Ramond Gregory v. Laura Sue Gregory - Concurring ( 1996 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT NASHVILLE
_______________________________________________
RAYMOND GREGORY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Lincoln Chancery No. 9645
Vs. C.A. No. 01A019508CH00357
LAURA SUE GREGORY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE LINCOLN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
THE HONORABLE TYRUS H. COBB, CHANCELLOR
Jack B. Henry of Pulaski
For Appellant
James S. Kidd and James B. Cox of Fayetteville
For Appellee
AFFIRMED IN PART AS MODIFIED, REVERSED
IN PART AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
FILED
February 7, 1996
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, SENIOR JUDGE
This appeal involves a suit to determine ownership of an 18.5 acre tract
of land located in Lincoln County, Tennessee. The facts are as follows.
The original tract of land consisted of 15.5 acres which was owned by
Samuel and Jane Gregory, the grandparents of plaintiff, who acquired the
property by deed dated July 30, 1889. Following the deaths of Jane and
Samuel Gregory in 1902 and 1906, respectively, the land was inherited by their
children, Samuel Jr., George, E.T., Henry (the father of plaintiff), Mary Ellen, and
Mary Lizzie. The children inherited the land as tenants in common, each child
possessing a one-sixth undivided interest in the land.
At some point after they inherited the land, the children of Samuel and
Jane orally agreed that they would treat the land as six individual tracts.
Sometime thereafter each child built a house, maintained a garden, and raised
livestock on his or her individual tract. Some of the children fenced off their
individual tracts. In 1928, the children had the land surveyed and drawn into six
individual tracts on the surveyor's map, but no boundary lines were established
nor were any deeds drawn as a result of this survey.
On May 20, 1929, Mary Lizzie Gregory sold her one-sixth interest to her
brother Henry, thereby giving Henry a two-sixths interest in the land. In 1943, the
plaintiff, Raymond Gregory, the son of Henry Gregory and grandson of Samuel
and Jane Gregory, moved off the parcel of his father, to Chicago where he
currently resides. In 1952 Samuel Gregory, Jr., died leaving issue. In 1953 Mary
Lizzie (then Smith) died leaving issue. In 1954 Mary Ellen died leaving issue. In
1955 George Gregory died without issue, and at some point prior to his death,
George had purchased an additional 3 acres of land adjacent to the original
15.5 acres. In 1959 E.T. Gregory died leaving a surviving spouse, Estella Gregory.
The will of E.T. Gregory, which was admitted to probate on February 18, 1965,
devised his interest in the "tract of land of about two and one-half acres . . .
received . . . in the division of the lands of . . . [his] father, Sam Gregory," to his
wife Estella. In August of 1961, Henry Gregory died intestate leaving twelve
children, Sam Gregory, Odell Gregory, William S.T. Gregory, Otho L. Gregory,
Lethel S. Gregory, Raymond Gregory (plaintiff-appellant), Ernest Gregory, Mary
G. Fearn, Joe G. Campbell, Sernetta G. Lane, Corine G. March, and Terea
Gregory. On August 19, 1961, eleven of the children of Henry Gregory executed
a deed to the twelfth, Terea Gregory, which granted Terea "5.5 acres, more or
less," such parcel of land "being the same real estate conveyed unto George
Gregory by various deeds and owned by him at the time of his death, October
30, 1955, and thereafter his brother, Henry Gregory, held possession of said
property adversely under fence paying all real estate taxes, until his death,
August 15, 1961, and upon his death his rights in said real estate descended to
us the undersigned as his children and only heirs at law and our sister, the
grantee herein named."1 The warranty deed from the children of Henry Gregory
to Terea Gregory was recorded in the Lincoln County Register's Office on August
22, 1961. Sometime in 1961, Odell Gregory took possession of the entire 18.5
acre tract and began to farm and graze the land. Odell did not share the
profits he received from these activities with any of the heirs of Samuel and Jane
Gregory.
On March 9, 1965, approximately six years after the death of E.T.
