Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2018 )


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  •                                                KEN PAXTON
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    February 15, 2018
    The Honorable James M. Tirey                                Opinion No. KP-0181
    Hale County Attorney
    500 Broadway, Suite 340                                     Re: Authority under article III, section 52(a)
    Plainview, Texas 79072                                      of the Texas Constitution of a Type-A general:-
    law municipality to expend funds or resources
    on ;various tasks related to events sponsored by
    the area chamber of commerce, such as
    Christmas on the Plaza and Petersburg Days
    (RQ-0174-KP)
    Dear Mr. Tirey:
    On behalf of the City of Petersburg, you ask several questions about the authority of a
    Type-A general-law municipality to allow the use of city resources for various tasks related to
    events sponsored by the chamber of commerce. 1 You tell us the City ofPetersburg (the "City") is
    a Type-A general-law city with a population of 1,202. See Request Letter at 2, Exhibit A at 1.
    You also tell us that the Petersburg Area Chamber of Commerce (the "Chamber") is a nonprofit
    organization that promotes the Petersburg community, including sponsoring ·events such as
    "Christmas on the Plaza" and "Petersburg Days." Request Letter at 2. You tell us that the Chamber
    describes the Christmas on the Plaza event as "an evening of holiday fun and shopping" in the
    storefronts and on Main Street, and includes a visit from Santa. 2 
    Id. You also
    tell us that
    Petersburg Day "involves a parade, vendors, a barbeque cook-off, and a motorcycle 'fun run"' and
    according to the Cha~ber, draws former residents back to the community for class and family
    reunions and constitutes "one of the best ways to promote our community." 
    Id. In connection
    with these events, the Chamber asks the City for the use of its employees, equipment, and supplies,
    as well as facilities and property. See Exhibit A at 1. You question whether article III, section
    52(a) of the Texas Constitution authorizes the City to allow the use of its employees, equipment
    and supplies, and facilities and property for this private purpose. See Request Letter at 1-2.
    1
    See Letter and attached Exhibit A from Honorable James M. Tirey, Hale Cty. Att'y, to Honorable Ken
    Paxton, Tex. Att'y Gen. at 1-2 (Aug. 10, 2017), https://texasattomeygeneral.gov/opinion/requests-for-opinion-rqs
    ("Request Letter" & "Exhibit A" respectively).
    2
    In the event the City provides funds for a Christmas display, if the display includes a religious aspect we
    refer the City to Attorney General Opinion KP-0116, addressing a display's compliance with the United States
    Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0116(2016) at 3-4 (discussing
    Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding Christmas displays and decorations).
    The Honorable James M. Tirey- Page 2             (KP-0181)
    Article III, section 52(a) of the Texas Constitution provides:
    Except as otherwise provided by this section, the Legislature shall
    have no power to authorize any county, city, town or other political
    corporation or subdivision of the State to lend its credit or to grant
    public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual,
    · association or corporation whatsoever ....
    TEX. CONST. art. III. § 52(a). The purpose of this provision is "to prevent the gratuitous grant of
    [public] funds to any individual, corporation, or purpose whatsoever." Byrd v. City of Dallas, 
    6 S.W.2d 738
    , 740 (Tex. 1928). Spending public funds for a legitimate public purpose to obtain a
    clear public benefit is not an unconstitutional grant of public funds. See Edgewood Indep. Sch.
    Dist. v. Meno, 
    917 S.W.2d 717
    , 740 (Tex. 1995). Further, an expenditure to directly accomplish
    a legitimate public purpose is constitutional even though it may incidentally benefit a private
    interest. See 
    id. The Texas
    Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine whether an expenditure
    of public funds or use of other public resources satisfies article III, section 52(a). See Tex. Mun.
    League Intergov 'ti Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm 'n, 
    74 S.W.3d 377
    , 384 (Tex. 2002);
    see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. JC-0113 (1999) (considering a school district's use of school
    district funds, personnel, and property to raise funds for charitable organization); JM-431 (1986)
    (considering whether the use of county personnel for private purposes violated article III, section
    52(a)); MW-89 (1979) (determining that school district policy allowing teachers to work for
    professional associations while receiving salaries from school district is unconstitutional). The
    public entity making the expenditure or authorizing the use of its other resources must: ( 1) ensure
    that the transfer is to "accomplish a public purpose, not to benefit private parties; (2) retain public
    control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is accomplished and to protect the public's
    investment; and (3) ensure that the political subdivision receives a return benefit." Tex. Mun.
    League Intergov 'ti Risk 
    Pool, 74 S.W.3d at 384
    .
    Regarding the first prong, general-law municipalities may exercise only that power
    specifically conferred on them by statute or the constitution. Town of Lakewood Vil!. v. Bizios,
    
