In Re Carter B. ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                        12/12/2017
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs July 3, 2017
    IN RE CARTER B.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lawrence County
    No. 3015-16    Robert L. Jones, Judge
    No. M2016-01438-COA-R3-JV
    This case involves the custody of Carter B., a child adjudicated to be dependent and
    neglected. The Department of Children’s Services, after taking custody of the child,
    asked the trial court to approve a 90-day trial home visit in the home of the child’s
    maternal grandmother, pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(d)
    (Supp. 2017). The trial court granted the motion, finding a trial home visit to be in the
    child’s best interest. The court scheduled a review hearing at a time near the end of the
    90-day period. The child’s guardian ad litem, Stacie Odeneal, who opposed the trial
    home visit, filed a notice of appeal. The child’s mother filed a motion to dismiss the
    appeal, arguing that the trial court’s order is not a final judgment. We hold the trial
    court’s order granting a temporary trial home visit is not a final judgment. Accordingly,
    the guardian ad litem’s appeal is dismissed.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed; Case Remanded
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL
    MCBRAYER and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JJ., joined.
    Stacie Odeneal, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, Guardian ad Litem for Carter B., appellant.
    Teresa P. Martin, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the appellee, Melynda B.
    Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Alexander S. Rieger, Deputy
    Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s
    Services.
    1
    OPINION
    I.
    The child was first placed in grandmother’s care after DCS filed a petition in
    juvenile court alleging that the child was dependent and neglected in his mother’s care.
    DCS alleged that the child was often staying in grandmother’s home while mother was
    staying in a camper in grandmother’s back yard. Law enforcement officers discovered a
    methamphetamine laboratory inside the camper while the child was present. The officers
    also found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the camper. DCS recommended that the
    court appoint a guardian ad litem and grant custody of the child to grandmother, who was
    tasked with supervising the parents’ visitation with the child. After a preliminary
    hearing, the juvenile court ordered that the child be placed in grandmother’s custody.
    Mother and father stipulated (1) that they were incarcerated at the time of the petition and
    hearing; (2) that the child was dependent and neglected; (3) that the child should remain
    in grandmother’s custody; and (4) that DCS should open a Family Support Services case.
    DCS later took custody of the child and began working with grandmother to help
    make her residence safe, clean, and suitable for the child. Eventually, DCS filed a
    motion in juvenile court for an order approving a trial home visit with grandmother. The
    juvenile court denied the motion. DCS appealed to the trial court. The trial court granted
    a 90-day trial home visit with grandmother. The court found that DCS had made multiple
    home visits and found grandmother’s home to be a clean, safe, and appropriate place for
    the child to live. The court also found that grandmother had participated in parenting
    training, homemaker classes, co-parenting classes, domestic violence classes, and a class
    on how to identify drug use in others. The court noted that grandmother and the child
    had been visiting with one another, love one another, and that grandmother had been
    caring for two other grandchildren. The trial court also noted that it “does not expect
    [grandmother] to be perfect, and the Court does not find much fault with her.” The court
    observed that grandmother had various personal burdens, including that she is not in ideal
    physical condition. However, the court found that a 90-day trial home visit was in the
    child’s best interest. The order states that “[a] review hearing is scheduled in this [court]
    for August 16, 2016, at 9 a.m. in order to review the status of the trial home visit.” The
    trial court did not designate its order to be a final judgment as allowed by Tenn. R. Civ.
    P. 54.02.
    The guardian ad litem filed a notice of appeal. Mother filed a notice to dismiss the
    appeal on the grounds that the trial court’s order is not a final judgment. The dispositive
    issue is whether the trial court’s order granting DCS’s motion for a trial home visit is an
    appealable final judgment.
    2
    II.
    Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) provides that
    [i]n civil actions every final judgment entered by a trial court
    from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of
    Appeals is appealable as of right. Except as otherwise
    permitted . . . , if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief
    are involved in an action, any order that adjudicates fewer
    than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
    the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to
    revision at any time before entry of a final judgment
    adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties.
    A final judgment is a judgment that resolves all of the parties’ claims and leaves the court
    with nothing to adjudicate. Ball v. McDowell, 
    288 S.W.3d 833
    , 836–37 (Tenn. 2009).
    “A final judgment ‘fully and completely defines the parties’ rights with regard to the
    issue, leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 
    224 S.W.3d 165
    ,
    168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Mosley v. Mosley, No. E2000-01445-COA-R3-CV,
    
