Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. Mrc Permian Company ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •           Supreme Court of Texas
    ══════════
    No. 21-0461
    ══════════
    Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC, et al.,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    MRC Permian Company,
    Respondent
    ═══════════════════════════════════════
    On Petition for Review from the
    Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas
    ═══════════════════════════════════════
    Argued October 25, 2022
    JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.
    This mineral-lease dispute concerns the interpretation of a force
    majeure clause. Typically, a lessee invokes a force majeure clause to
    avoid the harsh result of lease termination when confronted with
    circumstances beyond its control that impede compliance with a lease
    deadline or obligation.   But here, the lessee mistakenly scheduled
    operations to drill a new well to commence after the deadline to suspend
    lease termination under a continuous-drilling program. After missing
    the deadline, the lessee discovered its scheduling error and only then
    invoked the lease’s force majeure clause, referencing an allegedly
    qualifying event that had occurred nearly a month before the drilling
    deadline.   Though the event did not cause the lessee to miss the
    deadline, the lessee argues the clause extended the drilling deadline and
    prevented the lease from terminating. We disagree.
    As with other lease clauses, the application of a force majeure
    clause depends on the terms the contracting parties freely chose. The
    clause here provides that “[w]hen Lessee’s operations are delayed by an
    event of force majeure, being a non-economic event beyond Lessee’s
    control,” and timely notice is given, the lease shall “remain in force”
    during the delay and the lessee shall have 90 days to “resume
    operations.”   According to the lessee, its invocation of the clause
    retroactively kept its lease “in force” through the deadline because an
    earlier wellbore instability on an unrelated lease (the alleged force
    majeure event) required that the lessee effectively redrill portions of
    that well, setting back its rig schedule for subsequent drilling on other
    leases—including the untimely scheduled operation—by 30 hours.
    Before receiving notice, however, the lessors signed new leases.
    Contending the force majeure clause extended the lease, the original
    lessee sued the putative successor in interest and others for, among
    other claims, tortious interference with its lease. The putative successor
    responded that the original lease terminated when the lessee missed the
    deadline and that the size of any retained interests in production units
    for already-drilled wells was limited.
    On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court
    determined that (1) the force majeure clause did not extend the lease as
    2
    a matter of law, (2) the putative successor was entitled to a take-nothing
    summary judgment on the lessee’s tortious-interference claims, and
    (3) the lessee’s retained production units were not limited as a matter of
    law to the smaller of two possible capped sizes.                 On permissive
    interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals focused on the phrase
    “Lessee’s operations are delayed” to conclude that the lease deadline and
    untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking the force
    majeure clause. Reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding the
    case, the appellate court determined that fact issues exist both as to
    whether the clause applied and as to each element of the lessee’s
    tortious-interference claims and that, given its holdings, the issue of the
    production-unit size was not “ripe” for decision.
    We hold that, construed in context, “Lessee’s operations are
    delayed by an event of force majeure” does not refer to the delay of a
    necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the
    deadline for perpetuating the lease. We therefore (1) reverse the court
    of appeals’ judgment on the force majeure and tortious-interference
    issues, (2) render judgment that the force majeure clause did not save
    the lease, (3) render a take-nothing judgment in part on the lessee’s
    tortious-interference claims to the extent those claims are predicated on
    the force majeure clause’s saving the lease, and (4) remand the case to
    the court of appeals to consider two issues preserved but not reached:
    the size of the production units when the lease terminated and whether
    the   evidence    raised     a   fact       issue   supporting    the   lessee’s
    tortious-interference claims regarding any leasehold interest in the
    retained production units.
    3
    I. Background
    A. The MRC Lease
    In 2014, the Lessors 1 executed four identical leases (collectively,
    the MRC Lease) granting MRC Permian Company an exclusive
    leasehold estate of around 4,000 gross acres in Loving County for
    exploring, developing, producing, and marketing oil and gas. The MRC
    Lease’s primary term ended on February 28, 2017. During the primary
    term, MRC drilled five horizontal oil wells, spudding 2 the last well—the
    Totum well—on November 22, 2016.
    The lease provisions, including a retained-acreage clause, 3
    provide that after the primary term, the lease “shall automatically
    divide” into separate production units and terminate as to all lands and
    depths not then included in a production unit. A production unit, as
    defined by the lease, is the area and depths of the lease allocated to a
    producing well. Within 90 days after completing a well, MRC “shall file”
    1The Lessors are (1) TJ Bar, LLC, with Holland Acquisitions, Inc., d/b/a
    Holland Services as its agent; (2) Tubb Memorial, LP, with Bank of America,
    N.A., as its agent; (3) The Deborah Jackson Revocable Trust, with
    PlainsCapital Bank as its trustee; and (4) Janelle Jackson Marital Trust Part
    M2, Janelle Jackson Marital Trust Part M1, and Family Credit Shelter Trust
    Part B, with Bank of America, N.A. as their trustee.
    2  “‘Spudding-in’ is a term of art in the oil-and-gas industry that means
    ‘[t]he first boring of the hole in the drilling of an oil well.’” Sundown Energy
    LP v. HJSA No. 3, Ltd. P’ship, 
    622 S.W.3d 884
    , 886 n.1 (Tex. 2021) (quoting
    Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS—MANUAL OF OIL
    AND GAS TERMS 1007 (16th ed. 2015)).
    3 A retained-acreage clause “typically divides the leased acreage such
    that production or development will preserve the lease only as to a specified
    portion.” Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 
    554 S.W.3d 586
    , 598 (Tex. 2018).
    4
    a written designation of the production unit in the county where the well
    is located. For a horizontal oil well, the production unit “shall not
    exceed” either 160 or 320 acres (plus 10% tolerance) depending on
    whether “more than 5000 feet of its wellbore extends horizontally in the
    producing formation.”
    MRC could “temporarily suspend automatic termination” of the
    lease at the end of the primary term by conducting a continuous-drilling
    program, and the “lease will remain in force . . . so long as the
    Continuous Drilling Program is conducted by Lessee.”         Under that
    program, MRC had to spud a new well every 180 days measured from
    the spud date of the last well. If not, the MRC Lease “shall terminate
    as to all lands and depths” not then included in a production unit.
    Because MRC spudded the Totum well on November 22, 2016, MRC had
    until May 21, 2017, to spud a new well and continue “temporarily
    suspend[ing]” the lease’s termination.
