Lambert v. Invacare Corp. , 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
August 18, 1998
VIRGINIA LAMBERT, SUPERIOR ) C/A NO. 03A01-9802-CV-00071
HOME HEALTH CARE OF MIDDLE ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
TENNESSEE, INC., and LEGION ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
v. ) HAMILTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
)
)
)
)
INVACARE CORPORATION and )
NATIONAL MEDICAL EQUIPMENT OF )
THE SOUTHEAST, INC., )
) HONORABLE SAMUEL H. PAYNE,
Defendants-Appellees. ) JUDGE
For Appellant Virginia Lambert For Appellee Invacare Corp.
SONYA W. HENDERSON SAMUEL L. FELKER
Thomas, Henderson & Pate JOHN C. HAYWORTH
Murfreesboro, Tennessee Bass, Berry & Sims, P.L.C.
Nashville, Tennessee
For Appellants Superior Home For Appellee National Medical
Health Care of Middle Tennessee, Equipment of the Southeast,
Inc. and Legion Insurance Company Inc.
JOHN THOMAS FEENEY KENNETH R. STARR
Feeney & Lawrence, P.L.L.C. Starr & Daniell, P.C.
Nashville, Tennessee Chattanooga, Tennessee
O P I N IO N
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1
Plaintiff Virginia Lambert (“Lambert”) was injured on
August 22, 1995, while in the course and scope of her employment
with the plaintiff Superior Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee,
Inc. (“Superior”). Lambert’s injuries occurred while she was
using a mechanical lift manufactured by defendant Invacare
Corporation (“Invacare”) and leased to Superior by defendant
National Medical Equipment of the Southeast, Inc. (“National”).
As Lambert was transferring a patient from a chair to a bed, one
of the lift’s wheels came off, forcing Lambert to bear the
patient’s weight and causing an injury to her back. As a result,
Lambert received workers’ compensation benefits, which were paid
on behalf of Superior by the plaintiff Legion Insurance Company
(“Legion”).
Superior and Legion filed suit against Invacare and
National on February 26, 1997, seeking damages and reimbursement
for the compensation benefits previously provided to and on
behalf of Lambert. Their complaint, which states that their
action is brought pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-6-112 of the Workers’
Compensation Law,1 asserts claims based upon negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty.
On June 19, 1997, Lambert filed an action for breach of
warranty against the same defendants, Invacare and National,
seeking damages for her injuries. Lambert’s case was then
consolidated with that of Superior and Legion.2 The trial court
subsequently dismissed all claims, holding that the applicable
1
See T.C.A. § 50-6-101, et seq.
2
For ease of reference, Lambert, Superior and Legion will be referred to
collectively as “the plaintiffs.”
2
statute of limitations had run with respect to each. In so
holding, the trial court relied upon the limitations provisions
found in T.C.A. § 50-6-112, which section provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(a) When the injury or death for which
compensation is payable under the Workers’
Compensation Law was caused under
circumstances creating a legal liability
against some person other than the employer
to pay damages, the injured worker, or such
injured worker’s dependents, shall have the
right to take compensation under such law,
and such injured worker, or those to whom
such injured worker’s right of action
survives at law, may pursue such injured
worker’s or their remedy by proper action in
a court of competent jurisdiction against
such other person.
* * *
(d)(1) Such action against such other person
by the injured worker, or those to whom such
injured worker’s right of action survives,
must be instituted in all cases within one
(1) year from the date of injury.
(d)(2) Failure on the part of an injured
worker, or those to whom such injured
worker’s right of action survives, to bring
such action within the one (1) year period
shall operate as an assignment to the
employer of any cause of action in tort which
the worker, or those to whom such worker’s
right of action survives, may have against
any other person for such injury or death,
and such employer may enforce same in such
employer’s own name or in the name of the
worker, or those to whom such worker’s right
of action survives, for such employer’s
benefit, as such employer’s interest may
appear, and the employer shall have six (6)
months after such assignment within which to
commence such suit.
Applying the above provisions, the trial court reasoned that
since Lambert -- the injured worker -- had not filed a claim
within the one-year limitations period, her cause of action was
3
barred by T.C.A. § 50-6-112(d)(1). By the same token, the trial
court found that the additional period of limitations set forth
at T.C.A. § 50-6-112(d)(2) operated to bar the claims of Superior
and Legion, which had been filed more than 18 months after the
date of Lambert’s injury.
