Graham v. Edmondson ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
______________________________________________ FILED
RANDALL GRAHAM and
July 12, 1999
CHARLES J. FYKE,
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Appellate Court Clerk
Williamson Chancery No. 24797
Vs. C.A. No. 01a01-9809-CH-00482
LORAINE EDMONDSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
THE HONORABLE CORNELIA A. CLARK, JUDGE
David H. King; King, Turnbow & Brisby of Franklin
For Appellants
William Carter Conway of Franklin
For Appellee
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
This is an action to enforce restrictive covenants against a landowner.
Plaintiffs/appellants, Randall Graham and Charles Fyke (Plaintiffs), appeal the order of the trial
court granting summary judgment to defendant/appellee, Loraine Edmondson (Edmondson).
Plaintiffs in this action are homeowners in the upscale neighborhood of Bluff Road Acres
in Brentwood. They allege that Edmondson has a mobile home and operates businesses on her
property in violation of restrictive covenants placed on the neighborhood.
The facts are undisputed. In March 1978, Fitts and Johnson Development Company
(Fitts & Johnson) acquired title to a large tract of land which eventually became Bluff Road
Acres. On April 7, 1978, Fitts & Johnson sold two tracts of land to Hasty Construction
Company (Hasty). On September 13, 1978, Fitts & Johnson executed restrictive covenants,
which they recorded in the Register’s Office of Williamson County. The restrictions purported
to cover all of Bluff Road Acres including the two tracts previously sold to Hasty and in
pertinent part state:
RESTRICTIONS FOR BLUFF ROAD ACRES
* * *
Whereas, the undersigned developers of the property known as
Bluff Road Acres, desire to place restrictive covenants which
shall be applicable to all the lots shown on the recorded plat of
said subdivision and binding upon all present and future owners
for the period hereinafter. These restrictions only govern property
appearing on the west side of Owl Creek. Property on the east
side of Owl Creek remains unrestricted.
* * *
2. No trailer, basement house, tent, garage, barns, or other
outbuilding shall be erected or used as either a temporary or
permanent residence.
* * *
8. No school buses, trailer trucks, dump trucks, mobile homes,
etc., are to be parked or stored on any lot.
* * *
12. No commercial activities permitted to be conducted on the
west side of Owl Creek. . . .
13. If the parties hereto or any of them or their heirs or assigns
shall violate or attempt to violate any of the covenants or
restrictions herein before May 10, 2003, it shall be lawful for any
other person or persons owning any other lot in said development
to prosecute any proceedings at law or in equity against the
person or persons violating or attempting to violate any such
covenant or restrictions for such violation.
There is no evidence that Hasty agreed to or acquiesced in the covenants placed on the two tracts
it owned.
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On November 17, 1978, some two months after Fitts & Johnson filed the restrictive
covenants covering Bluff Road Acres, Hasty sold part of the land in question to Mr. and Mrs.
Thomas. Edmondson and her husband acquired the property on October 28, 1981 from the
Thomases. In 1991, after Edmondson and her husband divorced, the land in question was
quitclaimed to her. Edmondson subsequently installed a mobile home on her property, expanded
a barn, held rodeos, and began a beauty shop on her property.
Plaintiffs, on behalf of twenty-one (21) homeowners in Bluff Road Acres, filed suit
against Edmondson asserting that she was in violation of the restrictive covenants and seeking
injunctive relief by removal of her mobile home and removal of a garage located on her property.
The complaint also seeks to enjoin Edmondson from holding rodeos and from operating a beauty
shop. Edmondson answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment. After a
hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order granting Edmondson summary judgment
which states in pertinent part:
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit allege that defendant is currently
in the process of erecting a trailer on the lot owned by her in the
subdivision, and that this action violates the above-referenced
restrictive covenant. Defendant claims her property is not subject
to the restrictive covenants because it was deeded to her
predecessor in title prior to the placement of the restrictions on
the property.
Defendant’s position is correct. Under Tennessee law, at
least in the absence of an expressed contrary intention, a covenant
running with the land must be confined to the property as it
existed at the time of the covenant. . . .
Although courts recognize the validity of restrictive
covenants, they are not favored and will not be extended by
implication. (citation omitted) Since defendant’s property is not
burdened by restrictions either directly in the chain of title or by
any other document, recorded or otherwise, this court cannot
impose such restrictions upon her land. . . .
