Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1992 )


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    DAN MORALES                                May 4,1992
    .ATTOHSE)’
    GESERAL
    Honorable Tom Craddick                      Opinion No. DM-113
    Chairman
    Public Health Committee                     Re: Whether the Dallas Independent
    Texas House of Representatives              School District may give favored
    P. 0. Box 2910                              treatment to bidders based on the
    Austin, Texas 78768-2910                    bidder’s residence, ownership of taxable
    improvements to real property in the
    district, and related questions (RQ-40)
    Dear Representative Craddick:
    You ask several questions arising from the implementation of the ‘Tax Base
    Enhancement Policy” of the Dallas Independent School District (DISD). You
    inform us that in September of 1990 the board of trustees of the DISD adopted
    changes in the district’s procurement procedtires designed to implement a tax b&e
    enhancement policy, the overall purpose of which was to lessen the burden of its
    taxpayers for the expense of operating the district. According to the board agenda
    item proposing the policy, the increased cost of operating the district and an eroding
    tax base made it “necessary to protect and encourage the development of businesses
    within the DISD boundaries.” The agenda posting also states that tax base enhance-
    ments incorporated into the purchasing policies will stimulate competition, prevent
    favoritism, and gain for the district the best work and materials at the lowest
    “practicable” price.
    The September 1990 revisions to the DISD purchasing policies incorporate a
    numerical scoring system based on an index of various criteria. A bidder’s tally
    under the scoring system is factored into the determination of the bidder’s
    responsibility. As we understand the policies, they are not used to limit or restrict
    the solicitation or submission of bids. Rather, they are used to screen bids sub-
    mitted in response to published notifications of upcoming contract awards. The
    p.   571
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 2          (DM-113 1
    purchasing policies require the district, when evaluating a bidder’s “responsibility~i
    to consider several conventional factors such as price, contract terms, delivery dates,
    life-cycle costs, quality of materials, safety, past performance of the vendor or
    product, good business practices, transportation charges, and conformance to appli-
    cable local, state, and federal ordinances, laws, or regulations. They also require
    consideration of several additional criteria, including
    (1) the location or residence of the bidder;
    (2) the bidder’s compliance with the district’s Minority and
    Women Business Enterprise Contracting and Purchasing
    Program (M/WBE);
    (3) the bidder’s involvement with DISD schools; and
    (4) the “tax base enhancement points” earned by the prospective
    bidder.
    These four additional criteria are the focus of your inquiry.
    Prior to consideration of a bid, the district asks all prospective bidders to
    submit data reflecting the enumerated factors. Points are awarded on the basis of
    residence, with the greatest number of points awarded to bidders who own or lease
    facilities within the district or maintain their principal place of business within the
    diSt&t.
    Points are also awarded on the basis of a bidder’s compliance with the
    district’s M/WBE program. The M/WBE program applies to contracts of S25,ooO
    or more, and its overall goal is to achieve minority and women business enterprise
    participation in at least 2.5percent of the total dollar value of DISD contracts. The
    purchasing policies award “Good Faith Effort Points” in proportion to a bidder’s
    percentage of M/WBE participation, with greater points awarded the closer the 25
    percent goal is reached.
    p.   572
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 3         (DM-113)
    Bidders may accumulate “Cooperative Effort Points” by participating in
    various voluntary school-related activities such as the DISD Adopt-A-School
    Program, tutoring program and volunteer program. Additional points are granted
    to bidders who provide direct assistance to the district and its students such as
    donations, scholarships, or employment opportunities.
    Under the purchasing policy, the foregoing factors “shall” be taken into
    account for all bids that are no more than five percent higher than the lowest
    monetary bid. In addition, prospective bidders are assigned “tax base enhancement
    points” based on estimates of taxes to be paid to the district, the mtmber of local
    jobs created, and the total amount of local salaries and wages the bidder claims to
    have annually paid.
    You advise that the district reserves the right to award a contract covered by
    this policy to a bidder who has not submitted the lowest monetary bid but has
    accumulated the greatest number of points under the scoring system. You also
    advise that a contract for the construction of an elementary school was recently
    awarded by the DISD to the bidder submitting the fifth lowest monetary bid on the
    basis of this policy. You state that the successful bidder had accumulated only one
    point more than the low monetary bidder.
