Abou-Sakher v. Humphreys County ( 1997 )


Menu:
  •       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
    ROCK ABOU-SAKHER,                 )
    )
    Plaintiff/Appellant,        )
    )   Humphreys Chancery
    )   No. 22-381
    VS.                               )
    )   Appeal No.
    )   01A01-9604-CH-00185
    HUMPHREYS COUNTY, TENNESSEE       )
    and HUMPHREYS COUNTY AIRPORT
    AUTHORITY,
    )
    )          FILED
    )
    Defendants/Appellees.       )           March 27, 1997
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR HUMPHREYS COUNTY
    AT WAVERLY, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE LEONARD W. MARTIN, JUDGE
    For the Plaintiff/Appellant:          For the Defendants/Appellees:
    Calvin P. Turner                      John Lee Williams
    Lebanon, Tennessee                    Waverly, Tennessee
    AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
    OPINION
    This appeal involves a dispute between Humphreys County and the former
    fixed-base operator of the Humphreys County Airport. After the county declined
    to renew the fixed-base operator’s lease and hired a full-time airport manager, the
    former fixed-base operator filed suit in the Chancery Court for Humphreys County
    seeking a declaration that his lease remained in effect and challenging his
    termination as part-time airport manager. The trial court heard the case without
    a jury and found that the fixed-base operator’s lease had expired and that the
    plaintiff was not entitled to reinstatement as part-time airport manager. We affirm
    the judgment.
    I.
    On March 1, 1987, Rock Abou-Sakher and Humphreys County entered into
    a fixed-base operator’s lease agreement whereby Mr. Abou-Sakher became the
    fixed-base operator1 at the Humphreys County Airport. The agreement also
    provided that Mr. Abou-Sakher would be “designated personally as the Airport
    Manager.” The initial term of the lease was five years, and the lease permitted
    Mr. Abou-Sakher to renew the lease for one additional five-year period. The lease
    also required Mr. Abou-Sakher to pay $1.00 per year as rent, but both Mr. Abou-
    Sakher and the county ignored this provision.
    Some time later, the county began paying Mr. Abou-Sakher as a part-time
    county employee. As time passed, Mr. Abou-Sakher pressed the county for a full-
    time job because he desired to qualify for the county’s group health insurance
    plan. The county never acceded to Mr. Abou-Sakher’s request for full-time
    employment, and neither the county nor Mr. Abou-Sakher formally renewed the
    1
    A fixed-base operator fuels, services, and hangars airplanes in much the same way that
    a service station provides similar services for automobiles. American Eagle Ins. Co. v.
    Thompson, 
    85 F.3d 327
    , 328 (8th Cir. 1996); City of Pompano Beach v. F.A.A., 
    774 F.2d 1529
    ,
    1533 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985).
    -2-
    fixed-base operator’s lease when it expired in March 1992. Nonetheless, Mr.
    Abou-Sakher continued to function as the airport’s fixed-base operator.
    In December 1992, the county created an airport authority to oversee the
    airport, and Mr. Abou-Sakher became the authority’s first secretary. In mid-1994,
    the airport authority obtained funds to hire a full-time airport manager and
    advertised for the position. Mr. Abou-Sakher and others applied for the job.
    During the selection process, Travis Jenkins replaced Mr. Abou-Sakher as the
    airport authority’s secretary following a public altercation between Mr. Abou-
    Sakher and the airport authority’s chairman. The airport authority interviewed
    Mr.Abou-Sakher and the other candidates and in August 1994 hired Mr. Jenkins
    as the airport’s first full-time mananger.
    On September 1, 1994, the chairman of the airport authority informed Mr.
    Abou-Sakher by mail and telephone call that he was no longer the manager of the
    Humphreys County airport and that he would be required to negotiate another
    fixed-base operator’s lease with Mr. Jenkins because the old lease had expired.
    The chairman also informed Mr. Abou-Sakher that the authority reserved the right
    to review and approve any new fixed-base operator’s lease.
    On November 15, 1994, Mr. Abou-Sakher sued the county and the airport
    authority in the Chancery Court for Humphreys County seeking a declaration of
    his rights under the 1987 fixed-base operator’s lease agreement and his status as
    a county employee. On the same day, the county filed an unlawful detainer action
    in the Humphreys County General Sessions Court seeking to recover the airport
    property still in Mr. Abou-Sakher’s possession. The circuit court consolidated
    both cases after Mr. Abou-Sakher appealed the adverse general sessions judgment
    to the circuit court.
    Following a bench trial in October 1995, the trial court determined that the
    1987 fixed-base operator’s lease agreement expired in March 1992 and that Mr.
