Aguilar, Samuel v. State ( 2014 )

PD-1379-14
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 12/22/2014 2:38:00 PM
Accepted 12/29/2014 2:17:36 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
NO. PD-1379-14 CLERK
IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
SAMUEL AGUILAR
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
STATE’S REPLY TO PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
STEVEN E. REIS ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
State Bar No. 16757960 State Bar No. 16523700
Email: steven.reis@matagorda.tx.us Email: rramsey@langleybanack.com
Matagorda County Courthouse LANGLEY & BANACK, INC.
1700 7th Street, Suite 325 Trinity Plaza II, Suite 900
Bay City, Texas 77414 745 E. Mulberry
Telephone: (979) 244-7657 San Antonio, Texas 78212
Telecopier: (979) 245-9409 Telephone: (210) 736-6600
Telecopier: (210) 735-6889
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
______________________________________________
December 29, 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
QUESTION ONE .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Whether the trial court was within its discretion to
admit testimony about Aguilar’s assaulting his
girlfriend during an argument about her sexual
involvement with the victim.
QUESTION TWO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Whether the trial court was within its discretion to
admit into evidence photographs describing the
nature of Aguilar’s physical assault on his girlfriend
during his argument with her about her sexual
involvement with the victim.
QUESTION THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, is legally sufficient to support
Aguilar’s conviction because that evidence confirms
that a rational jury could have found him guilty of the
offense charged.
i
ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. The judge rightfully admitted testimony of Aguilar’s
assaulting his ex-girlfriend while arguing about her sexual
relations with the victim... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. The trial court rightfully admitted photographs of Aguilar’s
assault on his girlfriend, whom he accused of having had sex
with the victim... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
III. The evidence is legally sufficient to support Aguilar’s
conviction... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . 3
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 8
Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). . . . . . . . . 1-3
Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5
Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
STATUTES:
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
RULES:
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TEX. R. EVID. 103. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TEX. R. EVID. 401. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TEX. R. EVID. 403. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5
TEX. R. EVID. 404. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
iii
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not believe that oral argument would materially assist
this Court in reaching its decision. Therefore, the State does not request oral
argument,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a felony case in which a jury found Appellant Samuel Aguilar
guilty of murder and assessed his punishment at life in prison. 6 RR 35–36,
144.
iv
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
QUESTION ONE
(Extraneous Offense)
Whether the trial court was within its discretion to admit
testimony about Aguilar’s assaulting his girlfriend during an
argument about her sexual involvement with the victim.
QUESTION TWO
(Photographs)
Whether the trial court was within its discretion to admit into
evidence photographs describing the nature of Aguilar’s physical
assault on his girlfriend during his argument with her about her
sexual involvement with the victim.
QUESTION THREE
(Evidentiary Sufficiency)
Whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, is legally sufficient to support Aguilar’s conviction
because that evidence confirms that a rational jury could have
found him guilty of the offense charged.
v
ARGUMENT
I. The judge rightfully admitted testimony of Aguilar’s
assaulting his ex-girlfriend while arguing about her sexual
relations with the victim.
“When a party attempts to adduce evidence of ‘other crimes, wrongs or
acts,’in order to preserve error on appeal, the opponent of that evidence must
object in a timely fashion.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990). Aguilar’s failure to do so waived any alleged error in the
admission of this testimony. See Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 237 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994) (“A reasonably specific and timely objection is necessary to
preserve error for appellate review.”).
Regardless, this testimony was relevant to demonstrate Aguilar’s state
of mind as well as his motive for murdering the victim because it showed that
he was angry over the prospect of his girlfriend’s having had sexual relations
with Sutton. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 382. Furthermore, this
argument took place only a short time before Sutton was found murdered, and
Aguilar (finally) admitted that he had been in Sutton’s house on the day of the
murder and had seen Sutton’s corpse there.
Evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is admissible if it has
relevance “apart from its tendency ‘to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith.’” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at
387 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)). Therefore, the prosecution “may introduce
such evidence where it logically serves to make ... more probable or less
probable an elemental fact; where it serves to make ... more probable or less
probable an evidentiary fact that inferentially leads to an elemental fact; or
where it serves to make ... more probable or less probable defensive evidence
that undermines an elemental fact.” Id.
