Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2006 )


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  •                                   ATTORNEYGENERAL                OF   TEXAS
    GREG      ABBOTT
    October 23,2006
    The Honorable Tim Curry                         Opinion No. GA-0471
    Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney
    Justice Center                                  Re:, Whether a county that wishes to abandon a
    401 West Be&nap                                 drainage easement or right-of-way should comply
    Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201                    withTransportationCode    section251.05@),    Local
    Government      Code section 263.002, or Local
    Government Code section272.001       (RQ-0462-GA)
    Dear Mr. Curry:
    You ask whether a county that wishes to abandon a drainage easement or right-of-way should
    comply with Transportation Code section 251.058(b), Local Government Code section 263.002, or
    Local Government Code section 272.00 1.’ Because two ofthese statutes provide specifically for the
    disposition of a county road or highway right-of-way, we assume the drainage easements or rights-
    of-way about which you ask are related to a road. We begin by laying out the three relevant statutes.
    I.      Relevant Statutes
    A.    Transportation   Code section 25i.O58(b)
    Transportation Code chapter 25 1 provides for “General County Authority Relating to Roads
    and Bridges.” See generally TEX. TRANSP.CODEANN. ch. 251 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2006). A
    county commissioners court may exercise general control over all roads and highways in the county.
    See 
    id. 3 25
    1 .O16 (Vernon Supp. 2006). A “public road” is “[a] public road or highway that has been
    laid out and established according to law and that has not been discontinued.” 
    Id. 5 25
    1.002 (Vernon
    1999); see also 
    id. 5 251.001(2)
    (defining “discontinue”).       A commissioners court has express
    authority to abandon a public road by unanimous vote. 
    Id. § 251.051(a)(l),
    (b)(l); see also 
    id. ~~~~~~~,~~~ ~~~§25~l~;o57(a)~~(piovidingthata
    countyroad~is abandoned when it is entilosed). The term “abandon”
    is defined as relinquishing “the public’s right of way in and use of [a] road.” 
    Id. 3 251.001(l).
          When a county abandons a public road, title to the real property reverts to the adjoining property
    owner under section 251.058(b):
    ‘Letterfrom~HonorableTim Curry,TarrantCountyCriminalDistrictAttorney,to HonorableGregAbbott,
    Attorney General of Texas (Mar. 6, 2006) (on tile with the Opinion Committee, also available at
    http://w.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafterRequestLetter].
    The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 2                (GA-0471)
    Title to a public road or portion of a public road that is
    abandoned      . to the center line of the road vests on the date the order is
    signed by the county judge in the owner of the property that abuts the
    portion of the road being.       abandoned.     . A copy of the order shall
    be filed in the deed records of the county and serves as the official
    instrument of conveyance from the county to the owner of the abutting
    property.
    
    Id. 5 25
    1.058(b).    In Attorney General Letter Opinion 94-053 this office construed section
    251.058(b)‘s statutory predecessor to “automatically vest[]” title to the abandoned road in the
    abutting property owner. Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-053, at 3-4.
    B.   Local Government Code section 263.002
    Local Government Code section 263.002 is within chapter 263, subchapter A, which provides
    generally for the sale or lease of real property by counties. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODEANN. ch. 263,
    subch. A (Vernon 2005). Section 263.002 authorizes a county to sell or lease abandoned seawall or
    highway right-of-way property:
    If abandoned seawall or highway right-of-way property is no
    longer needed for such a purpose, the county may sell or lease the
    property only according to the following priorities:
    (1) to an abutting or adjoining landowner;
    (2) to the person who originally granted the right-of-
    way to the county or the grantor’s heirs or assigns;
    (3) exclusively for public use to the United St&es, this
    state, or a municipality within the municipal boundaries of
    which the property is located; or
    (4) at public   auction   in accordance    with   Section
    263.001.
    ~~A!.~
    ~3263.!%@);~see aWd.4        ?K!!? 1W@)~~(authorizing a commissiwers wurt t9~sell mlease
    county-owned real property at a public auction, conducted after appropriate notice has been
    published in a newspaper). But see Nueces Coun@ v. King, 350 S.W.2d 385,387-88 (Tex. Civ.
