Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1988 )


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  •          THE       ATTORNEY    GENERAI-
    OF TEXAS
    April 11, 1988
    Honorable Bill Turner                Opinion No. JR-890
    Brazos County Courthouse
    300 E. 26th Street, Suite 310        Re: Whether a contract for
    Bryan, Texas 77803                   microfilming of records of
    county clerks office     is
    subject    to  competitive
    bidding (RQ-1280)
    Dear Mr. Turner:
    You ask:
    [Wlhether the use of a private company to
    microfilm records  for the County Clerk's
    Office of Brazos County must comply with the
    competitive bidding requirements   of Local
    Government   Code, Sec. 262.021 et     se .,
    County Purchasing Act, or whether said item
    is a personal or professional service under
    Sec. 262.024(4), suvra, and thus need not be
    competitively purchased.
    You describe such services as follows:
    The County Clerk has contracted with a
    company in    Dallas to    microfilm    legal
    instruments  filed in the county clerk's
    office. The company furnishes the county
    clerk with a camera,    film, and provides
    maintenance for the camera. Every day the
    county clerk microfilms    the    instruments
    filed in his office. At the end of each day
    he splices the film and sends it to the
    company in Dallas where it is developed.
    The company makes an archival print of the
    film which it keeps and returns the original
    microfilm back to the county clerk's office.
    The company also makes     indices of     the
    clerk's records, binds the indices and sends
    it to the county clerk's office. The annual
    p. 4356
    Honorable Bill Turner - Page 2      U-M-890)
    cost for this service is slightly more        than
    $100,000.
    -,
    Section 262.023(a) of the Local Government Code provides
    that, for county contract purchases requiring expenditures
    over $5,000, the commissioners court "must comply with the
    competitive~ bidding or competitive   proposal  procedures
    prescribed by this subchapter.11
    Section 262.024 of the Local Government       Code provides
    in pertinent part:
    (a) A contract for the purchase of any of
    the following    items is exempt     from the
    requirement established   by section   262.023
    if the commissioners   court by order grants
    the exemption:
    .   .   .   .
    (4) a personal or professional       service.
    The "personal or professional     service"  exception
    currently  codified  as   section 262.024(a)(4)    remains         --,
    substantially  unchanged  from   that in the     section's
    predecessor provisions, article 2368a.5, section  4(a)(4),
    V.T.C.S. (Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 641, 51, at 2377) and
    article 2368a, section 2, V.T.C.S. (Acts 1931, 42nd Leg.,
    ch. 163, at 270-71).
    Prior to the codification     of the "personal
    professional service" exception  in 1931, the competitizz
    bidding statute provided the sole statutory exception   to
    its operation for "work done under the direct  supervision
    of the county commissioners   and paid  for by the day."
    V.T.C.S. art. 2368 (Acts 1923, 38th Leg., ch. 127, at 262,
    repealed by Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., at 269); and V.T.C.S
    art. 2368a (Acts 1917, 35th Leg., ch. 141, 51, at 349,
    repealed in part by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 149, 549(l),
    at 2545). Hunter et al v. Whiteaker & Washington et al,
    
    230 S.W. 1096
      (Tex. Civ. APP. - San Antonio 1921, writ
    ref'd) considered    the latter statute as applied      to
    engineering services:
    There is but one question of law in this
    case, and that is whether a commissioners'
    court has the legal power and authority   to
    enter into a contract with engineers     for
    their technical and professional services in
    connection   with   the   construction   and
    p. 4357
    Honorable Bill Turner - Page 3 W-890)
    maintenance of public highways and roads in
    their county, without advertising for compe-
    titive bids' for such services.
    .   .   .   .
    To hold that the act would require that
    the services of a man belonging       to   a
    profession such as that of the law, of
    medicine, of teaching, civil engineering, or
    architecture should be obtained by a county
    only through competitive bidding would give
    a ridiculous meaning to the act, and require
    an absurdity.
    .   .   .   .
    Such a construction   would require the
    selection of attorneys, physicians,   school
    teachers, and civil engineers by competitive
    bids, the only test being the lowest bid for
    the services of such men. Such a test would
    probably be the best that could be conceived
    for obtaining the services of the least
    competent man, and would be most disastrous
    to the material interest of a county.
    Civil engineering    is   a    profession,
    requiring years of education and service to
    obtain perfection in it, and calling, in its
    application, for a high order of intelli-
    gence and extraordinary skill and learning,
    and it was never contemplated by the Legis-
    lature that the money of the citizens of a
    county, raised for road purposes, should be
    expended upon the advice of a civil engineer
    who had obtained his employment by underbid-
    ding his competitors, and without regard to
    his ability to fill the position.
    
