Clinton Lien v. Nashville and Davidson County ( 1993 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
January 7, 2003 Session
CLINTON LIEN v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE
and DAVIDSON COUNTY, ET AL.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 01-126-II Walter C. Kurtz, Chancellor
No. M2002-00721-COA-R3-CV - Filed March 4, 2003
Chief Emmett H. Turner, of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Police
Department, discharged Appellant from employment as a police officer for certain violations of
various rules and regulations. The officer appealed his discharge and, after a hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge reduced his penalty to a thirty day suspension. The appeal was further
heard before the Civil Service Commission, which reversed the ALJ and upheld the dismissal of the
officer. The Chancery Court of Davidson County upheld the action of the Civil Service
Commission. The officer appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
WILLIAM B. CAIN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BEN H. CANTRELL , P.J., M.S., and
DON R. ASH , SP . J., joined.
Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Clinton Lien.
Karl F. Dean and William Michael Safley, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Metro
Government of Nashville and Davidson County.
OPINION
Clinton Lien was a metro police officer from August 16, 1993 until April 21, 1999, when he
was discharged by metro police Chief Emmett H. Turner on charges of running a swinger’s club,
downloading pornography on company time, and bringing discredit upon the police force. Mr. Lien
appealed his dismissal, and an administrative hearing took place on February 7 and 8, 2000, before
an Administrative Law Judge who, on September 10, 2000, rendered an Initial Order in which he
overturned the decision of Chief Turner to fire Mr. Lien and, instead, imposed upon him a thirty day
suspension. Metro appealed the Administrative Law Judge Order to the Civil Service Commission
and that Commission, by a vote of three to one, reversed the Administrative Law Judge decision and
upheld Chief Turner’s action in discharging Mr. Lien. The appeal by Mr. Lien was to the Chancery
Court of Davidson County where the administrative record was filed on March 2, 2001. The case
was argued before Honorable Walter C. Kurtz, Circuit Judge sitting by interchange, on February 1,
2002, and taken under advisement. The trial judge rendered judgment on February 20, 2002,
upholding the action of the Civil Service Commission, and Mr. Lien timely appealed.
Because we are dealing with the future of a veteran metropolitan government police officer
in a case where an Administrative Law Judge has held in his favor and because the vote in the Civil
Service Commission was a divided vote, we have left nothing to chance in reviewing the extensive
record in this case. The only issue asserted before this Court is whether the action of the Civil
Service Board in allowing the submission of extraneous evidence, subsequent to the hearing, of
minor previous infractions by Mr. Lien was prejudicial and reversible error rather than harmless
error. The action of the Civil Service Commission in this respect was clearly erroneous, but a
harmless error analysis cannot be made without careful consideration of the entire record, taking into
account all of the evidence that was before the Commission.
The standard of review in this Court is the same standard that was applicable to the review
by the trial judge.
The scope of review in this Court is the same as in the trial court, to review
findings of fact of the administrative agency upon the standard of substantial and
material evidence. DePriest v. Puett, 669 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984).
Although what amounts to “substantial and material” evidence provided for in T.C.A.
§ 4-5-322(h) is not clearly defined. It is generally understood that “it required
something less than a preponderance of the evidence, (citations omitted) but more
than a scintilla or glimmer.” Wayne County v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal
Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (1988).
Gluck v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 15 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
The extensive Memorandum of the learned trial judge left no stone unturned in the
consideration of this case, and since we cannot improve upon it, we adopt it in relevant part as the
Opinion of this Court as follows:
This is an appeal from the Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“CSC”) rendered November 16,
2000, pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The petitioner is
challenging his termination of employment as a Metropolitan Police Officer. The
petition for judicial review was filed in the chancery court on January 12, 2001.1 The
undersigned Judge is sitting by interchange per Order of January 7, 2002. Both
1
The administrative record was filed with the Court on March 2, 2001.
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parties have filed extensive and excellent memoranda of law. The case was argued
before the Court on February 1, 2002, and taken under advisement.
The plaintiff in this case contends that the decision of the CSC is illegal,
arbitrary, and capricious and that the decision of the CSC was unsupported by the
evidence in the record. Specifically, the Petitioner claims that:
....
