Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1992 )


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  •                           QBfficeof tfie 2lttornep Qhneral
    Bbtate of Qexae
    DAN MORALES                             April20.1992
    ATTORNEY
    GENERAL
    Honorable Mike Driscoll                     Opinion No. DM-107
    Harris County Attorney
    1001 Preston, Suite 634                     Re: Whether        the    Harris   County.
    Houston, Texas 77002-1891                   Attorney is--authorized to represent a
    ~Harris county Hospital District employee
    accused of criminal acts committed within
    the course of his duties, and whether the
    hospital diitrict is authorized to hire an
    attorney to represent such an employee
    or to reimburse the employee’s legal
    expenses following the conclusion of the
    litigation (RQ-291)
    Dear Mr. Driscoll:
    You have asked whether the Harris County Attorney (the “county attorney”)
    is authorized to represent a Harris County Hospital District employee accused of
    criminal acts committed during the course of his duties. You also ask whether the
    Harris County Hospital District. (the .%ospitaLdistrict”.) isauthorized to hire an
    attorney to represent such an employee or to reimburse,.the -employee’s legal
    expenses following the conclusion of the litigation. By way of background, you
    explain that an employee of the hospital district was charged with a misdemeanor
    for the alleged sexual touching of a hospital district patient. The county attorney
    denied the employee’s request for representation. The employee hired his own
    attorney and was eventually acquitted of the charges. The employee is now
    requesting that the hospital district reimburse him for his legal expenses.
    You contend that the county attorney’s office is prohibited from representing
    a hospital district employee under these circumstances by article 2.08 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure. We agree. Article 2.88 provides as follows:
    District and county attorneys shall not be of counsel
    adversely to the State in any case, in any court, nor shall they,
    after they cease to be such officers, be of counsel adversely to
    p.    535
    Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 2         (DM-107)
    the State in any case in which they have been of counse.1for the
    State.
    This provision generally prohibits district and county attorneys from representing
    defendants in &m.inaJ cases. See, eg., Attorney General Opinions V-247 (1947); O-
    5735 (1944); see &o Ethics Opinion 419, 47 Tex. B.J. 1370 (1984); @ Ex pmte
    Ramsqr, 
    642 S.W.2d 483
    (Tex. Grim. App. 1982) (county attorney not disqualified
    from representing petitioner in application for writ of habeas corpus because case’~
    did not fall within general provisions of chapter 2, Code. of Crhnimd Procedure).
    Clearly, article 2.08 would prohibit a county attorney from representing any person,
    including a hospital district employee, in a misdemeanor case such as the one you
    describe.
    You also ask whether the hospital district is authorized to hire an attorney to
    represent an employee against misdemeanor charges which arise from conduct
    allegedly committed by the employee during the course of his duties, or to
    reimburse the employee’s legal expenses following the conclusion of litigation.
    Generally, a special-purpose district, such as a hospital district, “may exercise only
    such powers as have been expressly delegated to it by the Legislature, or which exist
    by clear and unquestioned implication.” TnXiry Fresh Water Supply Dirt. No. 2 v.
    Munn, 
    142 S.W.2d 945
    , 946 (Tex. 1940). Implied powers are those that are
    “indispensable to.. . the accomplishment of the purposes of [the district’s] creation.”
    Id at 947; see ah Attorney General Opinion JM-258 (1984).
    The Harris County Hospital District was created pursuant to chapter 281 of
    the Health and Safety Code. Section 281.056 of that chapter provides:
    (a) The board may sue and be sued.
    (3) The county attorney, district attorney, or criminal
    district attorney, as appropriate, with the duty to represent the
    county in civil matters shall represent the district in all legal
    matters.
    (c) The board may employ additional legal counsel when
    the board determines that additional counsel is advisable.
    (d) The district shall contribute sufficient funds to the
    general fund of the county for the account of the budget of the
    county attorney, district attorney, or criminal district attorney, as
    p.   536
    Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 3               (DM-107)
    appropriate, to pay all additional salaries and expenses incurred
    by that officer in performing the duties required by the district.
    Subsection (c) of section 281.056 is broadly written. We believe that in limited
    circumstances it authorizes the hospital district to employ legal counsel to represent
    both the district and its officers or employees in civil and criminal matters.’ See