    Abou-Sakher had been a holdover tenant thereafter.           The trial court also
    determined that the county’s selection of a full-time airport manager violated the
    Sunshine Law but that Mr. Abou-Sakher did not have a contract right under the
    -3-
    fixed-base operator’s lease agreement to be employed as the airport manager. Mr.
    Abou-Sakher has appealed from this judgment.
    II.
    RENEWAL OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT
    Mr. Abou-Sakher asserts that the 1987 fixed-base operator’s lease is still in
    effect either because he exercised the renewal option or because the County
    waived its right to require strict compliance with the lease’s renewal provisions.
    We have determined that Mr. Abou-Sakher did not effectively renew the 1987
    fixed-base operator’s lease and that the county did not waive its right to require
    Mr. Abou-Sakher to comply with the lease’s renewal provisions.
    A.
    The 1987 fixed-base operator’s lease agreement contained the following
    renewal provision:
    2.) The Lessee shall have the option to renew the
    lease for an additional period of five (5) years on the
    same terms and conditions herein expressed by giving
    notice to the Lessor in writing of the Lessee’s election
    to extend this lease with the same to be given no later
    than sixty (60) days before the expiration of the original
    five (5) year period.
    Mr. Abou-Sakher asserts that he provided the county with written notice
    consistent with this provision in three letters between March 30, 1989 and July 29,
    1991.
    Mr. Abou-Sakher’s March 30, 1989 letter related to the reclassification of
    his part-time position to a full-time position. He stated:
    This is to confirm that I’m not requesting any increase in salary or
    any change to my existing or next contract with the county. My
    main interest in this move is to get on the county health plan.
    He closed his letter by stating: “Looking Forward To Serving The Airport and The
    County For Many More Years To Come.” In the same vein, Mr. Abou-Sakher’s
    April 11, 1991 letter stated:
    -4-
    Please be informed that I’m interested in renewing my
    contract with the county fot [sic] next five year period.
    However as we have discussed I would like for you to
    help put me on the county health plan, knowing that
    will not change this or the next contract period terms or
    conditions.
    Finally, Mr. Abou-Sakher wrote in his July 29, 1991 letter:
    Even though my contract with the county as fixed base
    operator is [sic] still have some time to go, I would like
    to list [sic] your help and support to change my status
    with the county as a part time airport manager to a full
    time, with the next contract period.
    B.
    THE EXERCISE OF THE RENEWAL OPTION
    Renewal options such as the one involved in this case are essentially
    unilateral contracts giving the lessee an irrevocable right extend a lease during the
    option period. American Oil Co. v. Rasar, 
    203 Tenn. 37
    , 45, 
    308 S.W.2d 486
    , 490
    (1957). Lessees must give timely notice according to the terms of the option, and
    lessees who fail to give the required notice lose their right to renew the lease.
    American Oil Co. v. Rasar, 203 Tenn. at 45, 308 S.W.2d at 490; Corim, Inc. v.
    Sam Blair Co., 
    721 S.W.2d 256
    , 260-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Southern Region
    Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Chattanooga Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 
    612 S.W.2d 162
    , 164-65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
    Mr. Abou-Sakher’s three letters do not satisfy the requirement in the fixed-
    base operator’s lease that he provide the county with written notice of his exercise
    of his right to renew the lease for an additional five years. While these letters
    make vague and general reference to Mr. Abou-Sakher’s interest in renewing the
    lease, they focus primarily on his desire to become a full-time county employee
    in order to obtain health insurance. In order for a notice to be effective in this
    context, it must state clearly that the lessee is exercising his or her renewal option.
    Expressions of a lessee’s “interest” in renewing a lease amount to little more than
    an indication that the lessee is still considering whether or not to exercise the
    renewal option. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that Mr. Abou-Sakher
    -5-
    did not effectively exercise his option to renew the 1987 fixed-base operator’s
    lease.
    C.
    WAIVER OF RENEWAL REQUIREMENTS
    Waiver on the part of the lessor is one of the special circumstances that will
    excuse a lessee’s failure to comply strictly with the terms of a renewal option.
    American Oil Co. v. Rasar, 203 Tenn. at 48, 308 S.W.2d at 191; Playmate Club,
    Inc. v. Country Clubs, Inc., 
    62 Tenn. App. 383
    , 390-91, 
    462 S.W.2d 890
    , 894
    (1970). In this context,
    [w]aiver is a voluntary relinquishment or renunciation
    of some right, a foregoing or giving up of some benefit
    or advantage, which, but for such waiver, he could have
    enjoyed. It may be proved by express declaration; or by
    acts and declarations manifesting an intent and purpose
    not to claim the supposed advantage; or by a course of
    acts and conduct, or by so neglecting and failing to act,
    as to induce a belief that it was his intention and
    purpose to waive.
    Griswold v. Income Properties, II, 
    880 S.W.2d 672
    , 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)
    (quoting Baird v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 
    178 Tenn. 653
    , 665, 
    162 S.W.2d 384
    , 389 (1942)).
