingly, the phrase
“troublemaker” is not actionable because it is
constitutionally protected.
Further, the statements’ lack of precision,
specificity, and verifiability prevents the inference
that McGrath committed specific acts that society finds
reprehensible. Thus, in this case, the phrase
“troublemaker” is not defamatory under the common law.
See Weissman v. Sri Lanka Curry House, Inc., 469 N.W.2d
471, 473 (Minn.App.1991) (under common law, adjective
such as “dishonest” was defamatory because it implied
the commission of specific act or conduct society found
reprehensible).
In light of our disposition of issue one, it is
unnecessary that we address issue two.
As to issue three, we agree with counsel for the
Defendants that the provision of Rule 56.03 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure, directing a simple concise statement of
the material facts to accompany any motion for summary judgment,
is for the benefit of the trial court, and could be, as it was in
this case, waived. Moreover, even if we were to find that this
issue has merit, it would require remand to the Trial Court where
another motion for summary judgment could be made, meeting the
omitted requirement of Rule 56.03. Even if a second motion for
summary judgment is not filed and the facts remain as are
contained in the present record, a motion for a directed verdict
would be sustained at the conclusion of the Plaintiffs’ proof.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Trial
Court is affirmed and the cause remanded for collection of costs
below. Costs of appeal are adjudged against the Plaintiffs and
their surety.
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H o u s t o n M . G o d d a r d , P . J .
C O N C U R :
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D o n T . M c M u r r a y , J .
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C h a r l e s D . S u s a n o , J r . , J .
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