    App.-San     Antonio 1961, writ refd) (finding unconstitutional portions of this statute according
    priority to certain persons). Before a commissioners court may sell or lease property to an abutting
    or adjoining landowner or the original grantor under section 263.002, the commissioners court must
    publish notice and appoint an appraiser to determine the property’s fair market value and fair lease
    value. See TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. 3 263.002(c) (Vernon 2005); see also 
    id. § 263.001(b)
     (requiring a commissioners court to publish notice of a’public auction to sell or lease county-owned
    The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 3                 (GA-0471)
    real property in a newspaper). Then, before the county may accept an offer for the property, the
    commissioners court must determine that the offer is reasonable. 
    Id. 5 263.002(d).
    C.    Local Government Code section 272.001
    Finally, section 272.001(b) of the Local Government      Code applies to the sale or exchange
    of certain types of real property:
    (1) narrow strips of land, or land that because of its shape,
    lack of access to public roads, or small area cannot be used
    independently   under its current zoning or under applicable
    subdivision or other development control ordinances;
    (2) streets or alleys, owned in fee or used by easement; [or]
    (5) a real property interest conveyed to a governmental entity
    that has the power of eminent domain.
    
    Id. 5 272,OOl(b)(lH2),
        (5). A political subdivision, such as a county, may not sell or exchange
    these real property interests “for less than the fair market value       unless the conveyance, sale, or
    exchange is with one or more abutting property owners who own the underlying fee simple.” 
    Id. § 272.001(b);
    see also Jones v. Jefferson County Drainage Dist. No. 6, 139 S.W.2d 861,862 (Tex.
    Civ. App.-Beaumont       1940, writ ret’d) (referring to counties as political subdivisions of the state).
    II.     Analysis
    You are uncertain which of the three statutes applies in particular circumstances:
    (1) When a county no longer needs a drainage easement, and
    the owner of the property underlying the drainage easement desires
    the county to issue a release of easement to clear title, is the drainage
    easement considered a “portion of a public road” witbin the meaning
    of section 251.058(b) of the Texas Transportation Code, such that
    title~~aatomatically vestsin the underlying~fee o~wner~up~on~me~date   the
    order of abandonment is signed by the county judge?
    (2) If the drainage easement is not considered a “portion of
    a public road” within the meaning of section 251.058(b), then must
    the county sell the interest in addition to formally abandoning it in
    order for title to pass to the underlying fee owner? If so, may the
    county sell the interest for less than fair market value to the
    underlying fee owner pursuant to section 272.001(b) of the Local
    The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 4                (GA-0471)
    Government Code, or must the county follow the notice, appraisal,
    and fair market value requirements of section 263.002(c) of the Local
    Government Code?
    (3) If a county desires to abandon a right-of-way [in] which
    it owns an easement interest        , when must the county follow the
    notice, appraisal, and fair market value requirements of section
    263.002 of the Local Government Code in order for title to pass
    rather than title passing automatically pursuant to section 25 1.058 of
    the Texas Transportation Code?
    Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1-2. We assume, because you expressly cite section 272.00 1(b), that
    the property may be classified as a real property interest conveyed to a county. Cf: TEX. LOC.GOV’T
    CODE ANN. 5 261.001 (a) (Vernon 2005) (authorizing a county to “exercise the right of eminent
    domain to condemn and acquire land, an easement in land, or a right-of-way” in certain
    circumstances). And in responding to these questions, we note that a county commissioners court
    may exercise only those powers that the state constitution and statutes confer upon it, either
    explicitly or implicitly. See TEX. CONST.art. V, 3 18(b) (providing that a county commissioners
    court “shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this
    Constitution and the laws of the State”); City ofSan Antonio v. City ofBoerne, 111 S.W.3d 22,28
    (Tex. 2003).
