Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1997 )


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  •                                    QBfficeof t&z Rlttornep Qkterat
    State of QLexae
    DAN MORALES                                             May 2, 1997
    ATTORNEY
    GENERAL
    The Honorable C. E. “Mike” Thomas III                        Opinion No. DM-438
    Howard County Attorney
    P.O. Box 2096                                                Re: Ad valorem taxation of equipment used to
    Big Spring, Texas 7972 1                                     produce. minerals on mineral leasehold estate, and
    related questions (RQ-918)
    Dear Mr. Willcerson:
    You have requested our opinion regarding the proper method of assessing and collecting ad
    valorem taxes’ on “casing, tubing, pump jacks, tanks, surf&e pipe” and other equipment used to
    produce minerals on a mineral leasehold estate. As you know, both real and personal property are
    subject to ad valorem taxation in Texas unless exempted by law corn taxation. Tax Code 6 11.01(a).
    Because certain tax statutes and tax provisions of the Texas Constitution treat real and personal
    property differently, property must be classified as one or the other for certain ad valorem taxation
    purposes.
    You state that the Howard County Tax Appraisal District* and “most, if not all, tax appraisal
    districts around the state, include in their appraisal of oil and gas mineral leasehold interests the
    production equipment necessBfy to produce the oil and gas.” You explain that a property owner has
    challenged the district’s appraisal method, as follows:
    A delinquent taxpayer has attempted to break out the portion of the
    account attributable to the production equipment and claim the four year
    statute of limitation applies to that portion of the account. The Howard
    County Tax Appraisal District has taken the position that the prod&on
    equipment is indispensable to the production of oil and gas on the leasehold
    estate, and is therefore taxable as an improvement, tixture or appurtenance to
    the realty and may be included in the value of the leasehold interest.
    You first ask whether the appraisal district may include the value of production equipment
    as part of the value of the mineral leasehold for which the equipment is used. We conclude that
    irrespective of whether production equipment is real or personal property, it must be appraised
    ‘Ad valomn   taxes are taxes imposed on the value of propxly. &&x’s LAW DICTIONARY5 l(6th           ed. 1990)
    ‘Appraisal dish&s are respomible for appraising pmpmty for taxing units that impose ad v&mu             taxes cm
    property located io tbe appmisd districi Tax code $6.01; Tex. Comt art. VIII, $ IS@). Taxing units include cities.
    counties. s&o01 districts, and other political s&divisions of the state that are authorized to impose and are imposing ad
    vd~taxesanpropaty.          TaxCode§      1.04(12).
    The Honorable C. E. “‘Mike”Thomas III - Page 2 @M-438)
    separately from its correspondiig mineral leasehold interest. The Tax Code specifically designates
    land, improvements, interests in real property, and personal property as separate taxable entities. See
    Tax Code $5 l.04,2S.02,.04.r Thus courts have held that land, improvements to land, and interests
    in land must be appraised separately, even though they are all included within the code’s definition
    of “real property.” See Cameron County Appraisal Review Bd v. Credirbanc Sm. Ass’n, 
    763 S.W.2d 577
    ,579-80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (“This specific enumeration by
    the legislature appears to show the legislative intent that land and improvements are separate
    entities.“); see ah Waker v. Appraisal Review Bd, 846 S.WSd 14, 16 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
    1992, writ denied) (“lR]equiring the Tax Appraisal District to maintain the separate listing of both
    land and improvement is more than a mere bookkeeping requirement.“). The appraisals may be
    combmed into one taxpayer account, but the account must retlect separate valuations for each taxable
    property. See Tax Code $Q 1.04,25.02, .04.
    You next ask which statute of limitations period applies to the collection of a delinquent tax
    account if the values of the production equipment and the mineral leasehold interest are combined
    into one account. As your question suggests, the classification of property as real or personal is
    material to the statute of limitations because the statute treats real and personal property ditTerently.
    It provides:
    (a) Personal property may not be seized and a suit may not be tiled:
    (1) to collect a tax on personal property that has been delinquent
    more than four years; or
    (2) to collect a tax on real ~property that has been delinquent more
    than 20 years.
    Id 5 33.05. Smce an account may include taxes on several taxable properties, a different limitations
    period may apply to diierent parts of the account. Determination of the appropriate statute of
    hmitations turns upon whether the property is real or personal. Ifthe property is personal, taxes on
    it may not be collected by suit or seizure ifthey have been delinquent for more than four years. Ifthe
    property is real, the twenty-year limitations period applies. You have asked about the property
    classification of equipment used to produce minerals on a mineral leasehold estate.
