Fossil Group, Inc. v. Nicole Harris ( 2024 )


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  •          Supreme Court of Texas
    ══════════
    No. 23-0376
    ══════════
    Fossil Group, Inc.,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    Nicole Harris,
    Respondent
    ═══════════════════════════════════════
    On Petition for Review from the
    Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
    ═══════════════════════════════════════
    JUSTICE BLACKLOCK, concurring.
    The Court’s opinion leans heavily on federal Title VII
    sexual-harassment cases to decide a case brought under Chapter 21 of
    the Texas Labor Code. I must observe, once again, that:
    Texas judges interpreting Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor
    Code have an independent obligation to construe Texas law
    that does not yield to statements made by federal
    authorities about federal anti-discrimination statutes.
    ...
    When Texas courts look to federal sources of law for
    assistance in understanding Chapter 21, we should take
    care not to give the impression that we are elevating
    federal law to the level of controlling authority that must
    be carefully parsed and assiduously followed. Federal
    sources of law have no formal role to play, in this case or in
    future cases, as this Court seeks to understand whether
    the various legal obligations that might be imagined to
    arise from Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code have truly
    achieved the consent of the governed in Texas.
    Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. – El Paso v. Niehay, 
    671 S.W.3d 929
    ,
    945–46 (Tex. 2023) (Blacklock, J., concurring) (internal quotations
    omitted).
    I do not object to the Court’s reiteration of propositions about
    sexual-harassment liability under Chapter 21 that we have previously
    stated. See, e.g., Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 
    313 S.W.3d 796
    , 804 &
    n.25 (Tex. 2010); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 
    544 S.W.3d 755
    , 771 (Tex. 2018). But we need not say anything new about the Texas
    Labor Code in order to correctly resolve this case. This is particularly
    true when, as Justice Young points out, an alternative ground for
    reversal exists. Post at 4–5 (Young, J., concurring). To the extent the
    Court’s opinion can be read to adopt into Texas law, for the first time,
    any propositions from federal case law about Title VII liability, I do not
    join those parts of the opinion.
    With this reservation noted, I respectfully concur.
    James D. Blacklock
    Justice
    OPINION FILED: June 14, 2024
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-0376

Filed Date: 6/14/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/17/2024