Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2004 )


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  •                              ATTORNEY            GENERALOFTEXAS
    GREG        ABBOTT
    August 9,2004
    The Honorable Matt Bingham                                Opinion No. GA-0229
    Smith County Criminal District Attorney
    Smith County Courthouse                                   Re: Whether a county sheriff is authorized to
    100 North Broadway, Fourth Floor                          enter into a contract to house federal prisoners
    Tyler, Texas 75702                                        or to accept and dispose of federal surplus
    property (RQ-0181-GA)
    Dear Mr. Bingham:
    You ask whether a county sheriff is authorized to enter into a contract to house federal
    prisoners or to accept and dispose of federal surplus property.’
    I.      Backmound
    You explain that your questions arise from an “Intergovernmental     Services Agreement”
    signed by the Smith County Sheriff as an addendum to a Cooperative Program Agreement between
    Smith County and the United States Marshals Service (USMS). See Request Letter, supra note 1,
    at 1. “Under the original agreement, the federal government agreed to provide moneys for the
    completion of a low risk jail facility in Smith County.” 
    Id. In exchange
    for the money, the USMS
    “received a contractual agreement for Smith County to reserve a minimum of 50 bed spaces for use
    by the [USMS] to house federal prisoners.” 
    Id. You state
    that this agreement “was entered into and
    signed by the Smith County Sheriff and the Smith County Judge in 1988 and had an original term
    of fifteen years with an automatic renewal unless otherwise terminated.” 
    Id. In 2002,
    the Smith
    County Sheriffentered into “an Interlocal Cooperative Agreement” with the USMS “as a supplement
    to the original agreement which is incorporated therein, which expanded the service provided to the
    [USMS] by including certain transportation services to be performed by the sheriff.” 
    Id. at l-2.
    The
    sheriff was the only county official to sign the 2002 agreement. See 
    id. at 2.
    Your letters do not
    address whether the commissioners court officially authorized either of these agreements.
    You also explain that the Smith County Sheriffs Office has received a large quantity of
    surplus goods over a period of several years from the federal government pursuant to the contract
    for housing federal prisoners. See 
    id. at 8.
    The commissioners court “‘has expressed concern that
    these surplus items have not been properly received into the county and that disposal of the surplus
    items [has] not been authorized by the commissioners court,” 
    Id. ‘See Letters
    from Honorable Man Bingham, Smith County Criminal District Attorney, to Honorable Greg
    Abbott, Texas Attorney General (Feb. 4, 2004 and Feb. 7, 2004) (on tile with Opinion Committee, also available al
    http://www.oag.state.tx.us)[hereinat& Request Letter and Supplemental Request Letter].
    The Honorable Matt Bingham        - Page 2           (GA-0229)
    In light of these facts, you ask three questions:
    1. Does the Sheriff, or any elected official, have authority to enter
    into a binding contract with the [USMS] to house federal prisoners in
    the county jail?
    2. Does the [Slheriff, or any elected offtcial, have the authority to
    accept surplus items provided under an agreement with the federal
    government?
    3. Who may dispose of surplus items provided to a county agency by
    the federal government   and must they be included in county
    inventory?
    
    Id. at 1.
    In a supplemental letter, you explain that a county commissioner      objected to your initial
    questions’ scope. As a result, you ask three additional, related questions:
    1. Does the Smith County Sheriff, or any elected official, have the
    authority to sign contracts and encumber the County without approval
    of the Commissioners Court?
    2. Does the Smith County Sheriff, or any elected official, have the
    authority to donate, sell, trade or destroy County property without the
    approval of the Commissioners Court?
    3. Does the Smith County Sheriff, or any elected official, have the
    authority to accept donated property without the approval from the
    Commissioners Court?
    Supplemental   Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.
    To answer these questions, we first address your primary concern, the authority of a county
    sheriff to enter a contract to house federal prisoners in the county jail, as well as the related, more
    general issue regarding elected county officials’ authority to enter into contracts that bind the county.
    Next, we address the authority to accept federal surplus property pursuant to a contract to house
    federal prisoners. Accepting donated property on the county’s behalfraises different issues and we
    address that question separately. Finally, we address the authority to dispose of county property.
    II.     Analvsis
    A.      Authority to Enter into a Contract Binding the County
    1.      Authority to Contract to House Federal Prisoners in the County Jail
    You first ask about the sheriffs authorityto enter into a binding contract with
    the USMS to house federal prisoners in the county jail. See Request Letter, sup-a note 1, at 1
    The Honorable Matt Bingham        - Page 3          (GA-0229)
    (question 1). We assume that you are concerned about the sheriffs authority to enter into a contract
    that the commissioners court has not officially authorized. See Part II.A.2, infia p. 7.
