In re: Adoption of Heather Christine Hatcher ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
December 17, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
IN RE: )
)
ADOPTION OF HEATHER )
CHRISTINE HATCHER, a child )
under the age of eighteen (18) years, )
)
JAMES HATCHER and ) Appeal No.
VELMA CHRISTINE HATCHER ) M1999-01843-COA-R7-CV
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) Dickson Juvenile
)
VS. )
)
HEATHER PATTERSON, )
)
Defendant/Appellee. )
APPEALED FROM THE JUVENILE COURT OF DICKSON COUNTY
AT CHARLOTTE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE A. ANDREW JACKSON, JUDGE
WILLIAM H. FARMER
STEPHEN A. COBB
PAULA A. FLOWERS
511 Union Street, Suite 2100
Nashville, Tennessee 37219-8966
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
JACK L. GARTON
110 Mathis Drive
Dickson, Tennessee 37056-0190
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
KOCH, J.
CAIN, J.
OPINION
Fifteen months after granting the adoption of an infant child, the
Juvenile Court of Dickson County voided the adoption for a host of substantive and
procedural problems – including the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and the
failure of the biological mother to sign the surrender. The adopting parents urge us
to hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-122(b)(1) cures all defects in the former
proceeding after the adoption order becomes final. We reject that contention, but
hold that the biological mother effectively surrendered the child. We therefore
affirm the lower court’s order setting the adoption aside, but we reverse the order
returning custody of the child to the biological mother.
I.
Heather Patterson, a pregnant unwed teenager, sought a couple to
whom she could surrender the baby for adoption. Through mutual friends she was
introduced to James and Christine Hatcher of Waverly. She visited the Hatchers
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with her parents, and kept in touch with them by telephone. At some point she told
the Hatchers that she wanted them to adopt the baby when it was born.
Mr. and Mrs. Hatcher had talked about adopting a child, and upon
becoming acquainted with Ms. Patterson and her family, they agreed to adopt the
child when they were asked to do so. In the fall of 1997, they contacted the
licensed pregnancy and counseling service that was providing services to Ms.
Patterson and asked the agency to conduct the home study required for them to
adopt the child. The agency agreed, and scheduled an interview with the Hatchers
in early January of 1998.
In the meantime, the Hatchers’ relationship with Ms. Patterson
continued to develop. They took her to some of her medical appointments, and
spent some time with her at Christmas in 1997. They were present when the baby
was born on February 6, 1998, and they took the baby home with them when she
was released from the hospital on February 14, 1998.
The Hatchers hired a lawyer to assist them with the adoption, but for
some reason not explained in the record, the legal system completely failed the
Hatchers in their attempt. The lawyer apparently drew up a petition for adoption,
the surrender forms for the mother and the adopting parents, a waiver of interest of
the putative father, and a final order of adoption. Then he sent the Hatchers by
themselves to get the court’s approval for the adoption, ignoring all the procedural
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steps usually required.
The petition is addressed to the Chancery Court of Dickson County
and the final order directs the “Clerk and Master to complete the forms necessary
for the state to issue a new birth certificate for the child.” The signature line,
however, refers to the Juvenile Judge of Dickson County by name and title.
Whether a petition was ever filed in the Chancery Court is still a mystery. In this
record the word “Chancery” is marked out of the petition and the word “Juvenile”
is written in. Why the juvenile judge accepted the petition and signed the order of
adoption is not explained in the record either.
The Hatchers executed the petition for adoption on February 12, 1998.
The petition contained the following two paragraphs:
8. Petitioners would state that there has been full
compliance with the law in regards to the surrender of the
child to your Petitioners and that all parties’ pursuant to
law have received a copy [of] said surrender.
9. Petitioners would state that the biological mother
has given her consent and does hereby execute this
Petition for Adoption further evidencing her consent and
that she is under no undue influence and that no
consideration has been given to them for the purposes of
agreeing to said adoption. Petitioners would further state
that the biological mother understands that the entry of an
Order confirming the parental consent, without revoking
the parental consent prior to the entry of such an Order
would terminate that parents parental rights to the child
forever and that the parents will have no legal rights to the
custody, or control of the child in the future. Further
Petitioners would state that the biological father has signed
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a Waiver of Interest.
Ms. Patterson executed the petition under oath before the juvenile
judge of Dickson County on March 4, 1998. The oath she took states that “she has
read the foregoing Petition for Adoption and that the facts set forth herein are true
to the best of her knowledge, information and belief . . . .”
