Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2001 )


Menu:
  •     OW,CE OF THB ATTORNEY GENEP.AL STATE OF TEXAS
    JOHN    CORNYN
    January 5,200l
    The Honorable Pete P. Gallego                       Opinion No. JCL0325
    Chair, Committee on General Investigating
    Texas House of Representatives                      Re: Whether a governmental body may prohibit
    P.O. Box 2910                                       the holder of a concealed handgun license from
    Austin, Texas 78768-2910                            carrying a handgun onto property owned or
    controlled by the respective unit of government
    (RQ-0248-JC)
    Dear Representative   Gallego:
    You have requested our opinion regarding the authority of various units of government to
    prohibit the holder of a concealed handgun license horn carrying a handgun onto property owned
    or controlled by the particular unit of government. We conclude that while a governmental body
    does not have general authority to prohibit such conduct merely by promulgating its own rules,
    regulations, or policies, it may, pursuant to section 30.06 ofthe Penal Code, bar entry to a concealed
    handgun licensee carrying his weapon by providing individualized verbal notice to such a licensee
    or by erecting a sign or other written communication.
    We begin with an overview of the relevant statutes. Subchapter H of chapter 411 of the
    Government Code establishes a mechanism whereby an eligible individual may be licensed to carry
    a concealed handgun. In addition to the restrictions imposed by subchapter H, chapter 46 of the
    Penal Code places additional limitations on the carrying of concealed handguns by licensees.
    Section 46.035, for example, provides that a licensee commits an offense if he carries his weapon
    on the premises of a business licensed to serve alcoholic beverages; on the premises where a high
    school, collegiate, or professional sporting event is taking place; on the premises of a correctional
    facility; on the premises of a hospital or nursing home; in an amusement park; on the premises of
    an established place of religious worship; or “at any meeting of a governmental entity.” TEX. PEN.
    CODE ANN. $ 46.035(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2000). In addition, section 46.03, the general statute
    relating to the carrying of prohibited weapons, provides that “[i]t is not a defense to prosecution
    under this section that the actor possessed a handgun and was licensed to carry a concealed handgun
    under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code.” 
    Id. 5 46.03(f).
    Thus, section 46.03
    proscribes the carrying of a concealed handgun by a licensee in the following locations:
    (1) on the physical premises of a school or educational institution, any
    grounds or building on which an activity sponsored by a school or educational
    institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or
    The Honorable Pete P. Gallego        - Page 2         (JC-0325)
    educational institution, whether the school or educational institution is public or
    private, unless pursuant to written regulations or written authorization of the
    institution;
    (2) on the premises of a polling place on the day of an election or while early
    voting is in progress;
    (3) in any government court or offices utilized by the court, unless pursuant
    to written regulations or written authorization of the court;
    (4) on the premises of a racetrack, or
    (5) in a secured area of an airport.’
    (5) in or into a secured area of an airport2
    