    A.   First question
    Your first question, whether a drainage easement is a portion of a public road of which a
    county automatically divests itself in accordance with section 251.058 of the Transportation Code,
    suggests that if the easement is within that section, neither section 263.002 nor section 272.001 of
    the Local Government Code applies. This suggestion is based on a 1994 attorney general letter
    opinion,94-053,whichconcluded      that,as betweenthesethree statutes,section251.058     prevails with
    respect to the disposition of an abandoned county public road. See Request Letter, supra note 1,
    at 5; Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-053, at 4. We consider this question in two parts: first, whether the
    drainage easement is a “public road or portion of a public road” for purposes of section 25 1.058(b);
    and second, assuming that the first issue is answered affirmatively, whether section 25 1.058(b)
    applies rather than either of the other Local Government Code provisions. We reexamine Letter
    Opinion 94-053 in the second part
    1.   Whether the phrase “public road or portion of a public road” in
    Transportation Code section 251.058(b) encompasses drainage easements
    Transportation Code    section 25 1.058(b) expressly refers to a “public road or portion of
    a public road” and does not     expressly refer to a drainage easement. TEX. TRANSP.CODEANN.
    5 25 1.058(b) (Vernon 1999).     Chapter 25 l’s description of a public road is not helpful in resolving
    this issue, defining a public   road circularly as “[a] public road        that has been laid out and
    established according to law    and that has not been discontinued.” 
    Id. 8 251.002.
    Texas case law
    TheHonorableTimCurry         - Page 5            (GA-0471)
    recognizes that a public road may incorporate more than a roadbed and that the grant of a right-of-
    way for roadway purposes “includes the attendant public purposes of transportation of persons and
    property, communication, and travel.” Harlingen Irrigation Dist. v. Caprock Commc ‘ns Corp., 49
    S.W.3d 520,527 (Tex. App.-Corpus         Christi 2001, pet. denied). Roads thus encompass “the use
    of the subsurface for sewers, pipelines and other methods of transmission and communication that
    serve the public interest.” HillFarm, Inc. v. Hill County, 436 S.W.2d 320,323 (Tex. 1969); see also
    Grimes Y. Corpus Christi Transmission Co., 829 S.W.2d 335,337 (Tex. App.-Corpus       Christi 1992,
    writ denied) (“Easements in [county roads] remain broad enough to allow [a county] to do the
    activities normally incident to maintaining those [roads]: laying sewer, gas and water pipelines.“).
    Courts appear to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a drainage easement serves a
    public road purpose and is therefore within a public road. Compare Harris County Flood Control
    Dist. v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 591 S.W.2d 798,799 (Tex. 1979), with Boucher v. Tex. Tpk. Auth.,
    
    317 S.W.2d 594
    , 597-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana             1958, no writ) (quoting State v. Hale, 
    146 S.W.2d 731
    , 736 (Tex. 1941)). For example, the Texas Supreme Court determined in 1979 that
    enlarging a drainage ditch, located in a public road right-of-way but perpendicular to the roadbed,
    to serve drainage district purposes “is not a public purpose for which the road was dedicated.”
    Harris County Flood Control 
    Dist., 591 S.W.2d at 799
    . The Court rejected the flood control
    district’s claims that the ditch served a road and street purpose and that the ditch “is a mode of
    transportation in that it carries storm water runoff.” 
    Id. By contrast,
    in 1958 the Texarkana court
    of civil appeals approved the Texas Turnpike Authority’s condemnation of perpetual drainage
    easements under a statute prohibiting the Turnpike Authority from condemning “any land except
    such as will be necessary for road and right-of-way purposes.“~ Boucher, 
    3 17 S.W.2d at 596
    (quoting
    former article 6674v, § 8, Revised Civil Statutes), 
    id. at 598.
    The court stated that, at least in the
    case of the drainage easements the Turnpike Authority was seeking to condemn, “[dlrainage of
    surface waters affecting a road and right[-]oq-]way whether the flow of water be onto, alongside[,]
    or off ofthe project is not a secondary consideration in its construction[,] and provisions for efficient
    drainage is not additional to the normal, ordinary and usual uses to which land is put in road
    construction.” 
    Id. at 597.
    The court further cited the “drainage principle,” previously articulated by
    the Texas Supreme Court in 1941 in a case that recognized the government’s power to create “a
    servitude       on land not actually taken or occupied by [a] public highway, for the purpose of
    carrying off the water, the natural flow of which is changed or diverted by the construction of such
    highway.” 