    Id. at 1097-98.
    Gulf Bitulithic Co. v. Nueces County, 
    11 S.W.2d 305
        (Tex. Comm’n  App. 1928, judgm't adopted) ruled on the
    P   applicability  of the competitive    bidding  requirements
    imposed by article 2368a, to the services of a company
    engaged by the county to supervise the construction      of
    county roads. Stressing that the county itself directly
    paid the cost of labor and material for the projects,  and
    P   that "[t]he company was not employed as contractor       or
    p.   4358
    Honorable Bill Turner - Page 4 (JM-890)
    materialman but as agent" the court, in holding    such
    services within the "personal or professional services"
    exception, reasoned as follows:
    To   hold   that    contracts for    the
    suvervision of work done directly by the
    county must be let to the lowest bidder
    would result in the county obtaining the
    least competent     supervision, as   those
    possessing the necessary skill, experience,
    and business judgment to supervise a large
    construction program in the most efficient
    and economical manner could not hope to
    successfully compete with those of lesser
    skill, experience, or business judgment.
    (Emphasis added.)
    &   at 309.
    all c      0 issioner    Court of Madison Co ., 281
    S.W. t93 "(Gez: &?    App. -' Waco 1926), m     on other
    arounds, 15 S.W.Zd 535 (Tex. 1929), considered a county
    contract with a company for various services such as
    making abstracts of property upon which taxes        were
    delinquent, making a map and plat system or block map of
    all land in the county, surveying where necessary      br
    agreed, and making reports of such to the commissioners
    court, and held that:
    Some of the things embraced in the con-
    tract in this case would perhaps require
    technical knowledge and some would not, and
    those that do not would be controlled by
    [the competitive bidding requirements   of]
    said statute.
    L   at 595.
    Attorney General Opinion MW-344    (1981) pointed  out
    that the pre-1931 cases established an exception        for
    services involving "special skills," but that the language
    of the exception adopted in 1931 for "personal           or
    professional services" does not on its face appear to be a
    mere codification of that prior court-created exception.
    "Personal services@' in its ordinary meaning,     for    -
    example, would include other sorts of services than only
    those involving "special skills."      Recently, Attorney
    General Opinion JM-486 (1986), in seeking to elucidate the
    scope of the personal SeNice    exception, referred to a      ?
    p. 4359
    Honorable Bill Turner - Page 5     (JM-890)
    definition of personal services developed by Van Zandt v.
    Port Worth Press, 
    359 S.W.2d 893
    (Tex. 1962) which had
    -     considered the applicability   of a statute providing   for
    recovery of attorneys fees by persons "having a valid
    claim . . . for personal    services rendered."    Attorney
    General Opinion JM-486 concluded with respect to the
    question of the applicability   of the competitive  bidding
    statute to janitorial services:
    Someone who claims to have        rendered
    'personal services' must have performed   the
    services himself. The claimant's employees,
    in contrast, may have rendered    'services.'
    If the contract you ask about requires      a
    specific person    to   perform    janitorial
    services, it is a contract      for personal
    services.  If the contract merely requires a
    person or corporation to provide persons who
    will perform janitorial services, it is not
    a contract for personal services.
    It is our opinion that the microfilm services which
    are the subject of your request are not           "personal
    .c,   services" within the scope of section 262.024(a)(4) of the
    Local Government Code, because from your description     of
    such services they are not to be rendered by a person    or
    persons chosen specifically by the commissioners     court,
    but rather by personnel of the service company, many or
    most of whom are unknown to the commissioners.
    The next question is:      Are the microfilm    services
    "professional services?" Webster's     definitions of "pro-
    fessional" range from "of relating to, or characteristics
    of a profession"    to "engaged in one of the learned
    professions" and "characterized    by or conforming to the
    technical or ethical standards of a profession."          The
    definition of profession     includes Ita calling   requiring
    specialized   knowledge  and    often long and      intensive
    academic preparation"   as well as 'Ia principal     calling,
    vocation,   or employment."      See Webster's    Ninth   New
    Collegiate Dictionary (1985).
    Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979)     contains   the
    following entry under "profession":
    A vocation   or   occupation  requiring
    special, usually advanced, education   and
    skill: e.q. law or medical professions.
    r            Also refers to whole body of such profes-
    sion.
    p. 4360
    Honorable Bill Turner - Page 6 (J?.-890)
    The labor and       skill involved  in     a
    profession   is   predominantly   mental     or
    intellectual,   rather    than  physical     or
    manual.
    The term originally    contemplated  only
    theology,   law,  and   medicine,   but
    applications of science and learning a::
