Hawkins v. Sundquist ( 1999 )

CHRISTOPHER M. HAWKINS, )
et al, )
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9803-CH-00164
v. )
) FILED
Davidson Chancery
DON SUNDQUIST, Governor, ) No. 97-3371-II
et al, ) January 21, 1999
)
Cecil W. Crowson
Defendants/Appellees. ) Appellate Court Clerk
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE CAROL L. McCOY, CHANCELLOR
HENRY A. WILLIAMS, Pro Se
#117522 H.C.C.F. POB 549
CHRISTOPHER M. HAWKINS, Pro Se
#232697 N.W.C.C. POB 660
Route One (1)
Tiptonville, Tennessee 38079
JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL MOORE
Solicitor General
PAMELA S. LORCH
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights and Claims Division
Second Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
OPINION
This is a complaint alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Plaintiffs/appellants are pro se and the pleadings are very difficult to comprehend
as voluminous hand written documents are submitted in support of the complaint
which are general and conclusory with limited and elusive factual assertions.
These two inmates were formerly housed at Northeast Correctional
Complex in Mountain City, Tennessee. While so incarcerated they allege that
they were disciplined and punished in derogation of Tennessee Department of
Corrections policies, and no specific allegations were made against various
defendants, including the Governor. They have since been transferred and at the
time of these proceedings in the trial court, inmate Hawkins was assigned to the
Turney Center Industrial Prison and Farm and inmate Williams resided at
Hardiman County Correctional Facility.
Defendants filed a combined Rule 12 motion accompanied by an
affidavit which was treated as a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court held:
On October 9, 1997, Plaintiffs Christopher M.
Hawkins and Henry A. Williams filed a petition styled
"Requesting the Court to Issue an Order for a Temporary
Restraining Order and an Order to Show Cause for
Preliminary Injunction.
A review of the numerous pleadings and exhibits filed
by Plaintiffs reveals that Plaintiffs originally sought the
following relief:
1) appointment of counsel; and
2) restraining order and injunction prohibiting
Defendants from transferring Plaintiffs from the Northeast
Correctional Complex; and
3) restraining order and injunction prohibiting
Defendants from unlawfully punishing and harassing
Plaintiffs for complaining about the conditions of their
confinement; and
4) hearing regarding the reasons that Plaintiffs
were placed on lockdown without any due process hearing.
On December 31, 1997 the Court denied Plaintiffs'
request for a temporary restraining order and show cause
hearing.
This case is before the Court on pro se Plaintiffs'
Motion for Appointment of Counsel. There is no absolute
right to counsel in a civil action. U.S. Constitution,
Amendment VI; Tenn. Constitution, Article I, §9; Barish v.
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Metropolitan Government, 627 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn.App.
1981). The Plaintiffs' request for counsel is denied.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. Because the Court
is considering an affidavit submitted by Defendants in
support of this motion, it will be reviewed as a summary
judgment motion.
As stated in Sergeant Peach's affidavit, Plaintiffs were
transferred from the Northeast Correctional Complex in the
fall of 1977. Not only have Plaintiffs failed to allege any
right to incarceration at a particular prison, but the issue of
their transfer is now moot. Any claim based on their transfer
is dismissed.
Plaintiffs also ask for a restraining order and
injunction prohibiting Defendants from unjustly harassing
and punishing them for complaining about prison life.
Plaintiffs' allegation regarding this "unjust harassment and
punishment" are conclusory and do not state a claim against
the Defendants. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to set a show
cause hearing regarding their placement on lockdown
without a due process hearing. Due process protection is not
accorded to prison discipline which does not impose atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandlin v. Conner, 115
S. Ct. 2293 (1995). Lockdown is not an atypical and
significant hardship in prison life and therefore there is no
due process protection. The above claims are dismissed.
The trial court correctly refused to appoint counsel for the appellants
in this civil action. Barish v. Metro Gov't, 627 S.W.2d 953, 955
(Tenn.App.1981).
Appellants seek to have the court "restrain" the appellees from
transferring them to other prisons. Prisoners have no constitutional right to be
housed in a particular security prison or to be given particular classifications.
Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir.1992); Redd v. Gilless, 857 F. Supp.
601 (W.D.Tn.1994).
In this case Appellants, without any specifications of persons, specific
incidents, or specific time frame, simply charge defendants with "unjust
harassment and punishment." These punishments include "lock down" and
segregation from general prison populations in some instances.
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Making all allowances for the inarticulate character of Appellants'
pleadings, the alleged actions simply do not rise to constitutional dignity.
Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995); see
also Eldred L. Reid v. Jerry Stover and Charles Noles, No. 02-A-01-9601-CV-
00016 1996 WL 507502 Sept. 9, 1996 (W.S.Ct.App.Tn.).
The motion for summary judgment was properly granted and is
affirmed.
Costs are assessed against Appellants and the case remanded for
collection of costs.
__________________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRES. JUDGE, M.S.
___________________________________
PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
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