Ronald Stephen Satterfield, Sr. v. Gary Long & Richard Smith ( 1999 )

FILED
October 13, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
AT KNOXVILLE
RONALD STEPHEN SATTERFIELD, ) KNOX CIRCUIT
SR., ) C.A. NO. 03A01-9805-CV-00162
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
)
vs. )
) HON. DALE WORKMAN
) JUDGE
)
GARY LONG and RICHARD M. )
SMITH, )
)
Defendants-Appellants. ) AFFIRMED IN PART
) REVERSED IN PART
) REMANDED
DAVID S. WIGLER, Knoxville, for Appellee.
JOHN KNOX WALKUP, Attorney General & Reporter, WILLIAM J. MARETT, JR., MARY M.
COLLIER, Assistant Attorneys General, Nashville, for Appellants.
OPINION
Goddard, P. J.
This is an action seeking damages for the tort of outrageous conduct.
Page 1
Plaintiff Ronald Satterfield, a former officer of the Tennessee Public Service Commission
(PSC) sued Lieutenant Richard Smith and Captain Gary Long, his former supervisors at
the PSC, alleging that they wrongfully caused him to be discharged by purposely
manufacturing and reporting false charges against him. Plaintiff also alleged that the
Defendants violated his constitutional rights of due process and free speech. The Trial
Court dismissed Satterfield's constitutional claims and his claims against the Defendants in
their official capacities, leaving only his outrageous conduct claims against the Defendants
personally.
These claims were tried before a jury, which returned a verdict against Mr.
Long in the amount of $64,000 in compensatory and $40,000 in punitive damages; and
against Mr. Smith in the amount of $16,000 compensatory and $10,000 punitive damages.
Defendants appeal the judgment entered and Plaintiff cross-appeals the Trial Court's
dismissal of his constitutional claims.
We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court relative to Plaintiff's constitutional
claims, affirm the judgment for compensatory and punitive damages against Defendant
Long, and reverse the judgment against Defendant Smith.
The relevant facts taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff are as follows.
Plaintiff began his employment as a PSC officer on October 1, 1990. He worked at the
Interstate 40-Interstate 75 Scales in Knox County, inspecting commercial tractor-trailers to
insure compliance with applicable safety regulations.
On June 18, 1995, he was off duty and watching his daughter play softball, an
umpire approached him and asked him for assistance in determining the birth date of a girl
playing softball in the league. The umpire, who knew Plaintiff was a state officer, had
Page 2
suspicions that the girl's parents and coach had falsified a copy of her birth certificate in
order to allow her to play in a league for which she was too old.
Plaintiff agreed to help the umpire, called the Tennessee Highway Patrol
office, and requested driver's license information regarding the girl. Plaintiff obtained from
the Highway Patrol a printout of the driver's license information, which showed that the girl
was in fact over the age limit for the softball league in which she was playing.
The next day, June 19, 1995, the girl's father filed a citizen's complaint
against Plaintiff alleging that he had misused his authority to obtain the information about
his daughter. The complaint was received by Shelton Hunt, who was then manager of
transportation services for the PSC. In filling out the complaint form, Mr. Hunt wrote that
Plaintiff had been accused of obtaining "a certified copy of an NCIC [National Crime
Information Center] report" used to verify the girl's age. Mr. Hunt testified as follows in this
regard:
Q: When you were talking to Mr. Smith, you filled out that form,
or filled it out shortly thereafter; is that correct?
A: Yes, sir. I think I filled it out. Yes, sir, I had it.
Q: Now, on that form, the language appears NCIC, or certified
copy of an NCIC report; correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did that language come from?
A: In talking to Mr. Larry Smith.
Q: Did Mr. Larry Smith tell you that an NCIC report had been
used to get his daughter disqualified from the softball
game?
A: It may or may not have been in those words. I think the
words that he actually used was [sic] a certified copy of
an official document, and I in turn thought it would be an
NCIC report from THP.
Page 3
At this point, a brief discussion is necessary regarding the difference
between the NCIC computer system and the computer system that actually was used, the
state driver's license system. The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system is a
federal computer database containing the criminal histories of individuals who have been
arrested, as well as outstanding arrest warrants. It is a confidential system. Misuse of the
NCIC system, such as was alleged here, is a federal felony carrying a penalty of up to three
years in prison.