Gregory, E.T.'s wife, Estella (then Buchanan), sold to Odell Gregory, "the same
real estate that was devised unto the undersigned as Estella Gregory by the last
will and testament of the said E.T. Gregory . . . ." The warranty deed from Estella
Buchanan to Odell Gregory was recorded in the Lincoln County Register's Office
on March 22, 1965.
On September 10, 1965, Terea Gregory (then McNeil) executed a
warranty deed to her brother Odell Gregory and defendant Laura Sue Gregory,
whereby she sold Odell and defendant "approximately 5 acres, more or less,
1
Neither the briefs nor the record disclose whether Henry Gregory did in
fact adversely possess George Gregory's tracts, but since neither party has
raised this as an issue, we will assume that Henry held legal title to
George's tracts at Henry's death.
3
and being the same real estate conveyed unto the undersigned as Terea M.
Gregory by deed of Sam Gregory, et al, dated August 19, 1961, and recorded
in the Register's Office of Lincoln County, Tennessee . . . ." The deed from Terea
Gregory McNeil to Odell Gregory was recorded in the Lincoln County Register's
Office on September 20, 1965.
In 1986 Odell Gregory died leaving a surviving spouse, defendant Laura
Sue Gregory, and issue. The will of Odell Gregory left his entire interest in all of
his property, whether real or personal, to his wife, defendant Laura Sue Gregory.
Following the death of her husband Odell, defendant continued to rent and/or
farm the 18.5 acre tract. She did not share the profits she received from these
activities with any of the heirs of Samuel and Jane Gregory.
On September 11, 1992, plaintiff Raymond Gregory filed this suit in the
Chancery Court for Lincoln County seeking to quiet title to the 18.5 acre tract of
land.2 Raymond Gregory filed the suit individually and as a member of a class
consisting of the known and unknown heirs of Samuel and Jane Gregory. The
plaintiff sought certification of the suit as a class action, but the trial court
refused to entertain the suit as a class action. The complaint alleges that the
plaintiff and the other heirs of Samuel and Jane Gregory, hold title to the 18.5
acres as tenants in common. The complaint also asserts that the deed from the
children of Henry Gregory to Terea Gregory was fraudulent, and that therefore,
the deed from Terea Gregory to Odell Gregory was invalid, because it was
based upon the fraudulent deed. The complaint also asserts that the deed from
Estella Buchanan to Odell Gregory is invalid, because Estella Buchanan never
had title to the property.
On December 2, 1992, the answer of defendant Laura Sue Gregory, the
2
The complaint does not specifically state that the plaintiff seeks relief
based upon an 18.5 acre tract, however, both sides introduced proof at
trial by which they each sought relief based upon an 18.5 acre tract of
land. Accordingly, under Tenn.R.Civ.P. 15.02, the complaint will be
considered to be implicitly amended to seek relief based upon an 18.5 acre
tract.
4
wife of Odell Gregory and sister-in-law of plaintiff Raymond Gregory, was filed.
The answer denied the material allegations of the complaint, and additionally
asserted the defense of laches to the allegations of the complaint. The
defendant also asserted a counterclaim to the 18.5 acres based on adverse
possession under T.C.A § 28-2-101 (1980), and the common law doctrine of
prescription. The answer and counterclaim aver that the defendant is the
owner of the entire 18.5 acre tract based upon the defendant's continuous and
exclusive possession of the property under fence, and the fact that defendant
and her husband have paid all taxes on the 18.5 acre tract since 1961.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court entered an order appointing a
guardian ad litem to represent the unknown heirs of Samuel and Jane Gregory.
On November 29, 1994, the case was tried before the chancellor sitting without
a jury. On March 13, 1995, the chancellor filed an order and a memorandum
opinion finding for the defendant. The chancellor found that the defendant
took title to 7.5 acres of the land by virtue of adverse possession under color of
title. The chancellor also found that the defendant took title to the remaining
8 acres3 by virtue of prescription, because the defendant openly, notoriously,
adversely, and exclusively possessed the land for a period of more than twenty
years. The court further found that the doctrine of laches barred the plaintiff
from asserting his claims of fraud in the underlying deeds. In addition, the
chancellor assessed the costs of the action, including a $1000 guardian ad litem
fee, against the defendant.