    In early 2017, MRC’s executive committee scheduled a May 11
    spudding of a sixth well—the Toot 211 well—using Patterson Drilling
    Rig 295, the same rig it had used to drill the Totum well. Rig 295,
    according to MRC, is “specially equipped to handle the high pressures”
    found in Loving County, and its “special equipment and crew make
    Rig 295 safer and more efficient for the area than other rigs.”
    Subsequently, however, MRC’s operations team created a new
    drilling schedule. By April 18, Rig 295’s schedule listed June 2 as the
    spud date for the Toot 211 well and erroneously identified June 19,
    rather than May 21, as the MRC Lease’s expiration date absent a timely
    spudded well. Around two weeks after the correct expiration date, MRC
    5
    discovered the scheduling mistake. MRC concedes it had mistakenly
    calculated June 19 as the expiration date based on the rig-release date
    from the Totum well, rather than its spud date as required by the lease.
    B. Force Majeure
    Having missed the May 21 deadline to continue “temporarily
    suspend[ing]” lease termination, and upon discovering its scheduling
    mistake, MRC determined in early June that an April 21 force majeure
    event provided 90 days from resolution of that event to spud the
    Toot 211 well. The lease provision MRC relied on provides:
    13. Force Majeure. When Lessee’s operations are delayed
    by an event of force majeure, being a non-economic event
    beyond Lessee’s control, if Lessee shall furnish Lessor a
    reasonable written description of the problem encountered
    within 60 days after its commencement, and Lessee shall
    thereafter use its best efforts to overcome the problem, this
    lease shall remain in force during the continuance of such
    delay, and Lessee shall have 90 days after the reasonable
    removal of such majeure within which to resume
    operations; provided, however, this paragraph shall not
    extend this lease or relieve Lessee for liability for any
    breach thereof for a period in excess of 180 days, and
    Lessee’s obligation to pay sums due hereunder shall not be
    affected by an event of force majeure.
    MRC sent force majeure notices to the Lessors on June 13—
    53 days after the alleged force majeure event and more than three weeks
    after the MRC Lease would have terminated under the May 21
    continuous-drilling deadline if no savings clause applied. 4          In the
    4Savings clauses, including force majeure clauses, are lease provisions
    designed to prevent automatic termination of a lease. See BP Am. Prod. Co. v.
    Red Deer Res., LLC, 
    526 S.W.3d 389
    , 394 (Tex. 2017) (“Many mineral leases
    contain savings clauses designed to prevent the automatic termination of the
    6
    notices, MRC alleged that around April 21, MRC began experiencing
    “operational issues with the rig scheduled to drill the Toot 211 well” and
    “wellbore stability issues that required a reaming operation for over
    2,500 feet of the lateral,” which “have caused a delay in drilling the
    Toot 211 well beyond MRC’s control.” 5 The notices did not mention the
    erroneously scheduled June 2 spud date; in fact, the notices referenced
    the earlier schedule, claiming the Toot 211 well “was scheduled to be
    spud[ded] . . . on May 11, 2017.”        MRC alerted the Lessors that it
    “currently anticipates that a rig will be arriving at the Lease acreage to
    drill the Toot 211 well as early as next week.”
    Discovery during litigation revealed that the delay caused by the
    April 21 wellbore instability lasted for only 30 hours while Rig 295 was
    drilling a well—the Dorothy White well—on an unrelated lease 60 miles
    away.       This wellbore instability, as MRC’s senior vice president of
    operations later explained, occurred when MRC was running production
    casing and the wellbore caved in. MRC overcame the problem through
    a reaming operation, redrilling over 2,500 feet of the wellbore.
    According to MRC, the delay on the Dorothy White well “necessarily set
    lease upon a cessation of production.”); Hardin-Simmons Univ. v. Hunt
    Cimarron Ltd. P’ship, No. 07-15-00303-CV, 
    2017 WL 3197920
    , at *7 (Tex.
    App.—Amarillo July 25, 2017, pet. denied) (“The category of clauses that might
    extend the duration of an oil and gas lease beyond a determinable condition,
    generally known as ‘savings clauses,’ include, among others, the ‘drilling
    operations clause,’ ‘continuous operations clause,’ or ‘reworking clause.’”);
    4 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
    LAW § 683 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2022) (“Another such savings clause
    which has made its way into leases . . . is the so-called force majeure clause.”).
    On appeal, MRC does not allege any rig “operational issues” other than
    5
    the delay due to the wellbore instability that required a reaming operation.
    7
    back the schedule for all of the subsequent wells on [Rig 295]’s schedule
    by approximately 30 hours, including the drilling of the Toot #211.”
    As noted on Rig 295’s April 18 schedule, two other wells on
    another unrelated lease—the Barnett wells—were scheduled to be
    drilled before the Toot 211 well.    On April 24, after completing the
    Dorothy White well, MRC moved Rig 295 to drill the Barnett wells, and
    as of the May 21 deadline for the MRC Lease, MRC was still drilling
    those wells. MRC’s drilling superintendent and its expert admitted that
    MRC would have had enough time to move Rig 295 to the Toot 211 well
    and commence drilling by early May, but they explained that MRC chose
    to drill the Barnett wells first.
    On June 15, Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC, instead of the
    Lessors, responded to MRC’s June 13 force majeure notices.         Point
    Energy explained that after reviewing publicly available drilling data,
    it “questioned whether MRC’s drilling schedule was sufficient to
    maintain the Continuous Development Program” and therefore had
    taken “leases from the mineral owners” on June 7.          Point Energy
    requested documentation regarding the force majeure event but did not
    dispute that MRC is entitled to a leasehold interest in production units
    for the five wells already drilled. Finally, Point Energy stated that
    without additional information, it had “serious concerns that any entry
    onto the land to drill the Toot 211 may constitute bad faith trespass.”
    8
    C. Procedural History
    MRC sued Point Energy; the Lessors and their trustees and
    agents; and certain entities affiliated with Point Energy, 6 alleging
    trespass to title and that (1) some of the Lessors, trustees, and agents
    had repudiated and breached the MRC Lease by signing new leases with
    Point Energy; and (2) Point Energy and the affiliated defendants had
    engaged in a civil conspiracy and tortiously interfered with an existing
    contract in their efforts to acquire the new leases from the Lessors. MRC
    also sought declaratory relief that the MRC Lease remains in full force
    and effect, that MRC met all requirements to suspend its drilling
    obligation, that the force majeure clause should be construed not to
    include certain additional requirements to invoke the clause, 7 and that
    the production-unit size should be 320 acres plus 10% tolerance if the
    MRC Lease terminated.
