James R. Tully, Jr. v. USA Wireless, Inc., PMT Investments, Inc., and Patrick M. Thompson, in both his individual and corporate capacity ( 1996 )


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  • JAMES R. TULLY, JR.,                     )
    )
    Plaintiff/Appellant/               )
    Cross-Appellee,                    )   Appeal No.
    )   01-A-01-9601-CH-00031
    VS.                                      )
    )   Davidson Chancery
    USA WIRELESS, INC.,                      )   No. 93-2020-II(I)
    PMT INVESTMENTS, INC., and               )
    PATRICK M. THOMPSON, in both             )
    his individual and corporate capacity,   )
    )
    FILED
    Defendants/Appellees/              )
    Cross-Appellant USA Wireless,      )                       July 3, 1996
    Inc.                               )
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
    APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
    AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE IRVIN H. KILCREASE, JR., CHANCELLOR
    LARRY D. ASHWORTH
    ASHWORTH & HIGH
    227 Second Avenue, North
    Nashville, Tennessee 37201-1636
    Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
    HUGH C. HOWSER, JR.
    KENNETH M. BRYANT
    TRABUE, STURDIVANT & DEWITT
    Suite 2500, 511 Union Street
    Nashville City Center
    Nashville, Tennessee 37205
    Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
    Cross-Appellant USA Wireless, Inc.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
    AND REMANDED
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    TODD, P.J., M.S.
    LEWIS, J.
    OPINION
    The issues in this appeal are (1) whether the chancellor erred in granting
    a judgment against a corporation for back wages, (2) whether the chancellor should
    have pierced the corporate veil and granted a judgment against the corporation’s
    principal shareholder and (3) whether the court erred in dismissing the fraud claims
    against the principal shareholder. We affirm the chancellor’s decision in part and
    reverse on the fraud claims made directly against the principal shareholder.
    I.
    Patrick M. Thompson was the principal shareholder and president of
    USA Wireless, Inc., a company he incorporated in February of 1990. James R. Tully,
    Jr. worked for USA Wireless, Inc. for ninety-six weeks without compensation. On
    November 22, 1991 Mr. Thompson sent Mr. Tully the following letter:
    On August 15, 1990, you received your last payroll
    check from USA Wireless, Inc. At that time we told you that
    there would not be any more payrolls because funds were
    thin and prospects of financing were not immediate.
    However, we did say that you could continue to work at USA
    with the understanding that there would be no payroll until the
    company received funding. When and if that occurs, you will
    be paid for your services at an agreed upon rate per year as
    an independent contractor.
    I am sorry to say that we have not been successful in
    securing the financing as of this date. As of November 1,
    1991, you will have completed 96 weeks of work without a
    payroll.    This means that USA Wireless owes you
    $158,000.00 for your services less your advances plus any
    approved expenses. Today the company has loaned you
    approximately $12,000.00 leaving a balance of $146,000.00.
    When and if the company receives a major funding of $2
    million dollars or is sold or liquidated, USA Wireless will pay
    you $146,000.00 within five days of receipt of the proceeds.
    Until that time you will be paid on an agreed upon
    commission schedule to be determined.
    Not only do I look forward to paying you $158,000.00
    less your loan; I look forward to the day you resume your
    work as a salaried employee as you were before August 15,
    1990. It will mean that the company is properly capitalized
    and we are moving forward, making progress and benefiting
    all of our customers and employees.
    -2-
    Rest assured that as long as I am in control of USA
    Wireless you will always have a position with this company.
    Warm regards.
    On October 7, 1992, in an agreement signed by Thompson on behalf
    of the company, USA Wireless, Inc. sold certain of its assets to Continental Wireless
    Cable Television, Inc. for $950,000. When the company did not pay Mr. Tully he sued
    (among others) USA Wireless, Inc. and Mr. Thompson. Against Mr. Thompson
    personally Mr. Tully alleged that Thompson had falsely represented that if Mr. Tully
    would continue to work for USA Wireless, Inc. he (Thompson) would pay for the work
    and give Mr. Tully a twenty percent interest in the company. In a second amended
    complaint Mr. Tully alleged that USA Wireless, Inc. was the alter ego of Thompson,
    making him liable for the corporate debts. On cross motions for summary judgment
    the court granted Mr. Tully a judgment against USA Wireless, Inc. for $147,000 but
    dismissed the claims against Mr. Thompson individually.
    II.
    On appeal USA Wireless, Inc. argues that the letter of November 22,
    1991 promised to pay Mr. Tully only if the company received two million dollars in