On April 10, 1995, the plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal. The plaintiff
presents six issues for our review. As stated in his brief, those issues are:
1. Did the Chancellor err in holding that there was a
parol partition of the land of Samuel and Jane
Gregory.
2. Did the Court err in holding that a parol partition is
3
The chancellor only ruled on 15.5 (rather than 18.5) acres of the property.
This was error since the parties seek relief based upon an 18.5 acre tract.
5
binding in this case.
3. Did the Court err in finding that the Plaintiffs were
guilty of laches
4. Did the Court err in finding that the title was vested
in the Defendants by reason of having had open,
notorious, adverse, and exclusive possession in excess
for (sic) (20) twenty years.
5. Did the Court err in holding that each of the
children of Samuel Gregory, divided the property into
2.5 acre tracts and took possession into control (sic) of
their own individual tract.
6. Did the court err in holding that the letter from Odell
Gregory to Terra (sic) Vines was not an admission that
the deeds were fraudent (sic).
In addition to the above issues, the defendant-appellee presents one additional
issue for our review. As stated in her brief, that issue is:
Whether the trial court erred in assessing the costs of
the action below against the defendant?
I. Parol Partition of the Land
We will first address appellant's first, second, and fifth issues regarding the
parol partition of the land. The plaintiff argues that the evidence preponderates
against the trial court's finding that following the death of Samuel and Jane
Gregory, their children orally partitioned the land which the children held as
tenants in common. We disagree.
Under Tennessee law, parol partition followed by possession is binding and
enforceable. Martin v. Taylor, 521 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1975). A parol partition of
land is not a sale of land, and therefore, does not contravene the Statute of
Frauds. Meacham v. Meacham, 91 Tenn. 532, 19 S.W. 757 (1892). In determining
whether a parol partition vests each individual partitioner with fee simple
absolute title in the partitioner's individual tract following partition, a court should
consider whether each individual takes possession of the tract and performs
acts evidencing absolute ownership over that part allotted to him or her. See
Martin v. Taylor, 521 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1975).
At trial, plaintiff Raymond Gregory testified that following the deaths of
6
Samuel and Jane Gregory, their children, E.T., Samuel Jr., Marry Lizzie, Mary Ellen,
George, and Henry orally divided the 15.5 acre tract of land which they
inherited from their parents as tenants in common. The plaintiff testified that
"they would say by word of mouth, '[t]his is my area right here.'" The plaintiff
testified that "each one had his . . . [tract], and they fenced off some areas
there, in a couple of places." Mr. Gregory further testified that each of the
children built a house, grew crops, and maintained livestock on the property
within their individual tracts. During Raymond Gregory's direct examination, the
trial court specifically asked him:
Q. As I understand it, just among them each one
picked out roughly what they thought would be their
two and a half acres and took that over and treated
it as theirs.
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
On cross-examination, Mr. Gregory was asked how the land was "divided up"
when he moved to Chicago in 1943. He responded, that the land was divided
according to "the amount of land these brothers and sisters lived on . . . ."
The trial court found that the children of Samuel and Jane Gregory orally
partitioned the 15.5 acres which they held as tenants in common following the
deaths of Samuel and Jane Gregory. The trial court further found that once the
children partitioned the land, each child performed acts of absolute ownership
over his or her individual tract. The court noted that the derivation clause in the
will of E.T. Gregory supported the court's finding that there had been a parol
partition of the land. In the will, E.T. Gregory devised unto his wife, Estella
Gregory, "the house and tract of land of about two and one-half acres, where
we now reside, which tract of land is on the Providence Road in the 7th Civil
District of Lincoln County, Tennessee, and was received by me about sixty-five
years ago in the division of the lands of my father, Sam Gregory, deceased."
Based upon the will and the testimony at trial, the trial court found that each of
the six children of Samuel and Jane Gregory owned approximately a 2.5 acre
7
tract of land in fee simple absolute.4 The evidence does not preponderate
against this finding.