On the other hand, the state driver's license computer system contains basic
information about individuals licensed to drive a vehicle in Tennessee. The information in
the state system is a matter of public record, and the undisputed evidence in the record
shows that it is readily accessible to anyone who requests it and pays a five dollar fee.
When Plaintiff called the highway patrol, he spoke with Lieutenant Brian
Farmer, telling him that he needed the birth date of a young lady. When asked at trial
whether he requested that Mr. Farmer use the NCIC computer, Plaintiff responded, "No, sir,
I did not. I stipulated specifically not to use the NCIC, that all I needed was a date of birth,
no history even on that." Mr. Farmer testified by affidavit that "Officer Satterfield asked for a
driver's license check. Officer Satterfield did not ask for an NCIC check."
Thus, Mr. Hunt's assumption that Plaintiff had requested use of the NCIC
computer was erroneous. Mr. Hunt directed Defendant Long to investigate the allegations
against Plaintiff. On June 26, 1995, Mr. Long interviewed Plaintiff in his office, in the
presence of Defendant Smith. Plaintiff testified that he unequivocally told Mr. Long that he
did not use the NCIC computer. Mr. Long testified as follows regarding the interview:
Q: But you didn't care about the difference between NCIC and
state computer system?
A: Sir, I wasn't asked to make that determination. I was asked
Page 4
to take a statement from Officer Satterfield and take a
statement from Lieutenant Farmer, I wrote them down
exactly like those two individuals told me, I typed it up in
my report and I sent it in, and that is the last thing I had to
do with anything in that investigation. I made no
recommendations about anything.
Mr. Long's memorandum of the interview, which was sent to Mr. Hunt and up through the
PSC chain of command, states in relevant part:
SUBJECT: Officer Ron Satterfield NCIC Investigation Report of
Interview and Officer's Statement
This interview was conducted from approximately 11:30 AM
until 12:05 PM at my office at the Knoxville Scales.
In attendance at this meeting was Lt. Richard Smith, Officer
Ron Satterfield and myself.
I advised Officer Satterfield of the allegations that he used the
NCIC Computer System by requesting and obtaining
information from the Tennessee Highway Patrol computer.
Officer Satterfield said he did call Lt. Brian Farmer of the THP
and requested a birth date on a girl who was playing in a
recreational softball league.
Officer Satterfield said he didn't think their [sic] was anything
wrong with requesting the information. He said he knows of
other agencies and he knows some of our officers run
information on the PSC computers at the scales for companies
requesting information on their drivers and for other reasons he
did not specify.
Officer Satterfield said he never meant to cause anyone any
trouble and he did not do it with the intent to hurt anyone.
He said he certainly would not have done it if he thought it
would jeopardize his job in any way.
He said he is sorry if his actions have caused a problem for
anyone involved including Lt. Farmer, the THP or the PSC.
Lt. Smith and I both believed Officer Satterfield to be sincere
during this interview.
I advised Officer Satterfield he would be on Administrative
Leave with Pay pending the outcome of this investigation.
Page 5
Mr. Hunt received Mr. Long's memorandum, along with a file containing
several other recent memoranda from Mr. Long to Plaintiff, and determined that Plaintiff's
employment with the PSC should be terminated. Mr. Hunt testified by affidavit in this regard
as follows:
On June 28, 1995, I submitted a Memorandum on the incident
to Gordon Smith, Director of the Transportation Services
Division. The memorandum recommended Mr. Satterfield's
termination. . .
I received no information from Gary Long or Richard Smith,
except what was included in the documents appended to
Gordon Smith's Memorandum.
Several memos drafted by Mr. Long regarding Plaintiff's job performance are attached to
Mr. Hunt's memorandum to Gordon Smith. One of them, dated July 18, 1995, begins with
the allegation that "Officer Satterfield has lost or destroyed the only copies of his former
officers [sic] weekly reports."
Mr. Long testified at trial that several of his officers had come to him with
complaints that Plaintiff had lost or falsified his weekly reports. He testified that the officers'
complaints first came to his attention "around July 18th," after Plaintiff had been placed on
administrative leave. There was no other evidence presented at trial tending to support this
allegation. In fact, Defendant Smith testified that Plaintiff had always turned in his weekly
reports to him on time.
The file on Plaintiff's disciplinary history which Mr. Long sent to Mr. Hunt also
contained a memorandum from Mr. Long to Plaintiff, dated June 26, 1995, which states as
follows:
On May 26, 1995 you were scheduled to be in court in Knox
County to prosecute the cases you had set for that date.
