Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1989 )


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  •                         May 23, 1989
    Honorable Garry Mauro          Opinion No.   JM-1049
    Commissioner
    General Land Office            Re: Whether real     property
    Stephen F. Austin Building     belonging to the    Permanent
    1700 North Congress Avenue     School Fund is exempt    from
    Austin, Texas 78701            property taxes when it is
    leased to a private business
    (RQ-1408)
    Dear Mr. Mauro:
    You ask five questions regarding the taxability      of
    certain interests in real property comprising   part of the
    permanent school fund, specifically, the interest retained
    by the state when it has leased land to private businesses.
    Your request is prompted      by the following two      fact
    situations.  First, in September 1986, the state acquired
    title in fee simple absolute to two tracts of land in
    Tarrant County for the use and benefit of the permanent
    school fund. At the time that the state acquired title, you
    leased both tracts on behalf of the permanent school fund to
    a Texas corporation.  A commercial strip shopping center is
    located on one tract: no improvements are located on the
    second tract. The permanent school fund owns only the real
    property; it owns none of the improvements located thereon.
    The Texas corporation  to which you leased the first tract
    owns the improvements and, in turn, has subleased the tract
    to the occupants of the stores. In October of 1987, Tarrant
    County and an independent school district located in Tarrant
    County sent tax statements    to the General Land Office,
    imposing ad valorem taxes on the real property but not on
    the improvements.
    The second situation you ask'about   involves the tax-
    ability of coastal and upland lands that are dedicated     by
    statute to the permanent  school fund. Pursuant to chapter
    33 of the Natural Resources Code, the School Land Board, of
    which you are a member, has the authority to grant easements
    for private use of coastal and upland public      land and
    leases for use by public entities.  It is your understanding
    P. 5442
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 2     (JM-1049)
    that local taxing units intend to impose ad valorem   taxes
    against easement holders that engage in private businesses
    (such as oil and gas pipelines       and commercial  marina
    operations) based upon the property values of the permanent
    school fund property encumbered by the easements.
    You contend that both the permanent   school fund land
    leased to a private business enterprise,    as well as any
    leasehold interest encumbering it, is exempt from property
    taxation.  In other words, you contend that both the real
    property in the hands of the state and the leasehold
    interest in the hands of the private lessee are exempt  from
    property taxation.  In the alternative, you contend that, if
    the permanent school fund land that is leased to a private
    business enterprise  is taxable, then only the leasehold
    estate is taxable to the private business enterprise:    YOU
    contend that the real property itself is not taxable to the
    state.
    You first ask:
    Does TEX. CONST. art. VIII, 52 and art. VII,
    ~$5, in conjunction with Tex. Tax Code Ann.
    §ll.ll(a)   (Vernon 1982), exempt Permanent
    School Fund property from ad valorem,property
    taxes even though leased to a private busi-
    ness enterprise?
    We conclude that the state's interest in land that is part
    of the permanent   school fund is exempt from ad valorem
    taxation, even if the state has leased the land to a private
    concern to be used for a private purpose.
    Article VIII, section 1, of the Texas Constitution
    provides in relevant part: "All real property and tangible
    personal property  in this State . . . shall be taxed in
    proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may
    be provided by law." Article VIII, section 2, provides   in
    relevant part that "the legislature may, by general   laws,
    exempt from taxation public property used for        public
    purposes."1   Pursuant to article VIII, section     2, the
    1. Article XI, section 9, of the Texas Constitution,
    by its terms, exempts "property of counties,    cities and
    towns, owned and held only for public purposes,   . . . and
    (Footnote Continued)
    P. 5443
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 3        (JM-1049)
    legislature enacted section 11.11 of the Tax Code, governing
    the taxation of public property:
    (a) Except as provided by Subsections (b)
    and (c) of this section, property owned by
    this state or a political subdivision of this
    state is exempt from taxation if the orouerty
    is used for DubliC oUrIJOSeS.2
    (b) Land owned by the Permanent Univer-
    sity Fund is taxable for county purposes.
    Any notice required by Section 25.19 of this
    code [Notice of Appraised Value]    shall be
    sent to the State Property Tax Board, and the
    board shall appear in behalf of the state in
    any protest or appeal relating to taxation of
    Permanent University Fund land.
