Earl A. Crow, III v. Daniel R. LeDoux ( 2005 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    February 18, 2005 Session
    EARL A. CROW, III v. DANIEL R. LEDOUX, ET AL.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Anderson County
    No. A2LA0495      James B. Scott, Jr., Judge
    No. E2004-01640-COA-R3-CV - FILED MAY 17, 2005
    Earl A. Crow, III, brought this action against his landlords, Daniel R. LeDoux and wife, Katherine
    Marie LeDoux (collectively “the defendants”), for injuries sustained by him in a fall caused by an
    allegedly defective heating grill in his apartment. The defendants filed a motion for summary
    judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s knowledge of the condition of the grill was at least
    co-extensive with that of the defendants, and that, as a consequence of this fact, no liability attached.
    The trial court agreed and granted the defendants’ motion. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the trial
    court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
    Vacated; Case Remanded
    CHARLES D. SUSANO , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY and
    PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JJ., joined.
    Harry L. Lillard, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellant, Earl A. Crow, III.
    Kenneth W. Ward, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Daniel R. LeDoux and wife, Katherine
    Marie LeDoux.
    OPINION
    I.
    On April 1, 1996, the plaintiff leased an apartment unit owned by the defendants for a period
    of one year. The leased apartment was one of two identical units located in a single complex, much
    like a duplex, with the plaintiff occupying the front apartment. The lease agreement contains the
    following pertinent provision:
    Lessee is to make no changes of any nature in the above named
    premises without first obtaining written consent from said Lessor or
    his heirs, nor to paint any signs on buildings herein leased; and the
    Lessor or his agent shall have the right to enter said premises at
    reasonable hours, to examine the same, make such repairs, additions
    or alterations as may be deemed necessary for the safety, comfort, and
    preservation of said building.
    (Paragraph numbering in original omitted). The apartment was located in Oak Ridge; however, the
    defendants resided in Georgia.
    On the day before Thanksgiving in 1996, the water heater in the plaintiff’s apartment became
    inoperable. The plaintiff called the defendants to report the problem. He spoke with Mrs. LeDoux
    in her husband’s absence. At Mrs. LeDoux’s suggestion, the plaintiff obtained several cost
    estimates to replace the water heater. The plaintiff later advised Mrs. LeDoux regarding the
    estimates, whereupon she told him to contact one of the estimators and have the water heater
    replaced. The plaintiff did as Mrs. LeDoux directed. Once Mr. LeDoux received the bill for the new
    water heater, he was “extremely angry” about its cost and contacted the plaintiff, telling him “not
    to ever, ever, ever authorize any repairs on [the defendants’] properties.”
    On Christmas day, 1996, a small fire broke out in the plaintiff’s apartment, which caused
    damage to a metal heating grill. The grill was located in the floor of the hallway that separated the
    bedrooms and bathroom from the main living area of the house; the grill spanned the entire width
    of the hallway. Heat was furnished to the entire apartment through the grill. On December 26, Mr.
    LeDoux instructed the plaintiff to take the metal grill out of the back apartment, which was
    unoccupied, and replace the fire-damaged grill in the plaintiff’s apartment. This, however, was only
    to be a temporary solution, as Mr. LeDoux told the plaintiff he would arrange to purchase a new grill
    for the plaintiff’s apartment.
    When the plaintiff replaced the grill, he noticed that the “new” grill “had a slight depression
    on one corner.” The plaintiff testified that, over time and with use, the depression began to deepen
    and change in shape. The plaintiff informed the defendants of the change in the grill, but Mr.
    LeDoux responded to the plaintiff by reminding him that the grill was “only temporary” and that it
    would “be fine for now.”
    Despite the plaintiff’s repeated requests that the grill be replaced, Mr. LeDoux did not do so,
    instead telling the plaintiff that he would “get around to it” and that he intended to purchase a grill
    at a wholesale price rather than paying retail. While the plaintiff considered purchasing a new grill
    and replacing it himself, he recalled Mr. LeDoux’s explicit instructions following the water heater
    replacement and knew that he could not replace the grill without Mr. LeDoux’s authorization.