    493 S.W.3d 527
    , 531 (Tex. 2016). Generally, all municipalities may govern "for the good
    government, peace, or order of the municipality or for the trade and commerce of the
    municipality." TEX. Loe. Gov'TCODE § 51.001(1); see also 
    id. § 51.015(b)("The
    governing body
    of the municipality may manage and control the property belonging to the municipality.").
    Additionally, a Type-A general-law municipality has that governance power "necessary for the
    government, interest, welfare, or good order of the municipality." 
    Id. § 51.012.
    To the extent a
    municipal expenditure or use ofresources serves one of the municipality's powers or functions, it
    serves the public purpose of the municipality. See State ex rel. Grimes Cty. Taxpayers Ass 'n v.
    Tex. Mun. Power Agency, 
    565 S.W.2d 258
    , 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ
    dism'd) (stating that to satisfy the public purpose test for a particular governmental entity, "[t]he
    purpose for which the ... payment .. 1 was made must be within the powers of the entity ...
    making the payment"); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0035 (2015) at 3 ("[M]unicipalities may
    expend or transfer municipal funds or property only to serve public purposes that are within the
    municipality's powers, not merely to benefit the public in general."). Community events such as
    The Honorable James M. Tirey - Page 3          (KP-0181)
    the ones you raise may arguably serve the public purpose of improving the trade and commerce of
    the municipality.
    With regard to the second prong, a public entity may retain public control over the use of
    its resources by entering into an agreement or contract that imposes an obligation on the recipient
    to perform a function benefitting the public. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0104 (2016) at 2.
    The same contract can also serve to satisfy the third prong by imposing safeguards to ensure the
    public entity receives a return benefit. See id
    Determining whether a particular expenditure or use of public resources satisfies the three-
    part test is for the city council in the first instance and subject to judicial review for abuse of
    discretion. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. KP-0104 (2016) at 2, GA-0078 (2003) at 4, JM-1255
    (1990) at 3. Accordingly, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the use of City employees,
    equipment and supplies, and facilities and property by the Chamber for the community events is
    unconstitutional. Yet, should the city council find that the use of city resources for the Chamber's
    events serve a public purpose of the municipality, article III, section 52( a) authorizes the use of
    resources in this way. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0007 (2015) at 3.
    You also ask whether article III, section 52(a) is the controlling law for your questions or
    whether there are other relevant constitutional provisions that apply. See Request Letter at 2.
    Aside from article III, section 51, which provides that "[t]he legislature shall have no power to
    make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual,
    association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whats_oever," and for which compliance
    is determined by the same three-part test, we are unaware of other constitutional provisions that
    would apply to the use of public resources about which you ask. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 51; see
    Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 917 S.W.2d at 739--40.
    The Honorable James M. Tirey - Page 4           (KP-0181)
    SUMMARY
    Article III, section 52(a) of the Texas Constitution prohibits
    the gratuitous payment of public funds for a private purpose.
    Because the determination whether a particular expenditure or use
    of public resources is gratuitous is, in the first instance, for the city
    council subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion, we cannot
    determine as a matter of law that the use of city resources in these
    circumstances is constitutional.
    Upon a finding by the city council that the Chamber's use of
    city resources serves a public purpose of the municipality and that
    sufficient controls exist to ensure the public purpose is carried out
    and a return benefit is received, article III, section 52(a) authorizes
    the use of city resources for these purposes.
    Very truly yours,
    KEN PAXTON
    Attorney General of Texas
    JEFFREY C. MATEER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    BRANTLEY STARR
    Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
    VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    CHARLOTTE M. HARPER
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KP-0181

Judges: Ken Paxton

Filed Date: 7/2/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/15/2018