Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2004 )


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  •                                 ATTORNEY GENERAL                     OF   TEXAS
    GREG        ABBOTT
    July 9,2004
    The Honorable Mary Denny                                    Opinion No. GA-02 13
    Chair, Committee on Elections
    Texas House of Representatives                              Re: Proper procedure, under article III, section
    Post Office Box 2910                                        24a of the Texas Constitution, for the Speaker
    Austin, Texas 78768-29 10                                   of the House of Representatives    to nominate
    individuals to serve as members of the Texas
    Ethics Commission    (RQ-0194-GA)
    Dear Representative      Denny:
    You ask about the proper procedure, under article III, section 24a of the Texas Constitution,
    for the Speaker of the House of Representatives to nominate individuals to serve as members of the
    Texas Ethics Commission (the “Commission”).’
    Article III, section 24a provides, in relevant part:
    (a) The Texas Ethics Commission          is a state agency consisting
    of the following eight members:
    (1) two members of different political parties
    appointed by the governor from a list of at least 10
    names submitted by the members of the house of
    representatives from each political party required by
    law to hold a primary;
    (2) two members of different political parties
    appointed by the governor from a list of at least 10
    names submitted by the members of the senate corn
    each political party required by law to hold a primary;
    ‘Letter from Honorable Mary Denny, Chair, House Committee on Elections, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Texas
    Attorney General (Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us)
    [hereinafter Request Letter]; see aZso Letters fromHonorable Mary Denny, Chair, Committee on Elections, to Honorable
    Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General (June 25,2004 and July 7,2004).
    The Honorable Mary Denny        - Page 2        (GA-0213)
    (3) two members of d@erentpoliticalparties
    appointed      by the speaker   of the house of
    representatives from a list of at least 10 names
    submitted by the members of the house Ji-om each
    political party required by law to hold a primary;
    and
    (4) two members of different political parties
    appointed by the lieutenant governor from a list of at
    least 10 names submitted by the members of the
    senate from each political party required by law to
    hold a primary.
    TEX. CONST.art. III, $ 24a(a)(l-4)  (emphasis added). You are here concerned about subsection
    (a)(3) regarding appointments by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and particularly its
    application with respect to the most recent appointment of a Republican to the Commission by
    former Speaker James E. “Pete” Laney. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.
    In construing a constitutional provision, the duty of a court, and the practice of this office,
    is to ascertain and give effect to the plain intent and language of the framers of the provision and the
    people who adopted it. Gragg v. Cayuga Ind. Sch. Dist., 
    539 S.W.2d 861
    , 866 (Tex. 1976). In
    construing article III, section 24a, “we give effect to its plain language. . . . We presume the
    language of the Constitution was carefully selected, and we interpret words as they are generally
    understood.” City ofBeaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143,148 (Tex. 1995); see also Armbrister
    v. Morales, 
    943 S.W.2d 202
    , 205 (Tex. App.-Austin               1997, no writ) (court gives words of
    constitution “their natural, obvious, and ordinary meanings as they are understood by the citizens
    who adopted them”).
    The requirement set forth in subsection (a)(3) of article III, section 24a - that the members
    of the Commission selected by the Speaker be equally divided between the political parties required
    by law to hold a primary - evidences the clear intent of both the legislators who proposed, and the
    voters who adopted, that provision to establish a bipartisan commission.         Only an equally divided
    Commission is able to demonstrate the appearance of political balance necessary to avoid its being
    used as a tool by one party or the other. The composition of the Commission established by article
    III, section 24a is obviously meant to ensure political neutrality in such a way as to buttress the
    integrity of the Commission and its decision-making         process and therefore to help assure the
    confidence of the public.
    Thus, bipartisanship is written into the very fabric of the Commission.     The plain language
    of article III, section 24a requires that membership be divided equally between Republicans and
    Democrats.      As applied to appointments made by the Speaker of the House, the intent of the
    legislature and the voters in adopting this constitutional provision is fulfilled by giving effect to the
    provision’s final clause, which states that the Speaker shall make his appointments “from a list of
    The Honorable Mary Denny       - Page 3        (GA-0213)
    at least ten names submitted by the members of the House from each poli,tical party required by law
    to hold a primary.” TEX. CONST. art. ITI,5 24a(a)(3).
    Subsection (a)(3) of article III, section 24a plainly directs that the Republican members
    submit for consideration to the Speaker at least ten names and that the Democratic members do
    likewise, for the appointment of a member of their respective political parties. To construe this
    provision to permit the Speaker to make his Republican appointment fi-om names submitted by any
    House member, rather than from only Republican House members, would effectively vitiate the
    provision’s last clause, which requires the Speaker to make his appointments from “a list of at least
    ten names submitted by members of the House from each political party.” TEX. CONST. art. III,
    5 24a(a)(3) (emphasis added). By contrast, to require that the Speaker select his Republican
    appointee only ti-om names submitted by Republican House members accomplishes the intent of the
    legislature in proposing the amendment, and the intent of the voters in adopting it: to create a
    Commission that achieves political balance, one that effectuates a genuine bipartisanship.
    You also ask whether additional language may be appended to subsection         (a)(3), so that it
    would read as follows:
    two members of different political parties appointed by the speaker
    of the house of representatives   from a list of at least 10 names
    submitted by the members of the house from each political party
    required by law to hold a primary, “acting together in some form,
    whether byformal caucus vote or through some sort ofjoint action.”
    Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Texas has held that the
    rules of statutory construction may be used in the interpretation of constitutional provisions. See
    Booth v. Strippleman, 
    61 Tex. 378
    (1884). In Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Systems, Inc.,
    
