Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1995 )


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  •                              QBffice of tfp ZZhmep            @eneraI
    Mate of Qexae
    DAN MORALES
    ATTORNEY
    GENERAL                            January 13, 1995
    Honorable W. Keith Oakley                    Opinion No. DM-3 15
    Chair
    Committee on Public Safety                   Re: Interpretation of section 80.001 of the
    Texas House of Representatives               Human Resources Code, which concems the
    P.O. Box 2910                                duty of local law enforcement officials to
    Austin, Texas 78768-2910                     perform fingerprinting services (RQ-718)
    Dear Representative Oakley:
    You ask this office to interpret section 80.001 of the Human Resources Code,
    which concerns the duty of local law enforcement officials to perform fingerprinting
    RNiCeS.
    Section 80.001   reads:
    (a) A state law enforcement agency or the law en8orcement
    agency of any political subdivision of the state shah comply with the
    request of a person to have a record of his fingerprints made or a
    record of the fingerprints of a child or ward of the person made.
    (b) A law enforcement agency may not charge for the service
    provided under this section and may not retain records of fingerprints
    made under this section unless specifically requested to do so by the
    person requesting the service.
    You note that some Texas law enforcement agencies are either re.&sing to provide
    such service or charging a fee for it, apparently taking the view that, as you put it, “rhe
    statute did not intend for local law enforcement officers to do free fingerprinting for
    anyone except children.”
    Accordingly, you ask three questions: first, whether a local law enforcement
    agency may refuse to provide fingerprinting services on request; second, whether it may
    charge for such services; and third, whether it may impose conditions (other than
    providing the service during normal business hours when staE is available) on providing
    such services.
    We believe that the plain language of the statute addresses your concerns. As to
    your first question, a local law enforcement agency is required to perform the senice, and
    may not refuse to do so. Section 80.001(a) provides that the agency “shall comply” with a
    request for this service. The language used by the legislature is mandatory, not precatory.
    BLACK’SLAW DICTIONARY1375 (6th ed. 1990) (“As used in statutes, contracts, or the
    like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory[;] [i]n common or ordinary
    p.    1676
    HonorableW.KeithOakky          - Page 2 (``-315)
    signiiication, the term “shall” is a word of command, and one which has always or which
    mustbegivenaannpulsory        meaning as denoting obligation”).
    Similar& the knguage of section 80.001@) plainly answers your second question.
    An agency “may not charge for the service provided under this se&on.” Nothing in the
    provision suggests that this sedcc is to be provided he of charge only to chikn. Such
    a~wwldreadarthe~“tohwearecordofhistingerp~smade”auplusaee.
    See Chewon Cap. v. Redmm, 745 S.W.2d 314,316 (Tex. 1987) @amtory kguage not
    tobetrutedassurplusage).
    Nordoesurythinginthestatutepamitalocal~enforcemartsgencytoimposc
    additional conditions on the perfom```` of this service. The law imposes a duty on local
    law enforcement agencies which they must discharge without fee or restriction.
    SUMMARY
    Section 80.001 of the Human Resource$ Code obliges state
    and local law etSxcement agencies to provide free
    fingeqkting    services to the public upon request and without
    additional wllditio&~
    DAN MORALES
    Attorney Gearal of Texas
    JORGE VEGA
    First Assistant Attorney General
    SARAH J. SHIRLEY
    Chair, Gpiion Committee
    Prepared by James Tourtelott
    Assistant Attorney General
    p.   1677
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DM-315

Judges: Dan Morales

Filed Date: 7/2/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017