    Attorney General Opinions JM-968 (1988); JM-824, JM-755, JM-685 (1987)
    (recognizing that Texas governing bodies are generally authorized to employ
    attorneys to defend their officers and employees in certain circumstances); see also
    C& of Corskenrr v. Bubb, 
    290 S.W. 736
    (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, judgm’t adopted);
    Attorney General opinion JM-968 at 3; Letter opinion No. 90-93 (1990)
    (recognizing that Texas governing bodies’ authority to employ attorneys exists not
    only when an officer is alleged to have committed an act of mere negligence, but
    also when an officer or employee is alleged to have committed an intentional tort or
    crimhal act).
    This office has repeatedly recognized that the statutory authority of Texas
    governing bodies to employ counsel is limited by the Texas Constitution, article JJJ,
    sections SO, 51, and 52. See, eg., Attorney General Opinions JM-824 at 4
    (interpreting predecessor provision to Local Government Code section 157.901);
    JM-755 at 3 (same); see u.ko Attorney General Opinion JM-685 at 2 (authority of
    school district to employ counsel). Thus, the authority of a hospital district under
    section 281.056(c) to employ attorneys to defend officers and employees is not
    boundless. Specifically,. this ~-authority is. limited ,-to ~situations where legitimate
    interests of the govermnental entity to employ counsel;-nofjiisf           thi5personal
    interests of the officers or employees - require the assertion of a vigorous legal
    defense on behalf of the public interest. Attorney General Opinion JM-824 at 2.
    Public funds may not be used when the interest to be defended is a purely private
    one. 
    Id. The governing
    body need not conclude, however, that the officer or
    employee must have been correct in his course of action; the governing body need
    only determine that the officer or employee acted in good faith within the scope of
    an official duty. 
    Id. at 3.
    ‘Your brief suggests that because subsection (h) refers to ‘civil matte*. the scope of
    subscclioa (c) is limited to ciGl matters. We disagrw. Subsection (b) merely identities the officials
    whoarc rqked to representhospitaldistrku. It dots not preclude hospital districtsfrom obtaining
    counsel in aimhal matters. As noted above, district aad county attorneys arc prohiicd from
    reprc-seatiagclients ia Riminal matlcrs.
    p.   537
    Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 4        (DM-107)
    Prior opinions of this office also establish that the question of the
    constitutionality of expending public funds in the defense of an officer or employee
    in a particular instance depends upon the nature of the interest at stake and,
    therefore, involves questions of fact which cannot be resolved in the opinion
    process. 
    Id. at 2.
    Thus, it is for the board of the hospital district to determine
    whether the matter at issue in a particular lawsuit concerns the interest of the
    hospital district or whether the expenditure of public funds would only personahy
    benefit the officer or employee. Id at 3.
    While we conclude that section 281.056(c) of the Health and Safety Code
    authorizes the hospital district to hire attorneys to represent officers or employees
    within the constitutional limitations described above, we conclude that the hospital
    district is not authorized to reimburse an employee following the conclusion of the
    litigation for legal expenses he incurred in defending himself. First, section
    281.056(c) merely authorizes the hospital district to employ counsel; it does not
    authorize the reimbursement of an employee’s legal expenses. Second, we are not
    aware of any other authority for the proposition that a governmental entity may
    reimburse a public official or employee a&r the person has incurred legal expenses.
    See Letter opinion No. 90-93.
    SUMMARY
    Article 2.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the
    Harris County Attorney from representing, a Harris ‘County
    Hospital District employee in a crimmal case.           Section
    281.056(c) of the Health and Safety Code authorizes the Harris
    County Hospital District to hire an attorney to represent an
    employee. Whether the Texas Constitution permits the Harris
    County Hospital District to do so in a particular case involves
    questions of fact and must be determined by its board. .The
    Harris County Hospital District is not authorized to reimburse
    an employee’s legal expenses following the conclusion of the
    litigZltiOIL
    DAN      MORALES
    Attorney General of Texas
    p.   538
    Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 5     (DM-107)
    WILL.PRYOR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    RmEAHIcKs
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    MADELEINE B. JOHNSON
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Mary R. Grouter
    Assistant Attorney General
    p.   539
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DM-107

Judges: Dan Morales

Filed Date: 7/2/1992

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017