2. There is no articulated procedure in the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County Civil Service
Rules, policy number 6.8 A-1, or Article 12.05 of the
Metropolitan Charter to guide the Civil Service Commission
in reviewing the initial order which led to the Civil Service
Commission acting arbitrarily and capriciously and rendering
a decision that was unsupported by the evidence in the record
thus violating the petitioner’s right to due process warranting
a reversal of the decision; and
3. The expansion of the record by the Civil Service Commission
to include prior disciplinary actions of the petitioner was
arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial and
material evidence in the record violating the petitioner’s due
process rights.
4. The act of expanding the record to include prior disciplinary
acts of the petitioner by the Civil Service Commission
amounted to the Commission using rule making instead of
adjudication thus violating the petitioner’s right to due
process and warranting reversal by this Court.2
(Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 13, 16, 22, and 25)
The Police Chief terminated the petitioner for cause. The petitioner appealed
to the CSC. The CSC is established by Article 12 of the Metropolitan Charter.
Section 12.05 states in part:
No employee in the classified service may be terminated, or
suspended from the service, or demoted in pay grade, except for cause
and after a hearing before the department head or other appointed
authority, with prior reasonable notice, in writing, of the proposed
2
The court considers No. 4 as just another way to raise the co mpla int made in No. 3. The four (4) issues
prese nted are taken from the sectio n head ings in the p etitioner’s brief.
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action and the reasons therefore, .... Any employee terminated from
the classified service or suspended or demoted in pay grade, by his
simple written request to the commission, shall have the action
reviewed by the commission. If the commission does not approve the
action, it may modify or reverse it, and provide whatever recompense
is indicated, which shall not exceed net loss of earnings. In a review
by the commission of any disciplinary action, the disciplinary
authority shall bear the burden of proof of just cause for discipline.
Section 12.07(h) states in part:
The disciplinary action within the classified service. Rules with
respect to such action shall provide that when an employee requests
a review of disciplinary action taken against him, as provided in
Section 12.05 above, such employee shall be furnished a copy of the
basis of his discipline not less than fifteen days prior to such hearing,
and said rules may provide for the amendment of grounds for
discipline upon reasonable notice to the employee.
It shall be mandatory that the rules provide that the judgment and
findings of the commission on all questions of fact, in the hearing of
charges proffered against any classified employee under provision of
this article, shall be final and shall be subject to review only for
illegality or want of jurisdiction, excepting only cases where the
classified employees have been dismissed from the service by
judgment of the commission, in which case such dismissed employee
may prepare and file the record of the proceedings, including the
transcript certified by the chairman of such commission, in the circuit
and chancery courts of Davidson County, ....
The CSC itself has adopted rules governing disciplinary proceedings. The rules
governing disciplinary proceedings, in cases of an appeal of a dismissal, require a
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) from the office of the Secretary
of State. The ALJ then conducts a hearing and enters an “initial order.” Rules of the
CSC then require:
The commission shall review the initial order of the administrative
judge or hearing officer sitting alone. Written notice of the review
will be included in the initial order.
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The CSC then receives briefs from the parties, hears argument, and then renders a
“final order.” Judicial review of the CSC is then to the chancery court pursuant to
the provisions of T.C.A. § 4-5-322. See T.C.A. § 27-9-114. See, e.g., Gluck v. Civil
Service Comm’n., 15 S.W.3d 486(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)(the demotion of police
officer by Metropolitan CSC affirmed).
It is repeated time and again in the appellate decisions that this Court’s scope
of review on an administrative appeal pursuant to T.C.A. § 4-5-322 is limited. The
scope of review is explained as follows:
The scope of review in this Court is the same as in the trial court, to
review findings of fact of the administrative agency upon the standard
of substantial and material evidence. DePriest v. Puett, 669 S.W.2d
669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). Although what amounts to “substantial
and material” evidence provided for in T.C.A. § 4-5-322(h) is not
clearly defined. It is generally understood that “it requires something
less than a preponderance of the evidence, (citations omitted) but
more than a scintilla or glimmer.” Wayne County v. Tennessee Solid
Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (1988).
While this Court may consider evidence in the record that detracts
from its weight, the court is not allowed to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency concerning the weight of the evidence. T.C.A. §
4-5-322(h), Pace v. Garbage Disposal Dist., 54 Tenn.App. 263, 266,
390 S.W.2d 461, 463 (1965). The evidence before the tribunal must
be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish a
reasonable sound basis for the action under consideration. Pace, 54
Tenn.App. at 267, 390 S.W.2d at 463.
Gluck, 15 S.W.3d at 490.
T.C.A. § 4-5-322 governing this review states in part:
(g) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and
shall be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in
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procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon
may be taken in the court.