    Point Energy and other defendants (collectively, Point Energy)
    counterclaimed for breach of the MRC Lease, trespass to try title, and
    an   accounting     and    constructive     trust.      As    part   of   their
    trespass-to-try-title claim, the counter-plaintiffs asserted that MRC is
    limited to 160 acres plus 10% tolerance for each production unit because
    the wellbores do not “extend[] horizontally in the producing formation”
    6These affiliated entities are Robert Gaudin, John Sabia, Bryan Moody,
    and Vortus Investment Advisors, LLC. MRC later nonsuited its claims against
    Gaudin.
    7 Specifically, MRC requested declarations that (1) the force majeure
    event “does not have to occur on the Leasehold Estate” or “cause MRC to miss
    a deadline” and (2) MRC does not have to “try to conduct operations . . . before
    the 90-day extended deadline” or “try to overcome the effects of the force
    majeure.”
    9
    “more than 5000 feet” and MRC did not satisfy the written-designation
    requirement for allocating acreage to each well.
    Point Energy then moved for partial summary judgment that the
    force majeure clause did not perpetuate the MRC Lease, arguing that
    the alleged force majeure event was economically motivated and within
    MRC’s control; the delayed operations had to be “on-lease”; the
    scheduling error rather than the force majeure event caused the delay;
    and the delay was foreseeable. MRC responded with a cross-motion for
    partial summary judgment, requesting declarations regarding the
    construction of the clause and arguing that Point Energy seeks to
    impose requirements not in the clause. 8 Point Energy then moved for
    traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on all claims.
    The trial court granted Point Energy’s motion for partial
    summary judgment on the force majeure issue and denied MRC’s
    corresponding motion; denied Point Energy’s motion to limit the
    production units to 160 acres each; and granted Point Energy’s motion
    for a take-nothing summary judgment on MRC’s tortious-interference
    claims. Based on these rulings, the trial court declared the MRC Lease
    to have terminated “as of May 22, 2017,” as to all property not included
    in a production unit.   The trial court then permitted a permissive
    interlocutory appeal from the order, identifying three controlling
    questions of law: (1) “whether the [MRC Lease] terminated as to the
    portion of the Leasehold Estate not included in a Production Unit for a
    Commercial Well by May 22, 2017”; (2) “what is the size of the
    8  MRC also moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment
    on the breach-of-contract counterclaim, which the trial court denied.
    10
    Production Units retained under the [MRC Lease]”; and (3) “if the [MRC
    Lease] did not terminate, whether the Point [Energy] Leases, and/or the
    acts of Defendants related thereto, can support a claim for tortious
    interference under Texas law.” 9
    The court of appeals accepted the interlocutory appeal, 10 reversed
    the trial court’s judgment in part, 11 and remanded the case. As to the
    force majeure dispute, the court distilled the disagreement to three
    issues: (1) whether the force majeure event needed to be “on-lease”; 12
    (2) whether the event must have caused MRC to miss a lease deadline
    and not just delay operations; and (3) whether the event was under
    MRC’s control and driven by financial considerations. 13 The court held
    9   See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d).
    
    624 S.W.3d 643
    , 650-51 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021) (citing TEX. CIV.
    10
    PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f)).
    11 Although the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on
    the primary issues, the court also (1) affirmed the trial court’s denial of MRC’s
    motion for summary judgment on both the force majeure issue and the
    breach-of-contract counterclaims and the trial court’s “ruling that TJ Bar
    cannot be held liable for tortious interference with its own lease with MRC,”
    (2) did not reach the trial court’s ruling on MRC’s estoppel defense, and
    (3) severed and abated the appeal as to Holland Acquisitions after it filed for
    bankruptcy. Id. at 651 n.2 & n.4, 663, 670.
    12  The parties dispute the court of appeals’ characterization of this
    specific issue. Point Energy claims the court “thought the issue was whether
    the force majeure event had to occur on the Lease, not the delayed operations,”
    but “[t]he parties agree the force majeure clause requires delayed operations
    on the Lease no matter where the triggering event occurs.” MRC asserts, “The
    delayed operations that matter are those on the lease, and the court of appeals
    did not hold otherwise. The only disputed issue has always been the location
    of the triggering event.”
    13   Id. at 658-61.
    11
    that the MRC Lease did not require the force majeure event to be
    “on-lease” or to cause MRC to miss a lease deadline; even if there were
    a causation requirement, testimony from MRC’s employee raised a fact
    issue; and the record “is fraught with conflicting evidence” on MRC’s
    control over and economic motivation for the force majeure event. 14
    Given the “uncertainty surrounding the continued existence of MRC’s
    lease,” including “when the new [Point Energy] leases were negotiated
    and signed,” the court concluded that the question of the production-unit
    size was unripe and that “there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
    each element of MRC’s tortious interference claims.” 15
    We granted Point Energy’s petition for review, which contends in
    three issues: (1) the court of appeals erred in holding the force majeure
    clause applied when only off-lease operations and plans were delayed,
    MRC would have missed its deadline even if the alleged force majeure
    event had never occurred, and this failure resulted from MRC’s
    choices—not events beyond its control; (2) the production-unit question
    should be decided in its favor as a matter of law; and (3) no fact issues
    exist on the elements of MRC’s tortious-interference claims.
    14   Id.
    15Id. at 664-69; see id. at 670-71 (Alley, J., concurring and dissenting)
    (disagreeing with the majority that a fact issue exists as to the “willful and
    intentional act of interference” element of MRC’s tortious-interference claims).
    12
    II. Discussion
    We review summary judgments and construe mineral leases de
    novo. 16 A traditional summary-judgment movant will prevail only by
    establishing that no material fact issue exists and it is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. 17 A lease that has a “certain and definite
    meaning” is unambiguous and interpreted as a matter of law; but if it is
    subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, summary judgment
    is improper. 18 When both parties move for summary judgment on an
    issue and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we
    review the summary-judgment evidence and render judgment that the
    trial court should have rendered. 19
    General contract-construction principles govern the construction
    of an oil-and-gas lease, although special interpretation rules also apply
    because the lease determines interests in real property. 20 Consistent
    with the law’s “strong public policy favoring freedom of contract,”
    contracting parties are generally free to determine the lease’s terms, and
    those terms define their respective rights and duties. 21 Our duty is to
    16See Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 
    645 S.W.3d 212
    , 218 (Tex.