    Because the plaintiff began to fear that the grill was unsafe, due to its continued deterioration,
    he would often place a chair over the grill in order to keep his family and guests from stepping
    directly onto the grill. The plaintiff and others would routinely step or jump over the grill when they
    were walking down the hallway, in order to avoid stepping directly on the grill.
    -2-
    On March 27, 1997 – over three months after the plaintiff replaced the fire-damaged grill
    with the “temporary” grill from the back apartment – the plaintiff was walking down the hallway of
    the apartment with an armload of clothes and a small stereo. The plaintiff attempted to step over the
    grill, but when his foot came down, a small, sharp piece of metal that was sticking up from the grill
    caught his foot. The metal piece went through the plaintiff’s tennis shoe and into his foot, causing
    the plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries to his shoulder, neck, back, and foot.
    The plaintiff originally filed suit against the defendants on March 17, 1998, alleging, inter
    alia, that the defendants were liable to the plaintiff for his injuries due to their failure to replace the
    defective grill. The plaintiff filed a voluntary nonsuit on February 7, 2002. The suit was re-filed on
    September 25, 2002. The defendants answered, generally denying all liability. They later filed a
    motion for summary judgment. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, and the plaintiff’s
    response, on May 10, 2004. At the hearing, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s knowledge of
    the condition of the grill was at least co-extensive with, if not superior to, the defendants’
    knowledge, and that under Tennessee case law, a landlord has no liability for a tenant’s injuries
    under such circumstances. The trial court held as follows:
    Well, the Court could be wrong in this case, but basically speaking,
    the idea of having a duty to yourself just seems to me to rise to the
    occasion that a person who is so concerned about this and has
    knowledge of a condition, that that’s what they’re talking about in our
    case law.
    Individuals who have that must look out for their own safety and –
    until a person who has superior knowledge in some way has actually
    been placed in a position where the other person would assume a
    greater degree of that responsibility than the person who has that
    knowledge, it would seem to me that your motion for a summary
    judgment should be granted, and I so rule.
    The trial court entered its order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on June 15,
    2004. From this order, the plaintiff appeals.
    II.
    In deciding whether a grant of summary judgment is appropriate, courts are to determine “if
    the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
    is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Courts “must take the strongest
    legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in
    favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence.” Byrd v. Hall, 
    847 S.W.2d 208
    , 210-11
    (Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted).
    -3-
    The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating that there are
    no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
    Id. at 215.
    Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that
    there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring submission of the case to a trier of fact. 
    Id. Summary judgment
    should be granted only “when both the facts and the conclusions to be drawn
    from the facts permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion.” Carvell v. Bottoms, 
    900 S.W.2d 23
    , 26 (Tenn. 1995) (citation omitted). In Evco Corp. v. Ross, 
    528 S.W.2d 20
    , 25 (Tenn.
    1975), the Supreme Court observed as follows:
    Where there does exist a dispute as to facts which are deemed
    material by the trial court, however, or where there is uncertainty as
    to whether there may be such a dispute, the duty of the trial court is
    clear. [It] is to overrule any motion for summary judgment in such
    cases, because summary judgment proceedings are not in any sense
    to be viewed as a substitute for a trial of disputed factual issues.
    Since a motion for summary judgment presents a pure question of law, our review is de novo with
    no presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s judgment. Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 
    857 S.W.2d 42
    , 44-45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). We must decide anew if summary judgment is
    appropriate.
    III.
    The plaintiff raises several issues on appeal. Our initial inquiry is directed at determining
    whether there are facts in the record, or inferences from facts in the record which are favorable to
    the plaintiff, from which a reasonable person could conclude that the piece of metal that was sticking
    up from the grill is an outgrowth of the depression in the grill, about which the plaintiff testified and
    about which the defendants were aware.
    A landlord generally will not be held liable to a tenant for any harm arising out of a
    dangerous condition on the leased premises. Lethcoe v. Holden, 
    31 S.W.3d 254
    , 256 (Tenn. Ct.