    Id. 5 46,03(a)(1)-(5).
      As you note, however, the term “premises” in both section 46.03 and section
    46.035 is defined to exclude “any public or private driveway, street, sidewalk or walkway, parking
    lot, parking garage, or other parking area.” 
    Id. @ 46,03(c)(l),
    .035(f)(3). You ask whether, in
    addition to the specific statutory prohibitions oncarrying concealed handguns, “aunit ofgovemment
    [may] promulgate rules, regulations, or policies under which such possession would be unacceptable
    on its own property or property subject to its control.“3
    In our opinion, a unit of government has no authority, merely by promulgating rules,
    regulations, or policies, to prohibit entry by concealed handgun licensees carrying their weapons.
    As we have noted, subchapter H of chapter 411 of the Government Code enacts a comprehensive
    scheme for licensing the carrying of concealed handguns. Although subchapter H curiously does
    not indicate what it is that is authorized by the holding of a concealed handgun license, we believe
    we may reasonably infer that possessing such a license entitles the holder to carry a concealed
    handgun. Section 411.202, for example, states that “[tlhe issuance of a license under this subchapter
    is a benefit to the license holder.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 411.202 (Vernon 1998). As one court
    has said, “[a] permit to carry a concealed handgun, like other permits and licenses, is not a right but
    a privilege under regulations prescribed by the legislature.” Texas Dep ‘fofPub. Safety   v.Tune, 
    977 S.W.2d 650
    , 653 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. dism’d w.0.j.). Furthermore, by indicating
    ‘Text of subdivision (5) as amended by Act of May 29, 1997,7Sth Leg., R.S., ch. 1043, 5 1, 1997 Tex. Gen.
    Laws 3969.
    “Text of subdivision (5) 11samended by Act of May 3 1, 1997,75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1221,s 2, 1997 Tex. Gen.
    Laws 46X4,4685.
    ‘Letter from Honorable Pete P. Gallego, Texas State Representative,to Honorable John Comyn, Texas
    Attorney General at 2 (June 14,200O) (on tile with Opinion Committee).
    The Honorable Pete P. Gallego     - Page 3        (JC-0325)
    specific locations in which a licensee may not carry his weapon, section 46.035 of the Penal Code
    implies that he may carry his concealed handgun elsewhere.
    If subchapter H, chapter 411 of the Government Code thus authorizes a concealed handgun
    licensee to carry his weapon wherever a statute does not affirmatively prohibit his doing so, it
    follows that a unit of local government may not, by ordinance, rule, regulation, or policy, place
    restrictions on the licensee’s authority to do so. In Attorney General Opinion JC-0048, we said that
    the City of Carrollton may not adopt an ordinance prohibiting the killing of feral pigeons because
    “such killing is explicitly authorized by section 64.002(b) of the Parks and Wildlife Code.” Tex.
    Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0048 (1999) at 4. “What the statute allows[,] a city may not by ordinance
    forbid.” 
    Id. at 1.
    See City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.Zd 790, 796 (Tex. 1982)
    (ordinance conflicting or inconsistent with state legislation impermissible). We conclude that a unit
    of government may not, by ordinance, rule, regulation, or policy, bar the holder of a concealed
    handgun license from carrying his weapon onto property owned or controlled by the particular
    governmental unit.
    Neither does a provision of subchapter H governing the rights of employers authorize such
    a rule or policy. Section 411.203 ofthe Government Code provides that “[tlhis subchapter does not
    prevent or otherwise limit the right of a public or private employer to prohibit persons who are
    licensed under this subchapter from carrying a concealed handgun on the premises of the business.”
    TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. 5 411.203 (Vernon 1998). In Attorney General Opinion DM-363, issued
    in the immediate aftermath of the original enactment of the concealed handgun law, this office said
    that section 411.203 does not authorize a public or private employer to prohibit persons other than
    its employees from carrying concealed handguns on the premises of the business. The opinion
    reached this result on the basis of a thorough review and consideration of legislative history, and we
    concur with its conclusion. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-363 (1995).
    Although DM-363 found that section 411.203 does not furnish a general means by which a
    public or private employer may bar entry to all concealed handgun licensees carrying their weapons,
    it nevertheless determined that an employer possesses the means to restrict the carrying of concealed
    handguns by any person on property it controlled, by virtue of the criminal trespass statute, section
    30.05 of the Penal Code. See 
    id. at 9.
    Shortly after the issuance of Attorney General Opinion DM-
    363, this office also concluded that “[a] state or local governmental entity, by posting notice under
    the criminal trespass statute,” could “prohibit a gun-carrying concealed handgun licensee from
    entering or remaining on premises of which the governmental body is the ‘owner’ as defined in the
    Penal Code.” Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-058, at 3.
    During its 1997 session, the legislature enacted section 30.06 of the Penal Code, which
    creates the offense of “Trespass by Holder of License to Carry Concealed Handgun.” That statute
    provides:
    (4      A license holder commits an offense if the license holder:
    The Honorable Pete P. Gallego      - Page 4        (X-0325)
    (1) carries a handgun under the authority of Subchapter H,
    Chapter 411, Government Code, on property of another
    without effective consent; and
    (2) received notice that:
    (A) entry on the property by a license holder
    with a concealed handgun was forbidden; or
    (B) remaining   on the property with a
    concealed handgun was forbidden and failed
    to depart.
    @I      For purposes of this section, a person receives notice if the owner of the
    property or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner provides notice to
    the person by oral or written communication.
    (cl    In this section:
    (1) “Entry” has the meaning assigned by Section 30.05(b).
    (2) “License holder” has the meaning assigned by Section 46.035(f).
    (3) “Written communication”        means:
    (A) a card or other document on which is
    written language identical to the following:
    “Pursuant to Section 30.06, Penal Code
    (trespass by holder of license to carry a
    concealed handgun), a person licensed under
    Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government
    Code (concealed handgun law), may not enter
    this property with a concealed handgun”; or
    (B) a sign posted on the property that:
    (i) includes the language described by
    Paragraph (A) in both English and
    Spanish;
    (ii) appears in contrasting colors with
    block letters at least one inch in
    height; and
    The Honorable    Pete P. Gallego    - Page 5        (JC-0325)
    (iii) is displayed in a conspicuous
    manner clearly visible to the public.
    (4       An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor,
    TEX. PEN. CODE   ANN. 5 30.06 (Vernon Supp. 2000). For purposes of section 30.06, “‘[alnother’
    means a person other than the actor.” 
    Id. § 1.07(a)(5)
    (Vernon 1994). “Person” is defined as “an
    individual, corporation, or association.”   
    Id. 5 l.O7(a)(38).
     And “association” includes “a
    government or governmental subdivision or agency.” 
    Id. § 1.07(a)(6).
    Finally, “government”
    means:
    (A)      the state;
    PI       a county, municipality,   or political subdivision   of the state; or
    P-3      any branch or agency of the state, a county, municipality,              or political
    subdivision.
    
