Jewell Maness v. Estate of Acie Maness ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
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IN RE: Henderson Chancery No. 8960
C.A. No. 02A01-9611-CH-00270
JEWELL MANESS,
Plaintiff,
Hon. Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
v.
ESTATE OF ACIE LEE MANESS,
Deceased; JAMES LEE MANESS,
FILED
WILLIE MANESS & EDWARD MANESS, November 12, 1997
Defendants. Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
THOMAS ANDERSON, Lexington, Attorney for Plaintiff.
STEPHEN MILAM, Lexington, Attorney for Defendants.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
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TOMLIN, Sr. J.
Mrs. Jewell Maness (“Plaintiff”) as administratrix of the estate of Acie Lee
Maness, her deceased husband, filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Henderson
County seeking to set aside or void a fraudulent conveyance. Named defendants were
the estate, along with James Lee M aness, Willie Maness and Edward Maness, the three
sons of plaintiff’s deceased husband, who were the grantees under a warranty deed
executed by Acie Lee M aness during his life- time. Plaintiff’s motion for sum mary
judgment was overruled, whereupon the case went to trial. Following a hearing, the
chancellor dismissed plaintiff’s petition. On appeal the sole issue for our consideration
is whether or not the chancellor erred in dismissing plaintiff’s petition. We are of the
opinion that the trial court did err. Accordingly we reverse and remand.
Most if not all of the material facts are undisputed. Plaintiff and Acie Lee
Maness were married in February 1975. They rem ained married until his death in
August 1993. At the time of the m arriage her deceased husband was the owner of a
farm, containing approximately 330 acres, located in Henderson County, on which he
and his three sons by a previous marriage kept their individual herds of cattle. This
farm is the real estate that is the subject of this litigation. During the time that they were
married both parties worked outside the home. Plaintiff was employed at Brown Shoe
and Magnetek and her late husband was employed by the City of Lexington. The
parties’ enjoyed generally a good relationship during their m arriage. The only
differences of any substance arose from how their respective incom es were to be spent.
As a general rule plaintiff spent her money on the household bills, utilities, groceries
and the like and as a general rule Acie Lee Maness spent his money on the farm for
such items as buying farm equipment, cattle, sowing pastures, feeding the cattle and
making im provem ents on the farm such as fencing, dozer w ork and the building of a
catfish lake.
The farm was m ortgaged for almost the entire period of tim e the parties were
married. D uring the period of their m arriage, Acie Lee Maness made regular paym ents
of principal and interest on the note secured by the mortgage. In point of fact, plaintiff
testified that her husband refused to pay any of the household expenses because he
contended that all of his income was needed to pay the farm expenses. Acie Lee
Maness paid off the mortgage in the fall of 1992.
Acie Lee M aness acquired this farm in separate parcels prior to their marriage.
A portion of the farm had been inherited by him from members of his family. Other
parts of the farm were purchased by him from either relatives or a neighbor. The record
reflects that Acie Lee Maness spent much of his free time on the farm. Most of the
time he maintained a herd of cattle on the farm , amounting to 50 or more head. In
addition, each of his sons kept a small num ber of cattle on the farm as well. From time
to time each of the sons would assist their father in doing some of the farm
maintenance.
It was acknowledged that Acie Lee Maness was in charge of the operation of the
farm and was responsible for paying the property taxes on it. James and Edward
Maness on a few occasions gave their father $100 to be applied to the property taxes.
At different times during his ownership of the farm A cie Lee Maness deeded each of
his sons an approximate eight (8) acre parcel of land at the edge of the farm. Two of
the sons testified that their father had promised them since they were young children
that they would have the farm som e day.
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Plaintiff testified that approximately two weeks prior to her husband’s death
Acie Lee Maness told her that she was to receive a child’s part of the farm and
requested that she arrange for an attorney to come to their home to “fix the farm up.”
She stated that he never regained enough physical strength how ever to bring this about.