You arrived to [sic] the courthouse at approximately 8:30 AM
Page 6
with other PSC Officers.
When court convened at 9:00 AM you were nowhere to be
found.
Citation #950096101 (Ray Skinner, Radar Detector) was
called by the judge on this date and you failed to appear to
prosecute the case. The case was dismissed.
When the judge called your case the other officers in court
searched the courthouse for you and determined after failing to
find you that you were not in the courthouse.
Plaintiff testified that he was in court on May 26, 1995, and that he appeared
for all of his cases which were on the court's docket that day. After he was finished with the
cases for which he was to testify, Plaintiff left the courtroom and went to speak with an
Assistant District Attorney about another case. At trial, Plaintiff presented the testimony of
the Assistant District Attorney and another employee who worked at the courthouse. The
testimony of both witnesses supported Plaintiff's assertion that he was in the courthouse on
May 26.
Regarding the Ray Skinner case referred to in the above memorandum, the
proof shows that Skinner showed up in court on May 26 to contest his citation, without his
case being scheduled on the court's docket. After the cases on the docket had been
heard, Skinner requested to be heard as a "walk-in" unscheduled case. Since the Skinner
case was not on the docket, Plaintiff could not have known that Skinner was going to
appear in court that day. After the court determined that the Plaintiff was unavailable to
testify on behalf of the state, the Skinner case was rescheduled for a later date. It was not
dismissed on May 26 as the memo from Mr. Long to Plaintiff asserts.
Another memorandum in the file sent to Mr. Hunt, drafted by Mr. Long, alleges
that Plaintiff claimed 5.5 hours more than he actually worked during the week of May 24,
1995, and states that "I am placing you on probation for a period of three (3) months." This
Page 7
memorandum is dated June 21, 1995, but also states, "revised June 26, 1995," the date on
which Mr. Long interviewed Plaintiff regarding the computer misuse allegations.
At trial, Plaintiff admitted that he had made mistakes in reporting his time
worked for May 24 and May 26. He stated that he was confronted by Defendant Long
about these errors before the computer incident, and that he "admitted to Captain Long that
it was an error on my part because I had plenty of annual time to cover it." Mr. Long gave
Plaintiff an oral warning, and Plaintiff was under the impression that the matter was
concluded at that point. Plaintiff testified that it "didn't make sense" that he would be
retroactively placed on probation for three months after he had been suspended with pay
pending the outcome of the computer investigation.
After reading Mr. Long's report and the memoranda contained therein, Mr.
Hunt recommended that Plaintiff be terminated. Mr. Long's report and Mr. Hunt's
recommendation made their way up the PSC chain of command to Paul Allen, then
Executive Director of the PSC. Allen concurred with Mr. Hunt, and his recommendation for
termination was followed by the Commission. Plaintiff received his termination letter on
August 11, 1995. The termination letter states in relevant part:
On June 18, 1995, you obtained personal information about
another person through the National Crime Computer. You
then used this information for personal reasons.
* * * *
In making this decision we also took into account your
falsification of your 28 day activity report for May 24, 1995,
which resulted in your pay being docked for 5.5 hours and your
being placed on probation for three (3) months. You were also
assigned to be in court on May 26, 1995. When you failed to
appear to prosecute the case, it was dismissed. This was
negligence in the performance of your assigned duties.
Additional recent instances include your losing the only copies
of your former
officers' weekly reports, and your being late for a training session.
Page 8
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Assistant to the Finance and
Administration Commissioner, who decided that Plaintiff should be reinstated and his
discipline reduced to a nine-day suspension without pay. Plaintiff then appealed this
decision to the Civil Service Commission. While this appeal was pending, Plaintiff and the
PSC settled his grievance by reducing his discipline to a written reprimand which was
placed in his record.
After his reinstatement, Plaintiff was reassigned to the Greeneville Scales
facility because the Knoxville Scales had been closed for renovations. He was unhappy
with his reassignment because it required him to drive a much longer distance to work. He
testified at trial that he felt there were closer areas to which he could have been assigned,
and that he was being punished by being sent to Greeneville. Mr. Long testified in his
affidavit that "Plaintiff's reassignment to the Greeneville Scales was not designed to 'punish
and get back at Plaintiff for challenging their termination of him'" and that "the Greeneville
Scales were chosen for Satterfield since it was the only location with an available space."