(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the
case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the
decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because
the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(5) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial
and material in the light of the entire record.
In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the
court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of evidence on questions of fact.
(i) No agency decision pursuant to a hearing in a contested case shall
be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court unless for
errors which affect the merits of such decision.
Petitioner was employed as a Metropolitan Police Officer beginning August
16, 1993, until his termination by Chief of Police, Emmett Turner, on April 21, 1999.
Chief Turner ’s April 13, 1999, letter to petitioner set out a number of factual
allegations for disciplinary action against the plaintiff, which included his operation
of an adult sexual entertainment facility, dispensing alcohol without a license, failing
to have an off-duty employment request on file, bringing discredit upon the Police
Department by operating a swingers club, and using a Department computer to view
and download pornography.
Petitioner appealed his termination pursuant to Civil Service Rules and
requested a hearing before an ALJ. The Metropolitan Government (“Metro”) filed
its charges and specifications and proceeded on six (6) charges. A two (2) day
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hearing was held before the ALJ beginning on April 7, 2000, where the ALJ heard
from fifteen (15) witnesses. Subsequently the ALJ issued a lengthy “initial order”
making findings of fact.3 The ALJ concluded that termination was too harsh a
punishment and decided that a suspension of thirty (30) days was more appropriate.
A summary of the detailed twenty-four (24) page opinion is outlined as
follows:
1. Charge: Appellant operated an adult swinger’s club in violation of a
U.S. District Court injunction.
- NOT SUBSTANTIATED.
2. Charge: Appellant gave away alcoholic beverages at his club.
- DOUBTFUL PROOF.
3. Charge: Appellant did not receive official permission to operate the
club. - PROVED, BUT MANY POLICE OFFICIALS KNEW
WHAT HE WAS DOING.
4. Charge: Appellant’s operation of the adult swinger’s club brought
discredit upon the Police Department. - PROVED, BUT
MITIGATED BY THE DEPARTMENT’S INACTION AND
FAILURE TO FOLLOW CORRECT PROCEDURE.
5. Charge: Appellant produced and circulated a flyer for a teen club he
operated which stated it was “owned, operated, and secured by a
3
An “initial order” is addressed at T.C.A. § 4-5-314 and the review of an “initial order” at T.C.A. § 4-5-315.
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Metro Police Officer.” - PROVED, BUT FLYER NEVER
CIRCULATED.
6. Charge: Appellant downloaded pornography and viewed it on police
computers. - PROVED.
As to Charge number 6, the ALJ stated and then concluded:
Of all the facts proven, this was the most serious of the
charges. The only reason that this, combined with the other proven
charges, should not result in dismissal is because of Appellant’s
previous spotless record from his employment dating from August
1993. Not only did he never have any previous discipline, but he
never received a performance evaluation in any category of less than
satisfactory. It is appropriate under the facts here to give Appellant
the maximum allowable suspension.
In order to ensure uniformity of discipline, and ascertain
appropriate discipline, this Judge had input from many other judges
in this office who have handled Metro Civil Service cases. The final
decision to suspend for thirty days is actually more severe than if this
had been a consensus opinion.
Metro sought review of the “initial order” of the ALJ and requested that the
CSC reject the thirty (30) day suspension recommended by the ALJ and terminate the
petitioner. Metro requested that the CSC reverse the “conclusion” of the ALJ and
indicated that it did not appeal the factual determination. Metro asserted “that such
conduct is not conduct that should be tolerated and therefore [the petitioner] should
be terminated from his employment.” The Metro attorney stated to the CSC:
The Department acknowledges however, that there were two
of the particular charges which would be considered the most serious
of the violations committed by Mr. Lien. These two particular
charges include: the using of company time and company equipment
to download pornography and secondly, bringing discredit upon the
Police Department. Now, unquestionably the ALJ found Mr. Lien
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guilty of both these charges. The discredit to the Police Department
charge resulted from Mr. Lien’s operation of a sex club in which an
admission was paid by patrons to enter and engage in open sexual
activity with other patrons.
The CSC first met on October 10, 2000, to review the “initial order” of the
ALJ. Mr. Lien was represented by counsel and the Police Department by attorney
Michael Safley. The matter was heard on argument of counsel. The Chairman of the
CSC defined the scope of the hearing as follows:
We are here to review the record that the Administrative Law Judge
had. On these facts, I believe, we are entitled to accept these facts
and look at those facts and make a judgment about the disposition on
those facts. I mean... Chief Turner made one judgment. The
Administrative Law Judge made an entirely different judgment and
now it is before this Commission to review these judgments and to
make our own determination based on the facts.
