Green, James v. Kellogg Companies , 2017 TN WC 2 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                   FILED
    January 19,,2017
    TN COURT Of
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    TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
    IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS
    AT MEMPHIS
    James Green,                                 )   Docket No.: 2015-08-0568
    Employee,                         )
    v.                                           )   State File No.: 6779-2015
    )
    Kellogg Companies,                           )   Judge Robert Durham
    Employer,                         )
    )
    And                                          )
    )
    Corvel Ins. Co.,                             )
    Insurance Carrier.             )
    COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER
    This Compensation Hearing came before the undersigned Workers' Compensation
    Judge on January 11, 2017, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239
    (2016). The dispositive issue is whether Mr. Green sustained an injury to his right
    shoulder on November 14, 2014, that arose primarily out of and in the course and scope
    of his employment with Kellogg. If so, secondary issues include to what extent he is
    entitled to past and future medical benefits, temporary disability benefits, and permanent
    partial disability benefits for this injury.
    The Court holds Mr. Green did not establish by a preponderance of evidence that
    he sustained injuries that arose primarily out of and in the course of his employment on
    November 14, 2014.
    Stipulations
    At the hearing, the parties agreed to the following stipulations:
    1.    Mr. Green's alleged date of injury was November 14, 2014, and he
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    provided notice to Kellogg of his alleged injury on that day.
    2.     Mr. Green's compensation rate is $932.80 for temporary disability benefits
    and $848.00 for permanent partial disability benefits.
    3.     If Mr. Green's shoulder replacement is compensable, he would be entitled
    to temporary total disability benefits from September 15, 2015, until December 27, 2015.
    4.     If Mr. Green's shoulder replacement is compensable, his date of maximum
    medical improvement would be December 27, 2015.
    5.     Mr. Green's medical expenses for treatment of his right-shoulder injury that
    were not paid by Kellogg total $56,057.13.
    6.    The designated medical expense records and the designated medical records
    jointly submitted by the parties and presented as Collective Exhibits Three and Four are
    admissible as evidence for consideration by the Court.
    History of Claim
    Mr. Green, fifty-eight, has made waffles for Kellogg for twenty-eight years, first
    as an "iron adjuster" and then, for the last seventeen years, as a "wheel technician." Mr.
    Green's job requires him to oversee a "wheel" of over one hundred waffle irons. He has
    to regulate the batter and heat, replace any irons that are working improperly, perform
    quality inspections, and periodically add "bits," i.e. small pieces of cinnamon or dried
    fruit, such as blueberries and strawberries, to the batter. To add bits, Mr. Green must use
    a pallet jack to bring in pallets holding boxes of bits weighing several hundred pounds to
    his station. He then must reach into the box and scoop the bits out with a bucket. After
    filling the bucket, he lifts it out of the box and carries it up several steps where he dumps
    it into a hopper that mixes the bits into the batter.
    Mr. Green testified that on November 14, 2014, he attempted to scoop bits from a
    box when he felt sudden and intense pain in his right shoulder. He averred that, while he
    suffered from aches and pains in his shoulder before, he had never experienced this type
    of pain and had never missed work or sought treatment for right-shoulder pain before
    November 14. Kellogg offered no evidence to the contrary.
    Mr. Green testified that immediately after the incident, he reported it to his
    supervisors, Jason Jackson and Bill Nabors. They sent him to see the company nurse,
    Pam Ewing. Mr. Green completed an accident report, and Ms. Ewing gave him some
    over-the-counter pain medication. Mr. Green then returned to work and finished his shift.
    The next day, Mr. Green started work as usual, but he testified his right-shoulder
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    pain became so intense that he again sought Ms. Ewing's assistance. She gave him some
    aspirin, and he returned to his job. Mr. Green stated this went on for several weeks; he
    would daily communicate with Ms. Ewing about his shoulder pain, but continued to work
    full-duty, although with great difficulty and often requiring assistance from co-workers.
    Mr. Green testified that on January 21, 2015, he insisted Ms. Ewing provide him
    with a doctor to treat his shoulder as soon as possible. Ms. Ewing provided a panel of
    physicians and informed him that Dr. Lloyd Robinson could see him quickly, but that an
    appointment with one of the other doctors would result in some delay. Mr. Green chose
    Dr. Robinson and signed the panel accordingly.
    Mr. Green saw Dr. Robinson, a family practitioner, the next day. (Ex. 2 at 6.) In
    the medical history forms, Mr. Green stated the injury occurred two months earlier and he
    had never had a similar injury in the past. (Ex. 2 at 45.) In his records, Dr. Robinson
    noted Mr. Green complained of "acute pain" in his right shoulder after lifting buckets at
    work. (Ex. 2 at 48.)