    (c) Agricultural   land or grazing land
    owned by a county for the benefit of public
    schools under Article VII, section 6, of the
    Texas Constitution   is taxable for all pur-
    poses. The county shall pay the taxes on the
    land from the revenue derived from the land.
    If revenue from the land is insufficient  to
    pay the taxes, the county shall pay the bal-
    ance from the county general fund.
    (d) Pronertv owned bv the state that is
    not used for wublic nurnoses     is taxable.
    Prowertv owned bv a state aaencv or institu-
    tion is not used for DUbliC ourooses if the
    (Footnote Continued)
    all other property devoted exclusively     to the use and
    benefit of the public . . . from taxation . . . ;'I     This
    section is self-executing.    Because the last clause has
    never been construed to apply to property owned by the
    state, we need not discuss the cases involving counties  and
    cities that rely upon this provision.
    2.  The Texas Supreme Court has construed the relevant
    language of article     VIII, section 2,     of the    Texas
    Constitution to require exclusive use by the political
    subdivision in order that it receive exempt status. Leander
    IndeD. School Dist.  v. Cedar Park Water SUDD~V Corp., 
    479 S.W.2d 908
    (Tex. 1972).
    p.    5444
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 4    (JM-1049)
    prowertv is rented or leased for comoensation
    to a orivate business   enternrise to be used
    by it   for a wurwose not related to the
    performance of the duties and functions of
    the state aaencv or institution    or used to
    provide private    residential housing     for
    compensation to members of the public    other
    than students and employees     of the state
    agency or institution owning the property,
    unless the residential use is secondary     to
    its use     by an   educational    institution
    primarily for instructional purposes.      Any
    notice required by Section 25.19 of this code
    shall be sent to the agency or institution
    that owns the property,   and it shall appear
    in behalf of the state in any protest       or
    appeal related to taxation of the property.
    (e) It is provided, however, that pro-
    perty that is held or dedicated       for the
    support, maintenance,    or   benefit of   an
    institution of higher education as defined by
    Section 61.003(7), Texas Education Code, but
    is not rented or leased for compensation to a
    private business enterprise to be used by it
    for a purpose not related to the performance
    of the duties and functions of the state or
    is not rented or leased to provide private
    residential housing to members of the public
    other than students and employees      of the
    state is not taxable.   (Emphasis added.)
    By the terms of subsection    (d), it might appear that the
    state's interest in the Tarrant County lands you ask about
    are taxable to the state, since both are leased for
    compensation to a private business enterprise to be used by
    it for a purpose not related to the performance        of the
    duties of the School Land Board. You contend, however, that
    leasing such property  for compensation that will inure to
    the benefit of the permanent school fund is precisely      the
    public purpose  for which the permanent     school   fund was
    created and that, therefore, the state is exempt from ad
    valorem taxation on such property. We agree with your
    assertion.  Before we discuss specifically the questions you
    submit, we first will present some background      information
    regarding the taxation of the various constitutional    school
    funds in Texas.
    P- 5445
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 5    (JM-1049)
    Article VII of the~Texas Constitution governs public
    education on both the ublic elementary and secondary school
    and university levels. I: Sections 10 through 18 of article
    VII set forth the provisions     regarding university  level
    education: sections 1 through 8 of article VII set forth the
    provisions regarding public elementary and secondary  school
    education. Article VII, section 11, creates a permanent
    university  fund, comprising,    inter alia, certain   lands
    dedicated for such purposes, as well as the proceeds derived
    from the sale thereof: interest derived from the investment
    of the proceeds   of the sale of such lands is usually
    referred to as the "available university fund." Article VII
    was amended in 1930 by the addition of section 16(a), which
    provides that all land mentioned in sections 11, 12, and 15
    of article VII, then belonging   to the University of Texas,
    shall be subject to taxation for county purposes to the same
    extent as lands privately     owned.4    See also Tax Code,
    § 11.11(b).
    Sections 2 and 6 of article VII create two distinct
    types of trust funds in what has been termed a dual system
    for public elementary and secondary education;   section 2
    dedicates state-owned  land to a state "perpetual    school
    3. Additionally, article VII, section 9, of the Texas
    Constitution  dedicates  all lands then granted    for the
    benefit of the "Lunatic, Blind, Deaf and Dumb, and Orphan
    Asylums" to create a permanent fund for their support,
    maintenance and improvement.
