Pait v. City of Gatlinburg ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
STEWART WAYNE PAIT, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9704-CH-00142
) October 30, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
v. ) SEVIER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
)
)
)
CITY OF GATLINBURG, TENNESSEE )
and HARRY MONTGOMERY, )
) HON. CHESTER S. RAINWATER, JR.,
Defendants-Appellees. ) CHANCELLOR
For Appellant For Appellees
STEWART WAYNE PAIT, Pro Se RONALD E. SHARP
Pikeville, Tennessee Sharp & Ripley
Sevierville, Tennessee
OPINION
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1
Stewart Wayne Pait (Pait), an inmate at the
Southeastern Tennessee State Regional Correctional Facility,
filed suit against the City of Gatlinburg and its Chief of Police
seeking access to police files pertaining to his two criminal
cases. Pait’s action was filed pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 10-7-503(a)
(Supp. 1996) and 10-7-505(a), which provide for inspection of
public records by “any citizen” of Tennessee. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, as a
result of Pait’s felony convictions, he was not a “citizen”
within the meaning of T.C.A. §§ 10-7-503(a) and 10-7-505(a). The
trial court granted the defendants’ motion, and Pait appealed,
arguing that his convictions do not exclude him from the ambit of
T.C.A. §§ 10-7-503(a) (Supp. 1996) and 10-7-505(a). We affirm.
Pait was convicted in 1990 of two felonies -- forgery
and solicitation to commit first degree murder. As required by
statute, the judgments of conviction provide that Pait is
rendered infamous. See T.C.A. § 40-20-112 (“Upon conviction for
any felony, it shall be the judgment of the court that the
defendant be infamous...”). As a result, Pait is no longer
eligible to vote. Id.
Subsequent to his incarceration, Pait sought to obtain
documents relative to his two criminal cases. In response to his
request, the Gatlinburg Police Department furnished various
documents, maintaining that such documents represented all
relevant material in its possession. Not satisfied that his
request had been fully complied with, Pait filed suit under
T.C.A. § 10-7-505(a).
2
The relevant statutes provide, in pertinent part, as
follows:
All state, county and municipal records...
except any public documents authorized to be
destroyed by the county public records
commission in accordance with § 10-7-404,
shall at all times, during business hours, be
open for personal inspection by any citizen
of Tennessee, and those in charge of such
records shall not refuse such right of
inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise
provided by state law.
T.C.A. § 10-7-503(a) (Supp. 1996)(emphasis added).
Any citizen of Tennessee who shall request
the right of personal inspection of any
state, county or municipal record as provided
in § 10-7-503, and whose request has been in
whole or in part denied by the official
and/or designee of the official or through
any act or regulation of any official or
designee of any official shall be entitled to
petition for access to any such record and to
obtain judicial review of the actions taken
to deny the access.
T.C.A. § 10-7-505(a)(emphasis added).
The defendants argue that by virtue of the fact that
Pait has been rendered infamous and has lost his right to vote,
he is no longer a “citizen”, as contemplated by T.C.A. §§ 10-7-
503(a)(Supp. 1996) and 10-7-505(a). This position has been
adopted by all three sections of this court, in cases involving
factual scenarios similar to that of the instant case. See Ray
v. Stanton, C/A No. 88-285-II, 1989 WL 14135 (Tenn.App., W.S.,
filed February 24, 1989, Crawford, J.); Bradley v. Fowler, C/A
No. 1387, 1991 WL 25929 (Tenn.App., E.S., filed March 4, 1991,
3
Goddard, J.); and Cole v. Campbell, C/A No. 01A01-9603-CH-00140,
1996 WL 724920 (Tenn.App., M.S., filed December 18, 1996, Lewis,
J.).1
Based on the foregoing decisions of this court, we find
and hold that Pait is not a “citizen” within the meaning of
T.C.A. §§ 10-7-503(a)(Supp. 1996) and 10-7-505(a) and hence has
no standing to bring this action. Therefore, his claim was
properly dismissed by the trial court. In so holding, we
recognize that a member of this court has opined that the
analysis underlying the above decisions is faulty. See Cole,
1996 WL 724920 at *2-4 (Koch, J., dissenting). However, until
such time as the Supreme Court holds otherwise, we feel bound by
the precedent established by the three sections of this court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on
appeal are assessed to the appellant. This case is remanded to
the trial court for collection of costs assessed there, pursuant
to applicable law.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
_________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
_________________________
William H. Inman, Sr.J.
1
Apparently, permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was not sought in
any of these cases.
4