Amanda Bradshaw v. Barney Samuel Bradshaw ( 2018 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
    ══════════
    No. 16-0328
    ══════════
    AMANDA BRADSHAW, PETITIONER,
    v.
    BARNEY SAMUEL BRADSHAW, RESPONDENT
    ══════════════════════════════════════════
    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
    COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    ══════════════════════════════════════════
    JUSTICE LEHRMANN, dissenting.
    While I join JUSTICE BOYD’S dissenting opinion in full, I write separately to reiterate that
    our precedent does not impose any specific limits on the size or percentage of a community
    property award. Perhaps trial courts and family-law practitioners will find this reminder helpful
    in the absence of a binding majority opinion in this case.
    We warned, in Young v. Young, that a community property division should not punish a
    spouse for his or her fault in a divorce. 
    609 S.W.2d 758
    , 762 (Tex. 1980). But that does not
    foreclose the possibility that a highly unequal division can be “just and right.” Rather, Young
    simply forecloses the trial court from considering retribution or punition in determining what is
    just and right. Our law recognizes numerous other, valid factors that might, in extraordinary cases
    such as this one, support an award of eighty percent or more to a single spouse.1 Such disparity
    does not de facto or presumptively constitute punishment, though it may fairly raise suspicions; it
    is permissible to the extent supported by valid legal considerations.                     As the concurrence
    recognizes, a division like the one in this case is a rarity, ante at ___, and I believe correctly so.2
    However, the occasional affirmance of more unequal divisions than the one at issue here
    does not allow the inference that the trial court erred by failing to award Amanda more than eighty
    percent of the house. The Family Code entrusts the trial court with broad discretion in dividing
    marital property, and I cannot say the trial court’s eighty-percent award was an abuse of discretion.
    ________________________________
    Debra H. Lehrmann
    Justice
    OPINION DELIVERED: June 29, 2018
    1
    Those factors include, among others, the parties’ income, earning capacity, and financial needs. Murff v.
    Murff, 
    615 S.W.2d 696
    , 698 (Tex. 1981).
    2
    The concurrence musters two cases in which a court of appeals affirmed an award of more than eighty
    percent to one spouse. Ante at ___ (first citing Ohendalski v. Ohendalski, 
    203 S.W.3d 910
    , 912 (Tex. App.—
    Beaumont 2006, no pet.); then citing Wright v. Wright, 
    65 S.W.3d 715
    , 716 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.)).
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-0328

Filed Date: 6/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/2/2018