    996 S.W.2d 864
    (Tex. 1999), the Texas Supreme Court said that a court “may add words into a
    statutory provision only when necessary to give effect to clear legislative intent. . . . Only truly
    extraordinary circumstances showing unmistakable legislative intent should divert us from enforcing
    the statute as written.” 
    Id. at 867
    (emphasis added).
    The quoted italicized language does not appear in the Texas Constitution.    To require that
    a list be submitted in such a manner that members of a party “act together in some form, whether by
    formal caucus vote or through some sort of joint action” would require this office, or the courts, to
    rewrite the Texas Constitution by adding language that does not appear there. This we may not do.
    Similarly, we can find nothing in the constitution, the legislative history proposing the referenced
    amendment, or elsewhere, supporting the conclusion that the intent of section 24a was to require that
    the names be submitted through some kind of “joint action” by members of a party. To find
    otherwise could be construed as an unconstitutional infringement on a right specifically granted to
    a member of the House by the Texas Constitution.
    As an example of why a “formal caucus” may not be inferred from the constitutional
    language, we note that the term “legislative caucus” is referred to throughout the Election Code, and,
    The Honorable Mary Denny - Page 4                        (GA-02 13)
    in one section, it is specifically defined.* Consequently, the lack of reference in subsection (a)(3)
    to a “legislative caucus” precludes our construing the constitutional language to limit the Speaker
    to appointing a nominee from a list of names submitted by a legislative caucus.
    As to the issue of whether former Speaker Laney correctly followed a nominating procedure
    that comports with article III, section 24a, that matter appears to be in dispute. Compare Brief from
    Honorable Kenny Marchant, Chair, Committee on State Affairs, Texas House of Representatives,
    to Nancy Fuller, Chair, Opinion Committee, Office of the Attorney General (Apr. 15,2004) (on file
    with Opinion Committee), with Brief from Honorable James E. “Pete” Laney, Texas State
    Representative, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General (Apr. 16,2004) (on file with
    Opinion Committee). This office is not authorized to adjudicate factual disputes. See, e.g., Tex.
    Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-01 86 (2004) at 5 (stating that this office does not resolve questions of fact);
    JC-0020 (1999) at 2 (factual disputes may not be resolved in the opinion process); M-l 87 (1968) at
    3 (attorney general is unable to make factual determinations); WW-277 (1957) at 6 (attorney general
    does not pass upon questions of fact). What is abundantly clear, however, is that any appointment
    by the Speaker to the Commission that does not comport with the constitutional requirements set
    forth in article III, section 24a is invalid.
    % this section, ‘legislative caucus’ means an organization that is composed exclusively of members of the
    legislature, that elects or appoints officers and recognizes identified legislators as members of the organization, and that
    exists for research and other support ofpolicy development and interests that the membership hold in common. The term
    includes an entity established by or for a legislative caucus to conduct research, education, or any other caucus activity.
    An organization whose only nonlegislator members are the lieutenant governor or the governor remains a ‘legislative
    caucus’ for purposes of this section.” TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. Q 253.0341(e) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
    The Honorable Mary Denny      - Page 5        (GA-0213)
    SUMMARY
    Subsection (a)(3), article III, section 24a of the Texas
    Constitution    requires that the Speaker of the House of
    Representatives    appoint a Republican to the Texas Ethics
    Commission from a list of at least ten names submitted by
    Republican members of the House; and that he appoint a
    Democrat from a list of at least ten names submitted by
    Democratic members of the House. Nothing in article III,
    section 24a requires that the names be submitted by formal
    caucus or through any other sort of joint action of a political
    party. Rather, the Texas Constitution accords to individual
    members the right to submit to the Speaker the names of
    suggested appointees.
    BARRY R. MCBEE
    First Assistant Attorney General
    DON R. WILLETT
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    NANCY S. FULLER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Rick Gilpin
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0213

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017