Plaintiff testified that after his reinstatement, Mr. Long's general attitude was
"very cold. I sensed venom and viciousness in that man." Plaintiff was not reissued his gun
belt, which contained his weapon and handcuffs. A memorandum from Mr. Long to Plaintiff,
dated December 28, 1995, states that "your weapon cannot be reissued until our firearms
instructor can schedule a time and place to requalify you. This could take some weeks and
I believe an officer working without a weapon is safer at a lighted scale complex."
Plaintiff testified that "once I arrived there [in Greeneville], there was no
equipment, no paperwork, anything to show me that anyone had even worked in that
section of the building with the Public Service Commission. . ." His immediate supervisor
Page 9
met with him shortly thereafter and gave him some paperwork, but did not provide him with
the wheel blocks necessary to properly immobilize the trucks.
Plaintiff testified that he was extremely concerned for his safety without a
weapon and handcuffs, and thus with no way to safely arrest anyone should the need arise.
Plaintiff described an incident which occurred in Greeneville where he was inspecting a
truck and the driver showed him an automatic weapon, and made a joke about Plaintiff
being unarmed. Plaintiff entered into evidence a memorandum from the PSC Drug &
Alcohol Enforcement Specialist, dated November 15, 1994, which warned of the necessity
of always remaining cautious and alert during inspections, stating, "[w]e have had a number
of officers assaulted this year. It is important to note that not all the
assaults have been by drinking or drug using drivers. It is more important to note, IT CAN
HAPPEN TO YOU."
Plaintiff testified that after working "about a week to ten days" in Greeneville
without his weapon, the stress and pressure became unbearable and his doctor suggested
that he take sick leave. Plaintiff took an extended period of sick leave, during which time he
attempted suicide and was hospitalized for two to three weeks. It is undisputed and clear
from the record that Plaintiff suffered quite serious emotional and mental injuries.
Plaintiff filed suit against Mr. Long and Mr. Smith on June 25, 1996. As noted
above, the Trial Court dismissed his claims against the Defendants in their official
capacities, and therefore this appeal involves only the Plaintiff's outrageous conduct claims
against them individually. After the jury trial, the judge approved the jury verdicts, which
totaled $104,000 against Mr. Long and $26,000 against Mr. Smith.
Defendants appeal, raising the following issues:
Page 10
1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that plaintiff's lawsuit
based upon his termination and allegations of retaliation
upon reinstatement was not barred by the exclusive
remedy of the Tennessee Civil Service System?
2. Whether the defendants are immune from this lawsuit under
the protection afforded state employees under T.C.A.
§ 9-8-307?
3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine
an issue of law, to wit: whether the conduct attributed to
defendants was so beyond the bounds of a civilized
society that a reasonable person could, upon hearing
the facts, exclaim "outrageous"?
4. Whether the evidence of defendants' alleged misconduct
was sufficient to support the jury's finding of willfulness,
maliciousness, and an award of punitive damages?
5. Whether the trial court erred in holding that it, and not the
Tennessee Claims Commission under a claim for
Workers' Compensation benefits, had jurisdiction over
plaintiff's cause of action?
6. Whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of the
defendants' psychological expert because she could not
point to a sole cause of plaintiff's alleged injury "to a
medical certainty?"
Plaintiff in his cross-appeal raises the issue of whether the Trial Court was correct in
dismissing his constitutional claims.
Defendants' first argument, that Plaintiff's exclusive remedy for his injuries lies
with the Tennessee Civil Service System, rests on their proposition that "[t]he creation of
the CSC and its remedies, preempts suits by State employees against their individual
supervisors, or against the State." Defendants cite T.C.A. § 8-30-328(k)(4) as support for
this preemption argument. T.C.A. § 8-30-328 et seq. establishes certain procedural
guidelines for regular state employees who wish to file a grievance. Subsection (k) of this
statute provides:
Page 11
(k)(1) Any regular or permanent state employee may file a
grievance within fifteen (15) work days after the receipt of any
final performance evaluation on procedural grounds under the
provisions of this section.
(2) Grievances filed under this subsection are limited to the
provisions of the informal procedure with the final step being
the appointing authority.
(3) Employees who are dissatisfied with the appointing
authority's decision may submit such decision, with all
documentation, to the commissioner for review.