    In his deposition, Dr. Robinson testified Mr. Green did not advise him of a
    specific work injury occurring on November 14, but stated he suffered worsening right-
    shoulder pain after lifting buckets at work. Dr. Robinson ordered x-rays and noted
    arthritic damage to Mr. Green's right shoulder. (Ex. 2 at 7.) He diagnosed Mr. Green
    with a shoulder strain, placed him under restrictions, and ordered physical therapy, which
    Carvel, Kellogg's workers' compensation administrator, never approved. (Ex. 2 at 8.)
    Mr. Green did undergo an initial evaluation for physical therapy and, according to the
    note, informed the therapist that he first noticed pain in his right shoulder when "reaching
    to scoop a heavy scoopful of brown sugar at Kellogg's. He felt a 'pop' in his shoulder
    and immediately felt an intense bum that radiated into proximal arm." (Ex. 2 at 68.)
    Dr. Robinson eventually ordered an MRI that showed extensive arthritic damage
    in Mr. Green's right shoulder, but there was no rotator cuff tear or evidence of an acute
    injury. (Ex. 2 at 9-11.) At that time, Dr. Robinson opined Mr. Green's underlying
    arthritis was the primary cause of his symptoms and that it was not a work-related
    condition. (Ex. 2 at 27.) Dr. Robinson then released Mr. Green to seek treatment with
    his primary care physician. (Ex. 2 at 11.) In his deposition, Dr. Robinson continued to
    opine that Mr. Green's employment contributed less than 50% to his pain complaints and
    that the underlying pre-existing arthritis was the primary cause of his symptoms. (Ex. 2
    at 13-14.)
    Mr. Green testified he did not feel Dr. Robinson would provide any substantive
    treatment for his shoulder; therefore, he saw his family practitioner, Dr. Lee McCallum,
    about a week after he began seeing Dr. Robinson. Dr. McCallum noted Mr. Green stated
    the pain began a week earlier when he was "picking up a pail and heard a pop." (Ex. 4 at
    51.) Dr. McCallum eventually referred Mr. Green to Dr. Kenneth Weiss, an orthopedist,
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    for specialized treatment. At the time of his referral, Dr. McCallum diagnosed Mr. Green
    with a "repetitive motion injury" and stated it "seems to be work-related to me." (Ex. 4
    at 42.)
    At Mr. Green's initi_al visit, Dr. Weiss noted that Mr. Green stated he had a "long
    history" of shoulder pain, claiming, "it has been hurting through the years." (Ex. 2 at 94.)
    After attempting conservative care, Dr. Weiss eventually performed a right-shoulder
    replacement on September 14, 2015. He subsequently wrote a letter opining the
    following:
    Mr. Green is a patient of mine. We have been treating him for his right
    shoulder pain with glenohumeral arthrosis. We do feel that the diagnosis
    from which we are treating him is compatible with his duties that he was
    performing while at Kellogg. We do feel that the shoulder issues and his
    glenohumeral arthrosis, which required surgery, is consistent with or at
    least exacerbated by his repetitive pushing, pulling and lifting the arm while
    at work.
    (Ex. 2 at 72.)
    Mr. Green worked full-duty at full pay until his surgery. After surgery, he
    remained off work until December 27, 2015, and then returned to full-duty with no
    restrictions. Mr. Green testified he continues to work at Kellogg as a wheel technician
    with no restrictions, albeit with some difficulty. He lacks full range of motion in his
    shoulder and frequently experiences pain as well as numbness and tingling in his right
    shoulder and arm.
    Mr. Green entered the C-32 Medical Report of Samuel Chung, D.O. into
    evidence. (Ex. 1.) In the C-32, Dr. Chung, an osteopath, opined Mr. Green did not suffer
    any temporary total disability as a result of his right-shoulder condition, although the
    parties stipulated that the "dates temporary total unpaid" was from September 15, 2015,
    through December 27, 2015. (Ex. 1 at 5 and T.R. 1.) Dr. Chung also opined that Mr.
    Green reached maximum medical improvement on December 1, 2015, although the
    parties stipulated the "date of maximum recovery or return to work" from Dr. Weiss'
    surgery was December 27, 2015. On the form, Dr. Chung marked that Mr. Green's
    injury "more probably than not" arose from his work; however, an unsigned addendum to
    the C-32 does have an "X" next to "yes" to the question as to whether the employee's
    injury "arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment." In addition,
    the form has an "X" next to "yes" to the following question:
    What is your opinion as to whether the employee's death, disablement or
    the and whether Mr. Green's "disablement or the need for medical
    treatment is shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it
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    contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the death, disablement
    or the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.
