Lisa Lynn Odom v. Claiborne County, Tennessee , 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 212 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs October 21, 2015
LISA LYNN ODOM, ET AL v. CLAIBORNE COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Claiborne County
No. 12-CV-1006 Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge1
No. E2014-02328-COA-R3-CV – Filed March 29, 2016
_________________________________
An “affidavit of complaint” was issued against Lisa Odom for custodial interference.
Deputies from the Claiborne County Sheriff‟s Office visited Ms. Odom for the purpose of
taking custody of her child and returning her to Ms. Odom‟s ex-husband, Scott Odom.
Ms. Odom objected to the removal of her child, and William Phipps, Ms. Odom‟s father,
asked to see a warrant prior to the removal of the child. After a prolonged standoff, the
deputies called Assistant District Attorney General Amanda Sammons, who explained
over a speakerphone that a warrant was not necessary because there was a court order for
Ms. Odom to return the child to Mr. Odom. During the course of the phone call, Ms.
Odom overheard General Sammons use derogatory language when referring to her. Ms.
Odom was ultimately arrested for custodial interference. Nearly a year later, Ms. Odom
and Mr. Phipps (collectively the plaintiffs) filed a complaint against General Sammons
alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy. General
Sammons filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs appeal.
We affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed; Case Remanded
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
SWINEY, C.J., AND JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.
Herbert S. Moncier, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Lisa Lynn Odom and
William Phipps.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor
General; and Mary M. Bers, Senior Counsel, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee,
Amanda Sammons.
1
Sitting by designation.
OPINION
I.
The Odoms were divorced on December 2, 2008. One child was born to their
union. Following their divorce, Ms. Odom and Mr. Odom shared custody of the child.
On July 12, 2012, Bill Baumgardner, a sergeant of the Claiborne County Sheriff‟s Office,
executed an affidavit of complaint against Ms. Odom for custodial interference, pursuant
to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-306 (2010). The affidavit of complaint states as follows:
Affiant, Sgt. B. Baumgardner, found through an investigation
that [Ms. Odom] and Scott Odom share custody of a minor
child. Affiant learned that [Ms. Odom] and Scott Odom share
custody of minor child by guidelines that were set forth by a
court order. It was found that [Ms. Odom] did commit the
offense of custodial interference when she removed said
minor child from the state of Tennessee and into the state of
California, thus restricting Scott Odom from his entitled,
court ordered visitation time with said minor child.
Thereafter, on August 7, 2012, deputies from the Claiborne County Sheriff‟s Office went
to the home of William Phipps, where Ms. Odom was living, to take custody of the child.
One of the deputies entered Mr. Phipps‟ home, took custody of the child, and gave the
child to Mr. Odom, who had accompanied the deputies. Ms. Odom protested the removal
of the child, and her father requested that the deputies show them a warrant. After
speaking with Mr. Phipps and Ms. Odom for approximately two hours, the deputies
called General Sammons and put her on a speakerphone. General Sammons explained
over the phone that a warrant was not necessary because there was a court order for Ms.
Odom to return the child to Mr. Odom. At some point while General Sammons was on
speakerphone, Ms. Odom overheard General Sammons call her a “jerk,” refer to her as a
“troublemaker,” and say, “Take that bitch to jail.” Ms. Odom was subsequently
handcuffed and taken to the Claiborne County jail. The custodial interference criminal
charge against Ms. Odom was eventually dismissed.
On August 5, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a complaint2 against General Sammons
alleging (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress and (2) civil conspiracy in
2
The complaint also listed Mr. and Ms. Odom‟s minor child and the State of Tennessee
as plaintiffs. However, the State Attorney General never authorized Ms. Odom and Mr. Phipps
to bring this action in the name of the State. In addition, the complaint named Mr. Odom,
2
violation of Tenn. Const. art. I, §§ 7, 8. On September 6, 2013, General Sammons filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). On October 1, 2014, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint to add allegations that General
Sammons‟ secretary had a “social relationship” with Mr. Odom and that General
Sammons “prosecuted multiple prior criminal proceedings instituted by [Mr.] Odom that
were all dismissed.” The trial court entered an order on October 6, 2014, allowing the
amendments.
On October 23, 2014, the trial court filed its findings and conclusions. With
respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against General Sammons,
the trial court stated:
Because mere insults do not rise to the level of outrageous
conduct required for an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim and because the Complaint fails to allege
anything concerning General Sammons beyond the allegation
that she called Ms. Odom a “jerk,” “trouble maker,” and said
“take the bitch to jail,” the [p]laintiff[s] have failed to state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against
General Sammons.
As for the civil conspiracy charge against General Sammons, the trial court concluded,
Tennessee courts have continuously determined that Tenn.