She further testified that Acie Lee Maness told her that if his sons got the farm that they
would have to pay for it.
The record is uncontradicted that at no time during the marriage of the parties
and prior to the death of Acie Lee Maness did plaintiff have any knowledge of the
existence of a warranty deed by which Acie Lee Maness had transferred title to the
farm in question. Acie Lee M aness died on or about August 19, 1993. Plaintiff
testified that on Sunday afternoon or Monday following the burial of her husband on
Saturday Edward M aness told her about the deed. She was directed to the Register’s
Office of Henderson County, where she discovered that a warranty deed signed by her
late husband and dated June 14, 1984 had been recorded on August 24, 1993. The
deed conveyed title to his three sons, subject to a life estate being retained by Acie Lee
Maness. This was the first knowledge plaintiff had that the farm in question w as not a
part of Acie Lee M aness’ estate.
The origin of the warranty deed in question was supplied by the testimony of
Steve Beal, a local attorney who prepared the deed, submitted by affidavit, as well as
the affidavit and live testimony of Belinda Maness, the wife of Willie Maness and a
certified court reporter in this area for many years. She testified that Acie Lee Maness
contacted her and requested that she recomm end a good attorney to draw up the deed,
whereupon she advised him that any attorney in town could accomplish this. Some
time thereafter, Steve Beal contacted her and requested that she get two persons to
witness the execution of a deed by Acie Lee M aness. Thereafter, she, Acie Lee M aness
and his attorney met at the hom e of friends of hers, Mike and Sandra Jones, where Mr.
Maness executed the deed conveying the farm to his three sons. The acknowledgment
of the execution of the deed was taken by attorney Beal. There were no signatures of
either Mr. or M rs. Jones identifying them as witnesses to this transaction.
Later that afternoon, according to Belinda Maness, Acie Lee Maness came to her
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home. After Willie Maness, her husband, arrived, Acie Lee Maness presented the deed
to Willie Maness with specific instructions that he, Acie Lee Maness, did not want
anyone to know about it. Thereupon Willie Maness gave the deed to Belinda M aness
and instructed her to “take this and put it in the lock box”, which she did, and there the
deed remained until after the death of Acie Lee M aness.
Both Ed Maness and James M aness testified that the first knowledge that each of
them had about the deed to their father’s farm was after their father’s death. Belinda
Maness testified that the deed was never discussed in the presence of the plaintiff and
that she was the one who retrieved the deed from the lock box following the death of
Acie Lee M aness.
Plaintiff’s petition to set aside the conveyance as being fraudulent was filed
pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 31-1-105 which reads as follows:
Any conveyances made fraudulently to children or others, with an intent
to defeat the surviving spouse of his distributive or elective share, is
voidable at the election of the surviving spouse.
Cases which have previously dealt with this issue make it clear that the gravamen of
this action is whether or not the husband intended to practice fraud on his wife. In
Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. App. 1986) the eastern section of this court set
forth the following factors which were to be considered in determining if a conveyance
had been made with fraudulent intent. These factors are: (1) the consideration given for
the transfer, (2) the size of the transfer in relation to the deceased’s total estate, (3) the
time between the transfer and the transferor’s death, (4) the relations which existed
between the spouses at the time of the transfer, (5) the source from which the property
came, (6) whether the transfer was illusory, and (7) whether the surviving spouse was
adequately provided for in the w ill. Finley, 726 S.W.2d at 924.
In Warren v. Compton, 626 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. App. 1981), an earlier case from
the eastern section of this court that dealt with the same issue, the court stated:
However, we do not lim it our considerations to those factors alone.
Circumstances which establish fraudulent intent are as varied as the
ingenuity of the human mind may devise. All facts and circumstances
surrounding the transfer m ust be considered. Warren, 626 S.W.2d at 17.
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Furthermore, as stated by this court in Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 57
Tenn. App. 241 (Tenn. App. 1967): “In cases of this type there can be no fixed rule of
determining when a transfer or gift is fraudulent to a wife; each case must be
determined on its own facts and circumstances.” Id. at 802.
