Caldwell v. Nissan Motor Manufacturing Corp., U.S.A. , 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 ( 1997 )

KEVIN CALDWELL, ) Rutherford County Circuit
) No. 34547
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
)
VS. )
)
NISSAN MOTOR MANUFACTURING ) Appeal No.
CORPORATION, U.S.A., ) 01A01-9703-CV-00096
)
Defendant/Appellee. )
FILED
October 22, 1997
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF RUTHERFORD COUNTY
AT MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE
HONORABLE DON R. ASH, JUDGE
Shelley I. Stiles
5214 Maryland Way, #210
Brentwood, TN 37027
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Andree Sophia Blumstein
SHERRARD & ROE PLC
424 Church St., Suite 2000
Nashville, TN 37219
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
HENRY F. TODD
PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
CONCUR:
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
KEVIN CALDWELL, ) Rutherford County Circuit
) No. 34547
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
)
VS. )
)
NISSAN MOTOR MANUFACTURING ) Appeal No.
CORPORATION USA, ) 01A01-9703-CV-00096
)
Defendant/Appellee. )
OPINION
The plaintiff, Kevin Caldwell, has appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his suit
against Nissan Manufacturing Corp. U.S.A., his former employer, for damages resulting from
the termination of his employment in retaliation for his claiming workers compensation benefits.
In this Court, plaintiff presents a single issue in the following words:
I. Whether there are material facts in dispute rendering
the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary
judgment erroneous.
Defendant presents the issues in the following form:
1. Whether, as the trial court found in this retaliatory
discharge case, plaintiff has filed to carry his burden of
presenting compelling circumstantial evidence of a causal
connection between his claim for workers’ compensation
benefits and the termination of his employment?
2. Even assuming that the plaintiff has presented
sufficient evidence of causation to make out a prima facie
case of retaliatory discharge, whether the fact that plaintiff
was discharged from employment pursuant to a facially
neutral and uniformly applied company policy shows that the
defendant had a legitimate, non-pretextual, non-retaliatory
reason for discharging the plaintiff from employment?
As material to this appeal, the complaint alleges:
1. Plaintiff was injured on the job on or about March 18, 1992, and reinjured on
August 12, 1992.
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2. Plaintiff worked for defendant during the months of February through August
prior to the second injury.
3. (On an unstated date) plaintiff filed a workers compensation claim and
subsequently (date unstated) plaintiff was awarded compensation benefits.
4. On or about April 6, 1993, after the worker’s compensation claim was filed,
defendant notified plaintiff that he was discharged.
5. It is plaintiff’s contention that Nissan discharged him because of his filing a
workers compensation claim and the underlying work injuries.
6. Plaintiff filed a workers compensation claim and subsequently was awarded
workers compensation benefits in the case of Kevin Marshall v. Royal Insurance Company, No.
11857, Marshall Circuit Court. (The date and amount of the award are not stated in the
complaint.)
7. Plaintiff was dismissed because of his filing a workers compensation claim and
pursuing in court his workers compensation benefits.
The prayers of the complaint are for damages, reinstatement, back pay and benefits, other
compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
The plaintiff admits to the two injuries on the premises of defendant and the subsequent
award of benefits, but does not supply any details. Defendant admits that defendant discharged
plaintiff effective April 6, 1993, but denies any causal link between the discharge and the
workers compensation claim.
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On February 28, 1995, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment stating:
The grounds of this motion are that there is no genuine
issue of fact that the plaintiff was terminated for violating
company policy by performing unauthorized work while on
workers compensation leave of absence and by denying that
he did so.
Defendant supported its motion for summary judgment by affidavit of Galen Medlin,
plaintiff’s responses to requests for admissions and for production of documents, and numerous
other documents.
On March 17, 1995, plaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment supported
by his own affidavit and that of his treating physician.
On October 1, 1996, defendant filed a “Supplemental Motion for Summary judgment”
stating:
Comes now the Defendant, Nissan Motor
Manufacturing Corporation, U.S.A., by and through its lawful
counsel, and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of
Civil Procedure, moves this Honorable Court for an Order
granting it Summary Judgment, dismissing the Plaintiff’s case
in its entirety with prejudice, and for grounds therefore (sic)
would state that there is no legal basis to support Plaintiff’s
cause of action, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and the Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment as
a matter of law.