    (Ex. 1 at 11.) Dr. Chung did not place any specific weight restrictions on Mr. Green's
    right-shoulder use but did recommend he limit climbing, balancing, and working
    overhead or away from his body. (Ex. l at 9.) He opined Mr. Green sustained a 14%
    impairment to the body as a whole pursuant to the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, as a result
    ofhis right-shoulder injury. (Ex. 1 at 5.)
    Mr. Green testified that, following Corvel's denial, he repeatedly asked Ms. Ewing
    for additional care through workers' compensation, but she told him she could not help
    him given Corvel's denial. Kellogg did not offer any witnesses to counter Mr. Green's
    assertions regarding his interactions with his managers or Ms. Ewing.
    Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
    The Court considers the following legal principles in reaching its conclusions in
    this matter. The Court must interpret the Workers' Compensation Law fairly, impartially
    and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the
    employee nor employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2016). Mr. Green has the burden
    of proof on all essential elements of his workers' compensation claim, including
    causation. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp.
    App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015).
    In order to establish causation, an employee must prove "to a reasonable degree of
    medical certainty that [the injury] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
    the death, disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes." Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C) (2016). The term "reasonable degree of medical certainty"
    means that, "in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely than not considering all
    causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D)
    (2016). Thus, causation must be established by expert medical testimony, and it must be
    more than "speculation or possibility" on the part of the doctor. !d.
    In this matter, both Mr. Green and Kellogg offered medical testimony. When
    weighing expert testimony, the law provides the causation opinion of a physician selected
    from a panel "pursuant to § 50-6-204(a)(3)" is presumed correct, but may be rebutted by
    the preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E) (2016).
    Therefore, the Court must first determine whether Dr. Robinson's opinion must be
    presumed correct regarding causation.
    The parties do not dispute that Mr. Green selected Dr. Robinson's name on
    January 24, 2015, from a panel provided to him by Kellogg, nor does Mr. Green dispute
    that the panel met the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)
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    (20 16). However, he did assert that it took repeated requests over a period of more than
    two months for Kellogg to provide the panel, and when it did, Ms. Ewing directed him
    toward Dr. Robinson.
    The Court agrees that waiting more than two months to provide a panel after an
    injury is reported is improper; however, the fact remains that Kellogg did eventually
    provide one that complied with the law. As to his assertion that Ms. Ewing "directed"
    him to Dr. Robinson, Mr. Green testified he demanded to see a doctor as soon as possible
    and Ms. Ewing told him Dr. Robinson was available right away, but it would take some
    time to get an appointment with the other physicians on the panel. Mr. Green offered no
    evidence disputing Ms. Ewing's assertion, and the fact that he obtained an appointment
    with Dr. Robinson the following day tends to corroborate her statement. He also offered
    no evidence that he would not have been allowed to choose one of the other physicians
    had he decided to do so. Thus, the Court finds Mr. Green chose Dr. Robinson from a
    proper panel and further holds that Dr. Robinson's opinion is entitled to a presumption of
    correctness pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14)(E) (2016).
    In his deposition, Dr. Robinson opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
    that Mr. Green's shoulder pain was primarily caused by his underlying, pre-existing
    arthritis, which was not a work-related condition. In order to prevail, Mr. Green must
    rebut this opinion by a preponderance of the evidence. When weighing the evidence
    offered by Mr. Green against Dr. Robinson's testimony, the Court finds Mr. Green failed
    to meet this burden.
    Mr. Green offered the C-32 of Dr. Chung in an attempt to rebut Dr, Robinson's
    testimony. "In evaluating expert medical opinions, a trial judge may consider, among
    other things, the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their evaluation, the
    information available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information
    by other experts." Venable v. Superior Essex, Inc., No. 2015-05-0582, 2016 TN Wrk.
    Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 56, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 2, 2016). "A
    trial judge has the discretion to conclude that the opinion of one expert should be
    accepted over that of another expert." Sanker v. Nacarato Trucks, Inc., No. 2016-06-
    0101,2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 27, at *11-12 (citation omitted). The Court
    finds Dr. Robinson's opinion more persuasive for several reasons.
    First, Dr. Chung's testimony is offered through a C-32 written medical report as
    opposed to a deposition. While a C-32 is certainly admissible, it is often less effective
    than a deposition given that the evidence contained within is not subject to explanation or
    cross-examination. Second, Dr. Chung is an osteopath, which requires less training and
    education than a medical doctor, as illustrated by Dr. Chung's CV attached to the C-32.
    Again, while an osteopath is qualified by law to testify as to causation, the Court finds
    Dr. Robinson's training and education to be more persuasive in this instance.