During the discussion between the CSC members and counsel, one of the CSC
members questioned whether the ALJ’s finding that the petitioner had a “spotless
record” was correct in that there was an article in the record from The Tennessean
that supposedly indicated that the petitioner had been disciplined a number of times
since joining the force in 1993. The petitioner’s lawyer objected and the Chairman
ruled:
O.K., we are going to rule evidentiary speaking, that we will not
consider anything The Tennessean article says about his prior record
Mr. Roberts. [Petitioner’s attorney]. You are exactly right. I haven’t
seen the article and certainly [will] not consider that. So anything that
... we are again bound by the findings of fact that the Administrative
Law Judge found even in this case if they are correct or incorrect.
As the proceeding reached an end, one of the CSC members stated that he had not
read the ALJ’s decision and asked that the matter be postponed. Counsel agreed that
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a postponement would be appropriate and the proceeding was reset for November 14,
2000.
When the case was called on November 14th, the Chairman announced that
the CSC had “expanded the record to include Mr. Lien’s personnel record.” The
petitioner objected. The discussion, however, continued related to the charges
against the petitioner and the Chairman pointed out that, while the prior disciplinary
matters involving the petitioner were “minor,” he did not have a “spotless record” as
the ALJ had found.4 As to the ALJ’s finding that the petitioner had a “spotless
record,” the Chairman stated “now that’s simply wrong.”
The CSC continued to discuss the case until a vote was taken, and by a vote
of three (3) to one (1) the CSC voted to overturn the “initial order” of the ALJ and
reinstate Chief Turner’s decision for termination. The CSC then on November 16,
2000, entered a brief Final Order which states in pertinent part as follows:
Based on consideration of the Technical Record and Order as issued
by Administrative Law Judge Robert Fellman, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision entered by the Administrative Law
Judge to reduce the disciplinary action to a thirty (30) day suspension,
be REVERSED, and the Appointing Authority initial decision to
dismiss Mr. Lien, shall be UPHELD by this Commission and
considered FINAL. 5
When reviewing an “initial order” the CSC is “not bound to accept the findings and
recommendations of hearing examiners.” See Sanderson v. University of Tennessee,
4
The reco rd sho wed discipline for two (2) traffic violations and a failure to appear in court.
5
This final ord er do es not comply with the requirements of T .C.A. § 4-5-315 (i) and 4-5-314(c). This
deficiency is, however, not alleged as error by the petitioner.
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1997 WL 718427, *5 (Tenn. App. Nov. 19, 1997). Here, the CSC and the parties
accepted the factual findings of the ALJ, but the CSC, as is appropriate, substituted
its judgment as to the appropriate action to be taken.
....
II. Lack Of Articulated Standards
As near as the Court can determine, the petitioner’s complaint is that the CSC
makes its decision without any standards and, therefore, the decision is subjective
and arbitrary. This contention is confusing because it does not allege that the CSC’s
decision was arbitrary compared to the punishment imposed for other like
disciplinary infractions but, rather, goes off on a tangent about there being no
“articulated procedures ... to guide the Commission” in making its decision. The
petitioner asserts that there should be criteria by which the CSC can make a
determination between those cases that warrant reprimand, a short suspension, a long
suspension, or termination. Without such standards the petitioner argues that the
decision can be nothing but subjective, arbitrary, and inconsistent with the policy of
the civil service laws.
The Metropolitan Charter has created the civil service system and has charged
the CSC to oversee and review the decisions of department heads related to employee
discipline as being consistent with the departmental rules and civil service laws. The
Court is unaware of any legal authority which requires that specific written criteria
be adopted governing the choice of sanctions for employment rule infractions.
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If a government employer has a choice of sanctions available for the violation
of an employment rule, it would only be a finding of arbitrariness that would allow
a court to “second guess” the administrative decision maker. It is the CSC itself that
is the primary protector of the employee against the arbitrary action of his department
head.
The determination of arbitrariness within the structure of an administrative
law decision is to compare the decision at issue with the precedent in prior cases.