(4) Notwithstanding any law or regulation to the contrary, the
decision of the commissioner shall be final and not subject to
review.
Nothing in T.C.A. § 8-30-328 et seq. mandates or supports the conclusion that a state
employee is preempted from filing a cause of action against his or her supervisor, in an
individual capacity, for an intentional tort. It is apparent that this statute addresses a
situation quite distinct from the present situation. Defendants' first argument is without merit.
Likewise, the Tennessee Workers' Compensation law does not preclude
Plaintiff from filing an claim for an intentional tort against a co-employee or a supervisor.
The Middle Section of this court so held in the case of Blair v. Allied Maintenance Corp.,
756 S.W.2d 267, 270-71 (Tenn.App. 1988), wherein it stated:
Even though the Workers' Compensation Law limits an injured
employee's claims against the employer, it does not place the
same limitations on claims against a fellow employee. The
Tennessee Supreme Court, relying on Tenn. Code Ann.
50-6-112(a) (Supp.1987), has held that an employee may
maintain a common law or statutory tort action against a
coemployee who intentionally injures that employee. Taylor v.
Linville, 656 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tenn.1983); Williams v. Smith,
222 Tenn. 284, 435 S.W.2d 808, 811 (1968).
Mr. Blair alleges that Mr. Oakley committed the torts of assault
and outrageous conduct. These actions, if proven, are
intentional torts. . .After reviewing the record in the light most
favorable to Mr. Blair, we have determined that he has alleged
two common law causes of action against Mr. Oakley that are
not barred by the Workers' Compensation Law.
Page 12
Blair, 756 S.W.2d at 270-71.
Defendants' second, third and fourth issues are similar in nature and we will
address them together. The essence of these issues presents the question of whether the
evidence presented, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, is sufficiently egregious
that a reasonable person could find Defendants guilty of outrageous conduct. Our review of
a properly-approved jury verdict is well-established:
Of course, in testing the validity of a plaintiff's jury award we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
This court has no right to weigh the evidence in a jury case, but
must indulge every reasonable inference in support of the
verdict. Houser v. Persinger, 57 Tenn. App. 401, 405, 419
S.W.2d 179, 181 (1967). We must look at all the evidence,
take the strongest legitimate view of it in favor of the plaintiff
and allow all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Norman
v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 556 S.W.2d 772, 773
(Tenn.App. 1977); Truan v. Smith, 578 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Tenn.
1979). Our duty upon review of conflicting evidence in a jury
trial is not to determine where the truth lies, but only to
determine if there was any material evidence to support the
verdict below. Davis v. Wilson, 522 S.W.2d 872, 875
(Tenn.App. 1974); Chattanooga Gas Co. v. Underwood, 38
Tenn. App. 142, 149, 270 S.W.2d 652, 655 (1954). Even if we
would have reached conclusions different from those reached
by the jury, if there is some material evidence to support the
verdict, it must be affirmed. Davis v. Wilson, supra;Chattanooga Gas Co. v. Underwood, supra at 149-50, 270
S.W.2d at 655-56.
Bryan v. Campbell, 720 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tenn. App. 1986); Mason v. Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tenn. App. 1982).
The standard for determining whether a person's conduct is sufficiently
egregious to give rise to liability for the tort of outrageous conduct was set forth in the
seminal case of Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., 398 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. 1966), wherein the
Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for outrageous conduct:
Page 13
It is the opinion of this Court that certain factors present in these
cases which have allowed an action for mental injury alone
outweighed the valid policy consideration against allowing such
actions.
These factors are set out in the Restatement of Torts (2d). Sec.
46, "Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional
Distress."
"(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily
harm results from it, for such bodily harm."
Clarification of this statement is found in the following comment:
"d. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct. The cases thus far
decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct
has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that
the defendant has acted with an intent which is torturous or
even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional
distress, or even that his conduct is characterized by 'malice,'
or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community
would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, "Outrageous."
"The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities."
From the foregoing portion of the Restatement, we find the two
factors which must concur in order to outweigh the policy
against allowing an action for the infliction of mental
disturbance: (a) the conduct complained of must have been
outrageous, not tolerated in a civilized society, and (b) as a
result of the outrageous conduct, there must be serious mental
injury.
Medlin, 398 S.W.2d at 274.
