Arzate, Francisco ( 2015 )


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  •                          PD-1343-15
    NO.
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF
    OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
    AT AUSTIN, TEXAS
    _______________________________________________________________
    No.01-12-01074-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE
    FIRST SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    AT HOUSTON
    __________________________________________________________________
    FRANCISCO ARZATE                    §          APPELLANT
    V.                               §
    STATE OF TEXAS                      §           APPELLEE
    __________________________________________________________________
    APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    __________________________________________________________________
    J. SIDNEY CROWLEY
    214 Morton St.
    Richmond. Tx. 77469
    TBC No. 05170200
    Attorney for Appellant
    October 15, 2015
    INTERESTED PARTIES
    INTERESTED PARTIES
    APPELLANT
    Francisco Arzate
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    Institutional Division
    TRIAL COUNSEL
    Anthony Osso
    Mario Madrid
    440 Louisiana, Suite 1730
    Houston, Texas 77002
    APPELLATE COUNSEL
    J. Sidney Crowley
    214 Morton St.
    Richmond, Texas 77469
    STATE OF TEXAS
    Devon Anderson
    District Attorney, Harris County
    1201 Franklin St.
    Houston, Texas 77002
    Tina Ansari
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    Charles Brodsky
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    2
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    INTERESTED PARTIES.......................................................................................2
    LIST OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................4
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT..............................................5
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE...............................................................................6
    STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE....................7
    GROUNDS FOR REVIEW....................................................................................8
    GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE
    The Court of Appeals erred when it held that the evidence was sufficient to
    support Appellant’s conviction for capital murder.........................................9
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF.......................................................................................11
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.....................................................................12
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..............................................................................12
    APPENDIX A. (OPINION BELOW)..................................................................13
    3
    LIST OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Curry v. State, 
    30 S.W.3d 394
    , 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)......................................9
    Davis v. State, 
    180 S.W.3d 276
    , 286 (Tex.App.-Texarkana, 2005)..........................10
    Greene v. State, 
    124 S.W.3d 789
    , 792 (Tex.App-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,ref’d)...10
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    (1989).........................................9
    Jones v. State, 
    984 S.W.2d 254
    , 257 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)...................................10
    King v.State, 
    29 S.W.3d 556
    , 562 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).........................................9
    Losada v. State, 
    721 S.W.2d 305
    , 309 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)..................................9
    Muniz v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 238
    , 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)..................................10
    Salinas v. State, 
    163 S.W.2d 734
    , 737 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)..................................9
    Scott v. State, 
    2007 WL 2264458
    (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007)(not
    designated for publication).......................................................................................10
    Sharp v. State, 
    707 S.W.2d 611
    , 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)....................................9
    4
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Appellant believes that oral argument is not necessary in this case.
    5
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    Appellant was convicted by a jury of the felony offense of capital murder and
    assessed a punishment of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
    Correctional Division, for life.
    6
    STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
    Appellant’s appeal was affirmed in an unpublished opinion of the First
    Court of Appeals rendered December 17, 2012. No motion for rehearing was filed.
    7
    GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
    GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE:
    The Court of Appeals erred when it held that the evidence was sufficient to
    sustain Appellant’s conviction for capital murder.
    8
    GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE
    The Court of Appeals erred when it held that the evidence was sufficient to
    support Appellant’s conviction for capital murder.
    Argument and Authorities
    In a legal sufficiency review the appellate court reviews all of the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the verdict and determines whether any rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    (1979); Salinas v. State, 
    163 S.W.3d 734
    , 737 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Wesbrook v. State, 
    29 S.W.3d 103
    , 111,
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); The jury as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses,
    is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness’ testimony. Jones v. State, 
    984 S.W.2d 254
    , 257 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). The jury may reasonably infer facts from the
    evidence presented, credit the witnesses it chooses to, disbelieve any or all of the
    evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. Sharp v. State,
    
    707 S.W.2d 611
    , 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Reconciliation of conflicts in the
    evidence is within the jury’s discretion and such conflicts alone will not warrant
    reversal if there is enough credible evidence to support a conviction. Losada v. State,
    
    721 S.W.2d 305
    , 309 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). An appellate court may not reevaluate
    the weight and credibility of the evidence produced at trial and in so doing substitute
    9
    its judgement for that of the factfinder. King v. State, 
    29 S.W.3d 556
    , 562
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the
    verdict. Curry v. State, 
    30 S.W.3d 394
    , 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The appellate
    court does not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the
    evidence, but only ensures that the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State,
    
    851 S.W.2d 238
    , 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993).
