James Rowland Moore v. Karen Owen Moore ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
December 8, 1998
JAMES ROWLAND MOORE, ) Cecil W. Crowson
) Appellate Court Clerk
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9708-CV-00444
VS. )
) Davidson Circuit
) No. 94D-2612
KAREN OWEN MOORE, )
)
Defendant/Appellee. )
APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE MURIEL ROBINSON, JUDGE
LINDA F. BURNSED
AMY BRYSON SMITH
424 Church Street, Suite 1750
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
SANDRA JONES
213 Third Avenue, North
Nashville, Tennessee 37201
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
REVERSED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
KOCH, J.
CAIN, J.
OPINION
After a 1996 divorce by the Circuit Court of Davidson County the
husband filed an independent damages action in the chancery court, alleging that the
wife fraudulently induced him to enter into the divorce settlement. The wife filed a
Rule 60.02 motion in the divorce court seeking a declaration that she was not guilty
of fraud. The divorce court ruled that the chancery court was bound by the circuit
court’s judgment and that the husband must pay $2500 in attorney’s fees to the wife
for services in the Rule 60.02 motion. We reverse.
I.
The parties were divorced in 1996 by an order of the Circuit Court of
Davidson County. Prior to the entry of the divorce, the parties negotiated a settlement
of the marital home. The wife agreed to pay the husband $9,000 for his equitable
interest in the home in exchange for a quitclaim of that interest to the wife. This
agreement was formalized by an agreed order entered in the divorce court on July 5,
1995. The final order granting the divorce and disposing of the remaining issues was
entered on May 20, 1996.
On or about January 17, 1997, Mr. Moore filed a complaint in the
Davidson County Chancery Court accusing Ms. Moore of fraudulent
misrepresentations in the marital home transaction. Specifically, the complaint
alleged that Ms. Moore was a real estate agent and that she and her attorney
represented to Mr. Moore that his interest in the home amounted to $9,000 when they
knew such representations were false and that the value was much higher. The
complaint further alleges that the $9,000 value was based on a total value for the
home of $215,000, as represented by Ms. Moore, but that she sold the house in
September of 1995 for $238,500. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive
damages and attorney’s fees and asked for a jury to try the issues.
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On May 2, 1997 Ms. Moore filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative,
for summary judgment in the chancery court. She asserted that Mr. Moore was
estopped from raising the fraud issue in the chancery court, that the judgment of the
divorce court was res judicata, and that the divorce court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the question. At some point not clear from the record, Ms. Moore answered the
complaint and raised the same defenses that she raised in her prior motions.
On May 2, 1997 Ms. Moore also filed a motion in the divorce court
seeking a review under Rule 60.02, Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. to determine “whether fraud
was perpetrated upon the Court and Defendant in this cause.” The motion also
asserted that Mr. Moore’s chancery court action was frivolous and that the divorce
court should award sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Tenn. R. Civ. Proc.
The chancery court overruled Ms. Moore’s motion to dismiss. The court
held that the complaint stated a cause of action for fraud, but the court deferred a
ruling on the other matters pending before it until the divorce court ruled on the Rule
60.02 motion.
The divorce court heard the Rule 60.02 motion on July 11, 1997 and
thereafter entered an order holding (1) that “Mr. Moore’s ‘equitable interest’ in the
parties real property is res judicata and binding on the Chancery Court,” and (2) that
the June 23, 1995 agreed order “is not contractual and does not constitute a contract
but is part of the final resolution of the divorce action and is part of the Final Decree
of Divorce.”
II.
We think most of the confusion in this case arises from a fundamental
misunderstanding of what is involved. First, the chancery court action is an action for
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damages based on fraud and deceit. It is not an action for relief from the judgment.
The chancery court complaint does not ask that the divorce decree be set aside,
altered, or modified in any way. It seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the
defendant’s alleged misrepresentations in the division of the marital home.
“This is a separate, independent, and distinct action....
Notwithstanding that the property settlement agreement
may have been incorporated into the divorce decree, one
option available to plaintiff to seek redress for the alleged
fraud of defendants is to sue for damages at law under
the theory of fraud and deceit.”
Tanner v. Tanner (Tenn. Ct. App., filed at Jackson July 31, 1985). See also Vance
v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1977). We would only add that, in our opinion,
and contrary to the circuit court’s order, the agreement to divide the marital home
does retain its contractual status, despite being incorporated into the circuit court’s
order. See Penland v. Penland, 521 S.W.2d 222 (Tenn. 1975).
Second, Ms. Moore’s Rule 60.02 motion filed in the circuit court had no
legitimate purpose. Rule 60 provides avenues for relief from a final judgment. But
Ms. Moore’s motion did not seek any relief from the circuit court’s final judgment.
Stripped to its bare essentials, the motion simply sought a declaration by the circuit
court that Mr. Moore’s chancery action had no merit -- a curious reversal of the historic
relationship between the two courts. That such relief is beyond the power of the
circuit court should be apparent. But even if the power existed, it should be even
more apparent that it is not invoked by a Rule 60.02 motion.
Finally, in perhaps the strangest aspect of this strange case, the circuit
court assessed sanctions under Rule 11, Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. for what the court
deemed was Mr. Moore’s frivolous lawsuit in chancery. There is no allegation that Mr.
Moore misrepresented anything in responding to the Rule 60.02 motion, or that his
position was not tenable under the applicable law. He did not voluntarily seek any
relief from the circuit court; he was compelled to respond to Ms. Moore’s effort to seek
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the court’s protection from the chancery action. In our opinion the Rule 11 sanctions
were misplaced.
III.
It may be that Mr. Moore’s chancery action is frivolous, we take no
position on the merits of that case, but the chancery court has the tools to deal with
frivolous lawsuits. We simply recognize that Mr. Moore had the right to file the
chancery action and that the circuit court had no power to rule on its merits or to
impose sanctions for its filing.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause is remanded
to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for any further proceedings that may become
necessary. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellee.
_____________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
_____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
_____________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE