Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2000 )


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  •                                                 November      IO,2000
    F.M. “Skip”Langley,   D.V.M., M.D., J.D.                    Opinion No. JC-0304
    Executive Director
    Texas State Board of Medical Examiners                       Re:     Whether the Texas Board of Medical
    P.O. Box 2018                                                Examiners may certify a foreign nonprofit
    Austin, Texas 78768-2018                                     corporation,   organized under the laws of a
    jurisdiction other than Texas, as anonprotit health
    organization under section 162.001(b) of the
    Occupations Code (RQ-0250-JC)
    Dear Dr. Langley:
    Section 162.001(b) of the Occupations Code directs the Board of Medical Examiners (the
    “Board”) to certify a health organization that “is a nonprofit corporation under the Texas Non-Profit
    Corporation Act” and that meets the other requirements set out in that section. TEX. Oct. CODE
    ANN. 5 162.001(b) (Vernon 2000). The Board construes this provision to mean that it may certify
    only nonprofit corporations organized under the Texas statute. The Texas Non-Profit Corporation
    Act deals with both nonprofit corporations incorporated thereunder and nonprofit corporations
    incorporated under the Jaws of other jurisdictions, namely, foreign corporations,       Because of the
    inadvertent certification of eight foreign corporations and their disagreement with the Board’s
    interpretation of section 162.001 (b), your predecessor in office asked whether the Board may certify
    foreign nonprofit corporations under this section. ’ We conclude that the Board’s long-standing
    construction that the statute allows certification of only Texas nonprofit corporations is a reasonable
    interpretation in harmony with the rest of the statute and is controlling.
    We begin by briefly reviewing the provisions of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act (the
    “Act”) and chapter 162 of the Occupations Code relevant to your question. The Act defines a non-
    profit corporation as “a corporation no part of the income of which is distributable to its members,
    directors, or officers.” TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.ANN. art. 1396-I .02 A(3) (Vernon 1997). A nonprofit
    corporation organized under the Act is a domestic corporation. See 
    id. art. 1396-1.02
    A(1). A
    nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of a jurisdiction other than Texas is a foreign
    corporation and is prohibited from conducting affairs in this state until it has procured a certificate
    of authority from the Secretary of State to do so. See 
    id. a&.1396-1.02 A(2),
    1396-8.01 A. A
    foreign corporation that obtains a certificate of authority enjoys the same privileges and is subject
    ‘See Letter from Bruce A. Levy, M.D., J.D., Executive Director, Texas State Board ofMedical Examiners, to
    Honorable     John Comyn, Texas Attorney General (June 19,200O) (on tile with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Request
    Letter].
    F.M. “Skip”Langley,     D.V.M., M.D., J.D. - Page 2            (X-0304)
    to the restrictions of a domestic corporation except with respect to its internal affairs and debt
    liability of its members. 
    Id. art. 1396-8.02
    A.
    Chapter 162 of the Occupations Code deals with Board certification of nonprofit health
    organizations. Section 162.001(a) directs the “board by rule [to] certify a health organization” that
    applies for certification and satisfies the further requirements of subsection (b) or (c). TEX. Oct.
    CODE ANN. 5 162.001(a) (Vernon 2000). Subsection (b) directs the Board to approve and certify
    a health organization that “is a nonprofit corporation under the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act
    [articles 1396-1.01 to 1396-11 .Ol oftheRevisedCivi1      Statutes] organized” to conductpublicinterest
    research, support medical education, improve and develop medical education and practice, deliver
    public health care, or provide public medical and health instruction.              
    Id. 5 162.001(b)(l).
    Additionally, the organization must be “organized and incorporated” only by persons licensed by the
    Board; and its directors and trustees must also be Board licensed and actively practicing medicine.
    
    Id. 5 162,001(b)(2),
    (3). Subsection(c) directs the Board to certify a health organization to contract
    or employ licensed physicians if the organization is “a nonprofit corporation under the          Act” and
    section 501(c)(3) ofthe United States Code, and is organized and operated as amigrant, community,
    or homeless health center or a federally qualified health center. 
    Id. 5 162.001(c).
    Finally, section
    162.003 authorizes the Board to refuse and revoke certification if the Board determines that the
    organization is established or operated with the intent to violate or violates the provisions regarding
    the practice of medicine. See 
    id. $ 162.003.