    Id. 5 l.O7(a)(24).
    The statutory language regarding the notice required under section 30.06 is virtually identical
    to that employed in section 30.05, the general criminal trespass statute. Because, under the reasoning
    of Attorney General Letter Opinion 95-058, section 30.05 is applicable to a governmental body for
    purposes of prohibiting the carrying of a concealed handgun, it naturally follows that the more
    specific section 30.06 permits a governmental body that is the “owner” of property to prohibit a
    concealed handgun licensee from carrying his weapon onto the premises of the governmental body.
    Furthermore, “ownership” does not present a problem in such a case. In Arnold v. State, 
    867 S.W.2d 378
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, in a criminal trespass case
    under section 30.05, the state may establish “ownership” of property “by proving, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that the complainant had a greater right to possession of the property than the
    defendant.” 
    Id. at 379.
    See also Vanderburgv. State, 874 S.W.2d 683,684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994);
    Sparkman v. State, 968 S.W.2d 373,377 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, pet. ref d). Thus, a governmental
    body, acting through its agent - i.e., “someone with apparent authority to act for the owner” -may
    act to bar entry to its property by concealed handgun licensees in the following manner: either by
    providing individualized      verbal notice to the licensee or by erecting a sign or other written
    communication,      in compliance with section 30.06, that furnishes statutory notice to concealed
    handgun licensees that entry on the property while carrying a concealed handgun is prohibited.
    The Honorable Pete P. Gallego      - Page 6       (JC-0325)
    SUMMARY
    A unit of government has statutory authority to bar entry to its
    property by a concealed handgun licensee carrying a weapon in the
    following manner: either by providing individualized verbal notice to
    the licensee or by erecting a sign or other written communication in
    compliance with section 30.06 of the Penal Code that furnishes
    statutory notice to concealed handgun licensees that entry on the
    property while carrying a concealed handgun is prohibited. However,
    a unit of government may not, merely by promulgating its own rules,
    regulations, or policies, bar the holder of a concealed handgun license
    from carrying his weapon onto property owned or controlled by the
    particular governmental unit.
    Attorney General of Texas
    ANDY TAYLOR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    CLARK KENT ERVIN
    Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel
    SUSAN D. GUSKY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Rick Gilpin
    Assistant Attorney General - Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JC-325

Judges: John Cornyn

Filed Date: 7/2/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017