Hutchinson, Che Patrice ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            PD-1507-14
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    Transmitted 12/22/2014 1:33:13 PM
    Accepted 12/29/2014 2:07:17 PM
    ABEL ACOSTA
    CAUSE NO. PD-1507-14                                          CLERK
    COURT OF APPEALS CAUSE NO. 11-12-00124-CR
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
    CHE PATRICE HUTCHINSON
    APPELLANT/PETITIONER
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    APPELLEE
    REPLY TO PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    ELISHA BIRD
    35th Assistant District Attorney
    State Bar No. 24060339
    200 S. Broadway,
    Brownwood, TX 76801
    Telephone: (325) 646-0444
    December 29, 2014                   Fax: (325) 643-4053
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
    LIST OF PARTIES ...................................................................................................iv
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2
    REPLY ISSUE ONE.................................................................................................. 2
    REPLY ISSUE TWO ................................................................................................. 2
    STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 3
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 4
    ARGUMENT
    REPLY ISSUE ONE.................................................................................................. 4
    REPLY ISSUE TWO ................................................................................................. 8
    CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 11
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 11
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    STATUTES
    Tex. R. App. P. 66.1................................................................................................... 8
    Tex. R. App. P. 66.3................................................................................................ 5,8
    CASES
    Ex parte Briggs, 
    187 S.W.3d 458
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ................................... 5,6
    Ex parte LaHood, 
    401 S.W.3d 45
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ...................................... 6
    Farrell v. State, 
    864 S.W.2d 501
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) .................................... 8,9
    Frangias v. State, 
    392 S.W.3d 642
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ................................. 5,6
    Hutchinson v. State, No. 11-12-00124-CR, 
    2014 WL 2957398
    (Tex. App.—
    Eastland June 26, 2014, pet. filed) ...................................................................... 2,6,9
    Hutchinson v. State, No. 11-12-00124-CR, 
    2014 WL 5529150
    (Tex. App.—
    Eastland Oct. 9, 2014, pet. filed) ........................................................................... 2,9
    Roldan v. State, 
    739 S.W.2d 868
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ....................................... 5
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984) ....................................................... 6
    Wiggins v. Smith, 
    539 U.S. 510
    (2003) .................................................................. 5,6
    iii
    LIST OF PARTIES
    Pursuant to Rule 74(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure the State lists the
    names and addresses of all parties to the Trial Court’s final judgment and their trial
    counsel in the trial court.
    CHE PATRICE HUTCHINSON
    C/O Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    Trial Counsel
    ROBERT MAURER
    Attorney at Law
    115 East Travis Street
    San Antonio, Texas 78202
    Appellate Counsel
    CONNIE J. KELLEY
    Attorney at Law
    1108 Lavaca #110-221
    Austin, Texas 78701
    State of Texas
    Trial Counsel
    SAM C. MOSS
    Assistant District Attorney
    Appellate Counsel
    ELISHA BIRD
    Assistant District Attorney
    35th District Attorney’s Office
    200 S. Broadway
    Brownwood, TX 76801
    iv
    CAUSE NO. PD-1507-14
    COURT OF APPEALS CAUSE NO. 11-12-00124-CR
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
    CHE PATRICE HUTCHINSON
    APPELLANT/PETITIONER
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    APPELLEE
    REPLY TO PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    1
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant pled guilty to the offense of Delivery of a Controlled Substance in
    an amount that was greater than 4 grams but less than 200 grams. (R.R. Vol. 2, p.
    8).
    A punishment hearing was held on February 16, 2012 and at that time, the
    trial judge sentenced Appellant to 50 years incarceration. (R.R. Vol. 2, pp. 1, 303).
    Appellant filed an appeal in the Eleventh Court of Appeals. The Eleventh Court of
    Appeals affirmed the 50 year sentence. Hutchinson v. State, No. 11-12-00124-CR,
    
    2014 WL 2957398
    , at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 26, 2014, pet. filed).
    Appellant then filed a motion for rehearing. Hutchinson v. State, No. 11-12-
    00124-CR, 
    2014 WL 5529150
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 9, 2014, pet.
    filed). The Court of Appeals denied Appellant’s motion for rehearing. 
    Id. at *3.
    REPLY ISSUE ONE
    THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DID NOT CONFLICT WITH ANY
    APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR THE SUPREME COURT.
    REPLY ISSUE TWO
    APPELLANT HAS RAISED A NEW ISSUE IN HIS PETITION FOR
    DISCRETIONARY REVIEW AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION SHOULD
    NOT BE GRANTED ON THIS ISSUE
    2
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Over the course of four to five years, Appellant distributed over a pound of
    methamphetamine obtained from the drug cartel and Mexican Mafia into Brown
    County in exchange for about $3,500 a month. (R.R. Vol. 3, pp. 111-19, 230-32).
