Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1939 )


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  •                                 TEXAS
    Honorable C. F. P&et
    Secretary
    Railroad Wnmission
    Austin, Texas
    Dear   Mr.   Pet&:              opinion No. 3-76
    Re:    Jurisdiction of Railroad Commission,
    in connection with Southern Pacific
    Lines' Discontinuing Trains 11 and
    .I.2through El Paso and to the Texas-
    New Mexico State  Line
    This office is in receipt of your letter of Januarg 10, 1939, advising
    that Fo February, 1938, the Southern Pacific Company discontinued the
    operation of two trains Nos. 11 and l.2,which prior thereto went
    through El Paso to the Texas-New Mexico State line. You are advised and
    ask us to assume that all of the business handled by those two trains
    was interstate business. The Southern Pacific Company did not obtain
    the permission of the Railroad Commission of Texas to so discontinue
    the use of said trains, and you ask an opinion as to whether the
    Railroad Commission has jurisdiction such as to make such permission
    necessary.
    Congresshas undertaken in the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act
    to regulate the operation of passenger trains and freight trains engaged
    in the handling of interstate business. Showing in part the regulations
    thus made. we quote from Section 1, Title 49, U. S. C. A., Chapter 1,
    as follows:
    "(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to common
    carriers engaged in-
    (a) The transportation of passengers or property wholly by
    railroad, or partly by m+lroad and partly by water when both
    are used under a common control, management, or arrangement
    for a continuous carriage or shipment; or
    (c) The transmission of intelligence by wire or wireless
    from one State or Territory of the United States, or the
    District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the
    United States, or the District of Columbia, or from one place
    in a Territory to another place in the same Territory, or
    .   .
    ,,     .,
    Han   C. F. Petet   January 12, 1939, Page 2   0 ~-76
    from any place in the United States through a foreign
    country to any other place in the United States, or
    from or to any place in the United States to or from a
    foreign country, but only in so far as such transportation
    or transmission takes place within the United States.
    (10) The term 'car service' in this part shall include the
    me, control, supply, movement. distribution, exchange,
    interchange, and return of locomotives, cars and other
    vehicles used in the transportation of property, including
    special types of equipment, and the supply of trains. by
    any carrier by railroad subject to this part.
    (11) It shall be the duty of every carrier by railroad
    subject to this part to furnish safe and adequate car
    service and to establish, observe, and enforce just and
    reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect
    to car service; and every unjust and unreasonable rule
    regulation, and practice with respect to car service is
    prohibited and declared to be unlawful. . . .
    (13) The Commission is hereby authorized by general or
    special orders to require all carriers by railroad subject
    to this part, or any of them, to file with it from time to
    time their rules and regulations with respect to car,
    service, and ,the:Commission‘may;init.8 discretion, direct
    that such~rules :and regulations shall be incorporated in
    their schedules showing rates, fares, and charges for
    transportation, and be subject to any or all of the pro-
    visions of this part relating thereto.
    (14) The Commission may, after hearing,on a complaint or
    upon its own initiative without complaint, establish
    reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect
    to car service by carriers by railroad subject to this part,
    including the compensation to be paid for the use of any
    locomotive, car, or other vehicle not owned by the carrier
    using it, and the penalties or other sanctions for
    nonobservance of such rules, regulations, or practices.
    (15) Whenever the Commission is of the opinion that
    shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic, or other
    emergency requiring immediate action exists in any section
    of the country, the Commission shall have, and it is hereby
    given, authority, . . .
    Hon. C. F.   Pet&,   Janurary 12, 1939, Page 3   0-76
    (a) To suspend the operation of any or all rules,
    regulations, or practices then established. with respect
    to car service for such time as may be determined by the
    Commission; (b) to make such just and reasonable directions
    with respect to car service without regard to the ownership
    as between carriers of locomotives, cars, and other vehicles,
    during such emergency as in its opinion will best promote
    the service in the interest of the public and the commerce
    of the people, upon such terms of compensation as between
    the carriers as they may agree upon, or, in the event of
    their disamcement, as the Commission may after subsequent
    hearing find to be just and reasonable . . .
    (17) The directions of the Commission as to car service
    and to the matters referred to in paragraphs (15) and (16)
    may made through and by such agents or agencies as the
    Commission shall designate and appoint for that purpose.
    It shall be the duty of all carriers by railroad subject
    to this part, and of their officers, agents, and employees,
    to obey strictly and conform promptly to such orders or
    directions of the Commission, and in case of failure or
    refusal on the part of any carrier, receiver, or operating
    trustee to comply with any such order or direction such
    carrier, receiver, or trustee shall be liable to a penalty
    of not less than $100 nor more than $500 for each such