    4. The "Interpretive Commentary"    to article VII,
    section 16(a), declares the purpose behind the adoption of
    the 1930 amendment:
    Due ~to the policy of the Board of Regents
    withholding the university lands from sale in
    spite of Art. 7, § 12 of the constitution,
    some of the   poorer counties contained large
    areas of untaxable land. In order to assist
    these counties this amendment was adopted  in
    1930.
    See also 2 Braden, The Constitution  of the State of Texas:
    An Annotated and Comparative Analysis, at 551-52 (1977).
    p. 5446
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 6    (JM-1049)
    fund,l15 while section 6 grants certain lands to counties
    also for the benefit of the public schools. -2        Braden,
    suwra, at 530-31. Income derived from the state "permanent
    school fund" is designated by article VII, section 5, as the
    "available school fund." Section 6 creates what is, in
    effect, a system of permanent   school funds for the various
    counties, with the income derived from permanent       county
    school fund    investments    dedicated  to   each   county's
    "available school fund." Article VII was amended in 1927 by
    the addition of section 6a (and, subsequently, in 1972 by
    the addition of 6b), which specifically makes taxable     for
    all except state purposes those lands set aside for the
    county permanent school funds.6 See Tax Code, 4 11.11(c).
    5. The terminology    used to designate  the fund is
    confusing:  section 2 refers to it as the "perpetual  school
    fund".and "perpetual public school fund:" section 4 refers
    to it as the "public free school fund;" and section 5 labels
    it the "permanent school fund." The Texas Supreme      Court
    long ago opted for the appellation of section 4, stating
    that sections 2 and 5 provided that certain       funds and
    property constituted   a "public free school fund."     y&r&
    County v. Board of School Trustees, 
    65 S.W. 878
    (Tex. 1901).
    The endowment  has been enlarged    from time to time by
    statute, which designates   it the "permanent school  fund."
    Educ. Code 5 15.01.    By your use of the phrase  "Permanent
    School Fund land," we understand    you to mean that real
    property dedicated   by section 2 of article VII, whose
    components have been added to by amendment to section  15.01
    of the Education Code.
    6. The "Interpretive    Commentary"  to article    VII,
    section 6a, sets forth the reason for the amendment:
    Article  11, Section    9 of the     Texas
    Constitution exempts from taxation  'property
    of counties, cities, and towns owned and held
    for public purposes.'    In 1888, the Texas
    Supreme Court held that no tax could be
    levied on a lease-holder of school lands:
    t*County school lands, when leased to raise an
    available school fund, are as exclusively
    devoted to the use and benefit of the public
    as they would be if covered with school-
    (Footnote Continued)
    P. 5447
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 7    (JM-1049)
    Therefore,  land    comprising   the  state   permanent
    university fund is taxable for county purposes only.    Land
    comprising  the permanent    school funds of the     various
    counties is taxable   for all, except state, purposes.   YOU
    ask about the taxability    of lands comprising neither the
    permanent university fund nor the various county permanent
    school funds, but rather       those comprising  the   state
    permanent school fund: Neither the Texas Constitution    nor
    the Tax Code specifically      addresses the issue of the
    taxability of such lands. Nor has any Texas court case or
    attorney general opinion addressed the issue.
    For two reasons we conclude that, under the provisions
    of section 11.11 of the Tax Code, those lands set aside by
    article VII, section 2, of the Texas Constitution for the
    benefit of the public free schools are exempt       from ad
    valorem taxation, even in the event that they are leased for
    compensation to private business enterprises to be used for
    purposes not related to the performance   of the duties and
    functions of the School Land Board.      Moreover,  even if
    section 11.11 of the Tax Code fairly could be construed   as
    requiring the taxation of permanent school fund land, we
    construe article VII, section 5, of the Texas Constitution
    as forbidding it.
    First, we do not construe section 11.11 of the Tax Code
    to require the taxation of permanent school fund land.    By
    the very terms of subsection    11.11(a) of the Tax Code,
    subsections (b) and (c) of section 11.11, which require the
    taxation in certain instances of permanent university   fund
    (Footnote Continued)
    houses; and the constitution      forbids the
    taxation of the means through which such
    lands may be made to yield a revenue, without
    sale, as fully as does it forbid the taxation
    of the lands. Forbidding the taxation of the
    lands, it forbids the taxation of an estate
    less than fee, whether imposed on the county
    or its lessee."    (Daugherty v. Thompson, 71
    T. 192, 
    9 S.W. 99
    )
    In order to permit such taxation,   except
    for state purposes, Sec. 6a was added to the
    Constitution in 1927.
    See also 2 Braden, m,     at 533-34.
    P- 5448
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 8     (JM-1049)
    land and land comprising the various county permanent school
    funds, serve as exceptions    to the general principles   set
    forth in subsections   (a) and (d).   The express mention  or
    enumeration of one person, thing, consequence, or class is
    tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. State v.
    Mauritz-Wells Co., 
    175 S.W.2d 238
    (Tex. 1943); Ex carte
    McIver, 586 S.W.Zd 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). We conclude
    that the express inclusion of subsections (b) and (c), which
    indicates the intention of the legislature    to require the
    taxation of certain specified   state-owned land as provided
    by the Texas Constitution, likewise indicates the intention
    of the legislature not to require the taxation of permanent
    school fund land.
    Second, we agree with your assertion that the sale or
    lease of land dedicated by article VII, section 2, of the
    Texas Constitution,  with the proceeds   from such sale or
    lease becoming part of the permanent school fund, is the
    precise public purpose for which such land was dedicated  in
    the first instance. Even a cursory reading of the relevant
    provisions of article VII of the constitution makes it clear
    that the legislature  that proposed those sections and the
    voters who adopted them did not intend, not that the land
    itself would be used for educational   purposes, but rather
    that the income derived from its sale or lease would be so
    used. The establishment    of such a fund in the Texas
    Constitution impresses upon the fund the nature of a public
    purpose. Absent specific constitutional language   requiring
    taxation, the state's interest in such dedicated lands is
    tax exempt.
    Subsections (a) and (d) of section 11.11 of the code,
    taken together,   provide the following:     (1) that   all
    property owned by the state or a political subdivision   is
    exempt from taxation if the property is used for a public
    purpose; (2) that property so owned that is not used for a
    public purpose is taxable: and,  (3) that property so owned
    that is rented or leased for compensation to a private
    business enterprise  to be used by it for a purpose     not
    related to the performance of the duties and functions   of'
    the political  subdivision, except under certain specified
    exceptions, is not used for a public purpose and therefore
    is taxable.
    If the legislature had intended that land owned by
    either the permanent university  fund, the various   county
    permanent school funds, or the permanent  school fund fall
    within the ambit of (3) above      (or, more specifically,
    subsection  (d) of section ll.ll), it would have been
    P. 5449
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 9    (JM-1049)
    unnecessary to include subsections (b) and     (c) in section
    11.11, making land owned by the permanent university     fund
    and by the various county permanent    school funds taxable.
    The very terms of subsection (d) ordinarily would require
    the taxation of such dedicated lands.     If the legislature
    had assumed that such dedicated     lands would be taxable,
    subsections (b) and   (c) would be mere suf;;z;a;z and the
    earlier amendments adding section 6a and              article
    VII would have been unnecessary.    The legislature is never
    presumed to do a useless act. H unter v.
    corr,., 
    620 S.W.2d 547
    (Tex. 1981): State v. Citv of Dallas,
    319 S.W.Zd 767 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1958), aff'd, State
    v. Citv of Austin,    331 S.W.Zd 737 (Tex. 1960). Had the
    legislature intended that permanent    school fund lands be
    taxable, it is reasonable   to assume that it would have so
    provided.
    Finally, when construing section 11.11 of the Tax Code,
    we must presume that the legislature       intended compliance
    with the Texas Constitution.    Gov't Code, g 311.021(l).  The
    legislature could not have intended that section 11.11 of
    the Tax Code be construed to require the state's interest in
    permanent school fund land that is leased to a private
    business enterprise be taxed, because to do so would violate
    subsection (a) of section 5 of article VII. That subsection
    provides in relevant part:      "Except as provided by this
    section, no law shall ever be enacted appropriating any part
    of the permanent     or available   school' fund to any other
    purpose whatever    . . . .@I This subsection has been con-
    strued to prevent the use of any proceeds for any purpose
    not specifically authorized. gg, e.q., Greene v. Robison,
    
    8 S.W.2d 655
       (Tex. 1928) and companion cases: Jerniaan   v.
