Isbell, John B. ( 2015 )


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  •                                                              PD-0469&470&471&472-15
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    December 17, 2015                                          Transmitted 12/17/2015 1:51:39 PM
    Accepted 12/17/2015 2:49:44 PM
    ABEL ACOSTA
    IN THE                                                CLERK
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    JOHN B. ISBELL,                §
    APPELLANT                  §
    V.                             §       NO. PD-0469-15
    §
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,            §
    APPELLEE                  §
    ON THE GRANTING OF THE STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY
    REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
    COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS IN CAUSE NUMBERS 02-14-00124-
    CR, 02-14-00125-CR, 02-14-00126-CR, AND 02-14-00127-CR, REVERSING THE
    JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CAUSE NUMBERS 1290119D, 1290121D,
    1290851D, AND 1290852D IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT
    COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE MIKE THOMAS, PRESIDING.
    APPELLANT’S REPLY
    BRIEF ON THE MERITS
    BARRY G. JOHNSON
    2821 E. Lancaster
    Fort Worth, Texas 76103
    SBE 10683000
    817-531-9665
    fax 817-534-9888
    barrygj@aol
    ATTORNEY for APPELLANT
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    PAGE
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
    THE CASE IN BRIEF ............................................................................................... 1
    STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 2
    SUMMARY OF APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT ..................................................... 3
    DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 4
    Because the cases were tried together, they are inextricably linked.
    The erroneous charge in the cases that occurred on July 17 made conviction more
    likely in thise cases, which in turn made conviction on the offenses that occurred
    on July 18 more likely.
    CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………..8
    PRAYER .................................................................................................................. ..9
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................................... 9
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................10
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES                                                                                                    PAGES
    Allen v. State ,
    
    253 S.W.3d 260
    , 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)…………………………………6
    Almanza v. State,
    
    686 S.W.2d 157
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)…………………… 5
    Gill v.State , 
    873 S.W.2d 45
    (Tex. Cr. App. 1994)………………………………7
    Heron v. State,
    