See Pierce, supra at § 11.5 (Unexplained Departures From Precedent). Thus, if an
agency treats individuals differently, it must acknowledge and explain that difference
in treatment or be subject to a determination of arbitrariness. Id. When an agency
does not have a sufficient record of precedents or the record of precedents is not
made, there is no occasion to find that the decision was arbitrary. Id.
In his brief the petitioner cites page 330 of the record and contends that he
asked the CSC to consider disciplinary actions taken against other police officers in
like cases. That contention is not exactly correct. Counsel on page 330 argued that
“[the ALJ] looked at the previous disciplinary action of other employees to see what
would happen to them when they did not fill out a form one fifty. And at that point,
he mitigated the termination of Clinton Lien by determining that other employees that
had committed the same act were not terminated.” This comment was in reference
to the minor offense of failing to file the paperwork related to petitioner’s second job.
Both the ALJ and the CSC found this offense to be minor compared to the viewing
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and downloading of pornography by the use of a government computer and the
operation of a “swinger ’s” club.
Although not referred to in petitioner’s brief, the more important comment
was made by Mr. Roberts to the CSC when he stated:
With no standards by which this action could be taken [,] [t]wenty
three other disciplinary matters were gone into at this evidentiary
hearing. In part of Chief Turner’s own deposition, with people who
had committed similar violations, or more severe violations nobody
received termination. They all received either reprimands or one or
two days off with pay. (TR at 302).
This comment again referred to discipline for failure to file the form 150, one of the
minor infractions at issue. (See ALJ Order at p. 8). Mr. Roberts then later said:
If you read the record, you will find that there ... that some rather
exhaustive testimony was introduced during Chief Turner’s
deposition. And he testified by deposition. In which the disciplinary
actions regarding other Officers were gone into. Some of them much
more serious than any that Officer Lien was accused of. Including in
one case brandishing a firearm in a bar after drinking. That Officer
was not terminated. That brings discredit to the Police Department.
Losing a weapon to someone else. Those were testified to
extensively and those punishments were far less than termination.
There was no consistency as to the punishments given and that is in
part the basis of Officer Lien’s appeal. (TR at 309).
There was proof in the record, brought in during Chief Turner’s testimony, of
disciplinary action taken against other officers for a wide variety of violations. (TR
575-587, 589-611). None of these, however, involved examples which resulted in
termination of officers. (TR 616). Chief Turner was then asked why he terminated
the petitioner and not the other officers whose situations he had been asked about:
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Q. Would you explain, why is there a difference between one - or
two-days’ suspension for the type of offenses to some people and in
Mr. Lien’ s case he got termination?
A. Well, I think what you have to take into consideration is that those
were single incidents that occurred. Although some of the officers or
some of the employees may have had prior charges, they were single
situations that had occurred during the course of their employment.
Q. And how does that compare to Mr. Lien?
A. Well, I think if you compare those individuals with what Mr. Lien
was doing – and certainly I don’t think any of those individuals were
operating a sexually oriented business. In my view, none of those
people were charged with viewing sexually explicit documents on a
computer, they were not charged with operating a private business
that was engaged in sexually oriented affairs. And in my opinion, Mr.
Lien’s business certainly brought a discredit to the police department,
and I felt very strongly that the offenses that he had committed or the
rules that he had violated certainly were serious enough to warrant
termination.
(TR 617-18).
The record does not suggest that the ALJ or the CSC disregarded petitioner’s
evidence as to disciplinary decisions regarding other police officers. In fact, the ALJ
probably went too far in making the comparison of this case with other cases. The
ALJ’s comment on page 23 of his opinion that he had “input” from other judges in
his office, in an effort to ascertain what had happened in other cases, is of dubious
legality. See T.C.A. § 4-5-304(a)(b) and T.C.A. § 4-5-314(d).
In determining discipline of an employee, “supervisors have discretion on
how to discipline the employee.” Gluck, 15 S.W.3d at 490-91. As the issue was
articulated and presented by the petitioner, the Court finds no due process violation.
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III. Expansion Of The Record By The CSC To Include
Prior Disciplinary Actions Against The Petitioner.
The CSC initially met in October 2000 and because a Commissioner had not
read the findings of facts and conclusions of law entered as the “initial Order” of the
ALJ, the matter was continued until November 14, 2000. As the November hearing
opened, it was announced by the Chairman that the CSC, itself, had obtained the
personnel file of the petitioner so as to inquire into his prior disciplinary proceedings.
The petitioner objected to the CSC’s augmentation of the record. Mr. Safley stated
that he had not requested this augmentation and actually did not think that the prior
disciplinary actions against the petitioner were of much importance.