    It is well established in Texas law that the commissioners court, as the governing body of the
    county, “is the general business and contracting agency of the county, and it alone has authority to
    make contracts binding on the county, unless otherwise specifically provided by statute.” Anderson
    v. Wood, 
    152 S.W.2d 1084
    , 1085 (Tex. 1941). “[A] sheriff has no authority to make contracts
    that are binding on the county, except where he is specially so authorized to do by statute.” 
    Id. A number
    of statutes grant to a sheriff the authority to enter into agreements in limited circumstances.
    See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 8 5 11.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (authorizing agreements between
    sheriffs regarding the transferring and receiving of prisoners); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
    5 351.0415 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (authorizing sheriff to contract with a person to operate a jail
    commissary). In the absence of such express authority, a sheriff may not enter into a contract. See
    
    Anderson, 152 S.W.2d at 1085
    .
    Your questions relate to the authority to contract with respect to the county jail’s operation.
    The statutory scheme generally charges “[t]he commissioners court of a county [to] provide safe and
    suitable jails for the county.” TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. 4 351.001(a) (Vernon 1999). Under
    Local Government Code chapter 351, subchapter C, which generally provides for the operation of
    county jails, “[tlhe sheriff of each county is the keeper of the county jail. The sheriff shall safely
    keep all prisoners committed to the jail by a lawful authority, subject to an order of the proper court.”
    
    Id. 5 351.041(a).
        “The sheriff may appoint a jailer to operate the jail and meet the needs of
    the prisoners, but the sheriff shall continue to exercise supervision and control over the jail.” 
    Id. § 351.041(b).
    Absent an express statute, the authority to enter into contracts regarding the county
    jail’s operation rests with the commissioners court. See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-111
    (1992) at 2 (the commissioners court has authority to contract with a licensed physician to provide
    medical services to inmates incarcerated in county jails, and the sheriff has authority to schedule
    medical services for the county jails); Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-97-030, at 2 (concluding that the
    commissioners court, not the sheriff, has authority to contract regarding the provision of telephone
    services to jail inmates); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0059 (2003) at 2 (approving Attorney
    General Letter Opinion 97-030 to the extent it concludes that, “because the provision of telephone
    services to inmates does not fall within section 35 1.0415 [ofthe Local Government Code], ‘a sheriff
    has no contracting authority regarding the provision of telephone service to inmates”‘).
    We note that 18 USC. $4002 authorizes the United States Attorney General to “contract,
    for a period not exceeding three years, with theproper authorities ofany State, Territory, or political
    subdivision thereof, for the imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of [federal
    prisoners].” 18 U.S.C. 5 4002 (2000) (emphasis added); see also 
    id. 5 4013(a)(3)
    (“The Attorney
    General, in support of United States prisoners in non-Federal institutions, is authorized to make
    payments from funds appropriated for Federal prisoner detention for           the housing, care, and
    security of persons held in custody of a United States marshal pursuant to Federal law under
    agreements with State or local units of government or contracts with private entities.“). In addition,
    -
    18 USC. 5 4013(b) provides that the United States Attorney General,
    in support of Federal prisoner detainees in non-Federal institutions,
    is authorized to make payments . . for entering into contracts or
    The Honorable Matt Bingham            - Page 4             (GA-0229)
    cooperative   agreements with any State, territory, or political
    subdivision   thereof, for the necessary construction,       physical
    renovation, acquisition of equipment, supplies, or materials required
    to establish acceptable conditions of confinement and detention
    services in any State or local jurisdiction which agrees to provide
    guaranteed bed space for Federal detainees within that correctional
    system.
    
    Id. 5 4013(b).
    We have not located any federal statute controlling which officials would constitute
    the proper authorities of any “State, Territory, or political subdivision” under section 4002 or 4013.
    Sections 4002 and 4013 appear to defer to state law in this regard.
    You assert that section 351.043 of the Local Government Code authorizes a county sheriff
    to enter into a contract to house federal prisoners in the county jail. Section 351.043 provides in
    pertinent part as follows:
    (a) The sheriff or jailer may receive into the county jail a
    federal prisoner delivered by a federal law enforcement officer unless
    the sheriff or jailer determines that receipt of the prisoner may violate
    a state or federal court order, a statute, or a rule of the Commission on
    Jail Standards or the Texas Board of Criminal Justice.
    -
    (b) The sheriff or jailer shall safely keep the prisoner until the
    prisoner is transferred or discharged by due course of law.
    (c) The federal law enforcement ofticer on whose authority
    the prisoner is received and kept is directly and personally liable to
    the sheriff or jailer for the jail fees and other costs incurred in keeping
    the prisoner. The fees and costs shall be estimated according to laws
    regulating similar fees and costs in other cases.
    TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 351.043 (Vernon 1999).*
    No court has addressed whether section 35 1.043 authorizes a sheriff to enter into a contract
    to house federal prisoners. In a 1990 letter opinion, however, this office concluded that section
    351.043 did not authorize a sheriff to enter into a contract to house federal prisoners from
    Washington, D.C. See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-90-95, at 4-5. Attorney General Letter Opinion 90-95
    observed that when the legislature intends to authorize a sheriff to enter into a contract, it does so
    expressly, as it has for example in section 351.0415 regarding jail commissary contracts. See 
    id. at 5;
    see also TEX.LOC. GOV’TCODEANN. 5 351.0415 (Vernon Supp. 2004). The letteropinion also
    ‘See also TEX. Lot. GOV’TCODEANN. 5 351.043(d)(Vernon 1999)(“In this section, ‘federallaw enforcement
    ,-   offker’ has the meaning assigned by 5 U.S.C. Section 8331(20).“);~5 U.S.C. 9 8331(20) (2000) (deftig “law
    enforcement officer”to mean “an employee, the duties ofwhose position are primarily the investigation,apprehension,
    or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States, including
    an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred to a supervisory or administrative position”).
    The Honorable Matt Bingham        - Page 5           (GA-0229)
    noted that the predecessor provisions to section 351.043 required a sheriff to receive federal
    prisoners. See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-90-95, at 4. The legislature amended the statute in 1981 to
    provide that the sheriff “may receive” federal prisoners. See id.; see also Act of May 19,198 1,67th
    Leg., RX, ch. 241, 5 1, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 603. Citing the 1981 legislative history, the letter
    opinion concluded that “[tlhe substitution of the phrase ‘shall receive’ for the phrase ‘may receive’
    was not intended by the legislature to [alffect anything other than to no longer impose on the county
    sheriff the mandatory duty to admit federal prisoners into the county jail.” Tex. Att’y Gen.
    LO-90-95, at 4-5.
    We conclude that Letter Opinion 90-95 correctly construed section 35 1.043. A sheriffmust
    have authority to keep a prisoner. See TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 351.041(a) (Vernon 1999)
    (“The sheriff shall safely keep all prisoners committed to thejail by a lawful    authority, subject to an
    order of the proper court.“) (emphasis added). On its face, section 351.043 merely provides legal
    authority for a sheriff or jailer to receive and keep a federal prisoner in the county jail. At most, it
    authorizes a sheriff or jailer to house and keep individual federal prisoners as requested by a federal
    officer on a case-by-case basis. It does not authorize a sheriffto enter into a contract committing the
    county to house federal prisoners, reserving beds in the county jail for federal use over a term of
    years. See 
    id. 9 351.043.
    Indeed, the statute authorizes the sheriff or the jailer to keep and house
    a federal prisoner. See 
    id. Under section
    35 1.041 (b), the jailer is an employee subject to the sheriffs
    supervision and control. See 
    id. 8 351.041(b)
    (“The sheriff may appoint a jailer to operate the jail
    and meet the needs of the prisoners, but the sherlffshall continue to exercise supervision and control
    over the jail.“) (emphasis added); see also De la Garza v. State, 579 S.W.2d 220,223 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1979) (concluding that statutory predecessor to section 351.041 “authorizes the Sheriff to
    legally impose such restriction on his jailers”); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM-1047 (1989) at 2 (“A
    jailer is employed by the sheriff and subject to his supervision and control in matters involving his
    duties as jailer.“). If we were to construe section 35 1.043 to authorize the sheriff to enter into a
    contract, we would also have to conclude that the statute vests the jailer with the same authority. We
    doubt the legislature intended to authorize ajailer, an unelected county employee under the sheriffs
    control, to enter into contracts obligating the county to house federal prisoners in the county jail. See
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 3 11.023 (Vernon 1998) (“In construing a statute,             a court may consider
    among other matters the: (1) object sought to be attained [and] (5) consequences of a particular
    construction        .“). Finally, while the legislature revisited section 351.043 in 1991 and 1997, on
    neither occasion did it reject the 1990 letter opinion’s interpretation of the statute by amending
    section 35 1.043 to authorize sheriffs to enter into contracts.’
    You disagree with Letter Opinion 90-95 for several reasons. First, you assert that while the
    legislature may not have intended section 3 5 1.043 to authorize a sheriff to enter into a contract, “the
    reality of the [ 198 1] change had the effect of creating a need for contractual obligations to ensure
    bed-space for federal needs.” Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2. You further assert that the
    legislature could not have intended to authorize the commissioners court to enter into such a contract
    because the commissioners court does not have authority over housing federal prisoners. See 
    id. at 3.
    -
    ‘SeeActofAug. 25,1991,72dLeg., 2dCS.,ch. 10, $11.16,1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 180,207;ActofMay 10,
    1997,7Sth Leg., R.S., ch. 259, 5 10, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1196, 1201.
    The Honorable Matt Bingham      - Page 6           (GA-0229)
    However, to the extent Texas statutes address the issue, they indicate that the commissioners
    court must have some authority over whether federal prisoners will be kept in the county jail.