    We find no evidence in this record that either the county or the airport
    authority expressly waived its right to insist that Mr. Abou-Sakher exercise his
    renewal option in accordance with the terms of the fixed-base operator’s lease.
    Similarly, Mr. Abou-Sakher has not pointed to any acts or declarations by the
    representatives of the county or the airport authority that could be reasonably
    construed as manifesting an intention and purpose to ignore the renewal
    provisions of the lease. To the contrary, the minutes of the airport authority’s
    May 18, 1993 minutes reflect that all the parties knew and understood that “[t]he
    Fixed Base Operator contract has been out since March 1992.” Mr. Abou-Sakher
    is in no position to assert that he was unaware of this fact because he was the
    secretary who took these minutes. Accordingly, the evidence supports the trial
    -6-
    court’s determination that all parties understood that Mr. Abou-Sakher was a
    holdover tenant after the 1987 fixed-base operator’s lease expired in March 1992.
    III.
    MR. ABOU-SAKHER’S EMPLOYMENT STATUS
    Mr. Abou-Sakher also insists that he is entitled to be reinstated as part-time
    airport manager on two grounds. First, he asserts that he has a contract to serve
    as airport manager as long as his fixed-base operator’s lease remains in effect.
    Second, he asserts that he is entitled to continue as part-time airport manager until
    the county properly hires a full-time manager. We have already determined that
    Mr. Abou-Sakher’s fixed-base operator’s lease has expired. We hold now that Mr.
    Abou-Sakher did not have a right to continue as part-time airport manager until
    the county selected and retained a full-time airport manager.
    A.
    Mr. Abou-Sakher obtained his title as “airport manager” from the fixed-
    base operator’s lease agreement. According to the lease, Mr. Abou-Sakher was
    to serve as the airport manager during the term of the lease without receiving any
    compensation other than the income he derived from being the airport’s fixed-base
    operatory. The circumstances surrounding Mr. Abou-Sakher’s later employment
    as a part-time county employee and the terms and conditions of his employment
    do not appear in this record.
    The airport authority interviewed Mr. Abou-Sakher and the other candidates
    for the full-time airport manager’s job on August 4, 1994. Thereafter, the
    authority published notice that it would meet in the office of one its members on
    August 18, 1994 at 4:00 p.m. to select the new airport manager. Contrary to the
    notice, the airport authority met at 4:30 p.m. in the courthouse annex. At this
    meeting, the airport authority selected Mr. Jenkins as the new full-time airport
    manager and determined that it would no longer need a part-time airport manager.
    Thereafter, on September 1, 1994, the chairman of the airport authority informed
    Mr. Abou-Sakher that his services as part-time airport manager were no longer
    -7-
    required and that he would be required to renegotiate the fixed-base operator’s
    lease.
    B.
    Decisions by governmental bodies made in meetings that violate the
    Sunshine Law are invalid. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-105 (1993). Accordingly, the
    airport authority’s decision to hire Mr. Jenkins was invalid because the authority
    did not give adequate public notice of the correct time and place of its meeting as
    required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-103(a) (1993). Setting aside the decision to
    hire Mr. Jenkins, however, provides no solace to Mr. Abou-Sakher unless he can
    demonstrate some entitlement to his part-time job or some condition of
    employment that he could remain in his job until his successor was properly
    appointed. Mr. Abou-Sakher has provided no such proof.
    In the absence of proof concerning the terms and conditions of Mr. Abou-
    Sakher’s employment as part-time airport manager, we must presume that he was
    an at-will employee of the county. At-will employees may be discharged without
    breach of contract at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.
    Forrester v. Stockstill, 
    869 S.W.2d 328
    , 330 (Tenn. 1994); Bennett v. Steiner-Liff
    Iron and Metal Co., 
    826 S.W.2d 119
    , 121 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, without an
    employment contract, a discharged employee cannot recover damages for breach
    of contract from his or her employer because the employee has no contract right
    to continued employment. Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d at 330.
    As an at-will employee, Mr. Abou-Sakher did not have a legally recognized
    expectation of continued employment with the county. Mr. Abou-Sakher has not
    asserted that the chairman of the airport authority violated the Sunshine Law or
    applicable statutes, ordinances, or rules involving county employment when he
    discharged Mr. Abou-Sakher as airport manager. The record provides no support
    for this contention had it been made. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
    determined that Mr. Abou-Sakher failed to prove that he had a legally
    recognizable right to continued employment as the airport’s part-time manager.
    -8-
    IV.
    We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for whatever
    further proceedings may be required. We tax the costs of this appeal to Rock
    Abou-Sakher and his surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue.
    ____________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ________________________________
    SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
    ________________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    -9-