    Finlev, 
    38 S.W. 24
    (Tex. 1896); Attorney General Opinions
    H-881, H-878     (1976); V-147    (1947).   We have found no
    authorization permitting proceeds to be expended       for ad
    valorem taxation, either in the Texas Constitution or in the
    Tax,~ Education, or Natural Resources Codes.
    We deem it significant that those        constitutional
    provisions that govern both the permanent university     fund
    and the various county permanent school funds do not contain
    restrictive language comparable to that found in section    5
    governing the permanent school fund. Moreover, we deem it
    significant that sections 6a, 6b and 16(a) of article VII
    had to be added before permanent university    land and the
    lands comprising the various county permanent school funds
    were taxed.
    P- 5450
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 10   (JM-1049)
    Accordingly, we answer your first question      in the
    affirmative; the state's interest in lands owned by the
    permanent school fund that are rented or leased to private
    business enterprises is exempt from ad valorem taxation.
    You next 'ask:
    If any of the tracts mentioned above are not
    fully exempt, are the leasehold estates taxed
    according to Tex. Tax Code Ann. 523.13 and if
    so, to what extent, if any, is the Permanent
    School Fund liable for any taxes that may be
    assessed?
    Section 25.07 of the Tax Code requires that certain
    leasehold and other possessory interests in exempt property
    be listed in the appraisal rolls in the name of the owner of
    the possessory  interest. Section 25.07 of the Tax Code
    provides in part:
    (a) Except as provided by Subsection    (b)
    of this section,      a leasehold or     other
    possessory  interest in property    that    is
    exempt from taxation to the owner of the
    estate or    interest   encumbered   by    the
    possessory interest shall be listed in the
    name of the owner of the possessory  interest
    if the duration of the interest may be at
    least one year.
    (b) Except as provided by Subsections (b)
    and (c) of Section 11.11 of this code, a
    leasehold or other possessory    interest in
    exempt property may not be listed if:
    (1) the   property      is   permanent
    university fund land;
    (2) the property   is county     public
    school fund agricultural land.
    Section 23.13 of the Tax Code governs the appraisal   of
    such taxable leaseholds and provides:
    A taxable  leasehold or other possessory
    interest in real property that is exempt from
    taxation to the owner of the estate or
    interest   encumbered   by   the   possessory
    interest is appraised at the market value of
    P. 5451
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 11     (JM-1049)
    the leasehold or other possessory   interest.
    However, the appraised value may not be less
    than the total rental paid for the interest
    for the current tax year.
    Sections 25.07 and 23.13 of the code and           their
    predecessor statutes have been construed to provide for the
    taxation of a leasehold interest in real property, even in
    an instance in which the real property       is exempt   from
    taxation to the owner.     See, e.a., Martin v. Citv of
    Mesouite, 590 S.W.Zd 793 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1979, Writ
    ref'd n.r.e.); Irvina Indew. School Dist. v. Delta Airlines,
    Inc., 
    534 S.W.2d 365
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1976, writ
    ref'd n.r.e.) (predecessor statute to section 23.13 of the
    Tax Code specifically held to be constitutional):    Attorney
    General Opinions WW-281, WW-270   (1957); O-4661 (1942).   We
    conclude that, by the clear terms of sections 11.11, 25.07
    and 23.13 of the Tax Code, the leasehold interests in land
    comprising part of the permanent school fund are taxable to
    the owners of those interests. The permanent school fund
    itself is not liable for such taxes.
    We have already concluded that permanent school fund
    land is not taxable to the state; we know of no reason why
    section 23.13 of the Tax Code does not require the taxation
    of the leasehold estate. Id.7     In such an instance, the
    permanent school fund would not be liable in the event that
    the owner of the leasehold estate fails to tender properly
    any taxes imposed.
    You next ask:
    7. You rely principally upon Dauahertv v. Thomwson, 
    9 S.W. 99
    (Tex. 1888) and two cases which rely upon Dauahertv,
    Davis v. Burnett, 
    13 S.W. 613
    (Tex. 1890), and Montaomerv v.
    Peach River Lumber Co., 
    117 S.W. 1061
    (Tex. Civ. App. 1909),
    in suwoort of the nrooosition  that a leasehold interest in
    exempt-land  is aiso-  exempt. In a case discussing      the
    history of the predecessor statutes to section 23.13 of the
    Tax Code, the Supreme Court of Texas declared,   inter alia,
    that Dauaherty  is no longer controlling     on the issue.
