Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2016 )


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  •                                               KEN PAXTON
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    May 17, 2016
    The Honorable Charles Perry                                 Opinion No. KP-0087
    Chair, Committee on Agriculture, Water,
    and Rural Affairs                                       Re: State compliance with restrictions on
    Texas State Senate                                          federal refugee dollars (RQ-0074-KP)
    Post Office Box 12068
    Austin, Texas 78711-2068
    Dear Senator Perry:
    You ask two questions concerning the use of federal refugee dollars by the State of Texas. 1
    The federal Refugee Act of 1980 established the Office of Refugee Resettlement (the "ORR"),
    which funds and administers programs for domestic resettlement and assistance to refugees.
    8 U.S.C. § 1521; see Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. Congress thereby
    authorized the ORR to provide funds to the states to assist in the states' refugee resettlement
    efforts. 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(6). Federal law does not require that states participate in the refugee
    program, and a state may cease participation by providing proper notice of its withdrawal from the
    program. 45 C.F.R. § 400.301(a). Upon a state's withdrawal, the ORR may authorize a private
    entity to administer the refugee program in the state. Id.§ 400.301(c). To date, twelve states have
    chosen to withdraw, but Texas remains a part of the refugee program and currently receives federal
    funding to implement it in this state. 2
    As a condition of receiving federal funding, a state must "meet standards, goals, and
    priorities, developed by the Director [of ORR], which assure the effective resettlement ofrefugees
    and which promote their economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible and the efficient
    provision of services." 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(6)(B). Related to this requirement, you first ask
    whether the State of Texas must "comply with restrictions on federal refugee dollars that are not
    found in the text of federal law." Request Letter at 1.
    The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]he Government of the United States has broad,
    undoubted power over the subject of immigration," and "[t]ederal governance of immigration ...
    1
    See Letter from Honorable Charles Perry, Chair, Senate Comm. on Agric., Water & Rural Affairs, to
    Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att'y Gen. at I (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinion/requests-
    for-opinion-rqs ("Request Letter").
    2
    0ffice of Refugee Resettlement, State Programs Annual Overview, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
    orr/state-programs-annual-overview.
    The Honorable Charles Perry - Page 2            (KP-0087)
    is extensive and complex." Arizona v. United States, 
    132 S. Ct. 2492
    , 2498-99 (2012). However,
    "[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy
    to the States." 
    Id. at 2500.
    While Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses
    federal money to the states, any conditions it attaches to a state's acceptance of such funds "must
    be set out unambiguously." Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 
    548 U.S. 291
    , 296
    (2006) (quotation marks omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that "the key is ... what
    the States are clearly told regarding the conditions that go along with the acceptance" of federal
    funds. 
    Id. at 304.
    There can "be no knowing acceptance if a state is unaware of the conditions or
    is unable to ascertain what is expected of it." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
    451 U.S. 1
    , 17 (1981 ). "Legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
    contract, and therefore, to be bound by federally imposed conditions, recipients of federal funds
    must accept them voluntarily and knowingly." 
    Murphy, 548 U.S. at 296
    (quotation marks
    omitted). Thus, the Court has required that "Congress speak with a clear voice" to enable the
    states to exercise their choice knowingly. 
    Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17
    (emphasis added).
    Few restrictions on refugee funding to the states are found in the text of the federal statute,
    and instead Congress has required that the states abide by the "standards, goals, and priorities"
    developed by the ORR. 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(6). In delegating this authority to a federal agency,
    Congress itself has failed to provide clear notice to the states about the conditions it is attaching to
    a state's acceptance of federal refugee dollars. A court would therefore likely conclude that any
    such conditions that are not found in the text of a federal statute are unenforceable under the
    Supreme Court's clear notice rule.
    Your second question asks whether "there is a legal prohibition to the State of Texas
    performing security verifications when allocating refugee funding." Request Letter at 1. The
    federal Refugee Act of 1980 and its subsequent amendments do not specifically address nor
    prohibit the states from performing their own security assessments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522.
    However, Congress has established laws for the treatment of immigrants .and refugees in the
    United States, and the Supreme Court has invalidated certain state laws on the grounds that they
    are preempted by the federal immigration scheme. See 
    Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503
    (concluding
    that a state law requiring aliens to carry registration documents was preempted by federal law).
    Depending on how specific security verifications are established and administered, a fact question
    could arise about whether specific verifications are preempted by federal law.
    In addition, specific verifications could invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the
    Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that no state "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
    the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. Under traditional equal protection
    principles, however, action that does not draw a distinction along suspect lines such as race or
    gender passes muster under the Equal Protection Clause as long as "there is any reasonably
    conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Fed. Commc 'ns
    Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 
    508 U.S. 307
    , 313 (1993). There is no question that security
    concerns may provide a rational basis on which a state could distinguish between individuals
    deemed to pose a heightened security risk and those who do not. See Unruh v. Moore, 326 Fed.
    App'x. 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an equal protection claim based on rational basis where
    an individual was treated differently due to disciplinary history and security concerns). Thus,
    The Honorable Charles Perry - Page 3        (KP-0087)
    while we do not opine on the legality of any specific security verifications that the State may
    impose, we have not been directed to, nor do we find any law generally prohibiting the State from
    performing security verifications when allocating refugee funding.
    The Honorable Charles Perry - Page 4         (KP-0087)
    SUMMARY
    A court would likely conclude that any conditions placed on
    a state's acceptance of federal refugee dollars that are not found in
    the text of a federal statute are unenforceable because the conditions
    do not provide clear notice to the state of how it must use the federal
    funding.
    We find no law generally prohibiting the State of Texas from
    performing security verifications when allocating refugee funding.
    Very truly yours,
    ~?~
    KEN PAXTON
    Attorney General of Texas
    JEFFREY C. MATEER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    BRANTLEY STARR
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER
    Chair, Opinion Committee