    Sections 351.001 of the Local Government Code requires a commissioners court to “provide safe
    and suitable jails for the county,” TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 35 1.001 (a) (Vernon 1999), which
    “must comply with the minimum standards and the rules and procedures of the Commission on Jail
    Standards,“id. 5 35 1.002. Section 5 11,0093(b) ofthe Government Code authorizes the Commission
    on Jail Standards (the ‘Commission”)     to adopt
    rules regulating the number offederalprisoners      and prisoners from
    jurisdictions other than Texas that are housed in a county jail, a
    municipal jail, or a correctional facility operated by a private vendor
    under contract with a municipality if the jail or correctional facility
    houses state, county, or municipal prisoners or prisoners of another
    state of the United States.
    TEX. GOV’T CODEANN. § 5 11.0093(b) (V emon 1998) (emphasis          added). Section 5 11.009 charges
    both the sheriff and the commissioners      court with reporting to the Commission regarding the
    county’s compliance with Commission standards. See 
    id. 5 511.009(a)(8),
    (14) (Vernon Supp.
    2004). Given that the legislature has charged each commissioners court with the duty to provide for
    a jail that complies with Commission standards and to report to the Commission, the legislature must
    intend for commissioners courts to exercise some authority over whether and to what degree the jail
    -.   will house federal inmates.
    In addition, section 5 11.0094 of the Government Code, which excepts from Commission
    regulation a correctional facility housing only federal prisoners, suggests that the commissioners
    court, not the sheriff, would enter into a contract with the federal government to house federal
    prisoners:
    The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a correctional
    facility contracting to house only federal prisoners and operating
    pursuant to a contract between a unit of the federal government and
    a county, a municipality,      or a private vendor.      If a county,
    municipality, or private vendor contracts to house or begins to house
    state, county, or municipal prisoners or prisoners of another state of
    the United States, it shall report to the commission before placing
    such inmates in a correctional facility housing only federal prisoners.
    
    Id. 5 5
    11.0094 (emphasis added).
    You also rely on the language of section 351.043(c): “The federal law enforcement officer
    on whose authority the prisoner is received and kept is directly and personally liable to the sheriff
    or jailer for the jail fees and other costs incurred in keeping the prisoner.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
    ANN. 5 35 1.043(c) (Vernon 1999). You believe that because the federal officer is liable for fees only
    to the sheriff (or the jailer) and not the commissioners court, any authority to enter into a contract
    to house federal prisoners must rest with the sheriff, See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 4.
    The Honorable Matt Bingham           - Page 7             (GA-0229)
    However, section 351.043(c) on its face requires a federal officer to pay fees to the sheriff; it does
    not vest the sheriff with the authority to enter into a contract.
    Moreover, the fact that the federal officer is liable to the sheriff or jailer rather than the
    commissioners       court for fees is not legally significant.    The statutory predecessors to section
    351.043(c) date from before the 1948 adoption of article XVI, section 61 of the Texas Constitution
    generally abolishing fees of office4 and requiring all counties to pay sheriffs on a salary basis. See
    TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 4 61(c) (“it shall be mandatory upon the Commissioners Courts to compensate
    all sheriffs . . . on a salary basis”). Even prior to this requirement, courts held that fees received by
    sheriffs for boarding federal prisoners were fees of office, accountable to the commissioners court
    in determining the maximum salary sheriffs could retain for their services. See Orndorff. El Paso
    County, 295 SW. 219,221 (Tex. Civ. App.-ElPaso 1927,writref d);Binfordv. Harris County,261
    S.W. 535, 537 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston              1924, writ refd).     And significantly, the Texas
    Constitution and the Local Government Code now require county sheriffs and other officials paid
    on a salary basis to deposit any fees of office, fees they collect for performing their official duties,
    in the county treasury. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 5 61(d) (“All fees earned by district, county and
    precinct officers shall be paid into the county treasury where earned for the account of the proper
    fund.      .“); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. @ 154.002 (Vernon 1999) (a district, county, or precinct
    officer “who is paid on a salary basis receives the salary instead of.         fees    the officer would
    otherwise be authorized to keep”), 154.003 (“A district, county, or precinct officer who is paid an
    annual salary shall charge and collect in the manner authorized by law all fees, commissions, and
    other compensation permitted for official services performed by the officer. The officer shall dispose
    ofthe collected money as providedby Subchapter B, Chapter 113.“); see also 
    id. § 113.021(a)
    (“The
    fees, commissions, funds, and other money belonging to a county shall be deposited with the county
    treasurer by the officer who collects the money.“). Under these provisions, a sheriff would be
    required to deposit in the county treasury any money paid by the federal government as a section
    351.043 fee.