    2000 WL 1859006
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Dec. 20, 2000)). “Until a judgment
    becomes final, it remains within the trial court’s control and may be modified any time
    prior to the entry of a final judgment.” Shofner v. Shofner, 
    181 S.W.3d 703
    , 712–13
    (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). A judgment that is not final “is interlocutory or interim in nature
    and generally cannot be appealed as of right.” In re Estate of Henderson, 
    121 S.W.3d 643
    , 645 (Tenn. 2003).
    This Court has not previously decided whether an order granting a trial home visit
    in a dependency and neglect case is a final judgment under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 37-1-130(d) addresses the issuance of such an order. It provides in pertinent
    part:
    (1) When [DCS] determines that a child who has been
    committed to the department under this section is ready to
    return home, the department shall notify the court in writing
    of its intention to place the child at home on a trial home visit.
    If the court objects to the trial home visit, it must notify the
    department of its objection in writing or set a hearing within
    fifteen (15) days of the date of the notice, with such hearing
    to be held at the earliest possible date. If the hearing is not set
    nor a written objection received within fifteen (15) days of
    the date of the notice, the department may place the child on a
    3
    trial home visit. The notice shall include the provision that
    the department’s legal custody of the child shall terminate in
    ninety (90) days.
    (2) If during the ninety-day period the department determines
    that the trial home visit is not in the child’s best interest and
    removes the child on an emergency basis or seeks to remove
    the child on a non-emergency basis, the department shall file
    a motion for review by the court of the trial home visit and
    shall provide notice to the parent or parents, guardian or other
    custodian. The court shall hold a hearing on such motion
    within three (3) days of an emergency removal and shall set a
    hearing within fifteen (15) days to be held at the earliest
    possible date if the motion seeks the court’s permission to
    make a non-emergency removal.
    (3) During the ninety-day trial home visit, the court may
    periodically review the child’s status and may make any
    orders that the best interest of the child may require.
    In our view, this statute contemplates and provides for “things left to do” for the trial
    court during the pendency of the 90-day trial home visit. The term “trial home visit”
    itself suggests the impermanent, modifiable, and non-final nature of the custody
    arrangement. It is clear from the above-quoted language of the statute that the issue of
    the best interest of the child remains an ongoing concern that must be monitored and
    addressed by DCS and the trial court, if necessary. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(d)(2)
    authorizes DCS to remove a child on an emergency or non-emergency basis, and requires
    the trial court to hold a timely hearing under such circumstances. Section (d)(3) permits a
    trial court to “periodically review the child’s status” and make such further orders as are
    in the child’s best interest.
    In the present case, the trial court’s order specifically provides for such a “review
    hearing scheduled . . . for August 16, 2016, at 9 a.m. in order to review the status of the
    trial home visit.” In mother’s supplement to her motion to dismiss the appeal, she
    attached an order of the trial court, entered January 24, 2017 ‒ roughly six months after
    the notice of appeal was filed ‒ which states:
    This matter came before the Court on August 16, 2016, for
    hearing regarding the trial home visit of the child . . . with his
    grandmother . . . . The hearing was held, but the Court
    continued the matter to January 17, 2017, for further hearing.
    4
    On January 17, 2017, the matter again came before the Court,
    and it was noted the [m]other’s attorney had filed a motion to
    dismiss the Guardian ad Litem’s appeal to the Court of
    Appeals. In light of the motion to dismiss pending before the
    Court of Appeals, the hearing was continued again.
    IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED the review hearing
    regarding the trial home visit is continued for final hearing to
    April 18, 2017, at 9 a.m.
    In deciding the issue presented, we are mindful of the general principle that
    “[n]ormally, the filing of a notice of appeal places jurisdiction of a case in our court and
    deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to act further.” Roberts v. Roberts, No. E2009–
    02350–COA–R3–CV, 
    2010 WL 4865441
    , at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Nov. 29, 2010),
    citing Born Again Church & Christian Outreach Ministries, Inc. v. Myler Church
    Bldg. Sys. of the Midsouth, Inc., 
    266 S.W.3d 421
    , 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“Stated
    another way, once the notice of appeal was filed, the jurisdiction of the appellate court
    attached, and, correlatively, the trial court lost jurisdiction”) (internal brackets and
    quotation marks omitted). If the trial court’s order granting a 90-day trial home visit
    constitutes a final and appealable judgment, then the oversight and review contemplated
    by the governing statute would be hindered or eliminated, because the trial court would
    lose jurisdiction to act further with the filing of a notice of appeal. This result would be
    contrary to the intent of Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(d). Consequently, we hold that an
    order approving a temporary trial home visit under the statute is not a final judgment.1
    III.
    The appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment. Because the guardian ad
    litem prosecuted this appeal on behalf of a minor child, we decline to adjudge costs of
    appeal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-128 (2017); Phillips v. Redmon, No. M1999-
    01619-COA-R3-CV, 
    2001 WL 840266
    , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed July 26, 2001). The
    case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    _______________________________
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
    1
    We note in passing that an aggrieved party can seek a review of an interlocutory order pursuant
    to the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 or Tenn. R. App. P. 9.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2016-01438-COA-R3-JV

Judges: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.

Filed Date: 12/12/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021