    Tiia to the 1919 codification of the Property Tax Code, the definition of”real prow       includedimpruvements
    tberem, and no provision required the improvements to be valued separstely. Thus prior to enactment of the new code,
    improvements were appraised as pm of the value of the real estate. See Attorney General Opinion H-370 (1974) at 2
    (referring to definition of reel property in former V.T.C.S. article 7146 and conchding that value ofiixtum     and otta
    impma          on ld ?sbdd be inchled in the value assigned to the realty”); c/: Comerun CountyAppmtsaiReview         Bd
    Y. Creditbanc Sm. Ass%. 
    763 S.W.2d 577
    .579-80           (Tex. App.-Capus       Christi 1988, writ denied) (TJn&r the new
    provisions of the Prop&y Tax Code tbe legislature has spe&cally designated land and impmvemmts and other taxable
    in-       as separate entities of real proper@.“).
    p.   2443
    The Honorable C. E. “Mike” Thomas III - Page 3 @M-438)
    We begin with the relevant statutory definitions. “‘Personal property” is property that is not
    real property. ZG!$1.04(4). “Real property” is:
    (A)   land;
    (B)   an improvement;
    (C)   a mine or quarry;
    (D)   a mineral in place;
    (E)   standing timber; or
    (F) an estate or interest, other than a mortgage deed of trust
    creating a hen on property or an interest securing payment or
    performance of an obligation in a property enumerated in Paragraphs
    (A) through (E) of this subdivision.
    Id 3 1.04(2). Since oil and gas and other mineral leaseholds are “estates or interests” in minerals in
    place, they are taxable as real property. Prince Bras Drilling Co. v. FArman Petroleum Cop., 
    150 S.W.2d 314
    (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ refd); Attorney General Opinion MW- 402 (1981).
    Thus the twenty-year limitations period applies to the collection of delinquent taxes on mineral
    leaseholds.
    With respect to minerrd production equipment used on a leasehold, you state that the Howard
    County Appraisal District and other districts around the state appraise production equipment as real
    property along with the corresponding oil and gas leasehold interests because the equipment is
    “indispen&le to the production of oil and gas on the leasehold estate, and is therefore taxable as an
    improvement, fixture, or appurtenance to the realty.” We found no authority to support your view
    that property is considered an improvement, fixture, or appurtenance to real property if it is
    “indispensable” to the property. Furthermore, since a mineral interest is taxable whether it is
    “producing” or not, we decline to link the tax classiication of equipment to the production status of
    the interest. See Attorney General Opinion MW-402 (1981) at 2; Tax Code § 23.17.
    Instead, an “improvement” taxable as real property is de&d      by the Tax Code as:
    (A) a building, structure, tixture, or fence erected on or atlixed
    to land; or
    (B) a transportable structure that is designed to be occupied for
    residential or business purposes, whether or not it is atIixed to land,
    if the owner of the structure owns the land on which it is located,
    unless the structure is unoccupied and held for sale or normally is
    located at a particular place only temporarily.
    D.   2444
    The Honorable C. E. ‘Mike” Thomas III - Page 4 (DM-438)
    Tax Code $1.04(3). Courts have long considered three factors in determining whether an article of
    property affixed to real property’ is an improvement:5
    (1) the mode and sufliciency of the annexation of the article to the realty,
    whether real or constructive;
    (2) the adaptation of the article to the uses or purposes of the realty; and
    (3) the intention of the party making the annexation.
    The third factor, intention, is the preeminent factor, and the first two are evidence of intention. See
    Sormier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co., 909 S.W.2d 475,479 (Tex. 1995); Logan v. Mullis, 
    686 S.W.2d 605
    , 607-08 (Tex. 1985); Hutchins v. Masterson &Street, 
    46 Tex. 551
    , 554 (1877).
    In Attorney General Opinion H-370 (1974) this office considered the three factors with
    respect to the classification of a water pump and irrigation casing used with a water well. We
    concluded that the classitication of property as real or personal requires the consideration of facts
    unique to each piece of property.
    ~]eaolution of the question of whether or not certain property is a fixture
    depends on the circumstances surrounding its placement on the land with
    particular emphasis being accorded to the intention of the party, or parties,
    who has placed it there. Since the same article or structure may in one set of
    circumstances be considered realty and in another be considered personal@
    no categorical rules applicable to particular properties can be stated.
    Attorney General Opiion H-370 (1974) at 3; see aIsoMeIe?r& v. State, 902 S.W.2d 132,137 (Tex.
    App.--Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, no writ) (“Generally, whether a particular item is a Sxture or
    personalty is a question of fact, and should be determined by the factfinder.“). We similarly are of
    the opinion that neither this office nor county appraisal districts can categorically classify mineral
    production equipment as either real or personal property. Determinations of the proper tax
    classitication of production equipment must be made on a case-by-case basis.
    Court opinions addressing the tax treatment of mineral production equipment offer some
    guidance for districts in making these determinations. InMuro Co. v. State, 
    168 S.W.2d 510
    (Tex.