II. Fraud in the Underlying Deeds
We next consider appellant's issue number six, "Did the Court err in holding
that the letter from Odell Gregory to Terra (sic) Vines was not an admission that
the deeds were fraudulent." The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
holding that defendant owns 7.5 acres of the land by virtue of adverse
possession, because the deeds which conveyed this 7.5 acres to the defendant
(and under which the defendant claims color of title) were either invalid or
fraudulent, and the defendant and/or her husband, Odell Gregory, were aware
of this invalidity and fraud. In forwarding this argument the plaintiff complains
of three deeds.
A. The Deed from the Children of Henry Gregory to Their Sister, Terea
Gregory.
The plaintiff first complains of the deed from the children of Henry Gregory
to Terea Gregory, arguing that the deed was either procured by fraud and/or
surrounded by fraud in its execution. As stated above, Henry Gregory died on
August 15, 1961. On August 19, 1961, the children of Henry Gregory conveyed
by deed "5.5 acres, more or less" of the land in dispute to Terea Gregory. The
land conveyed was apparently the same land which was originally owned by
Henry's brother, George, and apparently consisted of George's individual 2.583
acre tract, and 3 acres of land which was adjacent to the original 15.5 acres.5
The deed which conveyed the 5.583 acres recites that Henry acquired title to
George's land by adverse possession. The deed also states that Henry's children
acquired title to the land by virtue of being Henry's heirs at law. The text of the
deed reads in pertinent part:
4
Each of the children actually owned 2.583 acres of land.
5
George purchased the three acres sometime after he and his siblings
partitioned the original 15.5 acres.
8
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the love and
affection which we the undersigned have and
entertain for our sister, Terea M. Gregory, we the
undersigned Sam Gregory, Odell Gregory, William S.T.
Gregory, Otho L. Gregory, Lethel S. Gregory, Raymond
Gregory, Ernest Gregory, Mary G. Fearn, Joe G.
Campbell, Sernetta G. Lane, and Corine G. March
have bargained and sold and do hereby transfer and
convey unto the said Terea M. Gregory the following
described lot or parcel of land lying and being in the
7th Civil District of Lincoln County, Tennessee,
bounded and described as follows:
Bounded on the north by Providence Road; bounded
on the east by Gregory Heirs; bounded on the south
by Sarah D. Posey; containing 5.5 acres, more or less,
and bounded on the west by Sam Bagley, /and being
the same real estate conveyed unto George Gregory
by various deeds and owned by him at the time of his
death, October 30, 1955, and thereafter his brother,
Henry Gregory, held possession of said property
adversely under fence paying all real estate taxes,
until his death, August 15, 1961, and upon his death his
rights in said real estate descended to us the
undersigned as his children and only heirs at law and
our sister, the grantee herein named.
The deed was filed in the Lincoln County Register's Office on August 22,
1961. All of the signatures of the named grantors appear in the signature block,
and the deed contains the certification of a notary public. The plaintiff admits
that he and the other children signed a deed to Terea which contained the
same language as the deed dated August 19, 1961, but he asserts that the
deed he signed only granted Terea three acres of land and did not contain the
certification of a notary public. Mr. Gregory also testified that neither he nor his
siblings ever intended the "grant" of the land to Terea to vest her with ownership
of the land.6 He maintains that the deed which he signed was on a yellow
piece of paper, and was not signed in the presence of a notary public.7 I n
support of this argument the plaintiff introduced a letter which he alleges was
written by Odell Gregory to Terea Gregory. The letter contains the business
6
Mr. Gregory stated, "It was just giving her permission to stay on the a d
ln.
It [the land] wasn't ours to give. "
7
The deed in the record which is apparently the one which appears on
the books in the register's office is typed on white legal size paper.
9
letterhead of Odell and his partner in the funeral home business, George
Howard. The plaintiff argues that the letter is evidence that the deed from him
and his siblings to Terea which appears "on the books" is a fraud, because the
letter states that the plaintiff's brother Sam never signed the deed or
acknowledged his signature in the presence of a notary public. The plaintiff
argues that the letter is strong evidence of fraud, especially in light of the fact
that the notary who acknowledged the signatures was George Howard, Odell's
partner in the funeral home business. The letter is dated September 7, 1961, and
reads in pertinent part:
Dear Sister Terea;
***
Sam says he didnt Sign the Deed transfer, and
this is where I had to work fast to Save Putt [George
Howard] because he stamped his Seal on this
document.