    2022); Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 
    554 S.W.3d 586
    ,
    595 (Tex. 2018).
    17   TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Rosetta Res., 645 S.W.3d at 218.
    18Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 
    639 S.W.3d 682
    , 690 (Tex. 2022); Rosetta Res., 645 S.W.3d at 219.
    19   Rosetta Res., 645 S.W.3d at 218.
    See Discovery Operating, 554 S.W.3d at 595; XOG Operating, LLC v.
    20
    Chesapeake Expl. Ltd. P’ship, 
    554 S.W.3d 607
    , 611-12 (Tex. 2018).
    21Discovery Operating, 554 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Phila. Indem. Ins.
    Co. v. White, 
    490 S.W.3d 468
    , 471 (Tex. 2016)).
    13
    “respect and enforce” those terms by ascertaining the parties’ intent as
    expressed within the lease’s four corners. 22 To that end, we examine the
    entire lease, focusing on the plain language, considering the context in
    which words are used, and attempting to harmonize all the lease’s parts
    to “determine, objectively, what an ordinary person using those words
    under the circumstances in which they are used would understand them
    to mean.” 23 We also construe contracts “from a utilitarian standpoint
    bearing in mind the particular business activity sought to be served, and
    avoiding unreasonable constructions when possible and proper.” 24
    A. The Force Majeure Clause
    Generally speaking, a force majeure clause is a “contractual
    provision allocating the risk of loss if performance becomes impossible
    or impracticable, esp[ecially] as a result of an event or effect that the
    parties could not have anticipated or controlled.” 25         Force majeure
    clauses, however, come in many shapes, sizes, and forms. 26                For
    22   Id. at 595 (quoting White, 490 S.W.3d at 471).
    23 Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 
    615 S.W.3d 144
    ,
    148 (Tex. 2020) (quoting URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 
    543 S.W.3d 755
    , 764 (Tex.
    2018)).
    24 Id. at 148 (quoting Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors
    Inc., 
    473 S.W.3d 296
    , 305 (Tex. 2015)).
    25 Force-Majeure Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see
    5 Nancy Saint-Paul, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 57:28 (rev. 3d ed. 2018) (“The
    force majeure clause protects the lessee when events that are beyond the
    lessee’s control intervene to delay performance of the lease covenants.”).
    26Martin & Kramer, supra note 4, at § 683.1 (noting that “[t]he verbiage
    of force majeure clauses varies from approximately fifty words to five or six
    hundred words” and describing some of “the many variants of force majeure
    clauses”); 4 Eugene Kuntz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 53.5
    14
    example, in oil-and-gas leases, these clauses may vary according to
    their:
    •    “force majeure” definition; 27
    (1990) (noting that force majeure clauses “vary considerably” regarding “the
    enumerated causes which will constitute a force majeure” and “the type of
    performance that will be excused”).
    27For example, the clause may define force majeure by (1) specifying a
    list of qualifying events, see, e.g., In re Nueces Petroleum Corp., No. 05-44617,
    
    2007 WL 418889
    , at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2007) (“[B]y operation of force
    majeure including storm, flood or other act of God, fire, war, rebellion,
    insurrection, riot, or as a result of some order, requisition, or necessity of any
    governmental agency having jurisdiction[.]”); (2) listing events with a catchall,
    see, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 
    555 S.W.3d 176
    , 179 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (listing force majeure events of
    “fire, flood, storm, act of God, governmental authority, labor disputes, war or
    any other cause not enumerated herein but which is beyond the reasonable
    control of the Party whose performance is affected”); Roland Oil Co. v. R.R.
    Comm’n, No. 03-12-00247-CV, 
    2015 WL 870232
    , at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb.
    27, 2015, pet. denied) (including as force majeure events those caused “by a
    strike, fire, war, civil disturbance, act of god; by federal, state, or municipal
    laws; by any rule, regulation, or order of a governmental agency; by inability
    to secure materials; or by any other cause or causes beyond reasonable control
    of the party”); Va. Power Energy Mktg., Inc. v. Apache Corp., 
    297 S.W.3d 397
    ,
    403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“The term ‘Force
    Majeure’ as employed herein means any cause not reasonably within the
    control of the party claiming suspension . . . [and] shall include, but not be
    limited to . . . physical events such as acts of God, landslides, lightning,
    earthquakes, fires, storms or storm warnings, such as hurricanes, which result
    in evacuation of the affected area, floods, washouts, explosions, breakage or
    accident or necessity of repairs to machinery or equipment or lines of pipe.”);
    or (3) broadly defining the event with or without carve-outs, see, e.g., El Paso
    Mktg., L.P. v. Wolf Hollow I, L.P., 
    383 S.W.3d 138
    , 140 n.6 (Tex. 2012) (“[A]n
    ‘Event of Force Majeure’ means any act or event that prevents the affected
    Party from performing its obligations (other than the payment of money) under
    this Agreement if such act or event is beyond the reasonable control of and not
    a result of the negligence or intentional act of the affected Party[.]”).
    15
    •    causal-nexus requirement; 28
    •    remedial-action requirement; 29
    •    notice requirement; 30 and
    28 Among other alternatives, the clause may require that the force
    majeure event (1) caused the failure to perform, see, e.g., Va. Power, 
    297 S.W.3d at 403
     (“[N]either party shall be liable to the other for failure to perform a Firm
    obligation, to the extent such failure was caused by Force Majeure.”);
    (2) prevented or hindered compliance, see, e.g., Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P’ship,
    
    918 F.2d 1244
    , 1246 (5th Cir. 1990) (“This lease shall not be terminated . . . if
    compliance . . . is prevented or hindered by” a force majeure event.); TEC
    Olmos, 
    555 S.W.3d at 179
     (“Should either Party be prevented or hindered from
    complying with any obligation . . . by reason of” force majeure events, then the
    performance of the obligation is suspended.); or (3) delayed or interrupted
    operations, see, e.g., Nueces Petroleum, 
    2007 WL 418889
    , at *2 (“When any of
    the operations contemplated by this lease are delayed or interrupted by
    operation of force majeure . . . the time of such delay or interruption shall not
    be counted against Lessee.”); Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 
    984 S.W.2d 277
    , 280 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (“When drilling or other
    operations are delayed or interrupted by” force majeure events, “the time of
    such delay or interruption shall not be counted against Lessee[.]”).