    Cii. App.-Amarillo 1943, writ ref d), Wdbarger County argued that casing, rods, tubing, pumps, and
    WbilCihCT.%XCOdCSCClU.5tOdCfbCllC”impWCUl        en~“~inreIatioototheslnfaceofthelanduponwhichit
    is placed, courts have reoogniml that improvcmuI ts may be d&d       in relation to lcasebold in-.         See Shugurf v.
    Nomalndep.     Sch Dist, 288 S.W.2d 243,241 (Tex Cii. App.-Fort Wotih 19%. no wit); Mar0 Co. v. State, 
    168 S.W.2d 510
    ,512(Tcx     Civ. App.--Amarillo 1943,wti~tv.fd).
    “‘FixRue” is included in the statutcsy dehition of “improvement”     Tax Code 0 1.04(3). “Apprtrtenancts” arc
    dogons    to improvmts      and lixtwes. See Hamoxv. Peek, 355 S.W.Zd 568,569 (Tcx. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962.
    wit r&d n.r.c.). Our rcsearc hshowsthstthesamefactorsare~bycorntstodeterminewhctherpropertyisim
    improvcmcnt, cxlnre, or applntenancc.
    The Honorable C. E. Yvlike” Thomas III - Page 5 (DM438)
    other equipment used to produce oil on a leasehold estate was real property. Applying the three
    factors discussed above, the court stated that “it stands to reason that the intention of the parties to
    the original lease contract would be to place the casing, rods, tubing and even the pumps and tanks
    on such a leasehold for temporary use only with the full intention of removing them onto other leases
    if desired, and certainly in case production became unprofitable.” The court held that “the casing,
    rods, tubing and other such property        was not a part of the realty.” Id at 5 13.
    In shugar v. Nocona Znakpendent School District, 288 S.W.2d 243,247 (Tex. Civ. App.-
    Fort Worth 1956, no writ), a taxing unit argued that the casing, surface pipe, storage tanks, and ,other
    production equipment located on leased premises were personal property that could be seized and
    sold for payment of a tax debt. The court agreed citing Man, and applying the three factors, because
    the record in the case showed that the oil field operator “reserved complete charge and possession
    [of the equipment] along with the right of removal, in case of abandonment, of all of it, even
    including the salvageable pipe in the hole.” Id at 247.
    And in Lingleville Independent school Disbicr v. Valero Transmission Co., 
    763 S.W.2d 616
    (Tex. App.-Eastland 1989, writ denied), taxing units tiled suit to collect delinquent taxes on a gas
    pipeline buried beneath the ground. The pipeline owner argued that the suit was barred by the four-
    year statute of limitations because the pipeline was personal property. The evidence in the case
    showed that the pipeline company and the surlbce property owner expressly agreed that the company
    could remove or replace the pipeline at any time. The court held that the pipeline was personal
    property because the evidence showed that the parties never intended the pipeline to become a
    permanent part of the realty. Id
    Armed with facts, this office determined in Attorney General Opinion O-5268 (1943) that
    while pipeline located on an easement was personal property, the pumping equipment also located
    there was real property. The instrument conveying the easement provided that the grantee “‘may
    remove [the pipeline] . . . in whole or in part at will.“’ Id at 7. With respect to the pumping equip-
    ment, however, the attorney general conchrded that “[w]e have been placed in possession of no facts
    which indicate the pumping equipment was not intended by the parties to become a part of the
    realty.” Id at 8. The Attorney General cited cases in support of classifying pumping equipment as
    real property, but all of the cases were from states other than Texas. Id
    In sum, a determination of whether mineral production equipment is personal or real property
    depends upon factors relating to the equipment’s placement on the mineral leasehold. If the
    equipment is personal property, taxes on it may not be collected by suit or seizure if they have been
    delinquent for more than four years. Ifthe equipment is an “improvement,” and thus “real property
    as defined by the Tax Code, the twenty-year limitations period applies. Irrespective of whether the
    equipment is real or personal, it must be appraised separately from the mineral interest for which it
    is used.
    p.   2446
    The Honorable C. E. “Mike” Thomas III - Page 6 @M-438)
    SUMMARY
    For purposes of ad valorem taxation, the value of mineral production
    equipment must be appraised separately .gom the vahre of the mineral
    leasehold interest for which the equipment is used. Determination of the ap-
    plicable statute of limitations period for collection of delinquent ad valorem
    taxes turns upon whether the property is real or personal. If the property is
    personal, taxes on it may not be coIlected by suit or seizure if they have been
    delinquent for more than four years. Ifthe property is real, the twenty-year
    limitations period applies. Mineral production equipment cannot be cate-
    gorically &ssi&d as either real or personal property. Instead, determinations
    of the proper tax classification of production equipment must be made on a
    case-by-case basis.
    DAN     MORALES
    Attorney General of Texas
    JORGE VEGA
    Fist Assistant Attorney General
    SARAH J. SHIRLEY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Barbara GrifIin
    Assistant Attorney General
    p.   2447