    In sum, we conclude that section 35 1.043 does not authorize a sheriff to contract to house
    federal prisoners in the county jail. As no other statute vests such authority in a sheriff, we conclude
    that a sheriff is not authorized to enter into a contract to house federal prisoners in the county jail.
    2.        Commissioners      Court Approval Generally
    In a related question in your supplemental letter, you ask more generally about
    the authority of the sheriff or any other elected official “to sign contracts and encumber the county
    without approval of the commissioners court.” Supplemental Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1
    (question 1); see also Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1 (question 1 asking about the authority of
    4SeeAct of June 5, 1947, 50th Leg., R.S., H.R.J. Res. No. 36, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 1193 (proposing a
    constitutional amendment to require commissioners courts to compensate on a salary basis (i) constables, deputy
    constables, and precinct law enforcement officers beginning January 1, 1949, and (ii) in counties having a population
    of less than 20,000, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, county law enforcement offkers including sheriffs also performing the
    duties of assessor and collector of taxes and their deputies beginning Januay 1, 1949). The statutory predecessors to
    section 351.043 date from 1856. See TEX.Lot. GOV’TCODEANN.9 351.043 historical and statutory note (Vernon
    1999).
    The Honorable Matt Bingham             - Page 8              (GA-0229)
    .-
    “any elected official . . to enter into a binding contract with the [USMS] to house federal prisoners
    in the county jail”).
    As we have discussed, in the absence of a statute authorizing another county official to enter
    into a contract,’ the commissioners court has the sole authority to enter into contracts binding the
    county. See supra p. 3. Moreover, individual commissioners court members have no authority to
    bind the county by their separate action; only an action taken by the commissioners court acting as
    an official body can bind the county. See Can&s v. Laughlin, 
    214 S.W.2d 45
    1,455 (Tex. 1948);
    Gano v. Palo Pinto County, 8 S.W. 634,635 (Tex. 1888). A contract made by a county is valid and
    binding only if made under the authority of a resolution or order duly passed at a meeting of the
    commissioners court and entered in the minutes. See, e.g., Stratton Y. County ofliberty, 
    582 S.W.2d 252
    , 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont        1979, writ ref d n.r.e.); Wilson v. County of Calhoun, 489
    S.W.2d 393,397 (Tex. Civ. AppCorpus         Christi, 1972, writ ref d n. r.e.); Morrison v. Kohler, 207
    S.W.2d 951,954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont         1947, writ ref d n.r.e.).
    B.        Authority to Accept Federal Surplus Property for the County
    Next, you ask about the authority of the sheriff to accept federal surplus property
    pursuant to the USMS contract. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1 (question 2). We note that
    chapter 2175 ofthe Government Code designates the Texas Building and Procurement Commission
    as the state agency to dispose of federal surplus property pursuant to a program under 40 U.S.C.
    § 549. See TEX. GOV’T CODEANN. $5 2175.361-,367 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2004). Because your
    letter indicates that the USMS rather than the Texas Building and Procurement Commission
    transferred the property, we do not address chapter 2175.
    You have not identified the federal statute or regulations pursuant to which the USMS
    transferred the property.6 Nor have we located any federal statute or regulation governing which
    5Forstatutes that authorize individual county officialsother than the sheriffto execute contracts, see, e.g., TEX.
    LOC.GOV’TCODEANN.         $5 262.01l(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (“The county purchasing agent shall purchase all supplies,
    materials, and equipment required or used, and contract for all repairs to property used, by the county or a subdivision,
    officer, or employee of the county, except purchases and contracts required by law to be made on competitive bid. A
    person other than the county purchasing agent may not make the purchase of the supplies, materials, or equipment or
    make the contract for repairs.“),263.001(a)(Vernon 1999)(‘“Thecommissioners court of a county, by an order entered
    in its minutes, may appoint a commissioner to sell or lease real property owned by the county. The sale or lease must
    be made at a public auction held in accordance with this section unless this chapter provides othetise.“), (c) “(If the
    real property is sold, a deed that is made on behalf of the county by the appointed ‘commissionerin conformance with
    the order entered under Subsection (a) and that is properly acknowledged, proved, and recorded is sufficient to convey
    the county’s interest in the property.“), 411.006(b) (“If the commissioners court determines that a seawallright-of-way
    shouldbe donated, the countyjudge may convey the property in accordancewith the order ofthe commissioners court.“).
    6Forexample, federal law generallyprovides that “the Administratorof General Services shall supervise and
    direct the disposition of surplus property in accordance with this subtitle.” 40 U.S.C. 5 541 (2000). “An executive
    agency designated or authorized by the Administratorof General Services to dispose of surplus property may do so by
    sale, exchange, lease, permit, or transfer, for cash, credit, or other property, with or without warranty, on terms and
    conditions that the Administrator considersproper. The agencymay execute documents to transfer title or other interest
    in the property and may take other action it considers necessaryor proper to dispose of the property under this chapter.”