    Your predecessor’s question requires us to construe the phrase “anonprotit corporation under
    the      . Act” as used in section 162.001(b). The goal of statutory construction is to give effect to
    legislative intent, and where the language in the statute is unambiguous, that intent must be found
    in the plain and common meaning of the words used. Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mm. Util.
    Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937,939 (Tex. 1993); see also Texas Water Comm ‘n Y. Brushy CreekMun. Util.
    Dist., 917 S.W.2d 19,21 (Tex. 1996) (“We resort to rules of construction only when the statute in
    question is ambiguous.“). The language of section 162.001(b), however, is not unambiguous.            A
    “nonprofit corporation under the.       Act”may reasonably be understood to mean: (1) a corporation
    meeting the definition of a nonprofit corporation under the Act; (2) a nonprofit corporation
    incorporated under the Act, i.e., a domestic corporation; or (3) anonprofit corporation subject to the
    Act, i.e., a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation that has obtained a certificate of authority
    to do business in Texas. See Teleprofits of Tex., Inc. v. Sharp, 
    875 S.W.2d 748
    , 750 (Tex.
    App.-Austin      1994, no writ) (statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
    reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses); see also TEX.REV. CIV. STAT.ANN. arts.
    1396-1.01-1396-11.01       (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2000).
    In these circumstances, “[i]f a statute can be reasonably read as the agency has ruled, and that
    reading is in harmony with the rest of the statute, then [the court is] bound to accept that
    interpretation even ifotherreasonable     interpretations exist.” Berryv. State Farm Mut. Autolns. Co.,
    
    9 S.W.3d 884
    , 893 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Quick v. City ofAustin, 
    7 S.W.3d 109
    , 123 (Tex. 1998) (“While not controlling, contemporaneous            construction of a statute by the
    administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight.“). Additionally, we
    may consider legislative history and former statutory provisions, the circumstances under which the
    F.M. “Skip” Langley, D.V.M., M.D., J.D. - Page 3                           (X-0304)
    statute was enacted, the object sought to be obtained, and the consequences of a particular
    construction. See Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278,280 (Tex. 1994).
    For the past twenty-nine years, the Board has interpreted the statute to authorize certification
    only of domestic nonprofit corporations.        This interpretation is a reasonable interpretation in
    harmony with the other certification requirements of the statute. 
    SeeBewy, 9 S.W.3d at 893
    (court
    bound to accept administrative agency’s reasonable and harmonious reading). The legislature has
    assigned to the Board the authority to enforce section 162.001 and other provisions of the
    Occupations Code dealing with the practice of medicine. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. $5 15 1.003 (as
    matter of public policy, necessary to regulate practice of medicine and Board to remain primary
    means of licensing, regulating and disciplining physicians); 152.001 (Board authorized to regulate
    practice of medicine); 162.001(a) (“The board by rule shall certify            .“) (Vernon 2000). The
    legislature adopted the substance of subsections (a) and (b) of section 162.001 in 1971. See Act of
    May 25, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 627, 5 4, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 2037, 2041 (amending
    predecessor, former article 4509a of the Revised Civil Statutes). Since that time, the Board has
    consistently construed the law to authorize certification only ofnonprofit corporations incorporated
    under the Act. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 10-12. The Board’s construction was set out
    explicitly in the Texas Administrative Code from 1976 until 1996, when it was changed to comport
    with the statutory language. See id.’ The Board’s construction comports with the other provisions
    of the statute requiring the Board to investigate and ensure that nonprofit health organizations are
    organized and operated in accordance with section 162.00 1 to regulate, in turn, the corporate practice
    of medicine.
    The corporate practice of medicine is prohibited under the Occupations Code. A physician
    or an applicant for medical license is prohibited from aiding or abetting the practice of medicine by
    a person, partnership, association, or corporation not licensed to practice medicine by the Board.