Prime examples of permissible purposes to which extraneous evidence
of crimes, wrongs, or acts may be put include “proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)).
“Extraneous offense evidence that logically serves any of these purposes is
relevant beyond its tendency to prove the character of a person to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It is therefore admissible, subject only to the
trial court’s discretion nevertheless to exclude it if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....” Montgomery,
810 S.W.2d at 387 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 403).
Rule 403's provision that evidence “may” be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, “simply
means that trial courts should favor admission in close cases, in keeping with
the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence.” Montgomery, 810
S.W.2d at 389. After conducting the probative-versus-prejudical balancing
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test, the trial court “must be given wide latitude to exclude, or, particularly in
view of the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence, not to exclude
misconduct evidence as he sees fit.” Id. at 390. In this regard, “[s]o long as the
trial court thus operates within the boundaries of its discretion, an appellate
court should not disturb its decision, whatever it may be.” Id.
In applying this abuse-of-discretion standard, “an appellate court should
not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. Here, the trial judge was well
within that zone in determining that the extraneous-offense evidence was
relevant to issues such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of credibility. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at
387. Therefore, the trial judge’s discretionary decision is not subject to being
second-guessed on appeal.
II. The trial court was within its discretion to admit photographs
of Aguilar’s assault on his girlfriend, whom he accused of
having sex with the victim.
Aguilar has waived his complaint about the admission of the
photographs of the physical injuries he inflicted on his ex-girlfriend because
his objection at trial (that the photographs depicted an unadjudicated offense)
does not match his complaint on appeal (that the photographs were unfairly
prejudicial). Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
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(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) and TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)) (“[I]t is well
settled that the legal basis of a complaint raised on appeal cannot vary from
that raised at trial.”); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (holding that to preserve a complaint for appellate review “the point of
error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial”).
Regardless, the photographs were not unfairly prejudicial, but instead
were relevant to demonstrate the nature of the injuries Aguilar inflicted, which
in turn was relevant to show his state of mind and motive for murdering the
victim. TEX. R. EVID. 401.
Aguilar complains that the photographs were not necessary because the
jury had already heard testimony describing the injuries. But “[t]he fact that
the jury had also heard testimony regarding the injuries depicted does not
necessarily reduce the relevance of the visual depiction.” Shuffield v. State,
189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Texas Rule of Evidence 401
defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at
786–87 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 401). It is self-evident that seeing what
something looks like is more informative that hearing what it looks like.
Therefore, the trial court was within its discretion in admitting the
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photographs, which provided a more accurate description of the injuries that
Aguilar had inflicted. See Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 386 ( “The admissibility
of a photograph is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”).
Rule 403 “allows for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence when
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” TEX. R.
EVID. 403. However, this rule “favors the admission of relevant evidence and
carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than
prejudicial.” Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 787.
III. The evidence is legally sufficient to support Aguilar’s
conviction.
In a legal-sufficiency review, courts examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict to determine whether “any rational fact finder
could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“[T]he Jackson v. Virginia
legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should
apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each
element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt.”).
The Jackson legal-sufficiency standard requires reviewing courts to
resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment, keeping in
mind that the factfinder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979) (“The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the
facts proved, and of the weight to be given to the testimony …”); Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 899 (“Viewing the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the
verdict’ under a legal-sufficiency standard means that the reviewing court is
required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because
the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be
given their testimony.”). Aguilar’s highlighting the testimony he likes while
glossing over the evidence that goes against him contravenes these principles.
Some of the evidence he did not like included the following facts, which
connected him to the crime:
• He threatened that “before I go to court, before I go down,
somebody’s going down with me” and that he “was going to
do something bad before he went into prison” and that it
would be so shocking that it would make front-page news.
5 RR 21–23, 45, 51–52, 57–60. 5 RR 21–23.
• He knew Sutton and was at Sutton’s house frequently. 3 RR
142, 145.