    29  Some options include requiring due diligence or reasonable efforts
    (1) to overcome or mitigate the effects, see, e.g., El Paso Mktg., 383 S.W.3d at
    140 n.6 (requiring that a party affected by force majeure “has been unable by
    the exercise of due diligence to overcome or mitigate the effects of such act or
    event”); (2) to remove the force majeure event, see, e.g., Perlman, 918 F.2d at
    1246 (“Lessee shall use all reasonable efforts to remove such force majeure[.]”);
    Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 
    736 S.W.2d 715
    , 716
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (requiring that force majeure
    “shall so far as possible, be remedied with all reasonable dispatch”); or (3) both,
    see, e.g., Va. Power, 
    297 S.W.3d at 403
     (“Seller and Buyer shall make
    reasonable efforts to avoid the adverse impacts of a Force Majeure and to
    resolve the event or occurrence once it has occurred[.]”).
    30 Some clauses, for example, may require written notice within a
    certain time. See, e.g., Perlman, 918 F.2d at 1246 (“Lessee shall notify Lessor
    in writing . . . within fifteen days of any force majeure[.]”). Others may require
    notice only “as promptly as possible.” See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt
    Petroleum (AEC), Inc., 
    157 S.W.3d 462
    , 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    16
    •    grace period excusing           or   delaying    contractual
    performance. 31
    As with other mineral-lease clauses, the application of a
    particular force majeure clause depends on the terms the contracting
    parties freely chose, and each clause must be construed according to its
    own terms because there is no “one size fits all” construction. 32
    2004, no pet.) (“[P]arty shall give notice and details of Force Majeure in writing
    to the other party as promptly as possible after its occurrence.”).
    31  As examples, force majeure clauses may suspend performance
    obligations or lease termination during the period of prevention or delay. See,
    e.g., TEC Olmos, 
    555 S.W.3d at 179
     (“[T]he performance of any such obligation
    is suspended during the period of, and only to the extent of, such prevention or
    hindrance[.]”); Roland Oil, 
    2015 WL 870232
    , at *5 (“All obligations imposed by
    this agreement . . . shall be suspended while compliance is prevented[.]”);
    Zurich Am., 
    157 S.W.3d at 464
     (suspending obligations “during the
    continuance of any inability so caused”). Others may excuse performance
    based on whether the failure to perform was caused or affected by the force
    majeure event. See, e.g., El Paso Mktg., 383 S.W.3d at 140 n.6 (excusing party
    “from whatever performance is affected by the Event of Force Majeure to the
    extent so affected”); Va. Power, 
    297 S.W.3d at 403
     (“[N]either party shall be
    liable to the other for failure to perform a Firm obligation, to the extent such
    failure was caused by Force Majeure.”); Kodiak 1981, 
    736 S.W.2d at 716
    (“[N]either party hereto shall be liable for any failure to perform the terms of
    this Agreement, when such failure is due to ‘force majeure[.]”).
    32  See Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 
    554 S.W.3d 586
    , 598 (Tex. 2018) (describing the construction of retained-acreage
    clauses in a similar manner); see also Perlman, 918 F.3d at 1248 (“[T]he
    ‘doctrine’ of force majeure should not supersede the specific terms bargained
    for in the contract.”); Roland Oil, 
    2015 WL 870232
    , at *5 (“[W]e agree with
    Roland that the scope and effect of a force majeure clause depend ultimately
    on the specific language used in the contract and not on any traditional
    definition of the term[.]”); Va. Power, 
    297 S.W.3d at 402
     (“The scope and effect
    of a ‘force majeure’ clause depends on the specific contract language, and not
    on any traditional definition of the term.”); Allegiance Hillview, L.P. v. Range
    Tex. Prod., LLC, 
    347 S.W.3d 855
    , 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.)
    (“‘[W]hen the parties have themselves defined the contours of force majeure in
    17
    The force majeure clause in the MRC Lease addresses each of
    these types of variations. The clause describes the force majeure event
    as “being a non-economic event beyond Lessee’s control.” By requiring
    “Lessee’s operations” to be delayed “by” a force majeure event, the clause
    imposes a causal-nexus requirement that is a necessary predicate to
    properly invoke the clause. 33 For remedial action, a lessee must use its
    “best efforts to overcome the problem,” and, “within 60 days after its
    commencement,” a lessee must provide notice and include a “reasonable
    written description of the problem.” Finally, the clause provides a grace
    period that maintains the lease “during the continuance of such delay”
    while affording 90 days “to resume operations” after the “reasonable
    removal of such majeure,” not to exceed a total of 180 days.
    Although Point Energy raises other challenges to MRC’s
    invocation of the force majeure clause, we focus our discussion on
    whether MRC satisfied the predicate causal-nexus requirement: “[w]hen
    Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event of force majeure . . . .”
    Specifically, we focus on what it means for “Lessee’s operations” to be
    their agreement, those contours dictate the application, effect, and scope of
    force majeure,’ and reviewing courts ‘are not at liberty to rewrite the contract
    or interpret it in a manner which the parties never intended.’” (quoting Sun
    Operating, 
    984 S.W.2d at 283
    )); Zurich Am., 
    157 S.W.3d at 466
     (“Regardless of
    its historical underpinnings, the scope and application of a force majeure
    clause depend on the terms of the contract.”); Sun Operating, 
    984 S.W.2d at 283
     (noting that the clause’s “scope and application, for the most part, is utterly
    dependent upon the terms of the contract in which it appears”).
    33 Dictionaries define “by” as “through the means or instrumentality of”
    or “[t]hrough the agency or action of.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
    DICTIONARY 307 (2002); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
    ENGLISH LANGUAGE 255 (5th ed. 2016).
    18
    “delayed by” a force majeure event and whether that requirement
    interacts with lease deadlines. MRC identifies the scheduled June 2
    spudding of the Toot 211 well as the only “Lessee’s operation[]” allegedly
    delayed for the purpose of the force majeure clause. And it is undisputed
    that if there had been no delay, the operation as scheduled would not
    have satisfied the May 21 continuous-drilling deadline to perpetuate the
    MRC Lease.        Nevertheless, MRC argues it is irrelevant that the
    operation was already scheduled to commence after the deadline
    because “nothing in the [force majeure] clause here ties force majeure to
    performance or compliance [with lease deadlines]—just delayed
    operations.” According to MRC, “delay” means to make late as to the
    operation’s scheduled date but not in relation to the lease deadline for
    that operation. 34 Thus, even a slowdown of an operation erroneously
    scheduled to commence after the lease deadline could trigger the force
    majeure clause.