Defendants are correct in pointing out that the initial inquiry as to whether a
party's conduct could rationally be considered as "outrageous" lies with the court:
. . .the court has the burden of determining, in the first instance,
Page 14
whether appellees' conduct may reasonably be regarded as so
extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery or whether the
conduct is such as to be classed as "mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities," for
which appellees would not be liable.
Swallows v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 543 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1976). However, in
making this inquiry, we must keep in mind that the Supreme Court has noted that
[t]he standards here applicable, i.e., "extreme and outrageous"
and "not tolerated in civilized society," are, like "negligence"
and other variable standards which are based upon the
common sense of the community, primarily for application by
the jury.
Moorhead v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 555 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tenn. 1977); Dunbar v. Strimas,
632 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tenn. App. 1981); Dunn v. Moto Photo, Inc., 828 S.W.2d 747, 753
(Tenn. App. 1991).
Defendants cite T.C.A. § 9-8-307(h) in support of their argument that they are
entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in this case. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(h) provides that
State officers and employees are absolutely immune from
liability for acts or omissions within the scope of the officer's or
employee's office or employment, except for willful, malicious,
or criminal acts or omissions or for acts or omissions done for
personal gain.
[emphasis provided]. Although Defendants were acting within the scope of their
employment during all times relevant to this action, the statute does not provide immunity for
"willful" or "malicious" acts.
Our courts have recognized that in order to be considered "outrageous" an
actor's conduct must at least be characterized as reckless. See Johnson v. Woman's
Hospital, 527 S.W.2d 133, 138 (Tenn. App. 1975) ("A negligent or inadvertent act will not
Page 15
give rise to a claim of outrageous conduct. . .One is subject to tort liability for severe
emotional distress when he engages in outrageous conduct, which conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes such severe emotional distress.") Since T.C.A. § 9-8-307(h) removes
immunity only for "willful" or "malicious" acts, our inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could
find that Defendants' acts were willful or malicious, and sufficiently egregious to be beyond
the pale of common decency and not tolerated in civilized society.
Having carefully reviewed the evidence and the entire record in this case, we
are of the opinion that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the jury
could reasonably have found that Defendant Long's conduct was "outrageous." There is an
abundance of evidence from which the jury could conclude that Mr. Long's intent was to
cause Plaintiff's termination, and that he deliberately filed false and misleading reports to
this end. There is also material evidence from which the jury could conclude that Mr. Long
sent Plaintiff to the Greeneville Scales--into a position where Plaintiff would regularly face
potential danger without any means to safely make an arrest--as a retaliatory measure after
his reinstatement,
As noted above, both Plaintiff and Lieutenant Farmer testified that Plaintiff
specifically told Farmer not to use the NCIC computer. Plaintiff testified that after he was
informed of the allegation that he had used the NCIC computer, he emphatically told Mr.
Long on several occasions that he did not use that system. Yet Mr. Long sent a
memorandum up the chain of command that clearly implied that Plaintiff had admitted using
the NCIC system, which was the offense which caused Plaintiff to be terminated.
When asked on cross-examination whether he "didn't care about the
difference between NCIC and state computer system," Mr. Long answered, "Sir, I wasn't
asked to make that determination." Mr. Long further testified on this point as follows:
Page 16
Q: Do you recall testifying at page 152 of your deposition that
you weren't concerned about any distinction between
NCIC and the state computer system?
A: Well, what I didn't--I don't remember saying that I wasn't
concerned about it.
Q: [reading from deposition] QUESTION: That's right. But now
there is an important distinction, is there not, between
obtaining a confidential criminal record from NCIC, the
National Crime Information computer system, and
obtaining information that is of public record, a date of
birth record that could be obtained by paying the five
dollar fee, and an application with the Department of
Safety. You would agree there is a difference, wouldn't
you? ANSWER: I would say, I would agree there are
some differences there, yes, but I wasn't concerned
about that.
A: I must have said it if it's in the record, I guess.
Mr. Long admitted on cross-examination that he had testified in his deposition on three
separate occasions that he was "positive" that Farmer had told him that he had used the
NCIC computer. At trial he testified that "I don't recall [Farmer] saying NCIC information."
Shelton Hunt testified that "it was Gary Long's job to investigate whether the
NCIC computer was used." He further testified that Mr. Long informed him that the NCIC
computer had been used by Plaintiff:
Q: You didn't do any other investigation besides Gary Long?
A: No, sir. I used the documentation.