    You ask a number of questions about these policies. Your first three
    questions ask whether a governmental entity that is subject to the competitive
    bidding requirement of subchapter B of chapter 271 of the Local Government Code
    may award a contract for the construction of a public work to a bidder who does not
    submit the lowest monetary bid on the basis of
    (1) a general preference for bidders who are located within the
    geographic boundaries of the entity;
    (2) a general preference for bidders who participate in volun-
    tary programs of the entity; or
    (3)~ “tax base enhancement considerations” of vendor/contractor
    proximity, projected local employment opportunities, and pro-
    jected local spending.
    Your fourth question asks whether the DISD M/WBE program violates the Equal
    Protection Clause of the United States Constitution as interpreted in C&v of
    p.   573
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 4         (DM-113)
    Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 
    488 U.S. 469
    (1989). Your Bfth question is whether a
    governmental entity such as DISD may award a construction contract to one who is
    not the lowest responsible bidder on the basis of a general preference for
    contractors providing greater minority participation or compliance with an M/WBE
    program. Your final question is whether the contract alluded to above is void for
    failure to comply with relevant competitive bidding requirements. Because your
    questions are centered on the practices of the DISD, we will limit our response to
    the laws applicable to independent school districts.
    In response to your first three questions, we conclude that a school district
    may not condition the award of a construction contract subject to competitive
    bidding on the basis of the four additional criteria described above. We begin by
    noting that the tax base. enhancement policy arguably was adopted pursuant to the
    general authority conferred on the DISD board of trustees by section 28.26 of the
    Education Code, which grants the trustees the exclusive power to manage and
    govern the public schools of the district and authority to adopt such rules,
    regulations, and by-laws as they deem proper. Educ. Code 5 2326(b). (d). This
    grant -of authority is sufficient to include matters relating to procurement and
    construction contracting. See Teur Roofins Co. v. whiferide, 
    385 S.W.2d 699
    (Tex.
    Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965. writ refd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinion M-950
    (1971).
    The authority to manage and govern the public schools is not absolute.
    however. A school board is limited to exercising those powers expressly conferred
    by law or necessarily implied from the express grant of power. Taas Roofing Co. v.
    whiteside, stqmz. The board may also be limited by the Education Code or other
    laws and regulations. See, eg., Attorney General Opinion DM-14 (1991). With
    regard to construction contracts, school boards are bound by the rules set forth in
    section 21.901 of the Education Code and the procedures set forth in subchapter B
    of chapter 271 of the Local Government Code.
    Section 21.901(a) of the Education Code requires school district construction
    contracts valued at $10,000 or more to be submitted to competitive bidding.
    Subsection (e) of section 21.901 authorizes a school board to dispense with
    competitive bidding when a school building or equipment is destroyed or severely
    damaged and the “board determines that the time delay posed by the competitive
    bidding process would prevent or substantially impair the conduct of classes or other
    essential school activities.” The competitive bidding requirement does not apply to
    fees for professional services. Educ. Code 0 21.901(c).
    p.   574
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 5         (DM-113)
    The Education Code does not prescribe specific procedures or guidelines for
    competitive bidding in the award of construction contracts by a school district.
    These matters are governed by subchapter B of chapter 271 of the Local
    Government Code, sections 271.021 through 271.030. Section 271.024 of the Local
    Government Code states that
    [i]f a governmental entity is required by statute to award a
    contract [in excess of $10,000] for the construction, repair, or
    renovation of a structure,. . . or other improvement or addition
    to real property on the basis of competitive bids,
    the bidding must be conducted in accordance with subchapter B. “Governmental
    entity” is defmed to include independent school districts. Local Gov’t Code
    !j 271.021(2)(C).
    Section 271.027(b) establishes the following standard for the awarding of
    school district construction contracts:
    The contract must be awarded to the lowerr nrsponsible
    bidder, but the contract may not be. awarded to a bidder who is
    not the lowest bidder unless before the award each lower bidder
    is given notice of the proposed award and is given an
    opportumty to appear before the governing body of the
    governmental entity or the designated representative of the
    governing body and present evidence concerning the bidder’s
    responsibility. (Emphasis added.)