The record contains the filled-out forms for the surrender of the child
directly to the adoptive parents, but the forms are not signed by the Hatchers nor by
Ms. Patterson. The executed Waiver of Interest by the putative father is in the
record.
The final order of adoption recites that it came on to be heard on the
petition and, among other things, upon the “surrender of a child by the natural
parents directly to the adoptive parents.” The order was signed by the juvenile
judge and dated March 11, 1998. The order in this record does not contain any
information about where or when it was filed in the records of the juvenile clerk. No
one has offered an explanation why the petition is stamped filed by the juvenile clerk
on April 3, 1998 – three weeks after the juvenile judge signed the order of adoption.
On February 16, 1999, Ms. Patterson filed a petition to set aside the
adoption because “this court lacks jurisdiction to grant an adoption, that no home
study was ever completed, and that no surrender and acceptance was executed.”
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At a hearing on June 30, 1999, the court heard only an argument about
the legal issues involved. Apparently convinced that the adoption order was fatally
defective, the court ordered the adoption set aside and the child returned to Ms.
Patterson the next day. The court did not inquire about Ms. Patterson’s parental
fitness or the effect that such an abrupt change of custody would have on the child,
her biological mother, or the adoptive parents. We stayed the June 30 order and
directed the parties to work out a mutually acceptable visitation plan for Ms.
Patterson.
II.
The Hatchers do not assert on appeal that the Juvenile Court of
Dickson County had subject matter jurisdiction over adoptions or that the
proceedings in that court conformed to the statutory requirements for adoptions.
They also concede that a judgment rendered by a court without subject matter
jurisdiction is void, see New River Lumber Co. v. Tennessee Ry. Co., 210 S.W. 639(Tenn. 1919), and that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver or
consent, see Riden v. Snider, 832 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
Nevertheless, the Hatchers insist Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-122 (b)(1) prevents the
parties to the adoption from raising the jurisdictional question after the order
becomes final. That section provides:
(b)(1) After the final order of adoption is entered, no
party to an adoption proceeding, nor anyone claiming
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under such party, may later question the validity of the
adoption proceeding by reason of any defect or
irregularity therein, jurisdictional or otherwise, but shall be
fully bound by the order, except for such appeal as may
be allowed by law.
If one reads Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-122(b)(1) literally and in isolation
the Hatchers’ contention has some merit. We think however that the statute should
be read as a whole, because statutes similar in subject matter must be construed so
as to make the legislative scheme operate in a consistent manner. Davis v. Beeler,
207 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. 1948). Reading the Act as a whole, we note that subsection
b(1) was part of the statute passed in 1951. See 1951 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 202. In
1995 the legislature overhauled the adoption law, passing a seventy-four page bill
that re-enacted portions of the prior law with new provisions tucked in at
appropriate places. See 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 532. That Act added section
(b)(2). Now the two sections stand adjacent to each other.
(b)(1) After the final order of adoption is entered, no
party to an adoption proceeding, nor anyone claiming
under such party, may later question the validity of the
adoption proceeding by reason of any defect or
irregularity therein, jurisdictional or otherwise, but shall be
fully bound by the order, except for such appeal as may
be allowed by law.
(b)(2) In no event, for any reason, shall an adoption be
overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any
person or entity after one (1) year from the date of entry
of the final order of adoption by a court of competent
jurisdiction. This provision is intended as a statute of
repose.
If subsection (b)(1) had the meaning for which the Hatchers contend,
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then subsection (b)(2) would have been completely unnecessary – at least as to
parties to the adoption. Under their version of (b)(1) parties could not attack the
adoption order for any reason thirty-one days after the court signed it.
Nevertheless, the legislature passed (b)(2) in 1995 saying that no person could
launch a collateral attack on an adoption order signed “by a court of competent
jurisdiction” after one year had passed. Under (b)(2), if the court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction, the order may be attacked even beyond the one year
period. This result is more consistent with the traditional view that a judgment
rendered without subject matter jurisdiction may be attacked at any time. See 47
Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 838; Hughes v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 383
P.2d 55 (Or. 1963). Earlier adoption cases in Tennessee stand for the same
proposition. See Crocker v. Balch, 55 S.W. 307 (Tenn. 1900); Redmond v.
Wardrep, 257 S.W. 394 (Tenn. 1923).
