Doyle Sweeney v. David Tenney - Dissenting in part and Concurring in part ( 2011 )


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  •                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs August 29, 2011
    DOYLE SWEENEY V. DAVID TENNEY
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Greene County
    No. 10CV378-JKW
    No. E2011-00418-COA-R3-CV -FILED-SEPTEMBER 29, 2011
    Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., dissenting in part and concurring in part.
    I agree with the majority that Tenny raised at trial the defense of the statute of frauds.
    I also agree with the majority that Tenny is liable to Sweeney in the uncontested amount of
    $4,500. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the partial performance exception to the
    statute of frauds as I find such reliance unnecessary. In my judgment, a writing was not
    required in this case under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(5) (Supp. 2010) because we are
    dealing with an agreement that could have been performed within one year.
    While, as the majority states, “there was no agreement regarding when the loan was
    to be paid off in full,” I believe this fact is immaterial. As we said in the case of Boutwell
    v. Lewis Bros. Lumber Co., 
    27 Tenn. App. 460
    , 
    182 S.W.2d 1
     (1944),
    [t]he question is not what the probable, expected, or actual
    performance of the contract may be, but whether, according to
    the reasonable interpretation of its terms, it requires that it
    should not be performed within the year. Unless the court,
    looking at the contract in view of the surroundings, can say that
    in no reasonable probability can such agreement be performed
    within the year, it is its duty to uphold the contract.
    27 Tenn. App. at 464, 182 S.W.2d at 3 (quoting 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of, § 53 p. 561).
    As I view the evidence in this case, I cannot say “that in no reasonable probability can such
    agreement be performed within the year.” Id. See also Davidson v. Holtzman, 
    47 S.W.3d 445
    , 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
    Accordingly, while I dissent from the majority’s view that the partial performance
    exception is necessary to render the agreement enforceable, I agree with the majority that
    Sweeney is entitled to his judgment against Tenny.
    I dissent in part and concur in part and agree with the result reached by the majority.
    _______________________________
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2011-00418-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Charles D. Susano

Filed Date: 9/29/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014