    (continued...)
    The Honorable Matt Bingham             - Page 9             (GA-0229)
    official in a state political subdivision is authorized to accept such property. Of course, if a federal
    statute or regulation expressly authorizes a county sheriff or any other official to accept federal
    surplus property, it may control. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause);
    Delta Airlines, Inc. Y. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745,748 (Tex. 2003) (discussing federal preemption of
    state law).
    Given our conclusion that a sheriff is not authorized to enter into a contract to house federal
    prisoners in the county jail, it follows that such a contract would not authorize the sheriff to accept
    federal surplus property. Moreover, we believe that, in the absence of a controlling federal statute,
    title to any personal property paid by the federal government as consideration for housing federal
    prisoners in the county jail would vest in the county rather than the sheriff, the jail, or the sheriffs
    department. As we have discussed, in the event a sheriff or jailer kept and housed a federal prisoner
    and received amonetary fee from a federal officer under section 35 1.043(c) ofthe Local Government
    Code, the sheriff or jailer would be required to account for the fee as a fee of office and deposit it
    in the county treasury. See Part II.A.l, supra p. 7.7 To the extent the USMS transfers federal surplus
    property as consideration pursuant to a contract to house federal prisoners in the county jail, that
    consideration, like any monetary consideration, would also be accountable as a fee of office. Thus,
    we believe that title to anypropertypaid   by a federal official as a fee under section 35 1.043(c) would
    belong to the county.
    In addition, we note that the legislature has specifically vested sheriffs with control over
    money from certain defined sources. See, e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 35 1.0415(b) (Vernon
    Supp. 2004) (providing a sheriff with “exclusive control of the commissary funds”); TEX. CODE
    GRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 59.06(c)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (providing for the deposit of forfeited funds
    in “a special fund in the county treasury if distributed to a county law enforcement agency, to be used
    solely for law enforcement purposes”). The legislature has not provided the sheriff with exclusive
    
    Id. $543. Section553,40U.S.C.,provides
    thattheAdministratorofGenera1 Services,“inthe Administrator’sdiscretion
    and under regulations that the Administrator may prescribe, may transfer or convey to a State, or political subdivision
    or instrumentality of a State, surplus real and related personal property that - (1) the Attorney General determines is
    required by the transferee or grantee for correctionalfacility use under a program approved by the Attorney General for
    the care or rehabilitation of criminal offenders [or] (2) the Attorney General determines is required by the transfereeor
    grantee for law enforcement purposes.” 
    Id. 9 553(b)(1)-(2).
    A federal regulation provides for conveying “surplusreal
    and related personal property for: (a) Correctional facility purposes, if the Attorney General has determined that the
    property is required for such purposes and has approved an appropriateprogram or project for the care or rehabilitation
    of criminal offenders [or] (b) Law enforcement purposes, if the Attorney General has determined that the property is
    required for such purposes. .” 41 C.F.R. 5 102-75.750(2003), WL 41 C.F.R. ~102-75.750.
    ‘see also TEX. h3C. GOV’T CODE ANN.$9 113.003 (Vernon 1999) (‘“fhe county treasurer shall receive all
    money belonging to the county from whatever source it may be derived.“), 154.002 (“A district, county, or precinct
    officer who is paid on a salary basis receives the salary instead of all fees, commissions, and other compensation the
    officer would otherwisebe authorized to keep, except as otherwiseprovided by this subchapter.“), 154.003(“A district,
    county, or precinct ofticer who is paid an annual salary shall charge and collect in the manner authorizedby law all fees,
    commissions, and other compensation permitted for official servicesperformed by the officer. The officer shall dispose
    of the collected money as provided by Subchapter B, Chapter 113.“);see generally Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0059
    (2003) (concluding that revenues generated by an inmate telephone contract must be paid into the county treasury and
    may be used for any legitimate county purpose).
    The Honorable Matt Bingham       - Page 10         (GA-0229)
    authority over payments made by the federal government for housing federal prisoners in the county
    jail in section 35 1.043, and no other statute supports the contention that the sheriff would control
    property paid in lieu of a monetary fee.
    Finally, we note that the federal law pursuant to which federal surplus property is transferred
    to the county may require that the property be used by the county for certain limited purposes, such
    as law enforcement or corrections. See note 6, supra p. 8. Thus, although title to federal surplus
    property may not vest in the sheriff, the jail, or the sheriffs department, the sheriff, as the chief
    county law enforcement officer and keeper of the county jail, would be the county official to use
    such property.
    C.      Authority to Accept Donated Property
    In a related question you ask whether “the Smith County Sheriff, or any elected
    official, [has] the authority to accept donatedpropertywithout the approval from the Commissioners
    Court?” Supplemental Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1 (question 3). We answer this question
    generally and not with regard to any particular property that has been donated to the county or any
    county office.