    As this language plainly provides, a school board is not required to award a
    contract to the bidder submitting the lowest monetary bid. The criterion that
    authorizes a school board to award a contract to a bidder who does not submit the
    lowest monetary bid is the prospective contractor’s “responsibility.” As previously
    noted, the DISD scoring system is predicated as a measurement of a bidder’s
    responsiMity.     However, aside from a bidder’s safety record, id 8271.0275,
    subchapter B does not supply relevant benchmarks of responsibility. The answer to
    your first set of questions therefore will depend on whether the board possesses
    implied authority to examine the other factors that you inquire about. We conclude
    that a school board may not determine a bidder’s responsibility on the basis of these
    factors.
    p.   575
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 6                 (DM-1 13 )
    The Texas Supreme Court has noted that the main purpose of competitive
    bidding is to secure for the taxpayers the best work and materials at the lowest
    practicable price. Texas Highway Comm’n v. Texrrr A&n of Steel Importen, 372
    S.W.2d 525,527 (Tex. 1963) (quoting Stemztr v. Be& 240 S.W.2d 516,520 (Tex Civ.
    App.-Dallas 1951, no writ)). The requirement that public contracts be awarded to
    the lowest and best or lowest responsible bidder is merely intended to implement
    this policy and is incidental to it. VIII& Bras v. City of Dallas, 
    91 S.W.2d 336
    .340
    (Tex. 1936) (quoting with approval Hobart v. Detruit, 
    17 Mich. 246
    (1868)).
    Texas authorities provide scant guidance on the elements of responsibility in
    the competitive bidding context. One court has declared simply that the term
    lowest responsible bidder” contemplates compliance with statutory requirements
    relating to competitive bidding. Nikzr v. Had County Fresh Water Supply Dist No.
    IA, 
    336 S.W.2d 637
    (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, writ refd). In another case the
    court indicated that a governmental body may, in awarding a contract to the lowest
    responsible bidder, take into account a bidder’s experience, manpower, equipment,
    and supervisory requirements. Co&in v. Co&t Gnuuy Comm’rs Cowt, 
    651 S.W.2d 55
    (Tp. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ). Authorities elsewhere indicate that responsi-
    bility may be measured by an inquiry into such things as the bidder’s financial
    resources, business judgment, ability, efficiency, reliability, reputation, facilities, and
    capacity to perform the work required. See 1A C. AIWEAU, MUIWXPALCORP-
    ORATlON LAW 0 10.52 (1989); 4 C. AM’IEALJ,COUNTYLpw 0 39.08 (1990); 10
    McQuUUn,MUNICIPALCORPORATIONS 00 29.73.05 - 29.7320 (3d ed. 1990); 64 AM.
    JUR. 2d Acblic W&s nnd Cotumctr 00 70,71 (1972). Contracting authorities may
    also consider a bidder’s performance on similar contracts and the quality of the
    goods or services proffered.’ Id All of these factors are intended to provide insight
    into a bidder’s capacity to fulfill his pledge to the district - that he will provide the
    solicited goods or services in accordance with advertised specifications at the cost
    quoted in the bid
    The DISD procurement policies incorporate many of these conventional
    factors, but the specific criteria you are concerned with do not. Because we find
    these specific criteria are not authorized by statute, we conclude that a school board
    may not incorporate them into its competitive bidding policies.
    2Artick   6Olb, V.T.C.S., which gowms pmcuremcat by the state General Semias
    ~cxprcsslyautbori2catlu               comiss&indctcnniningwhoistbclowcst``biddcr,’
    to consider similar factors in addith to price. See V.T.C.S. art. 6Olb, f 3.11(e)(l) - (10). This pro&
    sioaiaiMpplic&leto sckwl dlsoictwn.%tNctlon
    contracts.