Const. [a]rt. I, § 17 does not create a substantive right, only a
“mechanism by which a citizen may redress grievances.”
State ex rel. Moncier [v. Jones], [No. M2012-01429-COA-
R3-CV], 2013 WL 2492648, [at] *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. [Nov.
13,] 2013); see Staples v. Brown, 85 S.W. 254 (Tenn. 1905).
In State ex rel. Moncier, the Court specifically declined to
hold that Article [I], Section 17 creates a substantive cause of
action to enforce other constitutional provisions or laws. Id.
This [c]ourt declines to reject this long standing rule in
Claiborne County, Sheriff Baumgartner, multiple deputies from the Claiborne County Sheriff‟s
Office, and Arthur J. Gallagher, Risk Management Services, Inc. as defendants. General
Sammons is the only defendant named in either the original complaint or the first amended
complaint who is a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we will only discuss the allegations
pertinent to General Sammons.
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Tennessee that there is no implied cause of action based on
violations of the Tennessee Constitution.
Further, assuming that General Sammons was acting in
conspiracy to violate [p]laintiffs‟ [c]onstitutional rights, she is
entitled to a prosecutor‟s immunity, as an assistant district
attorney general, from damages arising from her initiation and
pursuit of a prosecution. See Simmons v. Gath Baptist
Church, 109 S.W.3d 370 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Willett v.
Ford, 603 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). Therefore,
[p]laintiff[s] have failed to state a claim for which relief can
be granted for civil conspiracy against General Sammons.
Accordingly, the trial court granted General Sammons‟ motion to dismiss.
II.
The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on November 21, 2014, raising the following
issues:
Whether the trial court erred by granting General Sammons‟
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs‟
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action for injuries
caused by General Sammons as a state actor for violating Ms.
Odom‟s rights provided her by Tennessee‟s Constitution.
Whether General Sammons has absolute prosecutorial
immunity.
Whether General Sammons is individually liable.
III.
On the issue of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, we are guided by
the following principles as articulated by the Supreme Court:
A Rule 12.02(6) motion challenges only the legal sufficiency
of the complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff‟s proof or
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evidence. Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297
S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn. 2009); Willis v. Tenn. Dep't of
Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2003); Bell ex rel. Snyder
v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg,
P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999); Sanders v.
Vinson, 558 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1977)). The resolution
of a 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is determined by an
examination of the pleadings alone. Leggett v. Duke Energy
Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Tenn. 2010); Trau-Med of Am.,
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002);
Cook ex rel. Uithoven v. Spinnaker’s of Rivergate, Inc., 878
S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528
S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn. 1975). A defendant who files a
motion to dismiss “ „admits the truth of all of the relevant and
material allegations contained in the complaint, but . . .
asserts that the allegations fail to establish a cause of
action.‟ ” Brown v. Tenn. Title Loans, Inc., 328 S.W.3d
850, 854 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Freeman Indus., LLC v.
Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005)); see
Edwards v. Allen, 216 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tenn. 2007); White
v. Revco Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tenn.
2000); Holloway v. Putnam Cnty., 534 S.W.2d 292, 296
(Tenn. 1976).
In considering a motion to dismiss, courts “ „must construe
the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be
true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences.‟ ” Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-
32 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Trau-Med, 71 S.W.3d at 696); see
Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 92-93 (Tenn. 2004); Stein v.
Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997);
Bellar v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 559 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tenn.
1978); see also City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that courts “must construe the complaint liberally in favor of
the plaintiff by . . . giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded
facts”). A trial court should grant a motion to dismiss “only
when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”
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Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 857
(Tenn. 2002); see Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656, 660
(Tenn. 2007); Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn.
1999); Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d
690, 691 (Tenn. 1984); Fuerst v. Methodist Hosp. S., 566
S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tenn. 1978); Ladd v. Roane Hosiery,
Inc., 556 S.W.2d 758, 759–60 (Tenn. 1977). We review the
trial court‟s legal conclusions regarding the adequacy of the
complaint de novo. Brown, 328 S.W.3d at 855; Stein, 945
S.W.2d at 716.
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011).
IV.
The plaintiffs have alleged that General Sammons is guilty of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. “The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim are that the defendant‟s conduct was (1) intentional or reckless, (2) so outrageous
that it is not tolerated by civilized society, and (3) resulted in serious mental injury to the
plaintiff.” Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 (Tenn. 2012) (citing
Lourcey v. Estate of Scarlett, 146 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Tenn. 2004)); Leach v. Taylor, 124
S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tenn. 2004); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). When
determining whether particular conduct is so outrageous that it is not tolerated by
civilized society, “the test often used by our courts is the one found in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1964).” Alexander v. Inman, 825 S.W.2d 102, 105
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Comment d states that,
[t]he cases thus far decided have found liability only where
the defendant‟s conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It
has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an
intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct
has been characterized by “malice,” or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive
damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where
the conduct has been so outrageous, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally,
the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his
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resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
“Outrageous!”