Following the trial below, the chancellor wrote a letter to counsel for the parties
in which he set forth his reasons for ruling that the conveyance by the decedent was not
a fraudulent transfer. He noted that the following “facts” served to negate a fraudulent
intent: (a) The transfer of the property took place ten years before the death of M r.
Maness; (b) the relationship between Mr. Maness and Mrs. Maness over the years had
been a “good one”; (c) the farm was ancestral property and had been owned by Mr.
Maness before the marriage; and (d) the fact that Mr. Maness and his three sons had
worked the farm openly and continuously for years, with each one of them contributing
time, labor and incom e for the upkeep of the property. As to this factor the court
concluded that this was valuable consideration.
In our review of the record, the evidence preponderates against three of the four
findings of fact by the chancellor, the exception being that the relationship between
husband and wife. This factor is in equipoise, in our opinion.
As to the chancellor’s first finding, just because the transfer took place ten (10)
years before Mr. Maness’ death does not mean it wasn’t a fraudulent transfer. As to the
farm being ancestral property, the proof is to the effect that only a small portion of the
farm was actually inherited ancestral property. Lastly, the sons testified that the only
consideration given for the transfer was $10 paid to their father by Willie Maness, and
that they considered the labor by them and expenditures made by them in relation to the
farm as rent to their father for perm itting them to raise their cattle on their father’s
farm .
In our opinion not only does the evidence preponderate against the conclusion
reached by the chancellor, but preponderates in favor of our conclusion that the transfer
was a fraudulent one. First of all, the transfer of the farm to the sons under the
circumstances was without consideration and w ithout the consent of his w ife.
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Secondly, the size of the transfer w as substantial in relation to the total assets of Mr.
Maness. Excluding the farm, the uncontradicted testimony is that as to the balance of
their combined estate, the personal property had a value of $67,000 and the non-farm
real estate $25,000. Plaintiff valued the farm property transferred at $800 an acre or
$266,400. Willie Maness testified that the farm land was worth $300 to $400 per acre,
and no more than $133,200. With either valuation, the farm is a substantial portion of
the estate.
By far and away the most com pelling reason for holding that Mr. M aness
transferred this property with a fraudulent intent was the cloak of secrecy under which
the transfer was made. After employing an attorney to prepare the deed Mr. Maness
through his attorney requested a daughter-in-law to find two persons to “witness” the
execution of the deed. She did so by arranging a meeting at the friends’ home, where
the deed was signed by M r. Maness in their presence and notarized by the attorney.
The arranging for the execution of a warranty deed before third-party witnesses is in
essence a nullity and adds to the mystery.
The desire for secrecy by Mr. Maness and his intent to insure that his wife knew
nothing about this transaction is further spelled out by his presenting the deed after
execution to his son Willie, with a specific admonition that no one was to be told about
this deed (including his other two sons) and Willie’s instruction to his wife that she
place the deed in their lock box, which she did. There it remained until some four or
five days after the death of Mr. Maness nine years later, when it w as recorded. Only
then was plaintiff advised about the existence of this document and its effect
upon her life.
We reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that this conveyance
by Acie Lee Maness was a fraudulent conveyance insofar as his spouse, the
plaintiff, was concerned. It is hereby set aside and declared void. As a result
thereof, the property sought to be conveyed becomes a part of Acie Lee
Maness’ estate.
There is nothing in this record to indicate whether Acie Lee Maness died
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testate or intestate. While it would appear that he died without a will, this court
is certain that the status of his estate will be made clear to the trial court upon
remand. This case is remanded to the Chancery Court of Henderson County for
the determination of what plaintiff’s marital rights are and what her
distributive share of the estate as the surviving widow would amount to. Costs in
this cause on appeal are taxed to defendants, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
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TOMLIN, Sr. J.
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CRAWFORD, P. J., W.S. (CONCURS)
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HIGHERS, J. (CONCURS)
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