    p.   576
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 7         KJM-113 )
    The courts conclude that the legislature, in enacting competitive bidding
    statutes, has determined that the government’s interest in obtaining the best work or
    product at the lowest practicable price is secured by requiring maximum
    competition for government contracts. Texas Ash of Steel 
    Importers, 372 S.W.2d at 527
    . A governmental body subject to a competitive bidding statute must act to pro-
    mote the unmistakable legislative policy favoring unrestricted competition. Id
    Only the legislature may vary this policy by enacting exceptions to competitive
    bidding. See Attorney General opinion JM-712 (1987). A governmental body
    therefore may not adopt policies or issue bid solicitations or specifications that
    restrict competition unless such policies, solicitations, or specifications have a
    definite and objective relationship to matters of quality and competence or are
    adopted pursuant to clear legislative authority. E.6, Attorney General Gpiions
    JM-1213 (1990) (city may not require that contractors provide employees with basic
    health insurance benefits); MW-139 (1980) (county commissioners court may not
    adopt policy forbidding purchase of foreign automobiles by county); H-1219 (1978)
    (county may not restrict award of printing jobs to union printers); H-1086 (1977)
    (county may not restrict source of materials purchased under contract subject to
    competitive bidding); see Teza Adn of Steel 
    Importers, 372 S.W.2d at 529
    .
    Jn a similar vein, where a governmental body is prohibited from employing
    particular standards to limit or restrict the submission of bids, it may not use the
    same standards to make determinations of responsibility. See Attorney General
    Opinions JM-881(1988); H-1086 (1977). The separate criteria adopted pursuant to
    the tax base enhancement policy in our opinion bear no apparent objective
    relationship to the quality of goods or services or the competence or capacity of the
    bidder to perform under a contract.
    Turning to the specific procurement criteria, we first observe that subchapter
    B of chapter 271 does not authorize consideration of a bidder’s residence or locale
    in making a contract award and, standing alone, residence is not a legitimate
    indicator of responsibility. Jn Attorney General Opinion H-1086 at 3, this office
    concluded that a county may not award a contract to one who is not the low bidder
    “on the sole basis that the said bidder is a local merchant or businessman.” The
    opinion concluded that a contract award determined purely by a bidder’s location
    within a county would, under the Texas A&I of Steel Importen standard, constitute
    an illegal restriction on competition. The DISD policies in question here confer an
    advantage to bidders purely on the basis of residence. or proximity without requiring
    an individualized examina tion of the practical value of location under the contract
    vis-a-vis the abiity of the bidder to perform under the contract. In this respect, the
    p.   577
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 8                  (DM-113)
    policies are no different than the policy found objectionable in Attorney General
    Opinion H-1086P
    The same may be said with respect to the policy establishing a preference for
    bidders who participate in voluntary school programs. This policy essentially
    rewards those bidders who presumably have made positive contributions to the
    district and its students. We are also aware of no statutory authority that would
    permit DISD, when awarding contracts pursuant to competitive bidding, to consider
    either a bidder’s compliance with the district’s M/WRE program or contributions to
    the local economy such as those represented by the “tax base enhancement points.
    The conduct rewarded by these policies, though highly commendable, has no
    obvious relation to the responsibility of the bidder for purposes of competitive
    bidding under current law. Whether such conduct should be considered in the
    competitive bidding process is a matter that must be addressed by the legislature.
    This is precisely what the legislature did when it enacted section 6C(h) of V.T.C.S.
    article 1118x, which authorizes certain metropolitan rapid transit authorities to
    adopt programs designed to reasonably increase participation by minority business
    enterprises in public contract awards. See also Civ. Prac. &. Rem. Code
    Q 106.001(c)(2) (no general law or home-rule charter may be construed to prevent
    certain home-rule cities from adopting similar programs).
    We further believe Texas courts would, in keeping with the Teurs Ass51 of
    Steel Importers decision, find that without clear statutory authority a governmental
    body may not take a bidder’s “social responsibility” into account when evaluating a
    bidder’s responsibility or use the procurement process to remedy seemingly
    intractable social problems and promote general social policies, however laudable
    avc ootc t&t s.%tioo 271.901 of the Local Government cad& which apptie?to mticipakties
    anddishidstbatarcrcquLcdbylawtoa~dcontradsonthcbasHofthc”bwcstandbcrtb~may
    provide a basis on wbi& to reward resident biddus. In the mnt that identical bids arc submiied on P
    contract, and only one of the biirs is a resident, ‘the muuicipality or district must s&.ct that bidder.’