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
that defendant’s motion for summary judgment shall be, and is
hereby, granted. The action is dismissed. . . .
Plaintiffs timely appealed the trial court’s order and ask this Court to determine whether
summary judgment was appropriate.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the
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burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id. In Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d
208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stated:
Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then
demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery materials, that there is a
genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard,
Rule 56.05 [now Rule 56.06] provides that the nonmoving party
cannot simply rely upon his pleadings but must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.
Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn
from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26
(Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness
regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our
review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.
Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).
P l a i n t if f s f i r s t a s s e r t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g E d m o n d s o n ’ s m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e
a g e n u i n e i s s u e e x i s ts a s to E d m o n d s o n ’ s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t s . P l a i n t i f f s c i t e t w o c a s e s f r o m t h i s c o u r t
w h i c h d e a l w i t h n o t i c e o f r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t s n o t f o u n d i n t h e c h a i n o f t i t l e . I n Stracener v. Bailey, 7 3 7 S . W . 2 d
5 3 6 ( T e n n . A p p . 1 9 8 6 ) , a d e v e l o p e r p u r c h a s e d a p a r c e l o f p r o p e r t y w h i c h h a d b e e n d e s i g n a te d o n a p la t a s a p a r k .
W h e n th e d e v e lo p e r a t te m p t e d t o d e v e l o p t h i s la n d , o t h e r o w n e r s in t h e s u b d i v i s io n f il e d s u i t t o e n jo in th e d e v e lo p m e n t.
T h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t b y d e s i g n a ti n g t h e a r e a o n th e p la t a s a p a r k a n d s e ll i n g l o t s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p la t, t h e o w n e r o f t h e
s u b d iv i s io n c r e a te d a r e s t r i c t i o n o n t h e u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y . T h e o n l y q u e s ti o n t h e n f o r t h e C o u r t t o d e c i d e w a s w h e t h e r
t h e d e v e l o p e r , a s t h e p u r c h a s e r o f t h e p r o p e r t y , w a s b o u n d b y t h e r e s t r ic t i o n . I n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e r e s t r ic t i o n w a s
a p p li c a b le t o t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e C o u r t n o t e d t h a t a t i t l e s e a r c h o f t h e d e v e l o p e r ’ s c h a in o f t i t l e w o u l d h a v e r e v e a l e d th i s
r e s t r i c t i o n . T h i s c a s e i s d i s t in g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e c a s e a t b a r , b e c a u s e a t t h e ti m e th e r e s t r i c ti v e c o v e n a n t w a s p l a c e d o n
t h e p a r k p r o p e r t y , t h e p a r k p r o p e r t y w a s o w n e d b y t h e e n ti t y p l a c in g t h e r e s t r i c t i o n o n t h e p r o p e r ty . I n t h e c a s e a t b a r ,
t h e e n t i t y e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t s did not o w n t h e p r o p e r t y w h i c h i s n o w o w n e d b y E d m o n d s o n .
I n KLN Assoc. v. Metro Dev. & Housing Agency, 7 9 7 S . W . 2 d 8 9 8 ( T e n n . A p p . 1 9 9 0 ) , a d e v e l o p e r
4
f i l e d a d e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t a c t io n c l a i m i n g t h a t it s p r o p o s e d o f f ic e d e v e l o p m e n t s h o u l d n o t b e s u b j e c t t o a n u r b a n
r e n e w a l p l a n n o t f o u n d i n i t s c h a i n o f t i t l e . T h e KLN C o u r t h e l d i n p a r t t h a t “ [ o ] t h e r w i s e v a l i d r e s t r i c t i o n s o n p r o p e r t y
a r e b i n d i n g e v e n w h e n t h e y a r e n o t i n t h e c h a i n o f ti t l e i f t h e o w n e r h a d a c t u a l k n o w l e d g e o f t h e r e s t r i c ti o n s w h e n i t
a c q u i r e d t h e p r o p e r t y . ” Id. a t 9 0 4 .