    Id. at 598
    (quoting 
    Hale, 146 S.W.2d at 736
    ).
    It appears, therefore, that whether a particular drainage easement is part of a public road and
    subject to section 25 1.058(a) ~of the Transportations Code depends on the purpose the ~easement
    serves. Under the “drainage principle,” a drainage easement that serves the purpose of carrying
    ‘k~
    water, “the natural flow of which is changed or diverted by the construction of’ the road, should be
    ‘considered part ofthe bundle ofrights the county acquires when it obtains a public road. Id. (quoting
    
    Hale, 146 S.W.2d at 736
    ); see also TEX. TRANSP.CODEANN. 8 254.005(a)-(b) (Vernon 1999)
    (authorizing a commissioners court to construct ditches “on.or within the exterior lines of a public
    road      [with] the capacity to carry off into a natural waterway all surface water reasonably adjacent
    that may collect in the ditch from natural causes”). On the other hand, a drainage easement that
    serves other purposes is not part of the public road. Whether in any particular case a drainage
    The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 6                (GA-0471)
    easement is part of a public road for purposes of section 25 1.058(b) is a question of fact that cannot
    be resolved in the opinion process. See also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0156 (2004) at 10 (stating
    that fact questions cannot be answered in the opinion process). Rather, the county commissioners
    court must determine the issue in the first instance.
    2.   Whether Transportation Code section 251.058 applies to a drainage easement
    rather than Local Government Code section 263.002 or272.001; reexamining
    Letter Opinion 94-053
    While you believe Transportation Code section 251.058(b) prevails over the other two
    statutes with respect to the disposition of an abandoned “public road” as Letter Opinion 94-053
    concludes, you request clarification of the letter opinion’s observation that section 263.002 of the
    Local Government Code applies only to “highways.” See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-053, at 4; Request
    Letter, supra note 1, at 5-6. We thus reexamine the letter opinion here.
    In the letter opinion, a county proposed to abandon a county public road. Tex. Att’y Gen.
    LO-94-053, at 3; see TEx. TRANSP.CODE ANN. 5 251.051@)(l) (Vernon 1999). Under the opinion,
    once the commissioners court unanimously voted to do so, “title to the portion of the road that abuts
    an owner’s property, to the center line of the road, automatically vests in that owner” under
    Transportation Code section 25 1.058(b). Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-053, at 3-4; see also TEX. TRANSP.
    CODE ANN. § 251.058(b) (Vernon 1999). The county asked, however, whether either Local
    Government Code chapter 263 or 272 provides the county with a right to receive,compensation from
    the abutting property owner. See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-053, at 4. The opinion notes that section
    263.002 did not appear to apply because it specifically provides for the sale of highway property and
    that the county roads at issue were not “highways for purposes of section 263.002.” 
    Id. at 4
    n.4.
    And the opinion concludes that neither section 263.002 nor section 272.001 applies because section
    251.058 “does not authorize a county to sell its interest in an abandoned road to an abutting land
    owner.” 
    Id. at 4
    . The conclusion appears to be based on a finding that section 251.058 controls as
    the more specific provision relating to abandoned county public roads. See id.; see also TEX. GOV’T
    CODEANN. 5 3 11.026(b) (Vernon 2005) (stating that a special or local provision prevails over an
    irreconcilable general provision).
    The letter opinion is incorrect insofar as it suggests that the term “highway” in Local
    Government Code section 263.002 is different from a public road that is subject to Transportation
    Code section 251.058(b). See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-053, at 4 n.4. The term “highway right-of-
    way” used in section 263.0@ disco   broad~enough tomencompass~a county~ public road. See Request
    Letter, supra note 1, at 5-6. Although we find no statute, case law, or attorney general opinion that
    specifically construes the term “highway” for purposes of section 263.002 or its statutory
    predecessor, the term is “generally. . held to mean ‘a way open to all the people without distinction
    for passage and repassage at their pleasure.“’ S. K Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. R.R. Commh, 147
    S.W.2d 318,320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin         1940, no writ) (quoting 29 C.J. p. 364); see also TEX.
    GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 311.01 l(a) (Vernon 2005) (directing a court to construe statutory words
    “according to       common usage”). And construing section 545.301 of the Transportation Code
    (which prohibits a motor-vehicle operator from leaving a vehicle “on the main traveled part of a
    The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 7                  (GA-0471)
    highway”) in 1998, the Houston court of appeals indicated that the term “highway” does not exclude
    a county road unless relevant case law or statutes expressly exclude county public roads. See Tex.
    Dep’t ofPub. Saftyv. Guajardo, 970 S.W.2d 602,606-07(Tex. App.-Houston             [14th Dist.] 1998,
    no pet.). We find no indication in section 263.002’s plain language or in its legislative history
    suggesting that the legislature intended to exclude county public roads from the term “highway.”
    The provision pertaining to abandoned right-of-way property was adopted in 1953 and originally
    read “Provided, however, that where abandoned right-of-way property is no longer needed for
    highway or roadpurposes and the county decides to sell said right-of-way property, it shall be sold
    with the following priorities.    .” Act of May 5,1953,53d Leg., R.S., ch. 133, § 1,1953 Tex. Gen.
    Laws 447,447 (emphasis added); cj Act of June 27,1949,5lst       Leg., R.S., ch. 485, § 1, 1949 Tex.
    Gen. Laws 904, 904-05 (aniending the predecessor of section 263.002 but not containing the
    proviso). The phrase “highway or road,” which would definitely include a county public road, was
    shortened to “highway” in 1973, w&en the legislature also amended the provision to insert references
    to a seawall. See Act of May 28, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 499, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1329,
    1329-30.    Written materials .in the 1973 bill tile do note indicate the legislature’s intention
    in shortening the phrase “highway or road” to “highway.”                 See HOUSE COMM. ON
    INTERGOVERNMENTAL        AFFAIRS,BILL ANALYSIS,Tex. H.B. 1455,63d Leg., R.S. (1973). Because
    we find no clear evidence of a legislative intent to exclude county public roads from the term
    “highway,” section 263.002 on its face applies to abandoned county public roads. See TEX. GOV’T
    CODEANN. 5 3 11 .Ol l(a) (Vernon 2005) (directing areader to construe statutory words consistently
    with common usage); GreyhoundLines, 
    Inc., 147 S.W.2d at 320
    (quoting 29 C.J. p. 364) (defining
    the term “highway”).
    For the reasons given in section 1I.A. 1 of this opinion, we believe the term “highway right-of-
    way” encompasses a drainage easement that serves the “attendant public purposes of transportation
    of persons land property, communication, and travel,” as well as a .drainage easement that carries
    ,water for road-related purposes. Haulingen Irrigation 
    Dist., 49 S.W.3d at 527
    ; see 
    Boukher, 317 S.W.2d at 598
    (quoting 
    Hale, 146 S.W.2d at 736
    ). Thus, contrary to Letter Opinion 94-053, we
    conclude that section 263.002 appears to apply to the disposition of county public roads and their
    affiliated drainage easements (if the commissioners             court has made the appropriate factual
    determinations).
    Having determined that the term “highway right-of-way” in section 263.002 facially applies
    to public roads to which section 251.058 of the Transportation Code also applies, and assuming that
    the commissioners court has determined that the drainage easement is part of the public road, we
    must consider whether Letter Opinion 94-053 corre&ly d.$emi~nes that Transportation Code section
    251.058 prevails over Local Government Code sections 263.002 and 272.001.
    First, we compare sections 263.002 and272.001 ofthe Local Government Code. This office,
    using a general-specific analysis, determined in 1969 that, ti between the statutory predecessors of
    these two statutes, the statutory predecessor of section 263.002 prevailed. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op.
    ~No. M-524 (1969) at 3-4. The opinion pointed out that section 272.001 “is a general law [that]
    pertains to the sale of land by all political subdivisions of the State.” 
    Id. at 3.
    Chapter 263, by
    contrast, is a special law that pertains to the sale or lease of property by counties only. See 
    id. TheHonorabieTimCurry -
    Page 8            (GA-0471)
    Accordingly,   the opinion determined that chapter 263 operates as an exception             to the general
    requirements   of section 272.001.2 
    Id. at 34.