6
• The bloodstains on Aguilar’s T-shirt, shoe, baseball cap, and
bike matched Sutton’s blood. 3 RR 239–40, 249–50,
259–60; 4 RR 46, 143, 146, 176, 205–06, 207–08, 229–31,
239–43.
• His bike and T-shirt were found at the house of his brother
Benny, who lived “within spitting distance” of Sutton. 3 RR
239–40, 249–50; 4 RR 46, 143, 146.
• A bloodstain on his brother Benny’s front door matched
Sutton’s blood. 3 RR 239.
• Aguilar initially lied about having been at Sutton’s house on
the day of the murder, and did not admit this until he had
been confronted with incriminating evidence. 3 RR 262,
264.
• Upon being confronted with this incriminating evidence,
Aguilar altered his story “every step of the way” in an
attempt to conform with each new evidentiary increment,
and continued to make changes in his story to dovetail with
each additional bit of information the investigating offers
fed him. 4 RR 102, 114.
• His story about having tripped over Sutton’s body in the
dark was suspect because one of the window blinds was
open and there was a streetlight right outside. 4 RR 10–11,
13.
• After allegedly discovering Sutton’s body, Aguilar fled the
house and did not tell anyone about what he had found. 4
RR 10–11.
• Aguilar claimed that the only part of the house he had been
in was the livingroom area, but there was blood all over
other parts of the house, including bloody footprints that
matched the size and configuration of his shoes. 4 RR 15–16
7
• He had no explanation for how the blood had gotten on his
baseball cap. 4 RR 8.
• He claimed that the blood on his shirt came from having
wiped his hands after touching Sutton to try to get him to
respond, but the blood on Aguilar’s shirt was in spatters, not
smears. 4 RR 59.
• The configuration and position of the blood on Aguilar’s
shirt was not consistent with his story, but was consistent
with his having struck Sutton and cast off blood onto the
back of the shirt from the object he used to beat Sutton. 4
RR 61.
• About a week before Sutton’s murder Aguilar had accused
his girlfriend of having had oral sex with Sutton for money
and had become angry and physically violent with her. 4 RR
178, 182, 184–85.
A legal-sufficiency analysis requires courts to view all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of
fact could have found all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512,
517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Aguilar tries to rearrange this standard to view
the evidence in a manner he deems most favorable to himself rather than the
verdict by downplaying—or in some cases, outright ignoring—the evidence
against him. But under the legal-sufficiency standard, appellate courts do not
re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; they only ensure that
the jury reached a rational decision. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517 (“During
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such a review, an appellate court must not usurp the role of the factfinder.
Appellate courts are ill-equipped to weigh the evidence.”). Therefore, as long
as the jury rationally arrived at its verdict, as it did here, there can be no
reversal for alleged legal insufficiency. Id.
PRAYER
For these reasons, the State asks this Court to deny the petition for
discretionary review.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN E. REIS
State Bar No. 16757960
Email: steven.reis@matagorda.tx.us
Matagorda County Courthouse
1700 7th Street, Room 325
Bay City, Texas 77414
Telephone: (979) 244-7657
Telecopier: (979) 245-9409
/s/RobinsonC. Ramsey
ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
State Bar No. 16523700
Trinity Plaza II, Suite 900
745 E. Mulberry
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Telephone: (210) 736-6600
Telecopier: (210) 735-6889
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the
State certifies that the number of words in the State’s Reply to Petition for
Discretionary Review, including its headings, footnotes, and quotations, is:
1942.
/s/Robinson C. Ramsey
ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was deposited in an
official depository of the United States Postal Service, properly addressed to:
Samuel Aguilar Lisa McMinn
Coffield Unit - TDC #1631736 State Prosecuting Attorney
2661 FM 2054 Email: information@spa.texas.gov
Tennessee Colony, Texas 75884 P.O. Box 13046
Austin, Texas 78711–3046
on 22 December 2014
/s/Robinson C. Ramsey
ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
W :\lbclient\07513\00 64\L09298 70.W PD
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