    6
    Finally, the C-32 completed by Dr. Chung contained numerous errors that did little
    to create confidence in its reliability. It indicated Mr. Green did not suffer any temporary
    total disability even though it is undisputed he was off work for three months following
    surgery. It also stated he reached maximum medical improvement on December 1, 2015,
    although there is no indication as to how Dr. Chung arrived at this date when the parties
    agreed Mr. Green returned to work on December 28. Finally, the C-32 contained the
    causation standard that applied to injuries prior to July 1, 2014, and has no application to
    Mr. Green's injury. In fact, due to this error, the C-32 fails to rebut Dr. Robinson's
    opinion at all unless the document attached to the back of the C-32, which does state the
    correct causation standard, is considered an addendum to the report. However, while it
    may have been intended as an addendum, the document is unsigned. There is also no
    reference in the C-32 to the document or the opinions contained within it. Furthermore,
    the second question on the form, regarding "the employee's death, disablement or need
    for treatment," makes little sense when read in its entirety. Given the factors stated
    above, the Court cannot find Dr. Chung's C-32 is sufficient to overcome Dr. Robinson's
    opinion regarding causation. 1
    Of course, Dr. Chung's C-32 is not the only evidence offered by Mr. Robinson
    regarding causation. He also testified that he experienced intense pain in his right
    shoulder while using a bucket to scoop out "bits," and he had never experienced such
    symptoms before. While lay testimony cannot, in and of itself, serve to establish
    causation, it can certainly corroborate the testimony provided by experts. However, in
    this instance, while the Court has no reason to doubt Mr. Robinson's testimony that the
    November 14, 2014 event exacerbated his condition, he also testified he suffered from
    "aches and pains" in his shoulder before this event. The records of Dr. McCallum and
    Dr. Weiss, who both recorded that Mr. Robinson told them he had suffered from shoulder
    pain for years, corroborated this testimony. Furthermore, while Dr. McCallum and Dr.
    Weiss indicated in their records that it "seemed" Mr. Robinson's shoulder complaints
    were work-related, and his condition was consistent with his employment at Kellogg,
    neither opined that Mr. Robinson's right-shoulder condition arose primarily out of and in
    the course and scope of the work incident on November 14, 2014. See Tenn. Code Ann.
    § 50-6-012(14)(A) (2016). As a result, the Court finds the additional evidence offered by
    Mr. Green, in conjunction with Dr. Chung's C-32, is still insufficient to overcome the
    presumption of correctness afforded Dr. Robinson's causation opinion.
    Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Green failed to prove by a preponderance of the
    evidence that he sustained an injury that primarily arose out of and in the course and
    scope of his employment on November 14, 2014 with Kellogg. See Tenn. Code Ann.§
    50-6-102(14) (2016). Given the above finding, it is unnecessary to address other issues
    raised by the parties.
    1
    The Court would note that, unfortunately, neither party decided to obtain the testimony of Dr. Weiss, who would
    most likely have the most credible opinion regarding the cause of Mr. Green's shoulder condition and the need for
    shoulder-replacement surgery.
    7
    IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:
    1.      Mr. Green's claim for workers' compensation benefits is denied.
    2.    This Compensation Order constitutes a final adjudication upon the merits of Mr.
    Green's claim . .
    3.    The $150.00 filing fee for this this cause is taxed to Kellogg, pursuant to Rule
    0800-02-21-.07 (2015) of the Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations.
    4.     Kellogg shall prepare and file a Statistical Data Form within ten business days of
    the date of entry of this Order.
    ENTERED THIS THE /~ TH DAY OF January, 2017.
    ~-a-m_,_J_u_~_g_e                      _____________
    Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
    APPENDIX
    Exhibits:
    1.      Form C-32 of Dr. Samuel Chung with attachments
    2.      Deposition of Dr. Lloyd Robinson with attachments
    3.      Designated Medical Bills
    4.      Designated Medical Records
    5.      Form C-42
    Technical Record:
    1.      Notice of Stipulations for Trial
    2.      Notice of Disputed Issues for Trial
    3.      Employer's Pre-Hearing Statement
    4.      Employee's Pre-Hearing Statement
    5.      Order Denying Motion to Compel Discovery
    6.      Employer's Response in Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery
    7.      Motion to Compel Discovery
    8.      Dispute Certification Notice
    8
    9.     Initial Hearing Order
    10.    Employee's Witness List
    11.    Amended Employee's Lay Witness List
    12.    Employer's Expert Witness List
    13.    Employer's Lay Witness List
    14.    Transfer Order
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order
    was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the _19th
    day of January, 2017.
    Name                     Certified     Via        Via    Service sent to:
    Mail         Fax       Email
    Shannon T oon                                     X      stoon@taylortoon.com
    Thomas J. Smith                                   X      tsmith@spicerfirm.com
    rum, Clerk of Court
    Court Workers' Compensation Claims
    WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-08-0568

Citation Numbers: 2017 TN WC 2

Judges: Robert Durham

Filed Date: 1/19/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/10/2021