    When viewed in isolation and taking an unduly literal
    interpretation, the phrase “Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event
    of force majeure” could be read to support MRC’s position. But we do
    not read contractual phrases in isolation, 35 and we must avoid “taking
    literalism too literally and adopting a wooden construction foreclosed by
    34 See, e.g., Delay, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
    ENGLISH LANGUAGE 479 (5th ed. 2016) (“To cause to be later or slower than
    expected or desired[.]”).
    35Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 
    574 S.W.3d 882
    ,
    891 (Tex. 2019).
    19
    [the legal text’s] context.” 36        “‘Context,’ after all, ‘is a primary
    determinant of meaning.’” 37 Words “must be construed in the context in
    which they are used,” and their meaning “‘turns upon use, adaptation
    and context as they are employed to fit various and varying
    situations.’” 38 And a “vital part” of a text’s context is “the purpose of the
    text,” as gathered “from the text itself, consistently with the other
    aspects of its context.” 39
    In light of the phrase’s textual context of the MRC Lease’s
    operation deadlines and the force majeure clause’s grace periods and
    purpose, we cannot conclude that the contemplated “delay[]” of “Lessee’s
    operations” is entirely divorced from the lease deadlines. The MRC
    Lease repeatedly yokes operations with lease deadlines, which, if not
    met, result in lease termination, including:
    36 Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 
    356 S.W.3d 421
    , 451 (Tex. 2011) (Willett,
    J., concurring); see Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 
    615 S.W.3d 144
    , 151 (Tex. 2020) (declining to interpret a contested sentence in a
    contract in a “hyper-literal fashion”); URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 
    543 S.W.3d 755
    , 764 (Tex. 2018) (“[W]ords are simply implements of communication, and
    imperfect ones at that. Oftentimes they cannot be assigned a rigid meaning,
    inherent in themselves.” (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of Sw.
    Nat’l Ass’n, 
    354 S.W.2d 576
    , 579 (Tex. 1962))).
    Brown v. City of Houston, 
    660 S.W.3d 749
    , 754 (Tex. 2023) (quoting
    37
    Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
    LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012)).
    URI, 543 S.W.3d at 764 (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Mental Hygiene, 354
    38
    S.W.2d at 579); see Scalia & Garner, supra note 37, at 323 (“[C]ontext is as
    important as sentence-level text. The entire document must be considered.”).
    39   Scalia & Garner, supra note 37, at 33.
    20
    •    a drilling-commitment deadline; 40
    •    a substitute-well deadline; 41
    •    a continuous-drilling deadline; 42
    •    a production-unit deadline; 43 and
    •    a review-of-production-units deadline. 44
    40 “MRC agrees to commence drilling operations on or before the
    expiration of eighteen (18) months from the effective date of this lease . . . .
    Failure to timely commence drilling operations on the well will result only in
    termination of the lease[.]”
    41  “If, in the conducting of any of the drilling operations . . . MRC
    encounters any conditions or difficulties . . . [which] make further drilling and
    completion of any well impossible or impracticable, then MRC shall have the
    option to commence operations for the drilling of a substitute well within sixty
    (60) days after cessation of drilling operations on the well[.]”
    42“‘Continuous Drilling Program’ means the period of time during
    which Lessee is timely commencing Actual Drilling of Continuous Program
    Wells and ending on the calendar day upon which more than 180 consecutive
    days have elapsed since the commencement of Actual Drilling of the most
    recent Continuous Program Well,” and “Lessee may temporarily suspend
    automatic termination of this lease at the expiration of the primary term by
    conducting a Continuous Drilling Program.”
    43“[I]f production of oil and gas should cease from the Production Unit,
    this lease will not terminate as to such Production Unit so long as Lessee
    commences Actual Drilling of a new well or the Recompleting, Reworking or
    Refracing of an existing well on the Production Unit or before the expiration of
    60 days from date of the cessation of production and proceeds with such
    operations with no cessation of more than 60 consecutive days until
    commercial production of oil and/or gas is restored.”
    44 “At any time after the tenth anniversary date of this lease, if a
    Production Unit contains more acreage than is necessary to meet regulatory
    allowable and spacing requirements . . . upon request from Lessor, Lessee shall
    commence and diligently pursue either a Continuous Drilling Program on the
    Production Unit or Recompleting, Reworking or Refracing operations. If
    Lessee fails to commence a Continuous Drilling Program, Recompleting,
    Reworking or Refracing within 90 days of the request from Lessor . . . Lessee
    shall release this lease as to [that unnecessary] acreage[.]”
    21
    The operations described in these clauses are necessary to
    preserve the lease under certain circumstances and must be performed
    within specified time periods. If these operations were delayed by a force
    majeure event such that the lessee missed the corresponding deadline,
    then a force majeure clause, to be effective, would need to keep the lease
    in force during the delay and provide time for the lessee to resume the
    lease-preserving operations.
    This force majeure clause does precisely that. Its expressly stated
    purpose is to keep the MRC Lease “in force during the continuance of
    such delay” of “Lessee’s operations” and provide the lessee with 90 days
    “to resume operations.” On the other hand, there would be no need for
    the clause to provide that remedy if the operation would not otherwise
    keep the lease in force or the delay did not cause a missed deadline. The
    textual context provides no indicia of the contracting parties’ intent to
    cover a delay of an operation already scheduled to commence after a
    critical contractual deadline for perpetuating the lease. Indeed, the
    textual context signifies that the “delay[]” of “Lessee’s operations”
    relates to lease deadlines and obligations. MRC’s complete untethering
    of operations from their corresponding lease deadlines in claiming a
    “delay[]” of “Lessee’s operations” is at odds with a fair reading of the
    force majeure clause and embraces a wooden, isolated literalism over a
    natural, contextual construction. 45
    45 Scalia & Garner, supra note 37, at 33 (endorsing a “fair reading”
    interpretive approach that construes a legal text “on the basis of how a
    reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the
    text at the time it was issued” and considers the text’s purpose derived “only
    from the text itself, consistently with the other aspects of its context”).