    In addition to distributing methamphetamines, Appellant also sold marijuana,
    Xanax, crack cocaine, OxyContin, hydrocodone, codeine, and high-grade
    marijuana. (State’s Exhibit 21, R.R. Vol. 5, p. 27; R.R. Vol. 3, pp. 74-105, 120-
    21). In Appellant’s own words, he had either directly sold or been the middle man
    in the sale of marijuana “a thousand times.” (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 125). He also sold
    approximately half a pound of crack cocaine.             (R.R. Vol. 3, pp. 126-27).
    Witnesses testified that Appellant had a very disrespectful, above-the-law type of
    attitude about getting caught. (R.R. Vol. 3, pp. 99, 178-80, 300) (among other
    testimony, Appellant indicated through text messages that “Barney Fife can’t get
    me.”).
    On November 16, 2010, Appellant sold methamphetamines to a confidential
    informant. (State’s Exhibit #2, R.R. Vol. 3, pp. 25-40). Appellant was arrested
    almost a year later as part of a drug roundup held in Brown County. (R.R. Vol. 2,
    pp. 43-44).
    3
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    Current controlling precedent from this Court and the Supreme Court simply
    require that a decision not to investigate be a reasonable professional judgment.
    The Court of Appeals properly considered the reasonableness of the decision made
    by Appellant’s trial counsel not to have the controlled substance reweighed.
    Requiring counsel to consult with an independent expert before making such a
    decision is not controlling precedent. To consider such an issue would be an
    expansion of the current analysis required under the ineffective assistance doctrine
    related to failure to investigate.
    No decision by the Court of Appeals exists for review under Issue Two as
    Appellant never raised the argument to the Eleventh Court of Appeals that trial
    counsel’s conduct was deficient for failing to follow his client’s express wishes
    about having the controlled substance reweighed.
    REPLY ISSUE ONE
    Appellant has not identified any question of state or federal law decided by
    the Court of Appeals in this case that would conflict with the applicable decisions
    of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.
    Appellant claims in his brief that the Eleventh Court of Appeals decided “an
    important question of federal constitutional law in a way that conflicts” with
    4
    applicable decisions of higher courts. See Petition for Discretionary Review, p. 3.
    However, before a petition for discretionary review should be granted, Appellant
    should identify an adequate reason for review. Merely claiming that the lower
    court’s decision conflicts with Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court
    precedent is not sufficient. See Roldan v. State, 
    739 S.W.2d 868
    , 869 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1987) (holding that insufficient facts supported the Petitioner’s reasons for
    requesting review); See Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(c).
    Appellant cites to Wiggins v. Smith, Ex parte Briggs and Frangias v. State as
    the cases that best represent the federal constitutional law at issue in this case. See
    Petition for Discretionary Review, pp. 4-6. Therefore, the claim presented in
    Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review is fundamentally that the Court of
    Criminal Appeals decision in this case conflicts with Wiggins, Ex parte Briggs, and
    Frangias.
    However, the Court of Appeals decision in this case does not conflict with
    any of those cases. None of the cited cases, nor any other case law, create an
    absolute requirement that defense counsel investigate every claim that could
    possibly be presented for a defendant. See Wiggins v. Smith, 
    539 U.S. 510
    , 533
    (2003) (“…we emphasize that Strickland does not require counsel to investigate
    every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort
    would be to assist the defendant…”).
    5
    Instead, Supreme Court case law recognizes that “strategic choices made
    after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
    reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”
    
    Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521
    (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 690-91
    (1984)); Ex parte Briggs, 
    187 S.W.3d 458
    , 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting
    
    Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521
    -22). See Frangias v. State, 
    392 S.W.3d 642
    , 654 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2013) (recognizing that the “abandonment of alternative ways of
    implementing a particular trial strategy is reasonable” when reasonable efforts
    have been made to pursue those alternatives); Ex parte LaHood, 
    401 S.W.3d 45
    , 50
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“Counsel has a duty in every case to make… a reasonable
    decision that an investigation is unnecessary.”).
    The Eleventh Court of Appeals decision in this case recognized that the
    Court should look at the reasonableness of the defense attorney’s judgment in
    deciding to limit the scope of his pretrial investigation. Hutchinson v. State, No.
    11-12-00124-CR, 
    2014 WL 2957398
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 26, 2014,
    pet. filed).     The Eleventh Court properly looked at the totality of the
    circumstances1 to consider the reasonableness 
    Id. 1 The
    Court of Appeals considered the possibility of additional charges being brought against
    Appellant, the evidence of the weight of the methamphetamine with packaging and then without
    packaging, and the fact that the methamphetamine had already been weighed twice. See
    Hutchinson v. State, No. 11-12-00124-CR, 
    2014 WL 2957398
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland June
    26, 2014, pet. filed).