    Local Government Code section 81.032 generallyprovides        that “[t]he commissioners court
    may accept a gift, grant, donation, bequest, or devise of money or other property on behalf of the
    county for the purpose of performing a function conferred by law on the county or a county officer.”
    TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODEANN. 5 81.032 (Vernon Supp. 2004); see also TEX. TRANSP.CODEANN.
    $5 252.109 (Vernon 1999) (“A commissioners           court or the road commissioners       may accept
    donations of labor, money, or other property to aid in building or maintaining roads in the county.“),
    252.214 (“A commissioners court may accept donations of labor, money, or other property to aid in
    building or maintaining roads in the county.“). Prior to section 8 1.032’s enactment, this office had
    concluded that absent such express legislative authority, counties could not accept gifts of money
    or other personal property to use for county purposes.       See genernZly Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
    JC-0443 (2001) at 2; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-97-032, at 2 (concluding that county may not
    accept gifts of videotapes, books, or cash on behalf of alternative dispute center); Tex. Att’y Gen.
    LO-88-106, at 6 (concluding that county may not collect funds and disburse them to local law
    enforcement agencies to combat drug abuse in county).
    By its express terms, section 8 1.032 authorizes a commissioners court to accept a donation
    of property to be used by the sheriff in performing that office’s statutory functions. See TEX. Lot.
    GOV’T CODEANN. 5 81.032 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (authorizing a commissioners              court to accept a
    donation of property on behalf of the county “for the purpose of performing a function conferred by
    law on the county or a county officer”). No statute authorizes a sheriff to accept donated property.
    In the absence of a specific statute authorizing the sheriff, or any other county official, to accept
    donated property, the commissioners court is the proper body to accept property donations on the
    county’s behalf.
    Given that your letter suggests that the USMS transferred the federal surplus property at issue
    as consideration for housing federal inmates under the contract, see Request Letter, supra note 1, at
    The Honorable Matt Bingham        - Page 11          (GA-0229)
    8-9, we do not reach the question whether section 81.032 of the Local Government Code applies to
    federal surplus property transferred to a county as something other than consideration. We also note
    that to the extent there is any dispute regarding whether the USMS transferred the property to the
    county as consideration for services performed by the county pursuant to a contract, resolution ofthat
    issue would involve questions of fact and would be beyond the purview of an attorney general
    opinion. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0078 (2003) at 2 (stating that this office does not
    construe particular contracts), GA-0003 (2002) at 1 (stating that the opinion process does not
    determine facts).
    D.      Authority to Dispose of County Property
    With respect to the USMS contract, you ask “[w]ho may dispose of surplus items
    provided to a county agency by the federal government and must they be included in county
    inventory?” Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1 (question 3). In yourrequest letter, you inform us that
    the USMS provides two kinds of surplus property: accountable property for which USMS approval
    is required prior to disposal by the grantee and non-accountable property, which “is fully disposable
    upon transfer to the agency.” 
    Id. at 13.
    In the absence of a controlling federal statute, title to surplus
    property paid as consideration for housing federal prisoners in the county jail would vest in the
    county rather than the sheriff, the sheriffs department, or the jail. See Part ILB, supra p. 8. We see
    no reason why such property would not be included in county inventory or disposed of like any other
    county property, provided that the property has been used by the county as required by any applicable
    federal law or transfer term. See generally TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. ~$5112.005(a) (Vernon
    1999) (requiring a county auditor to “maintain an account for each county, district, or state officer
    authorized or required by law to receive or collect money or other property that is intended for the
    use ofthe county or that belongs to the county”), 262.011 (i) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (requiring a county
    purchasing agent to tile “an inventory of all the property on hand and belonging to the county and
    each subdivision, officer, and employee of the county. The county auditor shall carefully examine
    the inventory and make an accounting for all property purchased or previously inventoried and not
    appearing in the inventory.“); see nlso note 6, supra p. 8. Moreover, even if title has not been
    transferred to the county or the county must obtainUSMS approval before disposing ofthe property,
    federal surplus property received by a county officer for county use would be included in county
    inventory. See, ~.~.,TEx.Loc.Gov’TCODEANN.           55 112.005(a) (Vernon 1999) (requiringacounty
    auditor to “maintain an account for each county, district, or state officer authorized or required by
    law to receive or collect money or other property that is intended for the use of the county or that
    belongs to the county”) (emphasis added), 112.006(a) (“The county auditor has general oversight of
    the books and records of a county, district, or state officer authorized or required by law to receive
    or collect money or other property that is intendedfor the use of the county or that belongs to the
    county.“) (emphasis added).