KLN d e a l s s o l e l y w i t h t h e p o w e r o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a t b o t h t h e s t a t e a n d l o c a l l e v e l s t o e x e r c i s e i t s p o l i c e
p o w e r t o i m p o s e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . Id. a t 9 0 1 . O f c o u r s e , s u c h p o w e r i s f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d u n d e r p r i o r
c a s e l a w a n d i s l i m i t e d o n l y b y t h e s t a t e a n d f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T h u s , KLN i s e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e p r e s e n t
case.
W h i l e w e a g r e e w i t h t h e h o l d i n g o f t h e Stracener a n d KLN C o u r t s , w e d o n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y a r e
a p p li c a b le t o t h e f a c ts in t h e c a s e b e f o r e u s . I n s t e a d , t h e p e r t i n e n t is s u e i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e d e a l s w i t h t h e p o w e r o f a
d e v e l o p e r t o b i n d p r o p e r t y i t does not own b y f i l i n g a s u b d i v i s i o n p l a t w h i c h i n c l u d e s r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t s .
T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s ly h e l d :
I f it is a c o v e n a n t r u n n in g w ith th e la n d , a t le a st in th e a b s e n c e o f a n e x p r e s se d
c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n , its operation must be confined to the property as
it existed at the time of the covenant. A n d t h e r u l e o f s t r i c t c o n s t r u c t i o n
a p p l i e s w h e n a n a t te m p t i s m a d e t o a p p l y t h e c o v e n a n t t o o t h e r l a n d s .
Southern Advertising Co. v. Sherman, 3 0 8 S . W . 2 d 4 9 1 , 4 9 3 , 4 3 T e n n . A p p . 3 2 3 , 3 2 6 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ( e m p h a s i s
a d d e d ).
F u r th e r , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s d i s c u s s e d a t w h a t p o i n t i n t i m e a r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t b i n d s p r o p e r t y :
T h e p r e s e n t r e c o rd r e v e a ls n o re a so n w h y th e re s tr ic tiv e c o v e n a n ts sh o u ld n otbe
a p p l ie d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r te r m s a g a i n s t b u y e r s o f l o t s w h o p e r s o n a l ly a g r e e d to
t h e m o r w h o s e p u r c h a s e s occurred after the recordation of any
particular set of covenants. W e h a v e a l r e a d y s t a t e d t h a t n o s et o f
c o v e n a n t s s h o u l d b e g i v e n a n y g e n e r a l r e tr o a c ti v e e f f e c t .
East Sevier County Util. Dist. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 5 7 0 S . W . 2 d 8 5 0 , 8 5 3 ( T e n n . 1 9 7 8 )
(e m p h a sis ad d e d ).
I t i s c le a r f ro m t h e f a c ts in t h i s c a s e t h a t F i tt s & J o h n s o n s o l d th e t r a c t s o f l a n d i n q u e s t i o n o v e r f i v e m o n t h s
b e f o r e r e c o r d i n g t h e r e s t r ic t i v e c o v e n a n t s f o r B l u f f R o a d A c r e s . I t is e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t t h e l a w a p p l i e s r e s t r i c t i v e
c o v e n a n t s t o l a n d “ a s i t e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e . . . t h e c o v e n a n t ” w a s r e c o r d e d . Sherman, 3 0 8 S . W . 2 d a t 4 9 3 , 4 3 T e n n .
A p p . a t 3 2 6 . T h u s , E d m o n d s o n ’ s p r o p e r t y i s n o t b u r d e n e d b y th e r e s t r i c t i o n s w h i c h a p p l y t o a l l o t h e r t r a c ts c o m p r i s in g
B l u f f R o a d A c r e s . F u r th e r , w e a g r e e w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t w h e t h e r E d m o n d s o n h a d k n o w l e d g e o f r e s t r ic t i o n s , o r e v e n
f o r s o m e ti m e b e li e v e d th e r e s t r i c ti o n s a p p l i e d to h e r p r o p e r t y , i s n o t p e r t i n e n t.
T h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t t o E d m o n d s o n is a f f i r m e d , a n d t h e c a s e is r e m a n d e d f o r s u c h f u r t h e r
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p r o c e e d i n g s a s a r e n e c e s s a r y . C o s t s o f a p p e a l a r e a s s e s s e d t o A p p e l la n t s .
_________________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
____________________________________
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
____________________________________
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
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