Q: So somehow, he communicated back to you the results of
his investigation are, NCIC was used?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was false?
A: Well, I found that out at the Level IV hearing; yes sir.
* * * *
Page 17
A: I may have talked to him on the telephone, yes, sir, to verify
that this is what you have got.
Q: Based on those conversation [sic] you came to believe that
NCIC had been used?
A: That's correct.
When Plaintiff's testimony that he told Mr. Long on numerous occasions that
he specifically requested Farmer not use the NCIC system, and Farmer's independent
testimony, is credited, the conclusion is both rational and inevitable that Mr. Long
purposefully reported a serious allegation against Plaintiff which he knew to be erroneous,
and which, as a federal felony, was likely to lead to Plaintiff's termination.
Both the content and the timing of Mr. Long's other memoranda in the file sent
to Mr. Hunt would support a rational inference that Mr. Long harbored malicious intent
toward Plaintiff. As noted above, Mr. Long sent a memo to the Director of the PSC
Transportation Division, after the computer investigation was complete and Plaintiff had
been placed on administrative leave, which began by flatly stating that "Officer Satterfield
has lost or destroyed the only copies of his former officers['] weekly reports." On
cross-examination, Mr. Long agreed that he had told the hearing officers at Plaintiff's
hearing that Plaintiff "had lost, misplaced, stolen, or something, every report that he was
responsible for for weeks on end from the time he had become supervisor during that time."
Although Mr. Long alleged that this problem had continued for "weeks on end," there was
no written memorandum or documentation of such a problem until nearly a month after
Plaintiff had been suspended.
Regarding Plaintiff's weekly officer's reports, there is no evidence in the
record other than Mr. Long's testimony that Plaintiff ever failed to turn in a weekly report.
Defendant Smith, to whom Plaintiff was responsible for weekly reports, testified that Plaintiff
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always turned in his weekly reports to him on time and in satisfactory form.
Mr. Long's memorandum regarding Plaintiff's alleged missed court
appearance also contained inaccuracies. The memo alleges that Plaintiff missed a
scheduled court appearance, resulting in a case being dismissed. Plaintiff's evidence at
trial demonstrated that neither of these allegations was accurate.
After Plaintiff was reinstated, he made it clear that he did not want to be sent
to Greene County, and that he wished to be assigned somewhere closer to his home. Mr.
Long testified in his sworn affidavit that "the Greeneville Scales were chosen for Satterfield
since it was the only location with an available space." At trial, Mr. Long testified as follows:
Q: Greeneville scales was the only place that had an
opening for Officer Satterfield when he was reinstated?
A: No, I could have put him in Crossville and I could have put
him in Cleveland or I could have put him in Greeneville.
Q: Claiborne County?
A: Claiborne County? I think we just had a road crew working
in Claiborne County, there wasn't anybody working in a
set rest area or facility.
Q: You couldn't put him on a road crew?
A: Yes, sir, I could have put him on the road crew. I talked to
department of Personnel and told them the situation,
and they told me I could put him basically anywhere I
wanted. . .
Mr. Long testified that "I can't say I was real happy about" Plaintiff's reinstatement with the
PSC.
Regarding Mr. Long's possible motives, Plaintiff offered several potential
explanations for ill will toward him. Mr. Long admitted that he had testified in his deposition
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that he "always felt [Plaintiff] was trying to get him in trouble." Plaintiff also testified about
an incident which had occurred shortly before all of the allegations against him arose,
wherein he had witnessed a fellow PSC officer, who was married, "engaged in an illicit
romantic embrace" with a Department of Safety employee. He reported the incident to the
Department of Safety. Plaintiff testified that the fellow officer was "politically connected"
and well-liked in the PSC, and that after the incident, he felt that Mr. Long's attitude toward
him was "totally different; a coldness, I felt intimidation. . .I was very concerned about my
career with the department."
In summary, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict, we are of the opinion that Mr. Long's conduct could reasonably be viewed as
outrageous. The jury could have concluded that Mr. Long deliberately filed a report which
contained numerous false or inaccurate allegations against Plaintiff, which predictably
resulted in him losing his employment. Such an action could reasonably be characterized
by the trier of fact as intolerable in a civilized society.
Regarding Defendant Smith, we have carefully reviewed the record for
material evidence supporting the verdict and found none. Mr. Smith was not involved in
investigating the allegation of computer misuse. He did not participate in the drafting of Mr.