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities. The rough edges of our society are still in need of
a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that
are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion
for the law to intervene in every case where some one’s
feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an
unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left
through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam. It is only where there is a special relation
between the parties, as stated in § 48, that there may be
recovery for insults not amounting to extreme outrage.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (emphasis added and internal citation
omitted).
In the present case, the plaintiffs‟ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against General Sammons hinges on three separate comments concerning Ms. Odom.
Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that General Sammons called Ms. Odom a “jerk,” a
“troublemaker,” and a “bitch.” While all three of these comments were derogatory and
inappropriate in nature, none of them rise to the high standard of outrageousness
necessary to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As the
Restatement makes clear, “liability . . . does not extend to mere insults, indignities . . . or
other trivialities.” That is what we are dealing with in this case. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted for intentional
infliction of emotional distress by General Sammons, and the trial court correctly
dismissed this claim.
V.
The plaintiffs next argue that General Sammons “participated in a civil conspiracy
to violate [Ms. Odom‟s] rights provided her by the Tennessee Constitution in Art. I, § 7
and Art. I, § 8.” The plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to bring such a claim
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pursuant to Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17.3 The trial court disposed of the conspiracy charge
against General Sammons by noting that “Tennessee courts have continuously
determined that Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 17 does not create a substantive right, only a
mechanism by which a citizen may redress grievances.” (Internal citation and quotation
marks omitted.) The trial court concluded that “there is no implied cause of action based
on violations of the Tennessee Constitution.”
As noted by the trial court, this Court has previously addressed the issue of
whether Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17 creates a cause of action for violations of other
constitutional provisions. In State ex re. Moncier v. Jones, we stated that,
[t]he trial court held that there is no private cause of action for
damages based on violations of the Tennessee Constitution
and accordingly dismissed the claims of violation of the
Tennessee Constitution. On appeal, Mr. Moncier argues that
Article [I], Section 17 grants him a cause of action against
Ms. Jones for “violations of other Bill of Rights in
Tennessee‟s constitution; violation of Tennessee statutes;
violations of Tennessee rules; and violations of Tennessee
established torts.” We have reviewed the cases cited by Mr.
Moncier and considered his argument and decline to hold
that Article [I], Section 17 creates a substantive cause of
action to enforce other constitutional provisions or law.
Article I, Section 17 was before the court in Staples v.
Brown, an action involving the contest of an election to the
position of city attorney of Harriman; the initial challenge
was heard by the city council, which accepted the results and
dismissed the contest. The contestant‟s appeal to the Roane
County circuit court was dismissed because the statute which
vested the city council with jurisdiction to try the contest did
not provide for an appeal. On appeal, our Supreme Court
reversed the trial court; with respect to Article I, Section 17,
the court stated:
3
“That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against the State in such
manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17.
8
The Constitution (article [I], § 17) provides that
all courts shall be open, and every man having
an injury done him in his lands, goods, person,
or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial, or delay.
The obvious meaning of this is that there shall
be established courts proceedings according to
the course of the common law, or some system
of well established judicature, to which all of
the citizens of the state may resort for the
enforcement of rights denied, or redress of
wrongs done them.
Staples [v. Brown], 85 S.W. 254, 255 ([Tenn.] 1905). The
court proceeded to discuss the appropriate court and
procedure to hear the appeal of the contest and remanded the
case to the circuit court for retrial on the merits. The case
stands for the proposition that the constitutional provision
does not create a right but, rather, requires a mechanism by
which a citizen may redress grievances.
State ex rel. Moncier v. Jones, No. M2012-01429-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 2492648, at
*6 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed June 6, 2013), perm app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013)
(emphasis added). We reiterate the holdings of Staples and State ex rel. Moncier. The
plaintiffs are attempting to expand the language of Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17 so as to find a
substantive right that simply does not exist. The trial court was correct in declining to
find an implied cause of action in Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17 based on violations of the
Tennessee Constitution. We agree with the trial court‟s conclusion that the plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted for civil conspiracy against
General Sammons.
VI.
The plaintiffs have raised two additional issues: (1) whether General Sammons has
absolute prosecutorial immunity and (2) whether General Sammons is individually liable.
We have already affirmed the trial court‟s dismissal of the plaintiffs‟ claims against
General Sammons for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy.
9
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to analyze the issues of prosecutorial immunity and
individual liability, and those issues are pretermitted.
VII.
The trial court‟s grant of Ms. Sammons‟ motion to dismiss is affirmed. Costs on
appeal are assessed to the appellants, Lisa Lynn Odom and William Phipps. This case is
remanded, pursuant to applicable law, for collection of costs assessed by the trial court.
_______________________________
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
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