    extended to other departments   of affairs,
    other vocations also receive the name, which
    implies professed   attainments   in special
    knowledge as distinguished from mere skill.
    Marvland Casualtv Co. v. Crazv Water Co., 160 S.W.Zd
    102 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1942, no writ)   interpreted
    the meaning   of "professionalV' services  as found  in an
    insurance policy rider and found that the services of the
    bath house operator policy holder were not "professional"
    services, the labor and skill required for the latter
    sorts of     services   being "predominantly    mental   or
    intellectual, rather than physical    or manual."   
    Id. at 105.
    Marvland Casualtv Co. was cited in Attorney    General
    Opinion MW-344 (1981), which held that a contract for the
    services of a container terminal operator was not one for
    "professional services."
    A more recent indication by the legislature as to the
    present scope of the "professionall* service exception  it
    created 57 years ago is found in two other sections of the
    County Purchasing Act:
    5262.022.          Definitions
    In this subchapter:
    .   .   .   .
    (3) *High technology    item'       means  a
    service, equipment,  or good of        a highly
    technical nature, including:
    (A) data processing   equipment   and
    software and firmware used in conjunction
    with data processing equipment;
    (B) telecommunications,      radio,   and       ?
    microwave systems:
    ?
    p. 4361
    ,
    Honorable Bill Turner - Page 7   (JM-890)
    P
    (C) electronic    distributed   control
    systems,    including    building    energy
    management systems: and
    (D) technical   services    related   to
    those items.
    Local Gov't Code 5262.022.
    5262.030. Alternative Competitive Proposal
    Procedure for Insurance or High Technology
    Items
    (a) The competitive   proposal procedure
    provided by this section may be used for the
    purchase of insurance or high technology
    items. Quotations must be solicited through
    a request for proposals.   Public notice   for
    the request for proposals must be made      in
    the same     manner   as provided     in   the
    competitive bidding procedure.   The request
    for proposals    must specify the relative
    importance of price and other evaluation
    factors. The award of the contract shall be
    made to the      responsible  offeror    whose
    proposal is determined    to be the lowest
    evaluated offer resulting from negotiation,
    taking   into   consideration  the    relative
    importance of price and other evaluation
    factors set forth      in the request      for
    proposals.
    Local Gov't Code $262.030.
    In providing for "high-technology items." a "competi-
    tive proposal"   procedure alternative   to the competitive
    bidding procedure   set out in the Act, section 262.030
    clearly contemplates that such high technology items are
    covered by the requirement of section 262.023 that certain
    items be purchased in compliance with the "competitive
    bidding  or    competitive   proposal    procedures."   The
    legislature therefore could not have considered such "high
    technology" items to be exempted      from the coverage   of
    section 262.023 by the provisions of section 262.024 which
    provide for the "personal or professional      service" and
    ,r-‘   other exceptions to the operation of section 262.023.
    It is our opinion that since the legislature intended
    such high technology items to be covered by the competi-
    tive bidding or competitive proposal requirements and not
    p. 4362
    Honorable Bill Turner - Page 8     W-890)
    to fall within  the section 262.024 exceptions, it would
    not have considered the microfilm services     in question
    here as exempted from coverage.    If services    requiring
    such high skills and technical   expertise as "electronic
    distributed control systems," "microwave systems," and the
    other examples  of high technology    services   listed in
    §262.022(3) are nevertheless  not "professional"   services
    within the meaning of 5262.024(a)(4), then     it is clear
    that the microfilm services which, from your description,
    involve a lower level of technology, are not "professional
    services."
    We conclude therefore that the microfilm services you
    described  are subject to the competitive      bidding  or
    competitive proposal requirements of the County Purchasing
    Act, Local Gov't Code 5262.021, et sea.
    SUMMARY
    A contract   for microfilm services does
    not fall within the "personal or profession-
    al service" exception of Local Government
    Code section 262.024, and therefore must be
    let under     the competitive   bidding    or
    competitive proposal procedures set forth in
    the County Purchasing Act, Local Government
    Code section 262.021, et sea.
    Very truly yodd
    I
    JIM
    ““~
    Lb+& hc  MATTOX            -
    Attorney General of Texas
    MARY KELLER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    LOU MCCREARY
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN                                                       ‘7
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by William Walker
    Assistant Attorney General
    p. 4363
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JM-890

Judges: Jim Mattox

Filed Date: 7/2/1988

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017