The CSC Chairman explained that the ALJ had found that the petitioner had
no prior disciplinary actions against him and part of the basis of his recommendation
for only a suspension was petitioner’s “spotless” record. An article from The
Tennessean was in the record which indicated that the petitioner had some prior
disciplinary problems. Therefore, the CSC, on its own motion, sought out and
procured the filing of petitioner’s personnel record. Mr. Safley stated “I have not
made such a motion. The police department has not requested that. That doesn’t
mean that the Commission can do that but it is not pursuant to any motion that I have
come and laid before you.” Chairman Farmer stated: “No. I requested his personnel
record be made a part of the record so that it has some clarification about that.” The
Chairman then later stated “[i]t was my understanding and continues to be my
understanding that [the] Civil Service Commission has the power and authority under
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the code to expand the record in every disciplinary case that is brought to us to
include an employee’s past disciplinary record.”
The issue before the Court, then, is whether or not the CSC can expand the
record as was done in this case.
The Court concludes that it was impermissible for the CSC to expand the
record. The brief filed by Metro in this case cites to no rule, statute, or case in
support of the argument that the CSC can expand the record. The Court is of the
opinion that in considering the statute, T.C.A. § 4-5-315 (b)-(h) governing an appeal
from an initial order, the statute does not contemplate further proof being presented
before the agency or commission reviewing an initial order. The Court reaches that
conclusion by reference to the provision found in subpart (e) which states “[t]he
agency shall afford each party an opportunity to present briefs and may afford each
party an opportunity to present oral argument.” Furthermore, in subpart (g) the
statute states that the agency may render a final order or “may remand the matter for
further proceedings with instructions to the person who rendered the initial order.”6
The Court is of the opinion that this statute contemplates that the reviewing agency
or commission shall review the “initial order” on the record before the ALJ. If it is
necessary to take further proof, the case has to be remanded back to the ALJ. The
Court would further note, in a discussion of agency review of the initial order, there
was no mention of the reviewing body’s ability to hear additional evidence or to
6
The rule o f statutory construction is “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” The expession of one thing
exclud es the other. See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Gamble Const. Co., 56 S .W .3d 5 71, 5 76 (Tenn.Ap p.20 01).
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augment the record on its own motion. See Kratzke, A Review of Contested Case
Provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, 13 U. Mem. L. Rev. 552,
582-84 (1983).
Furthermore, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence apply to this case. See T.C.A.
§ 4-5-313. T.R.E. 614(a) only allows a judge (and a Commissioner) to call a witness
in “extraordinary circumstances.” That rule would also apply to the production of
documentary evidence. Documentary evidence is only properly admissible after a
witness lays a foundation. As one commentator on Tennessee law has stated:
Under the Anglo American trial process, lawyers for the parties have
the responsibility of deciding which witnesses to call and what
questions to ask. The judge is a neutral participant who generally
refrains from direct involvement in the presentation of proof, other
than to rule on objections by counsel.
Cohen, Sheppeard and Paine, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 6.14.1 (4th ed. 2000).
Here, it is important to remember that counsel for Metro did not ask for the
admission of the personnel file nor did counsel for Metro rely, in any way, on the
petitioner’s prior disciplinary record. In fact, counsel for Metro specifically stated
that he did not feel that the prior disciplinary record was important because the prior
infractions were so minor.
This case is akin to State v. Brock, 940 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)
where the judge called a witness in order to fill a gap in the state’s proof. The trial
judge had noted that no one had proven the victim’s age, a necessary element in a
statutory rape case. The judge, therefore, recalled a witness to present evidence as
to the victim’s age. The appellate court found this to be error. The Court, here, finds
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that even if the statutory prohibition is disregarded, the CSC erred by augmenting the
record on its own motion. See also J.F. v. State, 718 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. App.
1998)(trial court departs from position of neutrality when it sua sponte orders the
production of evidence that the [party] itself never sought to offer into evidence).
Metro has argued that even if the CSC was in error in augmenting the record,
that the error was harmless. See Hoover v. State Bd. of Equalization, 579 S.W.2d
192 (Tenn. App. 1978)(if an administrative agency commits harmless error, the
reviewing court cannot use it as a proper basis for reversal of the agencies decision);
Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Assoc., 436 S.W.2d 296, 304 (Tenn. App. 1968); and
T.C.A. § 4-5-322(h).