    Next, we compare Transportation Code section 251.058 with Local Government Code
    section 272.001. Applying the statutory analysis employed in the 1969 opinion, we believe that
    Transportation Code section 25 1.058(b), which pertains specifically to abandoned public roads,
    operates as an exception to section 272.001.
    We are left, then, to determine whether Transportation Code section 25 1.058 prevails over
    Local Government Code section263.002. The general versus specific analysis employed in the 1969
    opinion is not helpful IF resolving whether section 25 1.058(b) prevails over section 263.002 because
    both statutes apply to the disposition of abandoned county public roads. But “if statutes         . are
    irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails.” TEX. GOV’T CODEANN. 5 3 11.025(a)
    (Vernon 2005).
    We have determined in this opinion that section 263.002 of the Local Government Code
    applies to the same roads that are subject to Transportation Code section 251.058 and other
    provisions of chapter 251. See suprapp. 6-7. Additionally, to be applicable, both section 263.002
    and section 25 1.058 require that public roads be abandoned. See TEX. LOC. GoV’T CODE ANN.
    § 263.002(a) (Vernon 2005); TEX. TRANSP. CODEANN. 5 251.058(b) (Vernon 1999); see also TEX.
    TRANSP.CODEANK~~~~~.~~~;.~~~(~)(~),@)(~)(V                 emon 1999) (defining the term “public road”
    and setting out a commissioners court’s general authority to open and close public roads). Under
    section 25 1.058(b) of the Transportation Code, once a county abandons a public road or portion of
    a public road, title automatically vests in the abutting property owners on the date the commissioners
    court signs the appropriate order, which procedure directly conflicts with the county’s ability to sell
    the property in accordance with Local Government Code section 263.002(a). Compare TEX.
    TRANSP.CODEANN. 5 251.058(b) (Vernon 1999), with TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 263.002(b)
    (Vernon 2005). Thus, for county easements that are public roads or portions thereof, Transportation
    Code section 251.058 and Local Government Code section 263.002 are irreconcilable. Cf: Tex.
    Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0411 (2006) at 2 (stating that statutes conflict irreconcilably if “it is
    impossible to comply with both provisions at the same time”) (quoting Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
    GA-0369 (2005) at 4).
    Having found the two statutes irreconcilable, we look at the dates of enactment of each. The
    statutory predecessor to Transpo&tion Code section 25 1.058 was adopted in 1989. See Act of May
    25, 1989,7lst Leg., R.S., ch. 428, §~2,~~!~98~9~Tex.~~$en.
    Laws 1574,1574-75. The fEst reference to
    “highwayor roadpurposes”inLoca1       Government Code section263.002’~ statutory predecessor was
    inserted in 1953. See Act of May 5,1953,53d Leg., R.S., ch. 133,s 1,1953 Tex. Gen. Laws 447,
    447. The phrase “highway right-of-way” was adopted in 1973. See Act of May 28,1973,63d Leg.,
    2AttomeyGeneralOpinionM-524was issuedwithin monthsof section272.001’soriginaladoption.Its
    constructionhasnot beenoverruledby a courtor by a subsequentopinionofthis office,andthelegislaturehasnot acted
    to supersedeit. The opinion’sconsSruc.tion may,ttierefore,be considereda “contemporaneousconstruction”that “is
    worthyof seriousconsiderationas an aid to interpretation,
    particularlywheresuchconstructionhasbeensanctionedby
    longacquiescence.”Sfanfordv.Butler,181S.W.2d269,273(Tex. 1944)(quoting39 TEX.JUR.5 125).
    TheHonorableTimCuny          - Page 9           (GA-0471)
    R.S., ch. 499, 8 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1329, 1329-30. Section 251.058 of the Transportation
    Code, being the later enacted statute, thus prevails over section 263.002 of the Local Government
    Code.
    In sum, to answer your first question, we conclude, assuming that the commissioners court
    has determined that the easement is included in the road, that title to the easement vests
    automatically upon abandonment in the abutting landowner in accordance with section 25 1.058(b)
    of the Transportation Code.