    Local Gov’t Code i 271.901(b). The Texas Supreme Court has indicated that the “lowest and best bid’
    and ?owc.st rcaponriblc biddd standards arc cascatially symooymous. See Viig Bm., 91 CW2.d at
    340.
    Attomcy Gcncral Ophioo H-1086 indicated that there might be cirS                  iawbichthe
    pmdmily of a bidder may be relevant to P determination of rcspon&ility, but it did not dcscrii any
    such circumst-.       ckally, if not based 011swtioo 271.901, any preference given to a bidder bceause
    of locatioa or rcsidcaw must bc ma& casebycasc on an infonad, nonarbitrary basis and must relate
    to tbc spccik rquirements of the contract.
    p.   578
    Honorable Tom Craddick - Page 9                    (KIM-113)
    or salutary those policies might be. See generally Associated Gen Contractors,Inc. v.
    City & County of Son Francisco, 
    813 F.2d 922
    , 925-27 (9th Cir. 1987) (notion of
    “responsibility” in competitive bidding does not encompass bidder’s “social
    responsibility”)? Accordingly, because the criteria in question bear no evident ob-
    jective relationship to a bidder’s ability to perform under a contract or on the quality
    of his work, we must conclude that they are invalid measurements of responsibility
    under subchapter B of chapter 271 of the Local Government Code. Your first three
    questions are answered In the negative.
    Inasmuch as we believe the DISD does not possess sufficient statutory
    authority to award a contract on the basis of these criteria, we need not consider the
    constitutional issue posed in your fourth question.5 The preceding discussion also
    answers your fifth question insofar as it applies to school districts. Your sixth
    question, relating as it does to the actual award of a contract, requires the resolution
    of fact issues in addition to the legal question you ask.6 Fact questions camrot be
    resolved in the opinion process.
    SUMMARY
    The board of trustees of an independent school district may
    not, in the absence of clear statutory authority, adopt procure-
    ment policies that reward bidders purely on the basis of a
    bidder’s residence or location, the bidder’s participation in
    410 contra&, casts from a number of other jorisdictions spe4ficaUy hold that a bidder’s social
    rcspoosibiity is ao appropriate cow&ration       io public contract awards. See, e.g., Southwest
    Wash&ton Qllrprcr, Nat? E&c. Contmc~        Ash Y. Pitwe County, 
    667 P.2d 1092
    (Wash. 1%) (and
    easea cited thereio). Were it not for the Tcrac Ass% of Sfeel Impotters d&ion, this ofIke would be
    idined to place greater emphasis 011thcac decisioos. However, in light of Tcrrr Ass’n of Steel
    Imm        and the many opinions of this of& fokwiog it, we are compelled to ixmcIode that the
    legklahue has not authorized sehwl districts to account for a prmpective contractor’s social
    ‘capoosiiity.
    %is @ice has been supplied with arguments and evidence ie support of the constitotion&y
    of the DISD po&asiog politics. Without passing 0x1the sul&ieocy of the arguments or evidence, we
    note that they demonstrate that the coostitotional issue you raise requires the resolution of specific fact
    ismes which this of&x cannot undertake io the opioion process.
    ‘jFor example, the low bid io the situation you describe may have been rejected for reasons
    unrelated to the tax base enbanccment policy, such as the failure of the bid to conform to advertised
    spcciticatioos, or a determination that the low bidder was not “rcspoosiblc.”
    p.   579
    Honorable Tom Craddick - ‘Page 10 t DM-113 1
    voluntary school programs, the bidder’s compliance with the
    school district’s minority and women business enterprise
    contracting program, or on the basis of estimates of various
    economic factors, such as taxes to be paid to the district by the
    bidder, the amount of local salaries and wages paid by the
    bidder, or the number of local jobs created by the bidder.
    DAN      MORALES
    Attorney General of Texas
    WILL PRYOR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    RENEAHJCRS
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    MADELEJNE B. JOHNSON
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Steve Arag6n
    Assistant Attorney General
    p.   580