Metro cites specific quotations from CSC members stating that they did not
consider the petitioner’s prior disciplinary record in reaching their decision. Metro
is correct. Even though it was error for the CSC to include past disciplinary
documents in the record, such inclusion was harmless. There is “sufficient
competent evidence” to support the decision of the CSC. The following comments
of the various Commissioners are uncontradicted by the record. During the
deliberation of this matter, the following statements were made:
COMMISSIONER RACHEL: What I see in looking at the entire
case is separate incidents, but all of them reflect on a lack of
judgement (sic) on the part of the employee. Even though they are
separate and different in regards to what happened. Even the last
comment relative to the form one fifty, in my opinion, reflects a lack
of judgement (sic) on his part. I still think that the issue down
loading the pornography in and of itself should warrant
separation. It also shows a lack of judgement (sic). So, I don’t
know what the other incidents have been to other employees who
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have used technology for their own personal benefit that’s identical
or not. But that incident alone, in my opinion, warrants separation.
(TR. p.335)(emphasis added)
VICE-CHAIRMAN CORBITT: Well, I happen to agree with
Commissioner Rachel. Also, I agree with the ALJ that the
disciplinary actions, the supplemental information that we
received doesn’t weigh relative to me in ultimate disciplinary
action. I happen to agree that we have the right to request that
information and we always have. And in spite of the arguments we
heard that there was a precedent where we couldn’t expand upon the
record, we’ve always had the option or the right to request the
personnel file and additional information regarding an employee. I
don’t agree with the Judge’s ultimate decision in overturning the
termination. At the appropriate time, I will vote accordingly. (TR.
p. 335-336)(emphasis added)
CHAIRMAN FARMER: What we have in front of us here is a
Police Officer operating a swingers club. Not getting permission to
do that. Bringing discredit upon the Police Department. I ...clearly
that is something that I believe would be, in my opinion, bringing
discredit upon the Police Department. Using the computer on duty
to down load Adult pornography is serious enough offense in and
of itself to warrant dismissal and I agree with Commissioner Rachel
on that issue as well.
I’m not considering the disciplinary record ...prior
disciplinary record as having any particular medigation (sic) or
one way or the other in this case. Because as I said it is so minor,
but we will make it a part of the record. (TR. p. 337)(emphasis
added)
As evidenced by the above passages, each Commissioner felt that the actions
of the petitioner, specifically the downloading of pornography on a Department
computer while on duty, warranted dismissal of employment. Commissioners
Corbitt and Farmer even went further and specifically stated that the prior
disciplinary actions that were added to the record played no role in their decision to
terminate the employment of Mr. Lien. The CSC voted three (3) to one (1) to
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overturn the judgment of the ALJ and reinstate termination of employment as the
appropriate punishment. The three votes came from the above quoted
Commissioners. The information concerning the petitioner’s past disciplinary record
played no role in the decision of the CSC.
IV. Conclusion
The Court concludes as follows:
....
2. The Court finds no due process violation related to petitioner’s
allegation that the decision rendered by the CSC was somehow standardless.
3. The Court finds that while it was error to augment the record, that
error was harmless. There is material evidence to support the decision of the CSC.
The order of the CSC is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the petitioner.
The ALJ, in his findings of fact, described the materials downloaded by the Mr. Lien from
a computer also operated by the secretary in the warrants division of the police department. He
observed, “[m]ost of the pictures were of nudity alone, similar to those found in Playboy. But some
of the pictures arguably could be considered pornographic, although none showed the ultimate sex
act.”
The ALJ has confused Playboy magazine with Hustler magazine. In observing that, under
the criminal laws of the United States, the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States provided protection for everything except “hard-core pornography,” Justice Potter
Stewart observed, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart concurring).
Downloading pornography - - hard-core, soft-core, or medium-core - - - on one’s own
computer, in the privacy of one’s own home is one thing. Downloading such materials on a
computer assigned to another employee of the police department on department time and leaving the
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disk for perusal by other employees of the department who might not share Appellant’s enthusiasm
for such erotic display of the female body is quite another thing.
In the final analysis, Mr. Lien asserts on appeal a single issue that the admitted error of the
Civil Service Board in allowing the record to be supplemented, post-hearing, by materials related
to his prior minor disciplinary infractions justifies reversal. Considering the entire record in the case,
it clearly does not, as the error is harmless.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for such further
proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of the cause are assessed against Appellant.
___________________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
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