This Supplemental Motion and its predecessor Motion
are supported by this notice, the filed pleadings, various
medical records concerning treatment rendered to Plaintiff,
various deposition transcripts, various affidavits on behalf of
Defendant, the Memorandum of Law, the Supplemental
Memorandum of Law and permissible argument of counsel.
On November 8, 1996, plaintiff responded to defendant’s supplemental motion for
summary judgment with supporting affidavits.
On December 19, 1996, the Trial Court entered summary judgment of dismissal,
incorporating therein his memorandum opinion which stated:
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It is the opinion of this Court that there is no casual
link that the plaintiff was terminated because he had made a
claim for worker’s compensation benefits. The affidavits of
the plaintiff and his workers’ compensation attorney, alleging
a wrongful discharge, do not create a genuine issue of
material fact. The Court further finds the plaintiff was
terminated pursuant to a neutral policy of the defendant to
terminate employees who do not comply with their policy of
working outside the company while on worker’s
compensation.
A party who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of producing
admissible, competent evidence of a material fact or facts which, if uncontradicted, entitle the
moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Byrd v. Hall, Tenn. 1993, 847 S.W.2d 208.
When the moving party has satisfied this initial burden, then the burden of proceeding
shifts to the opponent of the motion to produce admissible, competent evidence to contradict that
offered by the moving party or admissible, competent evidence of another fact or facts which
would disentitle the moving party to a summary judgment despite the fact or facts shown in
support of the motion. Street v. J. C. Bradford & Co. (6th Cir. 1989), 886 F.2d 1472. The
evidence of the non-moving party must show more than a mere metaphysical doubt as to material
facts, but must include competent and material evidence of the non existence of facts asserted
by the moving party and/or other facts which effectively disentitle the moving party to summary
judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 104 S.Cl.
1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
Employees in cases like this must demonstrate that they will be able to prove at trial that
their pursuit for worker’s compensation benefits was a substantial factor in their employer’s
decision to fire them. Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d at 558. If an employee
elects to shoulder this burden with circumstantial evidence, the employee must present direct and
compelling circumstantial evidence. Thomason v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prods., Inc., Tenn. App.
1992, 831 S.W.2d 291, 293.
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In the present case, the issue on appeal appears to be whether the defendant-employer
supported its motion for summary judgment with uncontradicted, competent admissible evidence
of a legitimate cause or causes for termination of plaintiff, i.e., either (1) that the plaintiff was
physically disqualified for employment in plaintiff’s plant, or (2) that plaintiff violated an
employment policy of the employer by accepting employment with a different employer while
receiving from the defendant employee workers compensation for temporary disability without
written application to the employer for permission and receiving from the employer written
permission for such extra curricular employment.
This Court must first consider whether the motion for summary judgment was supported
by competent, admissible, material of uncontradicted evidence of facts which entitle defendant
to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The affidavit of Mr. Medlin stated:
1. My name is Galen Medlin. I am 45 years old,
am competent to make this affidavit and do testify herein
based upon personal knowledge.
2. I am currently employed as Department
Manager, Human Resources Operations for Nissan Motor
Manufacturing Corporation U.S.A. (“Nissan”).
3. From October 1991 to April 1993, I was
employed as Section Manager of Human Resources for the
Trim and Chassis Plant. In that capacity, I administered
company policies and employee benefit plans, responded to
questions regarding company policies and employee benefit
plans, and administered corrective action, up to and including
termination, on employees who violate company policies.
4. In my capacity as Section Manager of Human
Resources for the Trim and Chassis Plant I was familiar with
and have knowledge of Nissan’s policy with respect to
employees working while on leave of absence and the
implementation of that policy.
5. Additionally, I communicated directly with
Kevin Caldwell, a production technician in the Trim Car
department of the Trim and Chassis Plant, regarding him
working while on leave of absence, and I was the person in
Nissan management who told Kevin Caldwell he was
terminated from employment at Nissan.
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6. Finally, I have reviewed my notes made
simultaneously with my communications with Kevin
Caldwell, and I have reviewed reports and records maintained
by Nissan made at or near the time by or from information
transmitted by a person with knowledge and a business duty
to record or transmit the same in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity and as a regular practice of that
business activity to make the records or memorandum.
7. Based on the foregoing, it is my testimony that
Kevin Caldwell is a 28 year old male who began his
employment as a production technician in the Nissan Trim
Car department of the Trim and Chassis plant on February 2,
1992.
8. Mr. Caldwell sustained an on-the-job injury to
his back and went out on leave of absence on August 18, 1992
and remained out on leave.