    B.    Second question
    You next ask whether, if section 25 1.058(b) does not apply, the county must sell its interest
    in the drainage easement under either section 263.002(c) or section 272.001(b) of the Local
    Government Code “in addition to formally abandoning” the drainage easement. Request Letter,
    supra note 1, at 2. Section 251.058(b) would not apply if the drainage easement is determined not
    to be part of the public road. For fhe same reasons that the easement would not be part of the public
    road, it would not be part of a highway right-of-way that is subject to section 263.002 of the Local
    Government Code. In that event, the commissioners court would dispose of the easement under
    section 272.001 of the Local Government Code unless the county determines that a statute we have
    not considered here applies.
    C.    Third question
    You ask finally whether a county that “desires to abandon a right-of-way to which it owns
    an easement interest []     must.    follow the notice, appraisal, and fair market value requirements
    of section 263.002 of the Local Government Code . rather than title passing automatically” under
    section 25 1.058 of the Transportation Code. 
    Id. Because you
    specifically refer in this question to
    a right-of-way in which the county “owns an easement interest,” we assume you use the term to refer
    generally to a right to access or pass over a tract of land.) See id.; see also Tex. Elec. Ry. Co. v.
    Neale, 252 S.W.2d 451,454 (Tex. 1952) (noting that “[flhe term ‘right of way’            sometimes is
    used to describe a right belonging to a party [to pass]         over any tract; and it is also used to
    describe that strip of land” on which a roadbed is constructed); accord Lakeside Launches, Inc. v.
    Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d868,871 (Tex. App.-Austin         1988,writdenied).   Also, because
    you do not refer to the right-of-way as a drainage easement, it does not appear that your third
    question relates to a drainage easement. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2.
    The analysis we have already provided regarding whether a public road encompasses a
    drainage easement applies to the question of whether a right-of-way is “public road or portion of a
    public road” subject to disposition under section25 1.058(b) of the Transportation Code. A right-of-
    way that serves the public purposes of transporting persons and property, communication, and travel
    must be disposed of in accordance with section 251.058(b), not section 263.002 of the Local
    ‘Wedo not considerwhethersection263.002ofthe LocalGovernmentCodeappliesto an abandonedseawall
    or to a highwaythat the countyownsin fee simple.
    The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 10              (GA-0471)
    Government Code. You do not inform us whether this right-of-way serves the public purposes of
    transportation of persons and property, communication, and travel, and this office, because it cannot
    resolve fact questions, cannot determine whether a particular right-of-way serves an appropriate
    public purpose. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0334 (2005) at 1. If the right-of-way does not
    serve the purposes of transportation, communication, andtravel, it must be disposed of in accordance
    with section 272.001 unless the county finds that a statute not considered here applies.
    The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 11            (GA-0471)
    SUMMARY
    For purposes of Transportation Code section 251.058(b),
    which automatically vests title to an abandoned public road in the
    abutting landowner, the phrase “public road” encompasses the
    roadway as well as (1) right-of-way that serves attendant public
    purposes of transportation of persons and property, communication,
    and travel, and (2) a drainage easement created to carry off water, the
    natural flow of which the roadway changed or diverted. Whether in
    a particular case a property interest is part of a public road for
    purposes of section 251.058@) is a question of fact that must be
    resolved by the commissioners court inthe first instance. Abandoned
    public road that is subject to Transportation Code section25 1.058(b)
    may not be disposed of in accordance with section 263.002 or
    272.001 of the Local Government Code.
    Easements or rights-of-way that are not part of a public road
    under section 25 1.058(b) are likewise not highway rights-of-way that
    are subject to disposition under Local Government Code section
    263.002. Such property interests must be disposed of under section
    272.001 ‘unless the county determines that a statute not considered
    here applies.
    To the extent Letter Opinion 94-053 suggests that Local
    Government Code section 263.002 applies only to roads labeled as
    highways, not to county public roads generally, it is incorrect. See
    Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-053, at 4 n.4.
    Very truly yours,
    GREG      A        OTT
    A- Attorney G      al of Texas
    KENT C. SULLIVAN
    First Assistant Attorney General
    ELLEN L. WITT
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    NANCY S. FULLER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Kymberly K. Oltrogge
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0471

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017