    funding or was sold or liquidated. The company argues that the obligation to pay Mr.
    Tully never arose because neither of these events happened.
    We think, however, that the company’s reliance on the conditions in the
    letter is misplaced. First, the letter contains an unambiguous acknowledgment that
    USA Wireless, Inc. owes Mr. Tully $146,000 for his past services. Second, the
    language the company asserts is a condition precedent, we read as Mr. Thompson’s
    promise to pay the debt as soon as the company was in a position to do so. There
    is no indication in the record that Mr. Tully agreed to forego payment if the conditions
    -3-
    in the letter were never met. Therefore, we think the chancellor properly granted Mr.
    Tully summary judgment on the claim against USA Wireless, Inc.
    III.
    The corporate entity should be disregarded where it is a mere sham or
    dummy, where it is being used to justify wrong or where it is used to protect fraud.
    Neese v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 
    53 Tenn. App. 710
    , 
    386 S.W.2d 918
    (1964). Whether a corporation is a mere instrumentality of an individual is a question
    of fact, and the decision to disregard the corporate entity will depend on the
    circumstances of each case. Electric Power Board v. St. Joseph Valley Structural
    Steel Corporation, 
    691 S.W.2d 522
    (Tenn. 1985).            The one seeking to hold
    shareholders liable for the debts of the corporation has the burden of proving facts
    justifying piercing the corporate veil. Schlater v. Haynie, 
    833 S.W.2d 919
    (Tenn. App.
    1991). In Schlater, we addressed some assertions of particular misconduct on the
    part of corporate officers and concluded that so long as the corporate officers did not
    use their control of the corporation for fraudulent purposes they had the right to treat
    it as their own business enterprise, to favor a secured creditor over another (even
    when it meant reducing the personal liability of one of the officers), and to organize
    a successor corporation (with the infusion of new capital from one of the corporate
    officers) to take up the business of the failed corporation. The key, of course, is
    whether the assets of the failed corporation were fraudulently appropriated for the
    corporate officers’ purposes. 
    See 833 S.W.2d at 926-927
    . See also Tennessee
    Racquetball Investors, Ltd. v. Bell, 
    709 S.W.2d 616
    (Tenn. App. 1986).
    With these principles in mind, we are satisfied that Mr. Tully was not
    entitled to summary judgment piercing the corporate veil of USA Wireless, Inc. The
    facts in the record reveal that the company was organized by Mr. Thompson, who
    procured a charter on February 27, 1990.           The company had eight original
    -4-
    shareholders and Mr. Thompson, his wife Rita Thompson, and Nancy Cash served
    as directors. Mr. Thompson supplied the start-up operating capital. Ms. Thompson
    took no part in the company’s operation and, apparently, did not ever attend a
    meeting of the board of directors. She did receive some payments of corporate funds
    for her personal use, but these payments were accounted for on Mr. Thompson’s
    ledger and the company received credit for the payments on the amount owed to him.
    When the corporation sold part of its assets for $950,000, the proceeds
    of the sale were applied to the corporate debts -- admittedly including a partial
    payment to Mr. Thompson. We do not think, however, that a finder of fact could infer
    that any of the corporate funds were appropriated for fraudulent purposes.
    The remaining unanswered question, of course, is whether Mr.
    Thompson was entitled to summary judgment on the assertion that the corporate veil
    should not be pierced. While this is a closer question, we think the chancellor
    correctly decided this issue as well. Again, the key issue is whether there are
    controverted facts from which a trier of fact could infer that the corporate form was
    used to defraud creditors or that the corporation’s assets were fraudulently diverted
    for illegal or improper purposes. We find no evidence in the record to rebut the
    corporation’s evidence that all of its assets were properly accounted for.
    IV.
    Mr. Tully also asserts that the lower court erred in dismissing the claims
    he made directly against Mr. Thompson and PMT, Inc. for fraud and breach of
    contract. The appellees did not address these issues in their brief and we find that
    the evidence in the record is in conflict. Therefore, summary judgment on these
    claims was improper.
    -5-
    The judgment of the lower court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
    remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Tax the costs on
    appeal one-half to the appellant and one-half to the appellees.
    _____________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE
    MIDDLE SECTION
    _______________________________
    SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01A01-9601-CH-00031

Judges: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

Filed Date: 7/3/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014