    86 S.W.3d 621
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)………………………………………6
    Lawton v. State,
    
    913 S.W.2d 542
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds………….7
    Mitchell v. State,
    No. 11-01-00294-CR, 
    2002 WL 32344526
    (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002,
    no pet.) (unpublished) ................................................................................... .6,7
    McDuff v. State, 
    939 S.W.2d 45
    (Tex. Cr. App. 1994)……………………………7
    Saunders v. State, 
    817 S.W.2d 688
    Cim. App. 1991) ……………………………6
    Code
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14 ............................................................................. 5
    iii
    3
    IN THE
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    JOHN B. ISBELL,                       §
    APPELLANT                         §
    V.                                    §         NO. PD-0469-15
    §
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                   §
    APPELLEE                         §
    ON THE GRANTING OF THE STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY
    REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
    COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS IN CAUSE NUMBERS 02-14-00124-
    CR, 02-14-00125-CR, 02-14-00126-CR, AND 02-14-00127-CR, REVERSING THE
    JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CAUSE NUMBERS 1290119D, 1290121D,
    1290851D, AND 1290852D IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT
    COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE MIKE THOMAS, PRESIDING.
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    THE CASE IN BRIEF
    Appellant was convicted of (1) aggravated assault of a public servant (pointing
    a shotgun at him); (2) deadly conduct (shooting a woman’s car); (3) aggravated
    assault on a public servant (ramming the officer’s patrol car); and (4) evading
    arrest in a vehicle. Appellant was sentenced to forty-five years for each assault,
    twenty years for deadly conduct, and twenty years for evading arrest. RR VI – 38.
    1
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The State has accurately set out the facts with one caveat. With respect to the
    events that occurred in the vehicle Jamie Haney was driving on July 17, 2012, they
    are true as to the conducy of appellant, only if the testimony of accomplice Jamie
    Haney is believed. The fact that she was an accomplice and that her testimony was
    uncorroborated is central to this appeal.
    2
    SUMMARY OF APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT
    Because the State moved to consolidate the trials of the offenses that
    occurred on separate days, over the objection of the Appellant, it was proper for the
    Court of Appeals to consider them jointly in deciding whether substantial rights of
    appellant were violated because of the erroneous jury charge.
    The Court of Appeals correctly decided that the error caused egregious harm
    to Appellant in all the cases that were tried together.
    The erroneous jury charge occurred in jury charges on the July 17 offenses
    which alleged pointing a shotgun at a police officer and shooting a gun at a
    civilian’s car. The lack of the accomplice witness instruction made it easier for the
    jury to convict on those charges. The jury’s determination that Isbell had used a
    shotgun and pointed it at a police officer on July 17 probably made it easier for the
    jury to convict on the July 18 charge involving aggravated assault on a police
    officer, in violation of the rights of the Appellant.
    3
    DISCUSSION
    Should the Court of Appeals have reversed the convictions on the July 18
    offenses when the erroneous jury charge directly affected only the July
    17 offenses ?
    In its opinion the Court of Appeals asserted that the lack of accomplice
    witness instruction ―permeated‖ the entire trial.
    Four offenses were tried together. Two occurred during a police chase on July
    17, 2002 when Jamey Haney drove a vehicle that was pursued by the police, and
    her passenger pointed a shotgun at a police officer, an aggravated assault, and
    fired a shotgun at another car, deadly conduct. Haney successfully eluded police
    that day.
    On July 18, 2012, Isbell was driving the same vehicle as Haney had driven
    the day before, it was spotted by police officers, and a second police chase ensued.
    Haney was a passenger. The charges arising from that chase were evading arrest in
    a vehicle and aggravated assault by ramming a police car. Both Haney and Isbell
    were arrested at the scene following the police chase.
    At trial Haney testified that Isbell was her passenger on July 17, and that he
    had fired the shotgun.
    4
    The Court of Appeals reversed all four convictions, holding that Isbell
    suffered egregious harm because of the failure of the trial court to give an
    accomplice witness instruction as required by Article 38.14 of the Texas Rules of
    Criminal Procedure.
    In their brief, the state of Texas argues, on the one hand, that ―nothing on the
    face of the record‖ would indicate that the lack of corroboration for the July 17
    offenses would have anything to do with the July 18 offenses, (State’s Brief, p.8),
    and on the other hand that Jamie Haney’s presence on July 18 helps connect Isbell
    to the July 17 offenses (State’s Brief, p. 11).
    Anticipating the prejudicial affect of trying the cases together, Appellant
    objected to the State’s Motion to consolidate. RR II--5.
    The states seems to contend that no accomplice witness instruction was
    necessary because the July 18 incident obviously corroborates Jamie Haney’s
    testimony.
    In Almanza v. State , 
    686 S.W.2d 157
    , (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)
    this court held that the appropriate harm analysis depends on whether the error was
    preserved. Where it was not, as here, egregious harm must be shown. Under the
    egregious harm standard, the omission of the accomplice witness instruction is
    generally harmless unless the corroborating evidence is ―so unconvincing in fact as
    5
    to render the State’s overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less
    persuasive. Saunders v. State, 
    817 S.W.2d 688
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) In the
    Saunders case egregious harm was shown because the corroborating evidence was
    weak and was contradicted by other evidence. Heron v. State 
    86 S.W.3d 621
    , (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2002).
    Egregious harm occurs when an error affects the very basis of a case,
    deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.
    Allen v. State , 
    253 S.W.3d 260
    , 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
    The state cites the unreported case of Mitchell v. State, No. 11-01-00294-CR,
    