If he were to push this case and prove that he
did'nt Sign, Putt Howard could get some time in
confinement. I got Sam to Agree that it was Alwright
with him for you to have the little tract of land. And
thats that. Terea you see each of us were suppose to
sign our names in the presence of the Notary, But
being a partner of his he stuck his neck out trusting the
honesty of us. Dont you write Sam Anything
concerning this just leave it to me, and I'll settle all of
it.
***
Your Bro,
Odell Gregory
At trial the defendant objected to the letter on the basis that it was
hearsay not falling within any exception. The trial court admitted the letter
under Tenn.R.Evid. 804(b)(3)8 finding that the statement was against the interest
8
Tenn.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) provides:
Rule 804(b). Hearsay exceptions. The following are
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
***
(b)(3). Statement Against Interest. A statement which
10
of Odell Gregory, because the statement, if made public, could result in George
Howard being subjected to criminal penalties. The court found that because
George Howard was a business partner of Odell Gregory, any criminal action
against Howard could affect Odell's business interests. Therefore, the statement
was against the pecuniary interest of Odell Gregory.
Defendant states in her brief that the chancellor erred in admitting the
letter into evidence, but makes no argument as required by T.R.A.P. 27(a)(7).
Accordingly, we consider this issue waived. See Wilhite v. Brownsville Concrete
Co., Inc., 798 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tenn.App. 1990).
Terea Gregory, the grantee of the 5.583 acres in the deed from her
siblings, also testified at trial regarding the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the deed from her siblings. Terea testified that at her father Henry's
funeral, Odell approached her with a document on legal size paper and told
her that he and the other siblings were going to place "Uncle George's property"
in her name, because she had given her father Henry "support." Ms. Gregory
testified that the deed which appears in the Lincoln County Register's Office was
not the document which her brothers and sisters signed. Ms. Gregory also
testified that the deed which her brothers and sisters signed was "on a legal
pad" and had no notary certification. Ms. Gregory further stated that at the time
she saw the deed, three of her brothers and sisters had not signed the deed, but
she also admitted that it was possible that her brother Odell had obtained these
signatures between the time she last saw the deed and the filing of the deed.
In her testimony at trial, Ms. Gregory never specifically stated whether the deed
she originally saw granted her 3 or approximately 5.5 acres. She simply stated
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true.
11
that the deed granted her "Uncle George's property."
B. The Deed from Terea Gregory to her Brother Odell Gregory and
Defendant Laura Sue Gregory
The second deed which the plaintiff asserts is fraudulent is the deed from
Terea Gregory to Odell and his wife, defendant Laura Sue Gregory. In this
warranty deed, dated September 10, 1965, Terea sold the land that was
conveyed to her by the August 19, 1961, deed from her brothers and sisters, to
her brother Odell and the defendant for the sum of $300.000 The deed states
in pertinent part:
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of THREE
HUNDRED ($300.00) DOLLARS this day cash in hand
paid, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I, the
undersigned Terea Gregory McNeil, have bargained
and sold and do hereby transfer and convey unto
Odell Gregory and wife, Laura Sue Gregory, the
following described real estate lying and being in the
7th Civil District of Lincoln County, Tennessee,
bounded and described as follows:
Bounded on the North by Providence Road; on
the South by Mrs. Sara Douglas Posey; on the West by
Sam S. Bagley; and on the East by Odell Gregory,
containing approximately 5 acres, more or less, and
being the same real estate conveyed unto the
undersigned as Terea M. Gregory by deed of Sam
Gregory, et al, dated August 19, 1961, and recorded
in the Register's Office of Lincoln County, Tennessee, in
Deed Book "E-7", page 289, to which deed reference
is here had for particulars.
The deed is signed by Terea and contains the acknowledgement of a notary
public. This deed was filed in the Lincoln County Register's Office on September
20, 1965. At trial Terea Gregory testified that she sold this property to Odell
because she was getting married and moving away. She stated that the
signature on the deed was in fact hers, but Odell failed to ever pay her the
$300.00.