    In a related but more general question, you ask, “Does the Smith County Sheriff, or any
    elected official, have the authority to donate, sell, trade or destroy County property without the
    approval ofthe Commissioners Court?” Supplemental Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1 (question
    2). It is difficult for this office to answer such a broad question. We note, however, that Local
    Government Code provisions governing the sale or donation of county personal property generally
    The Honorable Matt Bingham              - Page 12             (GA-0229)
    ,-
    vest the authority to sell or donate property in the commissioners court.’ In particular, section
    263.152 of the Local Government Code authorizes a commissioners court to sell, trade in, donate,
    destroy, or otherwise dispose’ of county salvage or surplus personal property.” The authority to
    donate, sell, trade, or destroy particular county property would need to be resolved on a case-by-case
    basis.
    .-
    *See,e.g., TEX.GOV’TCODEANN.         g 1477.070(a)(Vernon 2000) (“The commissioners court may sell, deliver,
    and distribute any water of the project that is not needed for county purposes to a municipal corporation 01 political
    subdivision of this state, or an individual, corporation,OIcompany under terms that the court determines are in the best
    interestsofthecounty.“);T``.H~ALT~&S.w~nC``~Aw. $5 263.029(a)(Vemon2001) (“Acountymaysellorlease
    all or part of a county hospital or medical or other health facility operated by the county, including real property, if the
    commissioners court of the county, by order entered in the minutes of the cout, fmds that the sale OIlease is in the best
    interest ofthe county.“), 28 1.052(a)(“171 e commissionerscourt of a county in which a [hospital] district is created under
    this chapter may sell real OIpersonal property in order to enter into a contract       .“),
    ‘%e TEX.Lot. GOV’TCODEANN.9 263.152(a)(Vernon Supp. 2004) (“The commissioners court of a county
    may: (1) periodicallyseUthe county’s surplus or salvageproperty by competitive bid OIauction, except that competitive
    bidding OIan auction is not necessary ifthe purchaser is another county OIa political subdivision within the county that
    is selling the surplus or salvage property; (2) offer the property as a trade-in for new property of the same general type
    if the commissioners court considers that action to be in the best interests of the county; (3) order any ofthe property
    to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as worthless if the commissioners court undertakes to sell that property under
    Subdivision (1) and is unable to do so because no bids are made; or (4) dispose of the property by donating it to a civic
    01charitable organizationlocated in the county ifthe commissionerscourt [makescertain fmdings].“)(emphasis added).
    %e 
    id. 5 263.151(1)(Vernon
    1999)(def~g“salvageproperty” to mean“personalproperty, otherthanitems
    routinely discarded as waste, that because ofuse, time, accident,IXany other cause is so worn, damaged, or obsolete that
    it has no value for the purpose for which it was originallyintended”),(2) (defining “surplusproperty”to mean “personal
    property that: (A) is not salvage property 01items routinely discarded as waste; (B) is not currently needed by its owner;
    (C) is not required for the owner’s foreseeableneeds; and(D) possesses some usefulness for the purpose for which it was
    intended”).
    The Honorable Matt Bingham    - Page    13        (GA-0229)
    .-
    SUMMARY
    In the absence of a statute authorizing another county official
    to enter into a contract, the commissioners court has the sole authority
    to enter into contracts binding the county. Section 35 1.043 of the
    Local Government Code does not authorize a county sheriff to
    contract to house federal prisoners in the county jail.
    Generally, a contract made by a county is valid and binding
    only if made under the authority of a resolution or order duly passed
    at a meeting of the commissioners court and entered in the minutes.
    Under state law, a county sheriff is not authorized to contract
    for or to accept federal surplus property as consideration for housing
    federal prisoners in the county jail. In the absence of a controlling
    federal statute, title to any personal property paid by the federal
    government as consideration for housing federal prisoners in the
    county jail would vest in the county rather than the sheriff, the jail, or
    the sheriffs department.
    Section 81.032 of the Local Government Code generally
    authorizes the commissioners court of a county to accept donations
    on behalf of the county and would authorize a commissioners court
    to accept a donation of property to be used by the sheriff in
    performing that office’s statutory functions.
    Generally, in the absence of a controlling federal statute,
    federal surplus property paid to the county as consideration for
    housing federal prisoners in the county jail would be included in
    county inventory and disposed of like any other county property.
    Even if title has not been transferred to the county or the county must
    obtain federal agency approval before disposing of the property,
    federal surplus property received by a county officer for county use
    would be included in county inventory. While section 263.152 of the
    Local Government Code generally authorizes a commissioners court
    to sell, trade in, donate, destroy or otherwise dispose of county
    salvage or surplus personal property, the authority to donate, sell,
    trade, or destroy particular county property would need to be resolved
    on a case-by-case basis.
    Very truly yours,
    eneral of Texas
    The Honorable Matt Bingham         - Page 14    (GA-0229)
    BARRY R. MCBEE
    First Assistant Attorney General
    DON R. WILLETT
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    NANCY S. FULLER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Mary R. Crouter
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0229

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017