The plaintiffs appealed, raising the issue of whether
their claims are instead subject to the four-year limitations
period found at T.C.A. § 47-2A-506(1). That section provides, in
pertinent part, that
[a]n action for default under a lease
contract, including breach of warranty or
indemnity, must be commenced within four (4)
years after the cause of action accrued....
Plaintiffs contend that their claims are for breach of warranty
and are not related to Lambert’s employment, and that the
applicable statute of limitations period is thus four years,
rather than the one-year/18-month periods set forth in T.C.A. §
50-6-112.
We cannot agree with the plaintiffs’ contention. It is
true that the subject limitations provisions are in conflict. By
its own terms, however, T.C.A. § 50-6-112 expressly applies to
situations where an injury compensable under the Workers’
Compensation Law occurs under circumstances creating legal
liability in a third party. T.C.A. § 50-6-112(a). That is
precisely the situation in the instant case. The plaintiffs’
argument that the statute of limitations cannot be “reduced” from
four years to one year simply because the injury occurred while
4
Lambert was at work misses the point; the statute of limitations
provisions in T.C.A. § 50-6-112(d) are necessarily implicated
because Lambert’s injury was compensable under the Workers’
Compensation Law.
In construing T.C.A. § 50-6-112(d), we have previously
held that
[t]he statute is clear and unambiguous that
for a period of one year from the date that
the cause of action accrues, the employee...
can institute suit against allegedly liable
third parties. However, the statute
explicitly provides that at the expiration of
the one year, the claim of the employee is
assigned to the employer.... There is little
doubt that the legislature intended for the
employer or the workers compensation carrier
to proceed with its assigned claim within
eighteen months of the date the cause of
action accrues.
Craig v. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 794 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Tenn.App.
1990); see also Gibson v. Lockwood Products Division of J.L.
Underwood, 724 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tenn.App. 1986).
Furthermore, it is well-established that specific
statutory provisions generally will be given effect over
conflicting general provisions. See Dobbins v. Terrazzo Machine
& Supply Co., 479 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tenn. 1972), and Woodroof v.
City of Nashville, 192 S.W.2d 1013, 1015 (Tenn. 1946)(“...the
reason and philosophy of the rule [giving effect to specific
statutory provisions over general ones] is that where the mind of
the legislature has been turned to the details of a subject and
they have acted upon it, a statute treating the subject in a
5
general manner should not be construed as intended to affect the
more particular provision.”). In Dobbins, an injured employee,
who previously had received workers’ compensation benefits,
brought an action against the manufacturers of the machine that
had caused his injuries. The Supreme Court held that the
specific statute of limitations provisions now found at § 50-6-
112 controlled over the general statute of limitations for
personal tort actions.3 Dobbins, 479 S.W.2d at 809.4
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the facts
of this case bring it squarely within the provisions of T.C.A. §
50-6-112. Accordingly, Lambert had, pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-6-
112(d)(1), one year from the date of her injury within which to
file her claim against Invacare and National. The injury
occurred on August 22, 1995; Lambert’s complaint was not filed
until June 19, 1997, some twenty-two months later. Once
Lambert’s year in which to file had expired without suit being
filed, her cause of action was automatically assigned by the
statute to her employer, Superior; from that point, Superior had
six months in which to commence its own action. See T.C.A. § 50-
6-112(d)(2). It is clear that Superior and Legion did not file
their complaint until February 26, 1997 -- just over 18 months
from the date of the accident, or six months and 4 days from the
3
At the time Dobbins was decided, there existed a conflict between the
limitations periods set forth in the two statutes.
4
Cf. Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville, 827 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tenn.App.
1991), in which we held that the injured plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim
was governed by the four-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 47-2-725(1),
rather than the general limitations period contained in T.C.A. § 28-3-
104(a)(1). The instant plaintiffs’ reliance on Turner is misplaced, however;
although that case involved an on-the-job injury, the workers’ compensation
statutes, and T.C.A. § 50-6-112 in particular, were not mentioned in that
case. The issues now before us do not appear to have been raised in Turner.
6
date on which Lambert’s cause of action was statutorily assigned.
We therefore hold that the trial court correctly
applied the statute of limitations provisions contained in T.C.A.
§ 50-6-112(d) in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims.5 The
decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are
taxed to the appellant. This case is remanded to the trial court
for the collection of costs assessed there, pursuant to
applicable law.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
_________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
_________________________
William H. Inman, Sr.J.
5
Given this conclusion, we need not address the additional issue raised
by National, i.e., that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the
defendants under T.C.A. § 47-2A-216.
7