    Philliws Chemical co. v. Dumas Indew. School Dist., 
    316 S.W.2d 382
    (Tex. 1958), rev/d on other arounds, 
    361 U.S. 376
    (1959).
    p- 5452
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 12   (JM-1049)
    If a leasehold estate is subject to taxation,
    and the lease is terminated or forfeited  for
    failure to comply with the lease   agreement,
    what party remains liable for the payment  of
    taxes?  If the tract of land is  subsequently
    leased to another entity, does the        tax
    liability continue to encumber the property
    or does it remain a personal liability of the
    previous lessee?
    The person owning the possessory   interest when the
    assessment is imposed is the person who remains liable for
    any unpaid taxes. Section 32.01 of the Tax Code governs the
    creation of tax liens and provides:
    On January  1 of each year, a tax lien
    attaches to property to secure the payment of
    all taxes, penalties, and interest ultimately
    imposed for the year on the property, whether
    or not the taxes are imposed in the year the
    lien attaches. The lien exists in favor of
    each taxing unit having power to tax the
    property.
    Section 32.07 of the Tax Code governs in an instance in
    which the person who owned a taxable interest in property
    when the tax liability was imposed no longer owns such an
    interest:
    (a) Except as provided by Subsection    (b)
    of this section, property taxes are the
    personal obligation of the person who owns or
    acquires the property on January 1 of the
    year for which the tax is imposed. A nerson
    is not relieved of the obliaation because he
    no lonaer owns the wroaertv.         (Emphasis
    added.)
    Section 32.07 of the code and its predecessor   statutes
    have been construed    to preclude the imposition on        a
    purchaser of land that was subject to a lien for taxes and
    penalties  of personal   liability    for those taxes     and
    penalties.  Citv of San Antonio v. Toewwerwein, 
    133 S.W. 416
    (Tex. 1911): Attorney General Opinions V-441 (1947): O-6293
    (1944); O-5062 (1943). By the clear terms of section 32.07
    of the Tax Code, the person in whose name the possessory
    interest is listed remains personally liable for any unpaid
    taxes, penalty, and interest. We note, however, that the
    taxable interest in the property   is itself subject to sale
    P* 5453
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 13          (JM-1049)
    for the satisfaction    of unpaid taxes validly     assessed
    against it, whoever might have been its owner when the taxes
    originally accrued.   Tax Code 5 32.01; Attorney     General
    Opinions MN-523 (1982); H-1108 (1977).
    You next ask:
    If leasehold estates are subject to taxation
    by the authority of Tex.' Tax Code Ann.
    511.11(d) and    925.07(a),   are    easements
    granted by the School Land Board also taxable
    to the holder of the easement?    If so, what
    is the value of the taxable interest? Is the
    value equal to the consideration paid for the
    easement or the value of the property   encum-
    bered or some other measure?
    Section 33.103 of the Natural Resources Code specifies
    those interests that may be granted by the School Land
    Board:
    The board    may  grant  the  following
    interests in coastal public land for the
    indicated purposes:
    (1)    leases for public purposes;
    (2)   easements   for        purposes    connected
    with:
    (A)   ownership of littoral        property;
    or
    (B) the operation of a     facility
    operated by an existing channel and dock
    corporation that was issued articles of
    incorporation under Chapters 13 and 14,
    Title 32, Revised Statutes:
    (3) permits authorizing limited continued
    use of previously unauthorized structures   on
    coastal public land     not connected     with
    ownership of littoral property: and
    (4) channel easements to the holder of
    any surface or mineral interests in coastal
    public  land   for purposes    necessary or
    appropriate to the use of the interests.
    P-   5454
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 14   (JM-1049)
    Section 33.111 of the Natural Resources Code governs
    the granting of easements by the board and provides:
    (a) The board may grant easement    rights
    to the owner of adjacent littoral property
    authorizing-the  placement or location of a
    structure~on coastal public land for purposes
    connected with the, ownership of littoral
    property.
    (b) The board may grant easement rights
    to construct  channels, wharves,  docks, and
    marinas to an existing corporation that was
    issued articles    of   incorporation   under
    Chapters 13 and 14, Title 32, Revised   Stat-
    utes.
    (c) Notwithstanding any provision in its
    charter or articles of incorporation to the
    contrary, a corporation   described  in Sub-
    section (b) of this section may only obtain
    the use of or acquire property from the state
    as provided by that subsection.