9. On January 4, 1993, Mr. Caldwell’s treating
physician, Dr. Stanley Hopp, found that Mr. Caldwell had
reached maximum medical improvement. Dr. Hopp also
assigned Mr. Caldwell permanent restrictions.
10. There was no job within Mr. Caldwell’s
department at Nissan which fit the plaintiff’s restrictions, so,
in accordance with Nissan policy, Mr. Caldwell was not
returned to work at Nissan at that time. Mr. Caldwell,
though, remained a Nissan employee, with the opportunity to
obtain long term disability benefits (which were, in fact, paid
to the plaintiff, commencing March 10 1993).
11. Nissan has a company policy regarding
working while on leave of absence. The Employee Handbook
states that policy as follows, “Performing unauthorized work
for personal gain while on a leave will be cause for
termination.”
12. Because the requests to work while on leave
must be evaluated by members of both Nissan’s Medical and
Human Resources staff, an employee who requests to work
while on leave of absence is instructed to submit a written
request describing the nature of the work the employee
proposes to do while on leave.
13. On or about March 9, 1993, I spoke with Mr.
Caldwell by telephone. I was returning a message Mr.
Caldwell had left for me to call him.
14. The conversation began with Mr. Caldwell
stating that he had some questions about working while on
leave of absence. I explained to Mr. Caldwell that he needed
to submit, in writing, a request to work and describe in the
request the work he wanted to do.
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15. Mr. Caldwell responded that he did not see
why this procedure was necessary and that what he planned to
do was none of Nissan’s concern. Mr. Caldwell also stated
that he planned to substitute as a teacher and that he wanted
to work as a waiter. Mr. Caldwell told me that he had
discussed this work with an employee in Nissan’s Medical
Department who had told him to provide a written request to
work while on leave of absence to Nissan’s Human Resources
staff. Mr. Caldwell stated that he did not understand why I
could not give him permission over the telephone.
16. I told Mr. Caldwell that it was Nissan’s
procedure that the request must be made by the employee in
writing and that that was the only way it could be granted.
----
19. I never received from the plaintiff a written
request to work while on leave of absence.
20. On or about March 17, 1993, I contacted three
school systems in the area and learned that Mr. Caldwell had,
in fact, already been working for the Marshall County Board
of Education for as long as a month or six weeks (i.e., since
February of 1993) as a substitute teacher.
21. Because Mr. Caldwell had worked while on
leave of absence without having followed company procedure
to obtain authorization from Nissan to do so, and had denied
to me that he had engaged in any work while on leave of
absence when, in fact, he had done so, I followed customary
company practice and reported these violations to other
members of Nissan’s management and recommended Mr.
Caldwell’s termination.
22. As per company policy, I received instructions
to terminate Mr. Caldwell for violating Nissan’s policy
regarding working while on leave.
23. On April 6, 1993, I met with Mr. Caldwell,
told him that he had violated company policy regarding
working while on leave, and told him his employment with
Nissan was terminated.
Although some doubt may exist as to the first-hand knowledge of Mr. Medlin of some
of the facts stated in his affidavit, any such infirmity is cured by the affidavits of other employees
and the admissions of plaintiff also exhibited to the motion for summary judgment.
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Plaintiff’s claim that his work supervisor approved his working elsewhere is ineffective
because no written request was submitted and there is no evidence of the authority of the work
supervisor to grant any such permission.
It is also undisputed that plaintiff produced no physician’s authorization for outside work
until he had been working outside for nearly two months.
The defendant has shown by uncontradicted evidence a non-pretextual and justifiable
reason and cause of the discharge of plaintiff. Prior to the discovery of the violation of the rule
on outside work, defendant was overly generous in dealing with plaintiff who was hired for a 90-
day trial period and did not qualify during the first 90 days. Nevertheless, he was granted a
second 90-day trial period during which he was injured. So far as this record shows, plaintiff
received all of the benefits due him as workers compensation.
Plaintiff has offered nothing more than his own conception of why he was discharged,
plaintiff has shown no evidence contrary to that offered by defendant. This is simply not
sufficient to overcome the direct, undisputed reason shown by defendant. Newsome v. Textron
Aerostructures, Tenn. App. 1995, 924 S.W.2d 87.
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against the
plaintiff. The cause is remanded to the Trial Court for any necessary further proceedings.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
_________________________________
HENRY F. TODD
PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
CONCUR:
_____________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
_____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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