    In Appellant’s case there were no witnesses who testified that they had
    visually observed the shooter. The only evidence that linked Appellant to the murder
    was the testimony of the complainant’s family that they recognized the voice of the
    intruder as that of Appellant. There was no physical evidence such as fingerprints or
    DNA or ballistics evidence that linked Appellant with the crime.
    It is true that eyewitness testimony is unnecessary, as long as other evidence
    establishes the guilt of the offense. Greene v. State, 
    124 S.W.3d 789
    , 792 (Tex.App.-
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, ref’d). Appellant is aware that voice identification has been
    held legally and factually sufficient to support a conviction. Davis v. State, 
    180 S.W.3d 276
    , 286 (Tex.App.-Texarkana, 2005); Scott v. State, 
    2007 WL 2264458
    (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007)(not designated for publication). Appellant would
    argue that voice identification alone provides a shaky foundation and in and of itself
    is less reliable than eyewitness identification and that a rational jury could not have
    10
    found Appellant guilty based upon that alone. It is true that in Appellant’s case there
    was some circumstantial evidence in the remarks Appellant allegedly made to Patricia
    and to Ricardo Gonzalez, but would urge that there was never a direct admission by
    Appellant that he had committed the murder. Even with this additional evidence, the
    court should hold that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction.
    The Court of Appeals erred when it held otherwise.
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner prays that this Court
    grant this Petition for Discretionary Review, that the case be set for submission; that
    after submission this Court reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeals and reform
    the judgement to reflect an acquittal.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ J. Sidney Crowley
    J. Sidney Crowley
    214 Morton St.
    Richmond, Tx. 77469
    (281)232-8332
    TBC No. 05170200
    11
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that the foregoing document contains 1102 words, generated by
    computer.
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been mailed
    to the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, and to Lisa C. McMinn, State
    Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas 78711, this the 15th day of
    October, 2015.
    /s/ J. Sidney Crowley
    12
    Opinion issued December 17, 2013.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-12-01074-CR
    ———————————
    FRANCISCO ARZATE, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1317247
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Francisco Arzate appeals a judgment convicting him of capital murder for
    the shooting of his father-in-law, Guillermo Valdez. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
    § 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013). A jury found Arzate guilty, and the trial judge
    sentenced him to life in prison. In his sole issue on appeal, Arzate contends that
    the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
    Background
    Arzate was married to Maria and Guillermo Valdez’s daughter, Patricia, for
    almost ten years, but he and Patricia had separated two years before the incident.
    Patricia and Arzate had five children. Patricia testified that she and Arzate had an
    unstable relationship and often fought and that she moved to her parents’ home
    upon her separation from Arzate. In August 2011, Arzate was upset because he
    had recently learned that Patricia was in a relationship with another man. Arzate
    had called Patricia upset about her boyfriend and threatened that he would take
    action if Patricia did not end that relationship.
    Patricia testified that on the day of the incident, August, 19, 2011, she talked
    to Arzate about paying school tuition, but they did not fight, and it was a “normal
    day.” Arzate left a voicemail on Patricia’s phone around 11:30 p.m. that night
    saying that “he was suffering so [Patricia was] going to suffer the same way that he
    was suffering.” Patricia was at the hospital with her oldest son that night, but she
    called her sister because the voicemail worried her. A few minutes later, Maria
    called Patricia and told her that Arzate had shot Maria and Guillermo.
    Although Patricia was not at her parents’ home at the time of the shooting,
    several others were. Maria testified that she and Guillermo were in their bedroom
    2
    watching television with the door closed late at night when Maria heard a noise.
    Guillermo opened the bedroom door, Maria heard Arzate say “he was going to kill
    us,” and Arzate began shooting at Maria and Guillermo. Maria testified that she
    had heard Arzate’s voice on many occasions and immediately recognized it. Maria
    also testified that she saw the side of the shooter’s body and it looked like Arzate.
    On the night of the shooting, Maria told police that she saw only the shooter’s
    shadow, and not the shooter’s face.
    Guillermo and Maria’s other daughter, Elizabeth, was also at the scene.
    She had fallen asleep in one of the bedrooms a little after midnight, but she woke
    up when she heard Arzate screaming in Spanish from the living room several
    times, “where’s the bastard?” Elizabeth then heard gunshots and Maria screaming,
    so she ran to the living room and saw that the front door, which had been closed
    and locked, was open and appeared to have been forced open. She saw that
    Guillermo was lying on his back—shot more than once—and Maria was bleeding.