    We understand  you to ask about    the taxability   of   these
    easements granted by the board.
    As we stated in answer to your third question, sections
    23.13 and 25.07 of the Tax Code impose tax liability       on
    "leaseholds and other possessory interests in property   that
    is exempt to the owner of the estate or interest encumbered
    by the possessory  interest."   In Attorney General   Opinion
    JM-59 (1983), we construed section 23.13 of the Tax Code to
    require a two-step procedure:     first, there had to be a
    determination that the real property in question was exempt
    in the hands of the owner; second, there had to be a
    determination that the rights conferred by the owner of the
    fee constitute a llpossessory interest in property."  We have
    already concluded  that the real property     comprising  the
    permanent school fund is exempt in the hands of the state.
    We held in Attorney General Opinion JM-59 that concession
    rights in a state park for the construction and operation of
    a golf course granted by the Department        of Parks and
    Wildlife was a sufficient "possessory interest" for purposes
    of section 25.07 of the Tax Code. The issue is whether     an
    easement granted by the board likewise constitutes such a
    "possessory interest."
    ‘;)
    P. 5455
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 15    (JM-1049)
    Section 1.04(16) of the Tax    Code defines   ``possessory
    interest" in the following way:
    \Possessory interest' means an interest
    that exists as a result of possession      or
    exclusive use of a right to possession     or
    exclusive use of a property and that is
    unaccompanied by ownership of a fee simple or
    life estate in     the property.     However,
    \possessory interest' does not include an
    interest, whether of limited or indeterminate
    duration, that involves a right to exhaust a
    portion of real property.
    Generally, an "easement" is a right one person has to
    use the land of another for a specific purpose.      Maanolia
    Petroleum Co. v. Caswell 
    1 S.W.2d 597
    (Tex. Comm'n App.
    1928, judgm't adopted); Biller v. Babb, 
    263 S.W. 253
        (Tex.
    Comm'n App. 1924, judgm't adopted). Section 33.111 of the
    Natural Resources Code specifies the purpose for which the
    board can grant easements, i.e., "the placement or location
    of a structure on coastal public land for purposes connected
    with the ownership of littoral property."      By the cl;;:
    terms of section 33.111 of the Natural Resources Code,
    interest or easement granted is clearly a tVpossessory
    interest" for purposes of the Tax Code.        Therefore,   we
    conclude that an easement granted by the board pursuant     to
    section 33.103 of the Natural Resources    Code falls within
    the ambit of sections 25.07 and 23.13 of the Tax Code and iS
    taxable.   Any such easement granted must be appraised
    pursuant to section 25.07 of the Tax Code.
    Finally, you ask:
    If any interest held by the Permanent  School
    Fund is not exempt from ad valorem  taxation,
    and if the Permanent School Fund has cause to
    question the notice given by the taxing
    authority, the listing of the property in the
    name of the Permanent School Fund, or the
    valuation of the subject property, what is
    the appropriate procedure  for the Permanent
    School Fund to protest such notice, listing,
    or valuation  and to what extent would the
    Attorney General be required to represent the
    Permanent School Fund in such protest?
    In view of our answers to your previous questions,     we
    need not answer your last question.
    P. 5456
    Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 16     (JM-1049)
    SUMMARY
    The state's interest in real property
    comprising  the permanent   school fund      '
    exempt from ad valorem taxation, even in ttz
    event that the property      is leased to a
    private business  enterprise.   The leasehold
    estates  in land comprising     the permanent
    school fund are taxable to the lessees.     If
    such a leasehold   is terminated    and taxes
    remain unpaid  in the leasehold estate, the
    tax liability becomes a personal liability of
    the lessee who possessed the leasehold estate
    when the tax was imposed and the lien against
    the leasehold estate     remains   in   force.
    Easements granted by the School Land Board in
    coastal and upland public     lands that are
    dedicated to the permanent    school fund are
    taxable pursuant to sections 11.11 and 23.13
    of the Tax Code; such easements must be
    appraised pursuant to the provisions        of
    section 25.07 of the Tax Code.
    Ll iii&L
    Very truly yo
    L
    JIM     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    MARY KELLER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    LOU MCCREARY
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Jim Moellinger
    Assistant Attorney General
    P- 5457