    offense and $50 for each and every day of the continuance
    of such offense, which shall accure to the United States
    and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the
    United States: Provided, however, that nothing in this part
    shall impair or affect the right of a State, in the exercise
    of its police power, to require just and reasonable frei@t
    and passenger service for intrastate business, except in so
    far as such requirement is inconsistent with any lawful
    order of the Commission made under the provisions of this
    part. . .
    (21) The Commission may, after hearing, in a proceeding
    upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint,
    authorize or require by order any carrier by railroad
    subject to this part, party to such preceeding, to provide
    itself with safe and adequate facilities for performing
    as a common carrier its car service as that term is used
    in this part, and to extend its line or lines:"
    It is thus noted that for State regulation, there was left only intrastate
    business, and even that is curtailed by the requirement that no State
    regulation shall be inconsistent with any lawful order of the Interstate
    Commerce Commission. Par. 17 above.
    .   -
    Hon. C. F. Petet, January 23, 1939,Page 4   o-76
    In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State, 
    143 So. 255
    , the Supreme Court
    of Florida held that the State Railroad Commission could not enforce
    continued operation of an interstate passenger train carrying intrastate
    passengers. It was further held that if :dfscontinuance of the train
    would render service to intrastate business insufficient, the State
    Railroad Commission could require the rendition of sufficient service,
    not by requiring continued operation of the interstate train, but by
    requiring the carrier to supply proper facilities between intrastate
    points.
    In Transit Corn.Co. v. U. S., 53 S. C. 536, 
    289 U.S. 121
    77 L. Ed.
    1075
    , it was held that on taking effect of this Act, a State Commission
    was stripped of its power to prescribe terms for joint operation of
    railroad tracks under a trackage agreement, and thereafter authority
    of the Interstate Commerce Commission became paramount and exclusive.
    In Louisville & N. R. Co.v. Eubank, 184, U. S. 27, The United States
    Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Kentucky
    Constitution which attempted to prohibit common carriers from charging
    more for a shorter than for a longer haul, so far as its provisions
    extended to a long haul from a place outside of the one inside of the
    State, and a shorter haul between points on the same line and in the
    same direction, both of which are within the State, as the carrier is
    thus compelled to adjust, regulate or fix his interstate rates with
    some reference to his rates within the State.
    Quotation is from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in
    People vs. 111. C. R. Co., 324 111. 591. 
    51 A. L
    . R. 1236, certiorari
    denied, 48 S. C. 37, as follows:
    "The complete and paramount power of Congress to regulate
    interstate commerce is well established. By virtue of the
    comprehensive terms of the constitutional grant of power
    the authority of Congrem is adequate to meet the varying
    exigencies that arise rnd to protect the national interest
    by securing the freedom-of interstate commercial intercourse
    from local control. Houston, E. &W. T. R. Co. v. United,
    States, 
    234 U.S. 342
    , 58 L. ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep.
    833: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, 1, 6 L ed. 23; Brown v.
    Maryland, 
    12 Wheat. 419
    , 6 L. ed. 678; Minnesota Rate
    Cases( Simpson v. Shepard) 
    230 U.S. 352
    , 57 L. ed. 1511, 48
    L. R. A. (m. 5.) 1151, 33 Sup. ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916.4,
    18."
    Holding that Congress has the power to control theintrastate rates main-
    tained by a carrier under State authority to the extent necessary to
    remove the resulting discrimination against interstate commerce arising
    out of the relation between such intrastate rates and interstate rates
    which are reasonable in themsolves, the Supreme Court in H. E. & W. T.
    R. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S.Y342, said in part:
    Hon. C. F. Petet,Jsnuary 23,.1939, Page 5,      O-76
    "The fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce,
    as well as of -interstatecommerce, does not derogate from
    the complete and paramount authority of Congress over the
    latter, or preclude the Federal power from being exerted to
    prevent the intrastate operations of such carriers from
    being made a means of injury to that which has been confided
    to Federal care. Wherever the interstate and intrastate
    transactions of carriers are so related that the government
    of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress,
    and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe (352) the
    final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be
    denied the exercise of its constitutional authority, and'
    the state, and not the nation, would be supreme within the
    national field."
    Under the facts which you submit to us, the trains carried interstate
    business only. In our opinion the Railroad Commission of Texas was
    without jurisdiction to take any action in the premises. This.
    is likewise true, even though the two trains in question carried
    a mixture of intrastate and interstate business.
    Yours very   truly,
    AlTORNEX GRRRRAL OFTEXAS
    s/ Glenn R. Lewis
    BY
    Glenn R. Lewis
    Assistant
    GRL:IV/ldw
    APPROVED
    s/ Gerald C. Mann
    ATTORNEX GRRRRAL OF TEXAS
    

Document Info

Docket Number: O-76

Judges: Gerald Mann

Filed Date: 7/2/1939

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017