    22
    MRC’s construction of the phrase as applied to the June 2
    scheduled operation also rests on circular reasoning. To properly invoke
    the force majeure clause, the delayed operation must be “Lessee’s
    operations.” Had there been no delay, however, the lease would have
    terminated before the June 2 scheduled operation. In that scenario and
    at the time of the scheduled operation, MRC would no longer have been
    the “Lessee[]” and would have been conducting the operation on
    someone else’s property rather than on the lease. 46 In other words,
    MRC’s June 2 operation—as scheduled and before any delay—would not
    have been “Lessee’s operation[]” unless a savings clause would have
    perpetuated the MRC Lease until at least the operation’s scheduled
    date.    But this results in the following circularity: MRC’s June 2
    scheduled operation would be “Lessee’s operation[]” only if the force
    majeure clause (or some other savings clause not at issue in this appeal)
    would have kept the MRC Lease in force through June 2; but MRC could
    properly invoke the force majeure clause to keep the lease in force
    46 The parties agree that “Lessee’s operations” refers to on-lease
    operations. See supra note 12. Although the parties do not dispute the
    on-lease requirement for “Lessee’s operations,” we note that in other contexts,
    depending on the lease terms and definitions, “operations” could include
    off-lease operations that are related to the lease. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kramer,
    Keeping Leases Alive in the Era of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic
    Fracturing: Are the Old Workhorses (Shut-in, Continuous Operations, and
    Pooling Provisions) Up to the Task?, 49 WASHBURN L. J. 283, 306 (2010) (noting
    that with horizontal drilling “one needs to make sure that operations that take
    place off the leasehold premises are included” in the lease’s definition because
    “if the vertical portion of the well bore needs to be reworked and the horizontal
    or lateral section is shut-in, the reworking operations will not necessarily be
    on the leased premises”).
    23
    beyond the May 21 drilling deadline only if the delay of the June 2
    scheduled operation was a delay of “Lessee’s operations.”
    We conclude that an ordinary person using the phrase “[w]hen
    Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event of force majeure,” given its
    textual context, would not understand those words to encompass a
    30-hour slowdown 47 of an essential operation that was already destined
    to be untimely due to a scheduling error. 48 Our construction is further
    buttressed by viewing the clause from a utilitarian perspective, “bearing
    in mind the particular business activity sought to be served, and
    avoiding unreasonable constructions when possible and proper.” 49 Force
    majeure clauses like this one generally exist to allocate risk when a
    lessee encounters an irresistible force beyond a party’s control that may
    lead to the harsh result of lease termination. 50 Here, the language the
    47 In its briefing, MRC argued that the clause “does not require any
    minimum amount of delay.” At oral argument, however, MRC’s counsel
    conceded that a de minimis exception is implied within the force majeure
    clause, but explained, “A day in the oil field is important. We’ve seen leases
    lost by somebody missing it by a day. . . . If we’re getting into something that
    addresses what I would refer to as a de minimis kind of effect, that’s for another
    day, that’s for another case.” As we need not reach the issue of whether a
    30-hour delay falls within a de minimis exception, we agree with MRC’s
    counsel that this question is “for another day [and] for another case.”
    48 See URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 
    543 S.W.3d 755
    , 764 (Tex. 2018)
    (“[O]ur quest is to determine, objectively, what an ordinary person using those
    words under the circumstances in which they are used would understand them
    to mean.”).
    49 Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 
    615 S.W.3d 144
    ,
    148 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors
    Inc., 
    473 S.W.3d 296
    , 305 (Tex. 2015)).
    50Martin & Kramer, supra note 4, at § 683 (“Another such savings
    clause which has made its way into leases to protect lessees from liability or
    24
    contracting parties chose evinces that this force majeure clause’s
    purpose is the same. But if an untimely operation would not otherwise
    suspend termination of the lease—even absent any delay—the alleged
    force majeure event does not impose any risk of lease termination. The
    risk of lease termination derives from the scheduling error, which the
    parties agree the force majeure clause is not designed to remedy.
    Of course, parties are free to contract in a manner that either
    allocates the risk for when a lessee erroneously schedules an untimely
    operation or allows a lessee to invoke a force majeure clause based on
    operational delays entirely divorced from lease deadlines, regardless of
    whether such contractual language produces odd results or comports
    with a utilitarian perspective. 51 But the contracting parties to the MRC
    loss of leases for causes beyond their control is the so-called force majeure
    clause.”); 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS Particular clauses or provisions § 50:58
    (4th ed. 2022) (“The purpose of a force majeure clause is to relieve an oil and
    gas lessee from the harsh termination of the lease due to circumstances beyond
    the lessee’s control that would make performance untenable or impossible.”);
    Kuntz, supra note 26, at § 53.5 (“It is not uncommon for the oil and gas lease
    to contain a force majeure clause which is designed to relieve the lessee from
    the consequences of a failure to comply with the terms of the lease if such
    failure is the result of certain described causes.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
    CONTRACTS, introductory note to ch. 11 (1981) (“Contract liability is strict
    liability. It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to be
    kept. . . . The obligor who does not wish to undertake so extensive an obligation
    may contract for a lesser one by using one of a variety of common clauses
    [including] . . . a force majeure clause[.]”).
    51See Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC, 
    573 S.W.3d 198
    , 211 (Tex. 2019) (noting that parties are free to contract for odd
    results and “that lease drafters are not always driven by logic” (quoting
    Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Hyder, 
    483 S.W.3d 870
    , 874 (Tex. 2016))).
    25
    Lease did not do that, and the textual context here forecloses such a
    construction. 52
    Applying well-established contract-construction principles, we
    construe “Lessee’s operations are delayed by an event of force majeure”
    to have a “certain and definite meaning” 53 that would not encompass a
    slowdown of MRC’s June 2 scheduled operation to spud the Toot 211
    well when that operation would not have met the May 21 deadline even
    if there had been no delay. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment
    as to the force majeure clause and render judgment that the clause did
    not extend MRC’s drilling deadlines or perpetuate the MRC Lease. 54
    Accordingly, as a matter of law, the MRC Lease terminated as to the
    52 MRC argues that the clause “uses a soft-trigger/hard-cap design,”
    setting “a low threshold for lessees like MRC to declare force majeure (freeing
    the lessor—or its agent, the bank—from the burden of scrutinizing each claim)”
    but capping the lease extensions “at just 180 days.” The clause, however, does
    not provide the lessee with unfettered discretion to declare force majeure, and
    even if the “soft trigger” is construed as a relatively “low threshold,” we
    conclude that, as a matter of law, MRC did not satisfy it here by alleging the
    delay of an already untimely operation.