C. The Deed from Estella Buchanan to Odell Gregory.
The last deed which the plaintiff complains of is a warranty deed from
Estella Buchanan, the wife of E.T. Gregory, to Odell Gregory in which Estella
12
Buchanan sold her husband E.T.'s 2.583 acre tract of land to Odell for the sum
of $410.00. The deed is dated March 9, 1965, and describes the land as "being
the same real estate that was devised unto the undersigned as Estella Gregory
by the last will and testament of the said E.T. Gregory, deceased, which is to be
found of record in the Office of the County Court Clerk of Lincoln County,
Tennessee, in Will Book 10 [penciled in], page 334 [penciled in], to which
reference is here had for particulars." The deed is dated March 9, 1965, and
contains the signature of Estella Buchanan and the acknowledgement of a
notary public.
The plaintiff asserts that the deed from Estella Buchanan to Odell Gregory
is invalid, because Estella Buchanan never owned the property, and therefore,
could not deed the property to Odell. The plaintiff argues that E.T. Gregory's will
never vested Estella Buchanan with title to the property, because E.T. did not
own the 2.583 acres. Plaintiff contends that the 2.583 acres was simply part of
the original 15.5 acres which was held by all the heirs of Samuel and Jane
Gregory as tenants in common.
The trial court made no finding as to whether the August 19, 1961, deed
from the children of Henry Gregory to Terea Gregory was fraudulent, the court
simply ruled that the plaintiff was barred from asserting fraud by virtue of laches
and did not elaborate further. Because we find that the plaintiff failed to prove
fraud in the August 19, 1961 deed (or any other deed), we do not reach the
laches issues.
It is well settled that to set aside a deed, the proof must be clear, cogent,
and convincing. Myers v. Myers, 891 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tenn.App. 1994); Pugh v.
Burton, 25 Tenn.App. 614, 166 S.W.2d 624, 627 (1942). In this case the plaintiff's
proof simply fails to clearly, cogently, and convincingly prove fraud in the deed
from him and his siblings to Terea Gregory. The only evidence that the deed
contained in the Lincoln County land records was not the original deed signed
by the children of Henry Gregory, was the testimony of the plaintiff and the
13
plaintiff's witness, Terea Gregory. In many instances Terea's testimony failed to
corroborate the plaintiff's testimony. The plaintiff testified that the deed he
signed only contained a grant of 3 acres to Terea. However, Terea's testimony
and her deed to Odell in which she sold him "approximately 5 acres," indicate
that the deed to her from her siblings did in fact convey "5.5 acres, more or less."
In addition, while Terea testified that not all of her brothers and sisters signed the
deed, the plaintiff seemed to believe that all of them had signed the deed,
although not in the presence of a notary. Finally, even if we assume that the
letter which plaintiff introduced was in fact written by Odell Gregory, the letter
establishes at most, that Odell simply had heard that Sam Gregory had not
signed the deed; it does not establish that the deed was in fact not signed by
Sam Gregory.
With respect to the deed from Terea Gregory to Odell and Laura Sue
Gregory, which is dated September 10, 1965, the trial court also did not make
any finding as to whether the deed was procured by fraud or whether the deed
should be set aside due to any other fraud surrounding the deed. Not only has
the plaintiff failed to produce clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of fraud
surrounding this deed, the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of fraud
whatsoever. This argument is without merit.
In summary, the deeds from the children of Henry Gregory to Terea
Gregory, and from Terea Gregory to Odell and defendant Laura Sue Gregory,
vested Odell and defendant with whatever title that Henry Gregory had to the
5.583 acres that was originally owned by George Gregory. Upon Odell's death
his will vested defendant with title to all of his property, both real and personal,
thus, by virtue of Odell's will, defendant holds title to this 5.583 acres. The trial
court ruled that the deeds in conjunction with the defendant's possession of the
land, conveyed title to 5 acres of the land by virtue of adverse possession. This
ruling is modified to vest defendant with title to 5.583 acres of the land by virtue
of the deeds and the will of Odell Gregory.