We cannot ignore the obvious intent of the legislature, City of Oak
Ridge v. Morgan, 381 S.W.2d 901 (Tenn. 1964), but we should not interpret a
statute in a way that leads to an absurd result. Epstein v. State, 366 S.W.2d 914(Tenn. 1963). If we interpret section (b)(1) literally we would have to ignore section
(b)(2), the more recent legislative enactment. We think the legislature would be
startled to find that a court without subject matter jurisdiction (a traffic court, for
instance) could nullify all the safeguards the legislature has built into the adoption
statutes, and the adoption could not be set aside thirty-one days after the order was
signed. Therefore, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-122(b)(1) does not bar
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an attack on an adoption order entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction. 1
The order of adoption entered by the Juvenile Court of Dickson
County was, and is, a nullity.
III.
We are satisfied, however, that Ms. Patterson effectively surrendered
the child. The Juvenile Court of Dickson County does have jurisdiction to accept
her surrender, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-111(b), and Ms. Patterson did everything
necessary to surrender the child except sign the surrender document. She selected
the Hatchers as the persons she wished to adopt her child. She appeared in court
before the juvenile judge and signed the adoption petition under oath. The petition
alleged that “there has been full compliance with the law in regards to the surrender
of the child . . . and that all parties pursuant to law have received a copy of said
surrender.” A copy of a formal surrender form is in the record although it is not
signed by Ms. Patterson. The petition prayed for a final order of adoption by the
Hatchers and alleged:
9. Petitioners would state that the biological mother
has given her consent and does hereby execute this
Petition for Adoption further evidencing her consent and
that she is under no undue influence and that no
Page 9
consideration has been given to them for the purposes of
agreeing to said adoption. Petitioners would further state
that the biological mother understands that the entry of an
Order confirming the parental consent, without revoking
the parental consent prior to the entry of such an Order
would terminate that parents parental rights to the child
forever and that the parents will have no legal rights to the
custody, of control of the child in the future.
At oral argument counsel for Ms. Patterson conceded that Ms.
Patterson intended to permit the Hatchers to adopt the child and that she has no
basis to challenge the adoption other than the defects and oversights in the
preparation and execution of the forms. Counsel also conceded that Ms. Patterson
made the decision to surrender the child with full understanding of her options and
the consequences of her decision. There is no evidence in the record that she felt
any remorse about her decision or that she attempted to revoke her surrender within
the time provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-112 (1996).
Under all the circumstances, we are convinced that the proceedings in
this case substantially complied with the statutory requirements for a valid
surrender, see Brown v. Raines, 611 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-111(k)(1)(C)(i)(Supp. 1999) states that as an alternative to
witnessing the mother’s signature on the surrender form, the court may “witness the
actual act of surrender . . . by questioning the parent on the matters required by this
part before the entry of an order of confirmation of the parental consent.” Ms.
Patterson does not contend that the Juvenile Judge failed to ask the questions “
required by this part,” and as we have pointed out, she was knowledgeable about
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and comfortable with her decision at the time of the surrender.
Undoubtedly other unfulfilled requirements lurk in the labyrinthine
provisions of the adoption laws, but as a consequence of her surrender Ms.
Patterson no longer has the standing to raise them.
We affirm the order below setting the adoption aside. We reverse the
order returning custody of the child to Ms. Patterson. Tax the costs on appeal
equally to Ms. Patterson and the Hatchers.
_______________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
____________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
IN RE: )
)
ADOPTION OF HEATHER )
CHRISTINE HATCHER, a child )
under the age of eighteen (18) years, )
)
JAMES HATCHER and ) Appeal No.
VELMA CHRISTINE HATCHER ) 01-A-01-9907-JV-00397
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) Dickson Juvenile
)
VS. )
)
HEATHER PATTERSON, )
)
Defendant/Appellee. )
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Juvenile Court of
Dickson County, briefs and argument of the parties; upon consideration whereof, we affirm
that portion of the trial court’s order setting the adoption aside and reverse that portion
returning custody of the child to Ms. Patterson.
In accordance with the opinion of the Court filed herein, it is, therefore, ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the order of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The cause is remanded to the Juvenile Court of Dickson County for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion and for the collection of the costs accrued below.
Costs of this appeal are taxed one-half against Mr. and Mrs. Hatcher and one-half
against Ms. Patterson, for which execution may issue if necessary.
_______________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
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_______________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
_______________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
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