Long's memoranda which contained the other allegations against Plaintiff. Viewing the
whole record in Plaintiff's favor, perhaps the worst that can be said of Mr. Smith's conduct is
that he stood idly by while a higher member of the chain of command, his supervisor,
drafted and sent the inaccurate memoranda. This cannot reasonably be construed as
outrageous conduct. We reverse the judgment against Mr. Smith.
Defendants raise the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to
allow them to present the testimony of Dr. Susan Justice, a psychologist who was offered to
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rebut Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants' actions caused his injuries. It is well-settled that
speculative medical testimony is not admissible in personal injury actions, and that expert
opinions must be based upon a reasonable degree of certainty. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v.
Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993); White v. Methodist Hosp. South, 844 S.W.2d
642, 648-49 (Tenn. App. 1992).
Dr. Justice's testimony was presented in an offer of proof to the Trial Court.
The only instance where Dr. Justice was asked to provide an opinion to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty regarding causation of Plaintiff's injuries is as follows:
Q: Were you able to determine to a degree of reasonable
certainty within your profession with a Ph.D. in
psychology, that--is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: --thank you--that Mr. Satterfield's emotional injury that
occurred in January of '96 was proximately caused by
events that took place at his workplace?
A: Was I able to determine that?
Q: (nods head.)
A: Not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Q: Why not?
A: Well, I think that is because a lot of what happened with
him--and I don't know the truth or falsity of it all, I know
what he is claiming happened. It sort of depends on, not
just the situation itself but how he perceived that
situation. And he may have distorted in his
perception--he may have a distorted perception of the
events that occurred, so I don't know that, so it's really
hard to know whether what happened was a result
of--you know, he could have been, even if he distorted
his perception of what happened, he still could have
been depressed, but then there is more to the story; why
would he distort.
The Trial Court disallowed this testimony on the basis that it was speculative and did not
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establish a cause of Plaintiff's injuries within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. We
agree with the Trial Court. Dr. Justice's testimony establishes only that she could not
conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Plaintiff's injuries were caused by his
employment. She did not testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that his
injuries could be attributed to another cause. It was well within the Trial Court's discretion to
disallow her speculative testimony.
Plaintiff has cross-appealed the Trial Court's decision dismissing his
constitutional claims that the Defendants violated his due process rights. We find that the
Trial Court was correct in this regard. Even assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff was
not afforded due process during the hearing and termination proceedings, it is undisputed
that neither Mr. Long nor Mr. Smith had any control over these proceedings. The extent of
Mr. Long's involvement was to investigate the allegations against Plaintiff and report his
findings. The administrative hearings were scheduled and operated by individuals further
up the chain of command at the PSC. Mr. Long's role in these proceedings was as a
witness only. Further, we note that Plaintiff's constitutional claims are against Mr. Long and
Mr. Smith personally and individually. There is no evidence that Defendants, in their
personal and individual capacity, acted under color of state law to violate Plaintiff's due
process rights, or his right to free speech. We affirm the Trial Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's
constitutional claims.
We are of the opinion that under the circumstances of this case, the award of
punitive damages was justified. This Court has held that "punitive damages may be
awarded against a party who maliciously induces an employer to discharge an employee,"
Schwab v. Int'l. Ass'n. of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 482 S.W.2d 143,
149 (Tenn. App. 1972).
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While such an award, which lies within the
discretion of the trier of fact, B. F. Myers & Son of
Goodlettsville v. Evans, 612 S.W.2d 912 (Tenn.App.1980), is
only appropriate under the most egregious circumstances, we
conclude that this test has been met in this case and the jury
properly exercised its discretion in making the award.
Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of a case where a
jury has found a party liable for outrageous conduct to find
error because in the exercise of its discretion it found the
party also liable for punitive damages.
In conclusion, for the aforementioned reasons, we
affirm the judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages
against Mr. Long. Having found no material evidence
supporting it, we reverse the verdict against Mr. Smith. We
affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff's
constitutional claims against the Defendants in their
individual capacities. Costs of appeal are adjudged one-half
to the Plaintiff and one-half to Mr. Long. The case is
remanded to the Trial Court for collection of the judgment and
costs below which are also adjudged one-half against the
Plaintiff and one-half against Mr. Long.
_______________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P. J.
CONCUR:
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___________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr. J.
___________________________
William H. Inman, Sr.J.
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