Ralph & Linda Moore v. Dannie Christmas ( 1999 )


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  •                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    AT KNOXVILLE
    FILED
    November 29, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    RALPH MOORE, LINDA MOORE,                  )         ROANE COUNTY
    WAYNE MOORE, AND REBECCA MOORE             )         03A01-9903-CV-00118
    )
    Plaintiffs-Appellees                 )
    )
    )
    v.                                         )         HON. RUSSELL SIMMONS,
    JR.
    )         JUDGE
    )
    DANNIE CHRISTMAS                           )
    )
    Defendant-Appellant                  )         REVERSED AND REMANDED
    GREG LEFFEW OF ROCKWOOD FOR APPELLANT
    RALPH MOORE, LINDA MOORE, WAYNE MOORE, AND REBECCA MOORE, PRO
    SE
    O P I N I O N
    Goddard, P.J.
    This is an appeal from the Circuit Court’s order
    requiring Dannie Christmas to pay towing and storage costs for
    Page 1
    the Appellees’ automobiles, boats, and other towed items.
    Dannie Christmas, Defendant-Appellant, raises the following
    issues:
    I.    Is Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-15-124
    limited solely to actions for ejectment and
    inapplicable to actions for unlawful detainer?
    II.   In an unlawful detainer action, should the
    costs of removing and storing a defendant’s
    personal property be borne by the defendant?
    The background of this case arises from an unlawful
    detainer action filed by Dannie and Sharon Christmas against
    Ralph and Linda Moore in the Roane County General Sessions
    Court.    A judgment was entered for the Christmases to gain
    possession of the real estate.    The Moores appealed the
    judgment against them to the Roane County Circuit Court.       The
    Circuit Court and this Court affirmed the judgment against the
    Moores.    See Christmas v. Moore, an unreported opinion of this
    Court, filed in Knoxville on July 6, 1998.
    The facts pertinent to this appeal occurred between
    May 7, 1997 and May 9, 1997.     The Roane County Sheriff’s
    Department served the writ of possession on May 7, 1997.
    After service of the writ, the Moores had adequate time to
    remove their belongings.    The Moores did not remove their
    belongings or their automobiles and boats.    On May 8, 1997,
    the Moores’ automobiles, boats, and other items were towed by
    Goldston’s Wrecker Service pursuant to Mr. Christmas’ request.
    On May 9, 1997, the Moores’ furniture and other personal
    Page 2
    belongings were removed from the house.
    The Moores sued for damages sustained to their
    personal property which was removed from the house and placed
    near the street while it rained.                         Additionally, the Moores
    prayed for damages, depreciation, towing and storage costs for
    the items towed.              The lower court denied damages for the
    personal property removed from the house.                               Relying upon
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-15-124, the lower court
    awarded towing and storage costs to the Moores for the items
    towed.       The lower court found Mr. Christmas did not provide
    the Moores with the option provided in the Code and,
    therefore, he was responsible for the towing and storage
    costs.
    The Tennessee Code provides for the disposition of
    contents upon execution as follows:
    (a) In executing a writ of possession after judgment in an
    action of ejectment, the person being ejected shall have the option
    of having his personal property removed to a local warehouse for storage or having it removed from the
    property as has been the procedure of the sheriffs prior to March 28, 1976.
    (b) All storage fees and transportation costs incurred are to be paid by the owner of the stored property.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-15-124
     (1998)(emphasis added).
    When interpreting a statute, the appellate court’s standard of review is de novo
    without a presumption of correctness.                             See Browder v. Morris,
    
    975 S.W.2d 308
    , 311 (Tenn. 1998).                          “The cardinal rule of
    statutory construction is to effectuate legislative intent,
    with all rules of construction being aides to that end.”
    Page 3
    Browder, 
    975 S.W.2d at 311
    .    In ascertaining legislative
    intent, we look to the plain language of the statute.     “Courts
    are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the
    language used by the legislature in the statute, unless an
    ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative
    intent.”   Browder, 
    975 S.W.2d at 311
    .    Where the statute is
    clear in expressing the legislature's intent, there is no need
    to resort to auxiliary rules of construction and we need only
    enforce the statute as written.    Browder, 
    975 S.W.2d at 311
    (citations omitted).
    From the clear language of the statute, this section
    only applies to “an action of ejectment.”     This case involves
    an unlawful detainer action.   The language of the statute is
    clear and unambiguous.   The lower court erred in applying this
    section to an unlawful detainer action.
    The second issue raised by Mr Christmas involves his
    liability for the towing and storage costs of the towed items.
    In Simmons v. O’Charley’s, Inc., 
    914 S.W.2d 895
    , 903 (Tenn.
    Ct. App. 1995), this Court held that “the injured party is
    entitled to damages sustained by virtue of the unlawful
    detention of the premises.”    Only those damages proximately
    caused by the defendant are recoverable. Simmons, 
    914 S.W.2d at 903
    .
    Mr. Christmas argues that he should not be
    responsible for the towing and storage expenses when the
    Page 4
    Moores had adequate time to remove the towed items.    We agree.
    Because the Moores failed to remove their property after
    adequate notice and adequate time to act, the Moores are
    responsible for the towing and storage expenses.
    For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
    Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded for
    collection of costs below, which are, as are costs of appeal,
    adjudged against the Appellees.
    Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
    CONCUR:
    Herschel P. Franks, J.
    Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
    Page 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03A01-9903-CV-00118

Filed Date: 11/29/1999

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014