    See TEX. Oct. CODE ANN. $ 164.052(17) (Vernon 2000); see also 
    id. $5 155.001
    (person may not
    practice medicine without license), ,003 (to be eligible for medical license, person must be twenty-
    one years old, of good professional character, and have completed medical school and training);
    Sampson v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 
    940 S.W.2d 128
    , 137 n.6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996),
    rev’d on other grounds, 
    969 S.W.2d 945
    (Tex. 1998) (“The prohibition ofthe corporate practice of
    medicine is the law in all states except Nebraska and Missouri.“). Texas courts have held that a
    corporation comprised of lay-persons that employs licensed physicians to treat patients and receives
    fees for the services provided is engaged in the unlawful practice of medicine; and the licensed
    physician so employed violates section 164.052(17) and is subject to having his or her medical
    2Former section 177.2(a), which became effective on January 1, 1976, required the Board to obtain an
    organization’s application for a charter from the Secretary of State and to establish that the “[alpplication is for charter
    for a nonprofit corporation under the Texas Civil Statutes article 1396-1.Ol ef seq.” Tex. Board of Medical Examiners,
    Rule 177.2 (effective l/l/76) (repealed 1992); see also Request Letter at 10-l 1. The 1976 provision was repealed in
    1992 and replaced by a provision requiring “a copy of the certificate of incorporation under the Texas Non-Profit
    Corporation Act.“proposed    17 Tex. Reg. 1171(1992), adopted 17 Tex. Reg. 2393,2394 (1992). The 1992 provision
    was repealed in 1996 and replaced by a provision written to reflect the statutory language. Seeproposed      20 Tex. Reg.
    9246,9247 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 107 (1996) (codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 5 177.3(3) (2000)).
    F.M. “Skip” Langley, D.V.M., M.D., J.D. - Page 4                 m-0304)
    license cancelled, revoked or suspended by the Board. See Garcia v. Texas State Bd. ofhfaf.
    Zhm’rs,      
    384 F. Supp. 434
    (W.D. Tex. 1974), @‘d, 
    421 U.S. 995
    (1975) (upholding
    constitutionality ofpredecessor to sections 162,001(b)(2) and 164.052(17) ); see also Flynn Bras.,
    Inc. v. FirstMed. Assocs., 715 S.W,2d782,784(Tex.    App.-Dallas 1986,writrefdn,r,e.)(andcases
    cited therein).
    While the legislative history is silent regarding the purpose of section 162.001(b),” its
    apparent purpose is to create a limited exception to the prohibition against the corporate practice of
    medicine.    See Union Bankers Ins. 
    Co., 889 S.W.2d at 280
    (when legislative intent cannot be
    discerned from statutory language, circumstances under which statute was enacted, legislative
    objective, and consequences ofparticularconstructionmay      be considered). The statute, by its terms,
    authorizes the Board to “certify” as health organizations those nonprofit corporations organized and
    directed by physicians licensed by the Board. They are “special health organizations because they
    allow the employment of physicians for the purpose of practicing medicine by a corporation, thus
    providing an exception to the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine in Texas.”
    Request Letter, supra note 1, at 4. Although a foreign corporation that obtains a certificate of
    authority to do business under the Act is generally subject to the restrictions and liabilities imposed
    on similar domestic corporations with respect to affairs conducted within the state, the law of its
    incorporating jurisdiction governs significant aspects of a foreign corporation. The Act provides
    that:
    [T]he laws       of the jurisdiction      of incorporation  of a foreign
    corporation     shall govern (1) the internal affairs of the foreign
    corporation,   including but not limited to the rights, powers, and duties
    of its board    of directors and members and matters relating to its
    membership,      and (2) the liability, if any, of members of the foreign
    corporation    for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the foreign
    corporation    for which they are not otherwise liable by statute or
    agreement.
    TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-8.02 A (Vernon 1997). Section 162.001(b) requires the Board
    to investigate and regulate the internal affairs of a nonprofit health organization to ensure that it
    is “organized and incorporated solely by persons licensed by the board” and “its directors and
    trustees      are     licensed by the board; and actively engaged in the practice of medicine.” TEX.
    Oct. CODEANN.       5 162,001(b)(2), (3) (V emon 2000); see 
    id. 5 164.052(17).
    The Board is expressly
    authorized to refuse certification if it determines that an organization is established, organized, or
    operated in violation of the law or with intent to violate the law. See 
    id. $162.003(l). And,
    it must
    revoke a certification granted to such an organization. See 
    id. §162.003(2). The
    Board asserts it
    cannot effectively perform these duties with respect to foreign corporations whose internal affairs
    and structure are governed by the laws of other jurisdictions; and we cannot say, as a matter of law,
    that the Board is incorrect.
    ‘See House Coma ONPUBLICHEALTH,BILL ANALYSIS,Tex. H.B. 882,62d Leg., R.S. (1971). The legislature
    did not begin audio-taping public bearings or floor debates until the following 1973 legislative session.
    F.M. “Skip” Langley, D.V.M., M.D., J.D. - Page 5                     (JC-0304)
    The doctrine of legislative acceptance lends further support to the Board’s interpretation.
