Williams v. Sugar Cove Ltd. Partnership ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FRANK L. WILLIAMS, )C/A NO. 03A01-9605-CH-00175
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
)
FILED
v. )
) April 29, 1997
)
SUGAR COVE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
SUGAR COVE DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
Defendants, )APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
)MONROE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
and )
)
HAROLD WILSON, HARVEY BRANAM, )
THERON R. STONE, JAMES P. LEE, )
WALTER B. LUMSDEN, JR., VAN R. )
MICHAEL, HAY, MORRIS & SUTTON )
CONSTRUCTION CO., a partnership, )
JOE L. DIAZ, MICHAEL C. LITTLE, )
S. HARRIS LOVINGOOD, LOU L. )
LOVINGOOD, and CHARLES E. RIDENOUR,)
)HONORABLE WILLIAM E. LANTRIP,
Defendants-Appellees. )CHANCELLOR, By Interchange
For Appellant: For Appellees Wilson, Branam,
Stone, and Lumsden:
CLIFFORD E. WILSON
Madisonville, Tennessee WILLIAM E. HOWE
Howe & Lee
Sweetwater, Tennessee
For Appellee James P. Lee:
PETER ALLIMAN
White, Carson & Alliman
Madisonville, Tennessee
For Appellee Van R. Michael:
VAN R. MICHAEL, Pro Se
Sweetwater, Tennessee
For Appellee Hay, Morris &
& Sutton Construction Co.:
WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, III
Higgins, Biddle, Chester
& Trew, LLP
Athens, Tennessee
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For Appellee Joe L. Diaz and
and Michael C. Little:
JOHN CARSON III
White, Carson & Alliman
Madisonville, Tennessee
For Appellees S. Harris
Lovingood and Lou L. Lovingood:
J. LEWIS KINNARD
Madisonville, Tennessee
For Appellee Charles E. Ridenour:
ANDREW CRAIG TROUTMAN
O’Neil, Parker & Williamson
Knoxville, Tennessee
OPINION
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
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In this case, the plaintiff seeks to pursue a
“supplemental complaint” filed by him three years after he was
granted complete relief against the original defendants, by way
of a final judgment entered on July 8, 1991. The trial court
dismissed the supplemental complaint, and the plaintiff appealed.
We affirm.
On May 7, 1991, the plaintiff filed a complaint in this
proceeding against Sugar Cove Limited Partnership and Sugar Cove
Development Company, Inc., the latter being a Tennessee
corporation and the general partner of the limited partnership.
On July 8, 1991, the trial court entered a judgment against the
limited partnership and its general partner for $29,162.72, which
was the exact relief sought in the original complaint. With the
passage of time, that judgment became final.
Almost three years later, on June 30, 1994, the
plaintiff filed a motion in this proceeding seeking permission to
file a supplemental complaint, which pleading was attached as an
exhibit to the motion. The motion was granted by order entered
July 15, 1994. Thereafter, each of the eleven individuals and
one entity added to the proceeding by the supplemental complaint
filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment.
On December 8, 1995, the trial court entered an order
granting the defendants’ motions and dismissing the supplemental
complaint. The court found that:
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Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does
not permit the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint after a judgment has become final.
The trial court found that the “supplemental complaints add[ed]
new defendants and causes of action to [the] already concluded
and final judgment.” As an alternative basis for dismissing the
supplemental complaint, the trial court found that it “fail[ed]
to state a cause of action with respect to each of the
defendants.”
The plaintiff argues on this appeal that the filing of
a supplemental complaint in this proceeding is authorized by
T.C.A. § 26-4-101, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The creditor whose execution has been
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part,
may proceed in the court granting the
judgment, or may file a complaint in a court
of general jurisdiction against the defendant
in the execution and any other person, to
compel the discovery of any property,
including stocks, choses in action or money
due such defendant, or the defendant’s
interest in property held in trust for the
defendant, except when the trust has been
created by, or the property so held in trust
has proceeded from, some person other than
the defendant, and the trust is declared by a
deed, trust agreement or duly probated will
containing spendthrift provisions which apply
to such defendant.
* * *
(c) As used in this section, the defendant’s
“interest in property” held in a trust
created by the defendant, or in a trust where
the property so held in trust has proceeded
from the defendant, means the maximum amount
which the trustee under the terms of the
trust could pay to such defendant or apply
for such defendant’s benefit.
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We disagree. T.C.A. § 26-4-101 is limited by its terms to a
complaint that seeks “to compel the discovery of” property of the
defendants as to whom the plaintiff is a “creditor.” The
supplemental complaint in this case has nothing to do with
“discovery”; rather, it is an assertion of new causes of action
as to defendants other than the two defendants against whom the
plaintiff had, three years earlier, obtained a judgment. It
seeks money judgments against the new defendants; a finding that
certain of the new defendants are general partners of the limited
partnership and liable for the partnership’s judgment; a finding
that certain deeds are fraudulent conveyances that should be set
aside; and other related relief. The terms of T.C.A. § 26-4-101
thus do not apply to the supplemental complaint in this case.
The plaintiff also relies upon Rule 15.04,
Tenn.R.Civ.P., which provides as follows:
Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are
just, permit the party to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions or occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading
sought to be supplemented. Permission may be
granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for
relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the
supplemental pleading, it shall so order,
specifying the time therefor.
We hold, as did the trial court, that Rule 15.04 is not
applicable to the supplemental complaint in this case. That rule
pertains to a pleader’s attempt to supplement a pre-existing
pleading. Implicit in the rule is the requirement that there has
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to be a pleading to be supplemented. In this case, the only
pleading to which Rule 15.04 might be applicable is the original
complaint; but that pleading has been converted into a judgment--
and a final one at that. Once the judgment was final, there was
no pleading that could be supplemented.
Finally, the appellant relies on Woods v. Fields, 798
S.W.2d 239 (Tenn.App. 1990) to support his argument that the
supplemental complaint was properly filed in this case. Woods is
inapposite. It simply reaffirmed the holding in Fred’s Finance
Co. v. Fred’s of Dyersburg, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn.App.
1987), that permissive joinder of claims under Rule 20.01,
Tenn.R.Civ.P. is appropriate if the claims sought to be joined in
a single proceeding are “reasonably related.” Woods, 798 S.W.2d
at 242. The court in Woods pointed out that “[a]bsolute identity
of all events [is] not necessary.” Id. Woods permitted, in a
single proceeding, the joinder of a claim for paternity for
purposes of intestate succession under T.C.A. § 31-2-105 with the
plaintiff’s suit to impose a constructive trust on funds received
for the wrongful death of her natural father.
Our response to the plaintiff’s Woods argument is the
same as our reply to his Rule 15.04 argument. There is no
pending claim in this case to which the plaintiff’s supplemental
complaint can be joined. The claim that had been pending prior
to July 8, 1991, matured into a judgment on that date.
We find and hold that there is no authority for the
filing of the plaintiff’s supplemental complaint and that the
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trial court was correct in so holding. We do not find it
necessary or appropriate to reach the trial court’s alternative
holding that the supplemental complaint fails to state a cause of
action as to each of the defendants.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the supplemental complaint. See Welch v. Thuan, 882
S.W.2d 792 (Tenn.App. 1994).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs
on appeal being taxed against the appellant and his surety. This
case is remanded to the trial court for the collection of costs
assessed below.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
________________________
Don T. McMurray, J.
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