14
Finally the plaintiff's argument that the deed from Estella Buchanan to
Odell Gregory is invalid because Estella Buchanan never owned the property,
is without merit. The argument is without merit based upon our holding that the
children of Samuel and Jane Gregory orally partitioned and took possession of
the land in dispute, thereby vesting the children with a fee simple absolute title
in their individual 2.583 acre tracts. Since E.T. Gregory held title in fee simple
absolute to his tract he was free to devise the tract to his wife Estella at his
death. Myers v. Myers, 891 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn.App. 1994)("[T]he power of
alienation is necessarily incident to every estate in fee.) Likewise, Estella was free
to sell this tract to Odell Gregory. Since Odell Gregory's will devised all his real
and personal property to his wife, defendant Laura Sue Gregory, the effect of
Odell's will was to vest title to this 2.583 acre tract of land in the defendant. The
trial court ruled that defendant took title to this tract by adverse possession. This
ruling is modified to vest the defendant with title to this tract by virtue of the
deed from Estella Buchanan to Odell Gregory and the will of Odell Gregory.
III. Defendant's Adverse Possession and Prescription Claims
Since we have determined that the defendant holds title to 8.166 acres
of the land in dispute, we next address the issue of whether the trial court erred
in ruling that the defendant holds title to the remainder of the 18.5 acres by
virtue of prescription.
At trial, Raymond Gregory testified that following the death of Henry
Gregory in 1961, Odell Gregory exclusively possessed the entire 18.5 acre tract
of land until Odell died in 1986. Raymond also testified that after 1986
defendant continued to exclusively possess the land. Raymond testified that
Odell informed him sometime in 1966 that he (Odell) was going to use the land,
and that Odell used the property "as he pleased." Raymond further testified that
Odell paid all the taxes on the land, farmed the land, raised cattle on the land,
and rented the land, and that he never asked Odell for (or received) any of the
profits produced from Odell's activities on the land. The record indicates that
15
defendant continued to rent and farm the land after Odell's death in 1986.
The plaintiff also testified that prior to 1966, he attempted to pay the taxes
on the land on two separate occasions since he was uncertain whether the
land taxes were being paid, and that both times his tax payments were
returned, because the taxes had already been paid by Odell. Mr. Gregory
testified that he became aware that the land "was not our land any more"
about six or seven years prior to filing suit in 1992. The trial court ruled that the
defendant should be awarded title to 8 acres of the land by virtue of the
common law doctrine of prescription, because the defendant and her
husband, Odell Gregory, had continuously, exclusively, notoriously, and
adversely possessed these 8 acres for more than 20 years.
Title under the common law doctrine of prescription does not require
even color of title. Hallmark v. Tidwell, 849 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn. App. 1992)
(citing Freeman v. Martin Robowask, Inc., 61 Tenn.App. 677, 457 S.W.2d 606(1970)). To receive title under the common law doctrine of prescription, the
prescriptive holder must have been in exclusive, uninterrupted, notorious, and
adverse possession of the land in question for a period of more than 20 years.
Hallmark, 849 S.W.2d at 793. Where from long possession the presumption of a
grant to complainants arises, it is not necessary that they show title by paper
writings, uninterrupted possession for 20 years being sufficient to evidence title
and seizin in fee. Id. at 792-93 (Citing Keel v. Sutton, 142 Tenn. 341, 219 S.W. 351(1920)). The presumption that a prescriptive holder has title to land may be
rebutted by showing that the prescriptive holder was merely using the land with
the permission of the actual owner. Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W.
946 (1915).
The testimony of the plaintiff, Raymond Gregory, indicates that the
defendant has had exclusive, uninterrupted, and notorious possession of the
entire 18.5 acres since Henry Gregory died in 1961. The only element of
prescription which the defendant disputes is that of adverse or hostile
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possession. Raymond Gregory testified that although Odell made whatever use
of the property he (Odell) desired from 1961 until his death in 1986, Raymond
never thought that Odell was doing anything other than "just renting or using the
property" based upon an "understanding" which he and Odell had regarding
the payment of taxes on the land. Raymond argues that notwithstanding the
control which Odell and the defendant Laura Sue exercised over the property,
Odell and Laura Sue's possession should not be considered adverse (at least
until not Odell's death in 1986), because he understood that Odell could graze
the land and rent the land in exchange for Odell's payment of the taxes on the
land. Plaintiff argues that until shortly after Odell's death, plaintiff assumed that
Odell and defendant were simply using the land with the plaintiff's and the other
siblings' permission. In support of this argument, plaintiff introduced into
evidence a letter dated February 13, 1962, written to plaintiff from his brother
Odell in which Odell states:
Dear Bro Raymond;
***
The Land taxes were $8.32 which is a little
cheaper than they were last year. Terea's taxes on
Uncle George's track was $2.77
I pd. the taxes on both tracks just to be Sure they
were pd. Of Course Terea will reemburse on her's.