    2002 WL 32344526
    (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.) (unpublished), in support
    of its contention that Haney’s testimony was corroborated by evidence of the
    events of July 18 in which Isbell was arrested at the scene following a police chase.
    It is significant that Mitchell was an appeal based on whether the
    corroboration was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. In that
    case there was not an issue on appeal of whether an accomplice instruction should
    have been given.
    The Mitchell opinion, therefore, discusses whether a subsequent similar
    offense constitutes adequate corroboration. That is a separate and distinct issue
    from whether an accomplice instruction should have been given.
    6
    Therefore, whether an analysis of Mitchell is helpful or necessary may be
    questionable. That case involved two purse snatchings, the first of which led to an
    aggravated robbery charge, but the victim could not identify the defendant. The co-
    defendant, an accomplice, testified that Mitchell aided or assisted her in
    committing the robbery. The second incident occurred a day later, and the court
    noted some specific similarities, in determining that the second offense
    corroborated the first: (1) both offense were at the same time of day; (2) both
    occurred in the same parking lot; (3) the same person accompanied the defendant
    each time; and (4) both victims were older women. The court held that the
    similarities justified a determination that Mitchell had committed both offenses and
    that a common scheme or plan existed.
    Extraneous offenses can corroborate accomplice testimony. Lawton v. State,
    
    913 S.W.2d 542
    (Tex. Cr. App.1995). It is important to note that when
    considering accomplice testimony in determining the sufficiency of the
    corroborating testimony, all of the accomplice testimony is excluded from
    consideration. McDuff v. State, 
    939 S.W.2d 45
    (Tex. Cr. App. 1994). The
    remaining evidence is then considered in the light most favorable to the jury’s
    verdict. Gill v. State, 
    873 S.W.2d 45
    (Tex. Cr. App. 1994).
    7
    In the instant case, the only corroborating evidence is that Isbell was driving
    the same vehicle on July 18 that Haney had driven on July 17.
    CONCLUSION
    The Court of appeals correctly determined that the error in failing to include
    an accomplice witness instruction in the charge constituted egregious error.
    The failure to include such instruction made it easier for the jury to convict
    Isbell of the offenses of aggravated assault of a public servant by pointing a
    shotgun at the officer and the deadly conduct charge involving firing the gun at a
    vehicle, which occurred on July 17, 2012.
    The fact that the jury found Isbell guilty of the July 17 offenses then made it
    easier for them to convict him of the aggravated assault which occurred on July 18
    and to make a finding of use of a deadly weapon.
    But for the shotgun cases, the jury probably would have been less inclined to
    find that Isbell intentionally struck the officer’s vehicle on July 18 with his vehicle.
    As defense counsel argued the video showed that there was doubt that Isbell
    intentionally drove into the officer Parson’s car and doubt that he intended to use it
    as a deadly weapon. RR IV---30-31. Although he drove recklessly there was doubt
    about his intent. The conviction of the previous day’s shotgun offense, probably
    swayed the jury on that issue.
    8
    PRAYER
    Appellant prays that this court affirm the judgment of the court of appeals
    and remand the cases for a new trial.
    In the alternative, in the event that this court determines that The Court of
    appeals reversed in error, Appellant prays that this court remand the cases to the
    Court of Appeals for consideration of Appellant’s Grounds of Error which that
    court did not reach in its previous consideration of the cases.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/Barry G. Johnson
    Barry G. Johnson
    BAR CARD NO. 10683000
    2821 E. LANCASTER
    FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76103
    817-531-9665 FAX 817-534-9888
    barrygj@aol.com
    Attorney for Appellant
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that this document contains 1,951 words according to the software used to
    prepare it.
    /s/ Barry G. Johnson
    BARRY G. JOHNSON
    9
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    A copy of the State’s brief on the merits has been sent to opposing counsel,
    Hon. James Gibson, coaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com, 400 W. Belknap, Fort Worth,
    Texas 76196,     and to Hon. Lisa McMinn, information@spa.texas.gov State
    Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 13046, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711 on
    December 17, 2015.
    /s/ Barry G. Johnson
    BARRY G. JOHNSO
    10
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