    App. 2000) (citations omitted). However, this rule is subject to several exceptions. While a landlord
    typically has no duty to make repairs on the leased premises, 
    Evco, 528 S.W.2d at 23
    , it must do so
    if the lease so requires, Taylor v. Gunn, 
    227 S.W.2d 52
    , 55 (Tenn. 1950). If the landlord is required
    to make repairs under the terms of the lease agreement and if, after receiving notice, the landlord
    neglects to make repairs, “he is liable for one injured by the defective condition.” Ghormley v. Carl
    B. Cook, Inc., 
    756 S.W.2d 264
    , 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Cotton Press & Storage Co. v.
    Miller, 
    135 Tenn. 187
    (1916)).
    In the instant case, the lease clearly provides that the defendants are responsible for repairs
    to the premises. Moreover, when the plaintiff replaced the inoperable water heater in his apartment
    with the permission of Mrs. LeDoux, Mr. LeDoux informed him, in no uncertain terms, that he was
    never again to make any other repairs to the apartment without his express authorization. Based
    -4-
    upon the lease provision, as bolstered by the directive from Mr. LeDoux, the plaintiff was in no
    position to repair or replace the defective grill. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony and
    affidavit clearly establish that the defendants had notice of the damaged grill for over three months
    before the plaintiff was injured and yet they never made any attempt to repair or replace the grill.
    In the plaintiff’s deposition, he testified that the grill taken from the back apartment as a
    replacement for the fire-damaged grill had “a slight depression on one corner of it” at the time he
    installed it. As reflected in the plaintiff’s affidavit, Mr. LeDoux was aware of this damage, as he told
    the plaintiff that the grill had been damaged when he “dropped a piano on it” while moving his
    mother-in-law out of the back apartment. The plaintiff noticed that the grill “continued to change
    . . . its shape, from the time that [he] got it,” until it became a “major depression.” In his affidavit,
    the plaintiff states that, as he “attempted to step over the grill” on March 27, 1997, the grill had
    “finally broken and a sharp piece stuck up, catching [his] left foot and piercing it, caus[ing him] to
    fall and suffer injuries.” (Emphasis added). The plaintiff testified that the first time he saw the grate
    with the sharp piece of metal sticking up “was hours after [he] fell.” (Emphasis added). In his
    deposition, the plaintiff referred to photographs of the damaged grill that were taken after he was
    injured; while these photographs were made exhibits to the deposition, they are not included in the
    record on appeal. However, while referencing these photographs, the following exchange took place
    between the defendants’ attorney and the plaintiff:
    Q.      Now, when you moved [the grill] over [from the back
    apartment], I presume in December of 1996, you said it had
    a slight depression?
    A.      Correct.
    Q.      Was that depression located in this corner [of the photograph]
    (indicating) that the damage is shown on the pictures that
    you’ve given me?
    A.      Roughly there.
    Construing this testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we are required to
    do, we hold that there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable person could
    conclude that the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the original damaged condition of the grill. The
    testimony reflects that the grill continued to deteriorate after its installation, with what was once a
    “slight depression” becoming a “major depression.” The plaintiff did not notice that the grill had
    “finally broken” until hours after he fell. (Emphasis added). Moreover, the plaintiff’s deposition
    testimony reflects that the sharp piece of broken metal was in the same area as the original indented
    area of the grill. When all of the material before us is viewed in a light most favorable to the
    plaintiff, we conclude that a jury of reasonable individuals, when presented with these facts, could
    conclude that the defective grill condition, about which the defendants were very much aware and
    for the repair or replacement of which they were responsible, had morphed, over time, into the sharp
    -5-
    piece of metal that caused the plaintiff to fall and injure himself. Such a jury could further conclude,
    from the evidence now before us, that the plaintiff was not aware of this new danger and that the
    defendants breached their duty to correct the defective grill – a breach which resulted in the
    condition that caused the plaintiff’s fall. In view of this, we cannot conclude that the defendants’
    “co-extensive knowledge” argument warrants a grant of summary judgment. As the record now
    stands, there are genuine issues for trial by a fact finder. Summary judgment is not appropriate in
    this case.
    We pretermit other issues raised by the plaintiff.
    IV.
    The judgment of the trial court is vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court for
    further proceedings. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellees, Daniel R. LeDoux and wife,
    Katherine Marie LeDoux.
    _______________________________
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2004-01640-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.

Filed Date: 5/17/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014