Now On this 8.32 I am not Asking Anybody to help me
pay them, because I am going to try to grow enough
out there to get my money back, and its left up to you
as to whether you pay any of this tax. Give My Love to
all the family, And We Are All doing Very Well.
Your Bro,
Odell Gregory
The plaintiff argues that the above letter establishes that the plaintiff and
Odell Gregory had an agreement in which Odell would pay the taxes on the
land in exchange for farming the land, and therefore, Odell's use of the land
was not adverse to the interests of plaintiff and the other children of Samuel and
Jane Gregory and their respective heirs. We agree.
We think the above quoted letter was sufficient to lead the plaintiff to
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believe that Odell's possession of the land was not adverse to the interests of
plaintiff and the other children of Samuel and Jane Gregory and their respective
heirs. The defendant asserts that her and her husband's possession of the land
was adverse, and this fact was established by plaintiff's own testimony in which
he stated that Odell "excluded" him from the property. The defendant also relies
on a portion of the plaintiff's testimony in which he stated that he and Odell
never had an agreement regarding the payment of the land taxes.
We find the defendant's reliance on these portions of the testimony to be
unpersuasive. Although the plaintiff testified that he was "excluded" from the
land, it is unclear from the testimony when the plaintiff was excluded as well as
what form this "exclusion" took. With respect to the plaintiff's testimony stating
that he and Odell never had an agreement regarding the taxes, the plaintiff
was indicating that Odell unilaterally informed the plaintiff that he (Odell) was
going to use the land for farming and in exchange pay the taxes on the land.
When the plaintiff testified that he and Odell never had an agreement, he was
indicating that he never specifically assented to Odell's use of the land.
However, this testimony does not establish that Odell was using the land without
Raymond's permission, nor does it change the character of Odell's letter to
Raymond in which Odell stated that he would not ask anyone to share in the
burden of the taxes, because he would recoup his tax payments from farming.
Regardless of whether Raymond specifically assented to Odell's farming/grazing
of the land (and therefore, did or did not specifically give Odell permission to
use the land), we think Raymond could reasonably construe Odell's letter to
mean that Odell's possession of the land was not adverse.
In summary, the defendant has failed in her burden of proving that her
possession of the land was adverse to the interests of the plaintiff and the other
children of Samuel and Jane Gregory and their respective heirs.
IV. Costs of the Action
Finally we reach the defendant's issue regarding the trial court's
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assessment of the costs of the action against her. The court apparently
reasoned that the defendant should pay the costs of the action, because the
outcome of the litigation was to her benefit. The defendant argues that the
costs of the action were unfairly assessed against her, because she did not
initiate the action. She argues that in both civil and chancery suits, the
successful party is entitled to the costs of the action unless otherwise directed by
law or a court of record. She further argues that no compelling reason exists for
diverging from the longstanding rule that the costs of an action are assessed
against the losing party.
It is well settled that assessment of the costs of an action are within the
discretion of the trial court. In Re Webb, 675 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn.App. 1984).
However, in view of our decision, the costs should be assessed equally against
all parties.
Accordingly the judgment of the trial court awarding 7.5 acres to the
defendant by virtue of adverse possession is modified to award the defendant
8.166 acres by virtue of the will of Odell Gregory and the deeds from Estella
Buchanan and Terea Gregory. The judgment of the trial court awarding the
remaining property to the defendant is reversed, and the case is remanded to
the trial court for a determination of the respective interests in the property.
Costs in the trial court and costs on appeal are assessed equally against the
parties.
____________________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
________________________________
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
__________________________________
WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS,
SENIOR JUDGE
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