    When the legislature reenacts without substantial change an ambiguous statute that has been
    previously construed by an agency charged with its execution, a court should ordinarily adopt the
    agency’s construction. See Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 
    815 S.W.2d 245
    , 248 (Tex. 1991);
    Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Montemayor, 
    24 S.W.3d 581
    , 585 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet.
    denied). Since 197 1, the legislature has twice substantively amended the law now codified in section
    162.001, but has not changed the language at issue to explicitly overrule the Board’s consistent and
    long-standing interpretation that only domestic nonprofit corporations may be certified as nonprofit
    health organizations. See Act ofMay 25, 1991,72d Leg., R.S., ch. 721, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws
    2559; Act of May 18, 1995,74th Leg., R.S., ch. 392, 5 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2939. In fact, the
    legislature again used the language at issue in the subsequently adopted subsection (c) authorizing
    the Board to certify an organization that “is a nonprofit corporation under the” Act and section
    501(c)(3) of the United States Code, and that is organized and operated as a migrant, community,
    or homeless health center or a federally qualified health center. See TEX. Oct. CODE ANN.
    5 162.001(c) (Vernon 2000); ActofMay 13,1999,76thLeg.,          RX, ch. 388,s 1, sec. 162.001,1999
    Tex. Gen. Laws 1431, 1510.
    Finally, we are unpersuaded that the Board’s interpretation violates the federal constitution.
    A brief submitted on behalf of several foreign nonprofit corporations contends that a construction
    denying certification to foreign nonprofit corporations wouldviolate the Full Faith and Credit Clause
    ofthe United Constitution, because “Texas would be refusing to give full faith and credit to the laws
    of the ofher states under which the foreign corporations are formed, instead requiring that the
    corporations be formed as Texas Corporations in order to do business in the state.““ We are unaware
    of any case law supporting this legal proposition. And the only case the brief cites in support, Wells
    Y. Hiskett, 
    288 S.W.2d 257
    (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.), is inapposite. Wells
    does not address the constitutionality,    under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, of a state statute
    excluding or restricting foreign corporations from engaging in an activity in that state. See also
    Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 
    282 U.S. 440
    , 444 (1931) (“[Virginia is under its
    constitution] simply       refusing to grant a foreign corporation a permit to transact local business
    without taking out a charter from the jurisdiction within which [the] business must be done. There
    is no substantial evidence that the refusal would impose a burden on interstate commerce and it is
    presumed to be constitutional.“). Instead, Wells merely deals withjudicial recognition ofa corporate
    entity by giving “full faith and credit” to its validly issued foreign charter:
    Appellees also alleged that the Corporation was not duly
    incorporated; that its permit to do business in Texas was obtained
    by fraud;       and that its charter and permit were in violation of
    the laws of Texas and Oklahoma.            The record in this case
    shows that the corporate charter of the Corporation granted by .
    Oklahoma was regular and valid; [and] that the permit and renewal
    permit issued. . . by.     Texas was valid and legal       We must
    ‘See Brief from David W. Hilgers, Hilgers & Watkins, to Honorable   John Comyn, Texas Attorney General at
    6-8(Sept. 11,200O) (on file with Opinion Committee).
    F.M. “Skip” Langley, D.V.M., M.D., J.D. - Page 6            (JC-0304)
    give ‘lb11 faith and credit’ to public acts of other states, which
    includes the issuance of charters to corporations.
    
    Wells, 288 S.W.2d at 263
    (citations omitted).
    In sum, although there may be other reasonable interpretations, the phrase “a nonprofit
    corporation under the.    Act” in section 162.001 (b) ofthe Occupations Code can reasonably be read
    as the Board has interpreted it, i.e., a nonprofit corporation organized under the Texas Non-Profit
    Corporation Act. As that interpretation is in harmony with the rest of the statute, we accept the
    Board’s interpretation and it is controlling.
    F.M. “Skip” Langley, D.V.M., M.D., J.D. - Page 7            (JC-0304)
    SUMMARY
    Because the phrase “a nonprofit corporation under the
    Act” in section 162.001(b) of the Occupations Code can reasonably
    be read as the Board of Medical Examiners has interpreted it, i.e., a
    nonprofit   corporation    organized under the Texas Non-Profit
    Corporation Act, and is in harmony with the rest of the statute, we
    accept that interpretation and it is controlling.
    Attorney General of Texas
    ANDY TAYLOR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    CLARK KENT ERVIN
    Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel
    SUSAN D. GUSKY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Sheela Rai
    Assistant Attorney General - Opinion Committee