    53Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 
    639 S.W.3d 682
    , 690 (Tex. 2022).
    54 The court of appeals also held that “even if there were a causal link
    requirement” between the force majeure event and a missed deadline, “there
    is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the off-lease delay caused
    MRC’s missed deadline, or whether the delay resulted from a calendaring error
    by an MRC employee.” 
    624 S.W.3d 643
    , 660 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021). But
    the evidence the court of appeals relied on connected the force majeure event
    only with delaying the scheduled June 2 operation, not with missing the
    May 21 deadline. Id. at 660-61. We cannot agree with the court of appeals
    that this evidence, or any other evidence in the record, raised a fact issue on
    “whether the off-lease delay caused MRC’s missed deadline[.]”
    26
    portion of the leasehold estate not included in production units when
    MRC failed to spud a new well by May 21, 2017.
    B. Retained Acreage
    In its second issue, Point Energy complains of the court of appeals’
    decision to defer disposition of the dispute over the size of the production
    units MRC retained following lease termination.             Point Energy’s
    summary-judgment motion asserted that MRC’s retained acreage was
    limited     to   160 acres    per   production   unit   based   on   (1) the
    written-designation requirement and (2) how far the “wellbore extends
    horizontally in the producing formation.” After concluding that Point
    Energy had not established that the lease had terminated, the court of
    appeals held that determining “the amount of acreage MRC may retain
    when, and if, its lease terminated” would require “imagin[ing] a scenario
    in which MRC’s lease in fact terminated.” 55 Accordingly, addressing the
    issue “when the lease may not terminate at all ‘would create an
    impermissible advisory opinion’” and “‘eschew the ripeness doctrine.’” 56
    We disagree that such a determination would create an
    impermissible advisory opinion or implicate the court of appeals’
    jurisdiction under the ripeness doctrine. “[I]n evaluating ripeness, we
    consider ‘whether, at the time a lawsuit is filed, the facts are sufficiently
    developed so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than
    55   Id. at 664.
    56 Id. (quoting Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 
    22 S.W.3d 849
    , 853
    (Tex. 2000)).
    27
    being contingent or remote.’” 57      An intermediate appellate court’s
    answer to a predicate merits question within the same lawsuit may
    make disposition of additional merits-based issues unnecessary to
    resolve the appeal, but it does not affect ripeness or, in the ordinary case,
    the appellate court’s jurisdiction. As we recently explained:
    It may turn out, when the dust settles, that one element or
    another of a court’s decision ended up being irrelevant to
    the ultimate outcome. That does not mean the court lacked
    jurisdiction to decide that part of the case. Even assuming
    the remaining issues were rendered superfluous by the
    court of appeals’ resolution of [a predicate] question, the
    possibility remained that this Court would take a different
    view of [that] question, as we have done. The dispute over
    the remaining issues therefore remained live, and its
    resolution still impacted the parties’ rights—even though
    the extent to which it did depended on how the case
    progressed in the future. Resolving the remaining issues
    would not have amounted to an advisory opinion by the
    court of appeals. 58
    We also noted that “[t]he prudential practice of courts to decline to reach
    issues not necessary to the disposition of a case should not be confused
    with the constitutional prohibition on advisory opinions” and whether
    the court of appeals “could have reached” or “was obligated to reach”
    those issues are two distinct inquiries. 59
    Because we have reversed the court of appeals’ judgment as to the
    termination of the MRC Lease, we need not address whether the court
    Robinson v. Parker, 
    353 S.W.3d 753
    , 755 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Gibson,
    57
    22 S.W.3d at 851-52).
    58Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. Maverick County, 
    642 S.W.3d 537
    ,
    549 (Tex. 2022).
    59   Id. at 549-50.
    28
    was obligated to determine the production-unit size. The court will have
    the opportunity to address the issue in the future—assuming the parties
    maintain their current positions.             When reversal necessitates
    consideration of issues raised in but not decided by the court of appeals,
    we ordinarily remand the case to that court for further proceedings. 60
    Although we have discretion to take up those issues, we adhere to our
    usual practice and remand this issue to the court of appeals. 61
    C. Tortious Interference
    Point Energy’s final issue concerns MRC’s tortious-interference
    claims. As pleaded, MRC’s claims are based on two theories of liability:
    (1) a primary theory of interference with the MRC Lease; and (2) if the
    MRC Lease had terminated, a secondary theory of interference with the
    leasehold interest in the retained acreage. In the court of appeals, MRC
    admitted that “once the trial court erroneously held that the MRC leases
    expired after May 21, 2017, MRC’s primary theory of interference—
    which relied on actions taken in June 2017—fell by the wayside, leaving
    only the secondary ‘acreage issue.’” After disagreeing with the trial
    court on the applicability of the force majeure clause, the court of
    appeals held that there are fact issues about “whether there existed a
    valid contract subject to interference” and as to the tortious-interference
    elements. 62     The court focused only on MRC’s primary theory of
    interference without considering the secondary theory.
    60   Id. at 550.
    61   See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4; Maverick County, 642 S.W.3d at 550-51.
    62   
    624 S.W.3d 643
    , 665-68 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021).
    29
    We have agreed with the trial court that the force majeure clause
    did not extend the MRC Lease as a matter of law. The court of appeals’
    contrary conclusion led to its erroneous determination that fact issues
    exist as to each tortious-interference element under MRC’s primary
    theory of liability. We therefore reverse the court’s judgment on this
    issue and render judgment in part that MRC take nothing on its
    tortious-interference claims to the extent they are based on the lease
    perpetuating beyond May 21, 2017. The court of appeals, however, did
    not consider MRC’s secondary theory of interference.        Because the
    relevant evidence may relate to the question of the production-unit size,
    which we have remanded, we also remand the tortious-interference
    issue to the extent it relates to the retained acreage.
    III. Conclusion
    We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment on the force majeure
    and tortious-interference issues, render judgment that the force majeure
    clause did not extend the lease, render a take-nothing judgment in part
    on MRC’s tortious-interference claims, and remand the case to the court
    of appeals to consider the remaining issues.
    John P. Devine
    Justice
    OPINION DELIVERED: April 21, 2023
    30