    When Elizabeth saw Maria, Maria was screaming, “why Francisco, why?” and
    Elizabeth believed that Maria was referring to Arzate. Elizabeth did not see the
    shooter, but she testified that there was no doubt in her mind that the voice she
    heard yelling “where is the bastard?” was the voice of Arzate.
    Elizabeth’s thirteen year old son, Heron, was also home and sleeping on the
    living room couch when the shooting took place. Heron testified that he also heard
    3
    Arzate yelling, “where was the bastard at?” Heron did not see Arzate on the night
    of the shooting, but recognized his voice because he had often visited Arzate’s
    house. Heron also testified that he heard Maria say, “why Francisco, why?”
    By the time police and EMS arrived, Guillermo was dead from four gunshot
    wounds. Arzate called Patricia after the incident, but she did not answer.
    The day after the shooting, Arzate called his employer, Richard Gonzalez,
    and told him “that he wasn’t going to be coming in because he had an issue,
    something happened with his family and he doesn’t know if he’s ever going to
    come back.” Gonzalez testified that during the same phone call, Arzate also said,
    “what happened happened.”
    The police suspected Arzate was the shooter and that he had fled to Mexico
    shortly after the shooting. Arzate’s brother and sister testified that Arzate went to
    Mexico but added that the trip was a planned vacation to visit family. Patricia
    testified that this was Arzate’s first trip to Mexico and that he would not have
    vacationed there because he did not have documentation that would allow him to
    re-enter the United States.
    A few months after the shooting, Arzate sent Patricia a text message that
    said, “I’m sorry. Are you guys okay. Are my kids okay.” Patricia testified that
    Arzate also called her from Mexico. In one such call, Arzate, who had said he was
    angry that Patricia was not taking his calls, threatened Patricia by saying that “The
    4
    same thing that he did to [her] dad he was going to do it to [her] grandma, that he
    knew where she lived and he was going to go over there and get her also.”
    Patricia also testified that Arzate attempted to have her create an alibi for
    him. In a letter, Arzate wrote: “do it for our children and for the love we had
    between us. You know it wasn’t my fault about your father. Why do you want to
    take your children’s father away.” The letter continued: “If you feel something in
    your heart you tell the lawyer that I was in Mexico.”
    Arzate also called Gonzalez and threatened that Gonzalez would suffer the
    same fate as Guillermo. When Arzate left for Mexico, Arzate had left his car and
    tools with Gonzalez. Gonzalez testified that Arzate told him that if Gonzalez did
    not pay Arzate’s brother for the vehicle and his tools, that he “was going to kill me
    and come after my family.” Gonzalez testified that Arzate added, “If you don’t
    believe me you saw what happened to my in-laws.”
    Discussion
    In his sole point of error, Arzate contends that the evidence is legally
    insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Arzate argues that a rational
    jury could not have found him guilty based solely upon voice identification, which
    he argues is less reliable than eyewitness identification.
    5
    A.    Standard of Review
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact
    finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
    doubt. McGregor v. State, 
    394 S.W.3d 90
    , 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    ,
    2789 (1979)); see also Adames v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 854
    , 859 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2011) (holding Jackson standard is only standard to use when determining
    sufficiency of evidence). Our review of “all of the evidence” includes evidence
    that was properly and improperly admitted.         
    McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 110
    (quoting Clayton v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 772
    , 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
    The jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
    witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. 
    Id. (citing Bartlett
    v. State,
    
    270 S.W.3d 147
    , 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A jury may accept one version of
    the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness’s testimony. 
    Id. (citing Sharp
    v. State, 
    707 S.W.2d 611
    , 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). We may not
    re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment
    for that of the fact finder. 
    Id. (citing Williams
    v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 742
    , 750 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2007)).       We afford almost complete deference to the jury’s
    determinations of credibility and we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in
    6
    favor of the verdict. 
    Id. (citing Lancon
    v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 699
    , 705 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2008); Curry v. State, 
    30 S.W.3d 394
    , 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
    B.    Applicable Law
    A person commits capital murder when he commits murder under section
    19.02(b)(1) of the Penal Code and “commits the murder in the course of
    committing or attempting to commit . . . burglary.”        TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
    § 19.03(a)(2). A person commits the offense of burglary if, “without the effective
    consent of the owner,” the person “enters a building or habitation and commits or
    attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault.”        TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 30.02(a)(3) (West 2011). Under section 19.02(b)(1), a person commits murder if
    he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person or intends to
    cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that
    causes the death of another. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2011);
    Temple v. State, 
    390 S.W.3d 341
    , 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    A murder conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. 
    Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 359
    (citing 
    Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778
    ). “Circumstantial evidence
    is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and
    circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” 
    Id. (quoting Hooper
    v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In circumstantial
    evidence cases, it is not necessary that every fact and circumstance point directly
    7
    and independently to the defendant’s guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is
    warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating
    circumstances. 
    Id. (quoting Johnson
    v. State, 
    871 S.W.2d 183
    , 186 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1993)).
    C.    Analysis
    To prove that Arzate is guilty of capital murder, the State had to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Arzate, in the course of a burglary or attempted
    burglary, knowingly or intentionally caused Guillermo’s death or intended to cause
    Guillermo serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human
    life that caused Guillermo’s death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1);
    19.03(a)(2).
    We conclude the evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict. First, three
    witnesses who had known Arzate for years identified Arzate as the shooter based
    on his voice. Maria testified that she heard Arzate say “he was going to kill us”
    and then the shooter began shooting at her and Guillermo. Elizabeth testified that
    it was Arzate who screamed “where’s the bastard” right before she heard gunshots.
    Heron also testified that it was Arzate who yelled those words. Voice identification
    is an acceptable means of identification and has been held sufficient to support a
    conviction. See Locke v. State, 
    453 S.W.2d 484
    , 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)
    (“Voice is a competent means of identification if the witness had any previous
    8
    acquaintance with the person identified”); Davis v. State, 
    180 S.W.3d 277
    , 285–86
    (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (holding voice identification sufficient to
    support conviction).
    Second, Arzate’s conduct after the murder indicates consciousness of guilt.
    There is evidence that Arzate was in Mexico after the shooting, despite the fact that
    he had not previously traveled to Mexico because his immigration status made it
    impossible for him to return. Gonzalez testified that Arzate told him the day after
    the murder “something happened with his family and he doesn’t know if he’s ever
    going to come back.”
    Finally, there is evidence that Arzate implicitly admitted shooting
    Guillermo, explicitly asked Patricia to create an alibi for him, and threatened both
    Patricia and Gonzalez that their relatives would meet the same fate as Guillermo if
    his demands were not met. Patricia testified that Arzate sent her a letter asking
    Patricia to lie about his whereabouts on the night of the shooting. Patricia also
    testified that a few months after Guillermo’s murder, Arzate sent her a text
    message stating that he was “sorry” and that Arzate also called her from Mexico
    and threatened to do the “same thing” to her grandma that he did to Guillermo.
    Gonzalez testified that Arzate called him several times after the murder and during
    one call threatened to kill Gonzalez and go after his family if Gonzalez did not pay
    Arzate’s brother. Gonzalez testified that Arzate substantiated the threat by saying,
    9
    “if you don’t believe me you saw what happened to my in-laws. What do you think
    is going to happen to you[?]” And, in a voicemail Arzate left Patricia on the night
    of the shooting, he warned that he was going to make her suffer like she was
    making him suffer.
    Arzate contends that the State’s failure to present an eyewitness identifying
    Arzate or physical evidence—such as fingerprints, DNA, or ballistic evidence—
    linking Arzate with the shooting renders the evidence insufficient. But, the lack of
    physical evidence, such as fingerprints, footprints, or DNA, does not render the
    evidence supporting a conviction insufficient. Harmon v. State, 
    167 S.W.3d 610
    ,
    614 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). Similarly, eyewitness
    identification is not required for a conviction. Green v. State, 
    124 S.W.3d 789
    , 792
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (eyewitness identification is not
    necessary to identify perpetrator). The lack of eyewitness testimony and physical
    evidence were factors for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence, and we
    defer to the jury’s resolution of these issues. See 
    McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 110
    .
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
    that a rational juror could have found that during the course of committing a
    burglary, Arzate intentionally or knowingly caused Guillermo’s death or intended
    to cause his death and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
    caused his death. Accordingly, we hold the evidence was legally sufficient to
    10
    support the judgment. See Bigby v. State, 
    892 S.W.2d 864
    , 883 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1994) (“Evidence of flight or escape is admissible as a circumstance from which an
    inference of guilt may be drawn.”); McInturf v. State, 
    544 S.W.2d 417
    , 419 (Tex.
    Crim App. 1976) (holding voice identification is direct evidence, which may
    constitute sufficient basis for conviction, and testimony about voice identification
    is question of fact for jury); Kesaria v. State, 
    148 S.W.3d 634
    , 640–41 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (holding evidence was sufficient to establish
    defendant’s identity to support burglary of habitation conviction where victims
    unequivocally identified defendant as man who burglarized home in part because
    they recognized his voice), aff’d, 
    189 S.W.3d 279
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    We overrule Arzate’s sole point of error.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Rebeca Huddle
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    11