    6
    In his Amended Brief for Appellant filed in the Eleventh Court of Appeals
    and his Petition for Discretionary Review, Appellant relies on the fact that the
    defense attorney did not consult with a defense expert in order to conclude that the
    defense attorney’s actions were not reasonable. See Amended Brief for Appellant,
    p. 17; Petition for Discretionary Review, pp. 4-5. However, no case law indicates
    that consultation with an expert is required in order to make a reasonable
    professional judgment.
    Absent any case law indicating that consultation with an expert is required to
    make a reasonable professional judgment, Appellant is incorrect in claiming that
    the Court of Appeals decided this issue in a manner that conflicted with applicable
    decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Eleventh
    Court of Appeals cited the correct controlling legal principles and engaged in a
    thoughtful analysis of those legal principles.
    The mere fact that Appellant disagrees with that application does not mean
    that the decision conflicts with controlling case law. Nor does Appellant’s desire
    for this Court to expand the reasonableness prong of an ineffective assistance
    analysis to require consultation with an expert indicate that the Court of Appeals
    incorrectly applied controlling precedent.
    Therefore, this Court should deny Appellant’s petition for discretionary
    review.
    7
    REPLY ISSUE TWO
    In Issue Two, Appellant raises a new issue that was never presented to the
    Court of Appeals and that the Court of Appeals never decided.            Appellant’s
    primary argument in Issue Two is that his trial counsel’s performance was
    deficient for failing to follow his client’s express wishes about having the
    substance reweighed. See Petition for Discretionary Review, pp. 6-9.
    Examination by this Court in response to a petition for discretionary review
    is limited to reviewing the actual decision of the Court of Appeals. Farrell v.
    State, 
    864 S.W.2d 501
    , 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). Rule 66.1 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure limit this Court’s jurisdiction to only review of a
    court of appeals’ “decision.” Tex. R. App. P. 66.1.
    Additionally, Appellant has requested review in Issue Two under Rule
    66.3(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.          See Petition for Discretionary
    Review, p. 6. Rule 66.3(b) by its own terms also limits review to decisions of the
    court of appeals. Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(b) (“…the following will be considered by
    the Court in deciding whether to grant discretionary review… whether a court of
    appeals has decided an important question of state or federal law that has not been,
    but should be, settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals…” emphasis added).
    8
    In order to make sure that only “decisions” are reviewed, parties must
    provide the court of appeals with the first opportunity to resolve the issues
    associated with the appeal. 
    Farrell, 864 S.W.2d at 503
    .
    The Eleventh Court of Appeals did not make any decision on whether an
    attorney may refuse to conduct an independent pretrial investigation against a
    defendant’s express wishes. See Hutchinson v. State, No. 11-12-00124-CR, 
    2014 WL 2957398
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 26, 2014, pet. filed); Hutchinson v.
    State, No. 11-12-00124-CR, 
    2014 WL 5529150
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct.
    9, 2014, pet. filed).
    Nor did Appellant raise this issue for the Eleventh Court of Appeals to
    consider. Although Appellant did raise an ineffective assistance claim against his
    trial counsel, that claim was grounded only in the reasonableness of the strategic
    decision not to have the substance reweighed. See Amended Brief for Appellant,
    pp. 15-20. Appellant never structured his argument to present a claim that counsel
    was ineffective because counsel did not follow his client’s wishes. See Amended
    Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-20. Although there is mention of Appellant’s desire to
    have the substance reweighed, that reference is used to support a reasonableness
    analysis only. See Amended Brief for Appellant, p. 15 (“‘The reasonableness of
    counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s
    own statements or actions.’”).
    9
    Additionally, Appellant never presented any arguments related to Florida v.
    Nixon or Professors Dix & Schmolesky in relation to his ineffective assistance for
    failure to investigate claim before the lower court.        See Amended Brief for
    Appellant, pp. iv, vi, 15-20; Motion for Rehearing, p. 3.
    Therefore, based on both Appellant’s failure to specifically raise this
    argument in front of the Eleventh Court of Appeals and the lack of a decision by
    the Eleventh Court of Appeals to review on this issue, this Court should deny
    Appellant’s petition for discretionary review.
    CONCLUSION
    The State respectfully requests that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny
    Appellant’s petition for discretionary review on both issues.
    Respectfully Submitted,
    /S/ELISHA BIRD
    ELISHA BIRD, Assistant District Attorney
    State Bar No. 24060339
    200 S. Broadway, Brownwood, TX 76801
    Tel: (325) 646-0444 Fax: (325) 643-4053
    10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply
    to Petition for Discretionary Review was emailed to Connie J. Kelley at
    warrentucker@grandecom.net on the 22nd day of December, 2014.
    /S/ELISHA BIRD
    ELISHA BIRD
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P.
    9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-
    point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the
    word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains
    2,343 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
    /S/ELISHA BIRD
    ELISHA BIRD
    11